Bryn Mawr College

Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College
Bryn Mawr College Dissertations and Theses
2022

Speech and Enchantment in Early Greek Thought from the Archaic
to the Hellenistic Period
R. J. Barnes
Bryn Mawr College

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.brynmawr.edu/dissertations
Part of the Classical Literature and Philology Commons

Custom Citation
Barnes, R. J. 2022. "Speech and Enchantment in Early Greek Thought from the Archaic to the Hellenistic
Period." PhD Diss., Bryn Mawr College.

This paper is posted at Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College.
https://repository.brynmawr.edu/dissertations/231
For more information, please contact repository@brynmawr.edu.

Speech and Enchantment in Early Greek Thought
from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Period
R. J. Barnes
2022

Submitted to the Faculty of Bryn Mawr College
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Greek, Latin, and Classical Studies

Doctoral Committee
Radcliffe Edmonds, Advisor
Catherine Conybeare
Asya Sigelman
Annette Baertschi

ORCID iD: 0000-0001-9915-0858
© Robert John Barnes

Abstract

When describing complex aesthetic or cognitive experiences, speakers often reach for
idiomatic language. For ancient Greeks, one major cache of idiomatic terms comes from the
language of enchantment. This dissertation accounts for how and why ancient Greeks used words
related to θέλγω, κηλέω, γοητεία, µαγεία, µαγγανεία, ἐπῳδή, and ψυχαγωγία as a way of
describing the effects of speech and song. Examination is given to writers from the Archaic to the
Hellenistic period. Most important are Gorgias of Leontini, Plato, and Philodemus, who each remark
in detail about the experience of enchantment. The study reveals that Greek writers use the language
of enchantment to underscore a wide variety of effects that speech and song have on mind and
body. These effects can include the feelings of being gripped by a narrative, moved by the sounds of
a poem, or dumbstruck by a philosophical argument. Different writers provide their own fascinating
and idiosyncratic ways of conceptualizing the psychology of these ‘enchantments.’ However, what
unifies all accounts is a common motivation to avoid domesticating these aesthetic or cognitive
effects with a technical or familiar vocabulary and, instead, to use the language of magic as a way of
granting these effects asylum from the ordinary.
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Introduction

… [W]e demand rigidly defined areas of doubt and uncertainty.
- Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy1

In a short essay on the act of communication, the writer Ursula K. Le Guin describes speech
as magic:
This is why utterance is magic. Words do have power. Names have power. Words are
events, they do things, change things. They transform both speaker and hearer; they feed
energy back and forth and amplify it. They feed understanding or emotion back and forth
and amplify it.2
Le Guin is neither the first nor the last to sense something extraordinary in human speech and to pin
that something with the label of magic. Similar remarks are made by many others, such as Thomas
de Quincey, Kenneth Burke, and more recently Rita Felski, who sense that speech is capable of a
certain enchantment – whether through the allure of literature, the hortatory force of powerful
rhetoric, or the cut and thrust of everyday conversation.3 Evidence for these sorts of remarks can be

Adams 1979: 179.
Le Guin 2004: 199.
3 De Quincey senses a certain magic in the “life, velocities, and contagious ardour of conversation” (De Quincy 1964
[1847]: 268). Kenneth Burke feels compelled to address the magic inherent in the exhortative power of speech (Burke
1969: 40 et passim). Rita Felski argues that literary critics ought to speak more about their experience of enchantment
– an experience which, she suggests, is undoubtedly what drew them to literature in the first place (Felski 2008: 51-76;
cf. Felski 2015: passim).
1
2
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multiplied almost at will and, taken together, it testifies to a peculiar habit of mind that stretches
back at least to classical antiquity.
As early as Homer, we find descriptions of the incantatory powers of speech and song. We
hear, for instance, of how Odysseus’ ‘lying tales’ cast the Phaeacians several times into a state of
enchantment (κηληθµός).4 According to Pindar, songs can enchant (θέλξαν) with their touch.5
According to Eupolis, Pericles used to enchant (ἐκήλει) through the force of his rhetoric.6 This
semantic habit is so deeply ingrained in the Greek imagination that early sophists, philosophers, and
literary critics can be found drawing upon the conceptual framework of magic as a way of
theorizing about the more exceptional features of human communication.
1. Scope
In the following chapters, I trace this semantic habit chronologically from archaic Greece to
the close of the Hellenistic period. The material I survey is anchored to a specific family of words
that the Greeks used to mark out the experience of enchantment – terms such as θέλγω, κηλέω,
γοητεία, µαγεία, µαγγανεία, ἐπῳδή, and ψυχαγωγία. I work to recover the various ways that
Greek authors used this language of enchantment as a descriptor of speech. In doing so, I aim to
gain insight into what motivated these authors to associate magic and speech in the first place. With
this end in mind, I tether the focus of each chapter to a writer (or set of writers) who have something
specific to say about the means, outcomes, or experiences of being enchanted by speech: Chapter 1
focuses on Gorgias of Leontini, Chapter 2 on Plato, and Chapter 3 primarily on the writings of
Philodemus and the Hellenistic traditions that he preserves. My study ultimately reveals that the

Hom. Od. 11.334, 13.1-3.
Pin. Nem. 4.3.
6 Eup. 102 K.-A = 94 Kock = Demoi fr. 1 Telò.
4
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language of enchantment serves as a familiar way of labeling unfamiliar things as unfamiliar. That is
to say, the label of enchantment does not domesticate or familiarize what it labels but instead
underscores its difference. Greek writers turn to the language of enchantment both as a way of
speaking about extraordinary channels of communication and, at the same time, as a way of framing
these channels as extraordinary. Gorgias, as we shall see, uses the language of enchantment as a way
of articulating the dangerous and yet delightful effects of non-discursive modes of speech which had
yet to receive proper attention from Pre-Socratic thinkers; Plato uses the language of enchantment to
mark out as extraordinary a strain of psychosomatic effects produced by speech; and, in the
Hellenistic period, writers continue the use of the category of enchantment as a frame for staking out
the values of specific literary genres (such as poetry and rhetoric) and types of pleasure (such as the
physical pleasures of sights and the sounds of music) which seem to exhibit an exceptional sway
over mind and body.
2. Previous studies and my own
Most studies on the Greek notion of enchanting speech are concerned with individual works
or authors.7 The closest forerunners to my broader study are The Therapy of the Word in Classical
Antiquity by Pedro Laín Entralgo and Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece, which comes from
Jacqueline de Romilly’s Carl Newell Jackson lectures given at Harvard University.8 The former aims
primarily to recover a classical antecedent for the mid-modern idea of psychotherapy and largely
focuses on instances of enchanting speech that have a psychologically curative effect. The argument

Particularly Homer (Finkelberg 1985; on the idea of θέλγειν, Pucci 1987: 191-209; on the idea of κήλησις, Peponi
2012: ch. 4 et passim; et al.) and Plato (Belfiore 1980; Gellrich 1994; Vallejo 2000; Casadesús Bordoy 2002; et al.). Walsh
1984 and Parry 1992 are slightly more far-reaching but largely impressionistic. Halliwell 2011 deals with the early
Greek concept of enchantment quite well, albeit sporadically, as a subdomain to his more extensive inquiry into
specific sites of early Greek aesthetic thought.
8 Laín Entralgo 1970 [1958]; De Romilly 1975.
7
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Laín Entralgo makes is that early Greek authors (e.g., Homer, Gorgias, and Plato) shared a belief in
the psychologically curative power of the word and expressed this belief by drawing an analogy
between magic and the power of speech and song. As we see in the following chapters, not all
speech described as enchanting is straightforwardly psychotherapeutic; much is shown to have a
harmful or even somatic (rather than psychological) effect. Thus, Laín Entralgo’s study offers only a
partial picture of the semantic tradition. The study by Jacqueline De Romilly is essentially a
Doddsian attempt to illustrate how early Greek writers (e.g., Gorgias, Plato, and Isocrates) used the
language of magic metaphorically to describe the role played by ‘the irrational’ within the art of
rhetoric. De Romilly’s book is rich and insightful, but slim – running to around 100 pages with notes
and index. It is only a provisional foray into what is a larger and more complex topic, and the author
herself suggests as much in the first sentence of her work.9 My dissertation goes into much greater
detail than De Romilly’s study and cleaves more tightly to the Greek concept of enchanting speech
than Laín Entralgo’s work.
2.1. Continuity vs. decline
In addition to providing an updated and more detailed study than those that came before, I
also use this thesis to correct several broad misconceptions which have dogged earlier
interpretations of the language of enchantment in ancient Greek literature. The first misconception is
the tendency to view the Greek idea of enchanting speech within a decline narrative. The works of
Laín Entralgo and De Romilly, for instance, suggest that the concept of enchanting speech was

“I am not at all sure I am the right person to deal with the theme I have chosen for this series of lectures; in fact, I
doubt it very much” (De Romilly 1975: 3). See also remarks by reviewers: “These four essays are lectures in
transcription. They have retained their innate oral quality, which is to say, they are often enthymematic, suggestive,
but not always conclusive” (Holmberg 1977: 104); “Without such a careful examination the work remains an
interesting but essentially speculative argument awaiting more cogent verification”(Enos 1977: 202).
9
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primarily a classical phenomenon which flourished brilliantly up until the beginning of the
Hellenistic period when it was driven underground only to resurface either with the advent of
Christianity (according to Laín Entralgo)10 or with the second sophistic (according to De Romilly).11
Whether motivated by the relative scarcity or undervaluation of Hellenistic texts, this conclusion
that enchanting speech peters out around the time of or just after Aristotle has no real basis in
evidence. As I show in my final chapter, post-Platonic authors – be they poets, historians, or
philosophers (including Aristotle himself) – continue to use the concept of enchantment as a way of
speaking about the powers of speech.
2.2. Metaphorical vs. literal, belief vs. disbelief
A second and more complex misconception that I set out to revise is the habit of treating
remarks about enchanting speech as either literal or metaphorical. When, for instance, Plato describes
a poem as an enchantment, the first question philologists often ask is whether magic is meant
literally or metaphorically. I suggest that branding these remarks as one or the other reveals very
little about the content of the remarks themselves. That is, it does not help illuminate the specific
experience of the poem that the author is trying to communicate. One reason for this (which I will
return to in the next section) is that there is no broad consensus about what magic ‘literally’ is.
Without this, there is no easy way of determining what magic is a ‘metaphor’ for.12 This comes into

“With the death of Aristotle original speculation on the psychological action of the human word, and hence on its
curative power, comes to an end… Only with Christianity – within which the divine person who ‘became flesh’ will
be called Logos, ‘Word’ – will a new possibility begin for verbal psychotherapy” (Laín Entralgo 1970 [1958]: 240).
11 According to De Romilly, “the theorists of the fourth century had equally refused all the different meanings this
simile [i.e., of speech as incantation] could involve: they had disregarded the irrational impact of oratory, the poetical
strangeness in style, and any reliance on inspiration. They had made a choice” (1975: 66-70).
12 To borrow a term from G. E. R. Lloyd, we may say that the language of enchantment has a great deal of ‘semantic
stretch’ – a concept introduced in Lloyd (1987: 174-5) with n. 7 and further developed in later works (see most
recently Lloyd 2018).
10
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greater focus if we look toward a counterexample, such as ‘the king is a good shepherd.’ Here, there
is a relatively broad consensus on what a shepherd literally is, and it is correspondingly easier to
determine what the word shepherd is a metaphor for. Thus, pointing out that ‘shepherd’ is meant
metaphorically or literally has a direct bearing on what is being communicated about the king, since
there are noticeable differences between a king who is a literal shepherd and a king who is a
metaphorical shepherd. The same is not necessarily true for the language of enchantment. The main
difference between a literal claim that a poem is an enchantment and a metaphorical claim that a
poem is an enchantment has less to do with the nature of the poem than it has with the speaker’s
belief in magic. By branding remarks about enchanting speech as either metaphorical or literal,
commentators are not so much helping to explain the experience that the author is trying to
communicate as making a wager regarding the author’s belief in magic, and, what is more, they are
treating this belief in terms of a simple binary.
Determining an author’s belief in magic is a ticklish game even in the best of circumstances.
Belief is itself a highly mobile system, open to contradiction, change, and many levels of rational or
irrational types hedging.13 When it comes to the murky domain of magic, this mobility is often
relatively high and exceedingly difficult to hive off into a neat binary of straightforward belief or
disbelief. Moreover, even if one could determine that, say, Gorgias or Plato believed in the literal
magic of speech or that one or the other conceived only of a metaphorical type of magic, this would
yield very little insight into the ‘magical’ quality of speech that motivates their remarks in the first
place.

13

Note the remarks in Gordon 2008: 143 and Gordon 2009: 7.

6

For these reasons, I shall largely sidestep the dichotomy of literal or metaphorical and the
question of belief or disbelief in my study of enchantment. Instead, I suggest that the literal remark
that speech is magical and the metaphorical remark that speech is like magic both gesture toward the
same idea – i.e., that speech is somehow capable of producing extraordinary experiences. To explain
what I mean by this last remark, it will be helpful to briefly review some significant advances made
in the study of the concept of magic itself.
2.3. What does ‘magic’ mean?
Magic is a notoriously tricky term to define.14 What may seem to be a religious or scientific
practice to one person may smack of the occult to another. This relativity makes the category of
magic a rather difficult one to pin down unless we treat it more as a social construct – that is, as a
category that can only be roughly defined against the systems of social power in which it is
enmeshed.15 From this perspective, magic is not a universal pattern of actions but a mobile and
socially contingent pattern of perceptions; it consists only of practices deemed, in one way or
another, as non-normative by a particular individual or society.16 For example, an ancient Greek
society may be less likely to deem as magical the actions of a male citizen sacrificing at the city’s
central altar during a festival. Such an action would more likely be regarded as ordinary (religious)
behavior performed by a centrally normative member of the city. On the other hand, a Greek society
may be more likely to deem as magical the actions of an old widow burning strange materials over a
makeshift altar in the woods at the dead of night. This latter action would more likely be regarded as
extra-ordinary (magical) behavior performed by a more peripheral member of the city. Thus, what

See, in general, Styers 2004 and, more recently, Sanzo 2020.
Such is the approach taken by Gordon 1999; Stratton 2007; Edmonds 2019; et al.
16 For the notion that magic, as a category, shares in the aspect of non-normativity, see Edmond 2019: esp. 8-10.
14
15
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constitutes as a ‘magical’ practice is ultimately in the eye of the beholder, and the main feature that
motivates the appearance of magic is the strangeness of that practice, its distance from what is
expected and ordinary.
In this dissertation, I am less interested in magic as a social practice and more interested in
how the language of magic comes to be used to describe other human experiences, such as the
experiences of speech and song. Yet the category of magic functions primarily as a label in both
cases. In one case, speakers use the label of magic to mark out extraordinary ritual behavior as
extraordinary, for better or for worse. In the other, speakers use the label of magic to mark out
extraordinary utterances or songs as extraordinary, for better or for worse. Thus, the central
motivation which binds together the entire semantic tradition is a desire to draw on the sense of
exceptionality and strangeness inherent to the category of magic and to do so as a means of
explaining or coloring the ways in which speech or song yields extraordinary experiences. Put
briefly, ‘magic’ can be a label for bringing strange experiences into arm’s reach while, at the same
time, keeping them at arm’s length.
2.4. What types of speech are deemed magical?
One final misconception about the semantic category of enchantment is that it was used by
the Greeks to refer consistently to a fixed experience or a fixed type of speech. For instance, many
scholars, like De Romilly, claim that enchantment stands for an irrational (rather than rational)
experience. Closely allied with this view is the additional claim that enchantment is a purely
aesthetic experience brought about by means of the sound (rather than the content) of an utterance
or song. Finally, there is a frequent tendency to suggest that enchantment is a pejorative term (rather
than a laudative one), denoting an experience whose ends or outcome is unwanted and detrimental
rather than desirable and beneficial.
8

These claims about the means, ends, and experience of enchantment impose dichotomies that
do not map well onto actual usage. It is true that many remarks about enchanting speech underscore
the dangerous ends or outcomes of the experience of being enchanted – as when Homer describes
the Sirens,17 when Plato describes the dangerous allure of contemporary poetry,18 or when
Eratosthenes suggests that all poetry aims at mere enchantment as opposed to education.19
However, this does not mean that the language of enchantment is only or even primarily pejorative.
There are very many instances in which authors describe the benefits of incantatory speech and
song. For instance, the author of the Homeric Hymn to Apollo describes how the maidens of a Delian
chorus enchant the tribes of men with their pleasing, imitative song;20 in his Laws, Plato describes the
enchantments of educational-cum-entertaining choral songs of Magnesia;21 and the historian
Polybius describes how historical prose can be both a benefit and an enchantment to a reader.22 As
for the experience of enchantment and the means by which it is brought about, there are indeed
some writers, like the Euphonist critics mentioned by Philodemus, who treat enchantment mainly as
an aesthetic experience and stress the role that sound and musicality play in bringing it about.
However, there are again many counterexamples in which enchantment appears to be a much more
rational experience – such as the experience of being enchanted by Socratic elenchus,23 or the sense
of enchantment felt upon grasping a mathematical proof.24 It is telling how the Siren song of the
Odyssey (an archetypal example of verbal enchantment) achieves its effect not only through its

Hom. Od. 12.40, 44.
Pl. Resp. 601b1, 607c8 et al.
19 Strabo 1.1.10 and 1.2.3 = Eratosth. I A 20 Berger. See ch. 3, pp. 166-8.
20 Hymn Hom. Ap. 161.
21 Pl. Leg. 659e1 et al. See ch. 2, pp. 127-35.
22 Polyb. 6.2.8-9 et al. See ch. 3, pp. 168-9.
23 Pl. Symp. 215b3-216c3, Men. 79e8-80b6. See ch. 2, pp. 123-4.
24 Hypsicles, Eucl. Lib. XIV pr. 12.
17
18

9

melodious sound (µελίγηρυν), but through the knowledge it shares about “however much occurs
on the fruit-bearing earth” (ὅσσα γένηται ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ).25 The experience described is
not just aesthetic, but also intellective.
What the evidence reveals then is that enchantment as a category may point to positive or
negative experiences, and these experiences may be brought about by a wide variety of different
types of speech which may appeal to reason and/or sensation, ψυχή and/or σῶµα. What binds these
qualities together is, again, their perceived exceptionality – how they seem to exceed the expected
and ordinary function of speech, for better or for worse.
3. Chapter overview
In Chapter 1, I examine Gorgias’s Encomium of Helen, which contains the first extended
description of speech as a type of enchantment. I begin by showing how the whole picture of λόγος
that Gorgias paints in the Helen is best understood as a response to earlier Pre-Socratic theories of
language which placed a high premium on the notion of linguistic reference – that is, on how nomina
correspond to nominata. Gorgias’s description of speech is decidedly not a referential theory of
language, but one in which λόγος impresses itself onto the soul through the manipulation of
opinion and thus functions less as a sign than as a sort of psychic sensation. Enchantment is one of
the frames Gorgias draws on to articulate this newfangled, non-referential notion of speech. In the
last half of the chapter, I show how Gorgias draws his picture of enchanting speech from a preexisting idea of enchantment popular in archaic poetry. Gorgias uses this frame to foreground the
extraordinary and unstable qualities of non-discursive speech.

See Hom. Od. 12.184-191 with Montiglio 2019. See also ch. 1, p. 75 below. Throughout this thesis, all translations are
my own unless otherwise noted.
25
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In Chapter 2, I move ahead to Plato. I begin by showing how Plato makes frequent mention
not only of enchanting speech but also the social practice of magic. I argue that his attitude towards
magic is not monolithic but mobile. That is to say, when Plato remarks on the practice of magic, he
tends to bracket questions about the supernatural efficacy of spells and curses. Instead, he remarks
only on their rhetorical efficacy (i.e., how these practices produce a powerful expectation that a
supernatural effect will take place) and their moral-cum-religious implications (i.e., how these claims
about the coercion of the gods may affect popular morality). For Plato, then, magic is treated
primarily as a rhetorical act regardless of whether it is supernatural. When he uses the language of
enchantment to describe the effects of poems or the force of sophistic or Socratic rhetoric, he is
highlighting a contiguous relationship between the rhetorical/[supernatural] efficacy of magic and
the rhetorical/[supernatural] efficacy felt in these other forms of human communication. The
experience that these effects share and that Plato marks with the label of enchantment are
psychosomatic experiences in which speech induces either a mental expectation so strong that it
leads to a physical experience or a physical experience so strong that it instills a mental expectation.
In the final portion of the chapter, I turn to the Laws and show how Plato harnesses this
psychosomatic experience of enchantment for his own philosophical purposes. In particular, I show
how Plato uses the mechanisms of state-run choruses and legislative preambles (both of which he
calls enchantments) as a means of non-coercively ensuring citywide obedience to the laws.
In Chapter 3, I trace how Hellenistic authors continue to use the language of enchantment to
describe the powers of speech. In the first half, I show how Hellenistic literary critics, following in
the footsteps of Aristotle, treat enchantment as the main effect of a good poem. Their remarks about
enchantment are primarily preserved in the writings of Philodemus, who shows them engaging in a
widespread Hellenistic debate over whether poetic enchantment is a product of a poem’s form or
11

content. One group, known as the Euphonists, breaks from Aristotle by downgrading the primacy of
plot as the source of poetic enchantment and plumps instead for the primacy of sound. This
heightened interest in the sounds of poetry runs parallel with an increasing tendency to question the
didactic value of poetry and, specifically, poetic enchantment. This latter tendency ossifies into the
widespread opposition between two distinct literary ends or aims – enchantment (ψυχαγωγία) and
education (διδασκαλία) – which are treated as either compatible or incompatible by different
Hellenistic authors. When the Epicurean Philodemus weighs in on these Hellenistic debates, he
revives a more Aristotelian point of view on poetry in which content is regarded as essential to the
experience of enchantment produced by poetry; however, unlike Aristotle, Philodemus maintains
the Epicurean position that poetic enchantments are of no use to education. In the second half of the
chapter, I turn to the Stoics who use the language of enchantment to categorize a subset of pleasures
– namely physical pleasures, such as pleasure from sights (i.e., γοητεία) and pleasures from sounds
(i.e., κήλησις). I begin by placing these Stoic remarks about κήλησις and γοητεία within the larger
Stoic theory of emotions and show that, within the rigidly rationalistic framework of Stoic emotions,
enchanting pleasures are exceptional since they are some of the most physical and, thereby, least
straightforwardly rational types of pleasure. In closing, I turn to Diogenes of Babylon, who, in his
writings on music (preserved again by Philodemus), provides the only surviving Hellenistic account
of how Stoics might conceptualize the experience of enchanting speech and song. We see how
Diogenes argues that pleasure derived from songs can be both rational and beneficial. He illustrates
this by developing a notion of psychic harmony in which sounds pass over the soul and harmonize
with it in ways that produce psycho-physical effects.
In my conclusion, I underscore once more the common thread that binds these authors
together – namely, their shared hunch that speech (whether in the form of song, poetry, oratory, or
12

daily conversation) produces experiences that exceed what is commonly expected. The language of
magic provides these ancient writers with a way of speaking about this extraordinary quality,
without domesticating or familiarizing that quality. In closing, I turn to an example of how the
language of enchantment continues to be used in current discussions of ‘the disenchantment’ or ‘reenchantment’ of modernity. There, we find that scholars use the language of magic as a frame for
negotiating the nature and limits of human experience, the non plus ultra of what experiences can be
deemed as ordinary and what must necessarily remain just beyond reach, granted asylum from the
ordinary through the language of enchantment.

13

Chapter 1. Gorgias
Human beings entrap animals in the mesh of human purposes using an array of
psychological techniques, but these are primitive by comparison with the
psychological weapons which human beings use to exert control over the thoughts
and actions of other human beings. The technology of enchantment is the most
sophisticated that we possess.
~ Alfred Gell1

Although the notion of enchanting speech is alive and well as early as Homer (and no doubt
earlier), the first extant author to offer an account of what gives speech its magical quality is the
fifth-century sophist, Gorgias of Leontini (c. 483-375 BCE).2 According to tradition, Gorgias arrived
in Athens on embassy from Sicily in the year 427 BCE.3 In mainland Greece, he had great success as
a public speaker and is said to have excelled all other orators and sophists of his time.4 In his
surviving display speeches, we find that Gorgias had practical as well as theoretical interest in how
humans communicate thoughts and feelings, truths and untruths. Each of his speeches (Defense of
Palamedes, Encomium of Helen, and On Not Being) approaches the act of communication from a
different angle, variously stressing the remarkable efficacy or inefficacy of certain communicative
modes and techniques. It is in the Encomium of Helen that Gorgias underscores the extraordinary

Gell 2008 [1988]: 162.
For a collection of some earlier, non-Greek examples of the idea of enchanting speech, see Nünlist 1998: 126.
3 Thuc. 3.86.3-4; DK 82A4 = Diod. Sic. 12.53.1-5; DK 82A7 = Paus. 6.17.8–9. For a treatment of Gorgias and his
intellectual milieu, specifically from the perspective of Sicilian intellectual history, see Willi 2008: 264-322. Enos 1992
gives an account of Gorgias’s diplomatic trip to Athens.
4 DK 82A19 = Pl. Men. 70a–b; DK 82A35 = Philostr. Ep. 73, p. 257.2–7 Kayser.
1
2
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efficacy of human speech and describes the way it persuades and moves auditors as if by a potion or
a spell.
Gorgias’s younger contemporaries – such as Antiphon (c. 480-411 BCE), Thrasymachus (c.
470-400 BCE), and Socrates (c. 469-399 BCE) – betray a similar fondness for describing certain acts of
speech in terms of magic.5 In the following generation, Socrates’s students – Isocrates (436-338 BCE),
Xenophon (c. 431-354 BCE), and above all Plato (429/7-347 BCE) – would continue to shape and
develop this notion of incantatory speech in different ways and to differing degrees.6 As we shall see
in later chapters, even as the increasingly technical disciplines of philosophy, rhetoric, and literary
criticism emerge and ossify, the concept of incantatory speech continues to serve as a useful frame
through which to discuss extraordinary channels of communication. In this chapter, I focus on the
earliest stage of this intellectual history. This is a stage that begins with Gorgias but, as we shall see,
has roots that stretch deep into the earliest poetic and philosophical traditions of Ancient Greece.
Thus, our inquiry into Gorgias’s remarks about speech and magic will require a careful analysis of
not only Gorgias’s own words and ideas, but also the Pre-Socratic and poetic contexts from which
they emerged.

5 Antiphon of Rhamnus is said to have claimed to be able “to help those in pain through his power of speech” (τοὺς
λυπουµένους διὰ λόγων θεραπεύειν) and “to remove any grievance from the mind” (ἄχος […] ἐξελεῖν τῆς
γνώµης, DK 87A6 = [Plut.] Vit. X Orat. 833c-d; Philostr. V S. 1.15, pp. 15.32–16.3 Kayser). Thrasymachus is shown by
Plato to boast about his own ability “to cast a spell over an angry audience” (ὠργισµένοις ἐπᾴδων) and “to enchant
them” (κηλεῖν, DK 85B6 = Pl. Phdr. 267c = Radermacher 9.6 with note ad loc.). Apart from Plato, who frequently
depicts Socrates speaking of enchantment, Xenophon too suggests that Socrates had a penchant for this type of
language (Xen. Mem. 2.6.1-39; 3.11.1-18), and Aristophanes may, likewise, allude to this penchant when he writes:
“over by the Shade-footed folk there lies a lake, where unwashed Socrates conjures/beguiles spirits” (πρὸς δὲ τοῖς
Σκιάποσιν λίµνη τις ἔστ᾿, ἄλουτος οὗ | ψυχαγωγεῖ Σωκράτης, Ar. Av. 1553-5). Here, Aristophanes seems to play
on the semantic ambiguity of the word ψυχαγωγεῖν, which had originally meant ‘to raise the dead’ but later takes on
the sense of ‘enchant/beguile (often with speech)’ (cf. Dunbar 1998 ad loc.). It is possible that Socrates (along with
Gorgias) prompted or catalyzed this semantic extension of the language of ψυχαγωγία. I shall treat the relation
between Gorgias and the concept of ψυχαγωγία in more detail below (pp. 85-6).
6 Plato will be the subject of Chapter 2. For Xenophon, see ch. 2, nn. 10, 87. For Isocrates, see ch. 2, nn. 76, 84; ch. 3, n.
13 as well as De Romilly 1975: 52-58.
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In the first part of the chapter, I argue that Gorgias uses the conceptual category of
enchantment to challenge a prevailing Pre-Socratic idea of language and how it works. Early
philosophers, such as Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles, share a common
concern regarding linguistic reference or how words correspond to things in the world. Gorgias
sidesteps this worry over linguistic reference by suggesting that speech may instead simply stamp
the soul with its meaning, both directly and physically. Although Gorgias’s account can hardly be
considered a coherent theory of communication per se, it nevertheless serves as a provocative
challenge to the linguistic thought of his time and as an early attempt to account for less familiar and
more non-discursive channels of communication. It diverts the prevalent focus on the relation
between words and things by reframing words as things – in fact, as magical things – capable of
affecting the listener in ways that cannot be explained easily by the framework of nomen et
nominatum.
In the second part of the chapter, we turn to the poetic tradition from which Gorgias drew
his notion of incantatory rhetoric. Long before Gorgias, poets had used the language of magic and
enchantment to mark out various extraordinary experiences, such as being immersed in a story,
enthralled by a song, or duped by false accounts. These instances of enchanting speech were, on the
whole, depicted as psychosomatic experiences of distraction which may result in positive or
negative ends. I show how Gorgias adopts this poetic concept of enchantment in the Encomium of
Helen and splices it with contemporary discourse about medicine and the soul (ψυχή). For Gorgias,
speech qua enchantment is an experience that occurs in the ψυχή, but functions much like a sensory
experience. It conveys content to the mind, but does so in a physical manner. The upshot of this
experience is deeply ambivalent: λόγος can provide either a benefit or a detriment, instilling belief
in truths just as much as lies. This ambivalence is accentuated by the conceptual framework of magic
16

that Gorgias draws upon. Like a spell, the Gorgianic λόγος is potentially a terrific boon or a terrible
bane.7
1. Gorgias on λόγος
1.1. On linguistic and paralinguistic thought in Archaic Greece
Gorgias’s remarks about speech and magic emerge alongside (and largely in opposition to)
the rise of certain systematic ways of thinking and talking about language. The first examples of
linguistic thought found in Greek literature betray a broad concern over how to distinguish three
levels of linguistic reference – i.e., words for things, ideas of things, and things themselves. The
human ability to use words in order to communicate ideas about things in the world comes under
increasing scrutiny, even suspicion as the Greeks grappled more and more with significant
hermeneutic questions linked to pre-Platonic cosmological inquiry, divination, medical prognosis,
and poetic exegesis.8 It is from this growing suspicion toward linguistic reference that finally sprang,
in the sophistic and philosophical traditions, increasingly refined semantic theories which set the
ball rolling toward modern language theory.9
According to popular histories of linguistics, this emergence of a more rational and scientific
view of language overtook the non-referential (or what they often call a ‘pre-rational’ or ‘magical’
attitude) that had existed in the earliest periods. As I will show, these ‘pre-rational’ or ‘magical’
attitudes toward language will kindle and rekindle for centuries – even in the cool confines of
philosophy, rhetoric, and literary criticism. For certain thinkers, there persists a hunch or maybe a

For the radical ambivalence inherent to the cultural category of magic in antiquity, see Gordon 1999: 191ff. and
Edmonds 2019: 25ff.
8 On the role divination and medical prognosis played in the emergence of linguistic thought, see Manetti 1993, 1996,
2010. On the role played by early rhapsodic exegesis, see Sluiter 1997: 166-8; Novokhatko 2015: 28-34.
9 For standard accounts of Greek linguistic thought, see Robins 1968; Pinborg 1975; Matthews 1994; Law 2003. For
several concise and incisive treatments of the earliest stages (from Homer to Plato), see Schmitter 1990, 2000, 2001.
7
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hope that the effects of speech are too extraordinary, too uncanny to be articulated and explained by
recourse to the framework of nomen et nominatum. In order to underscore this perceived excess in
human communication, certain ancient thinkers turned to the conceptual domain of magic. For
them, the powers of speech appear, at times, to enchant (κηλεῖν, θέλγειν, γοητεύειν) for better or
for worse and are thus best described in terms of magical incantations (ἐπῳδαί).10
As noted at the outset, our first explicit reflection upon this magical quality of speech comes
down to us in sections 8-14 of Gorgias’s Encomium of Helen. In what follows, I first address the
difficulties of interpreting Gorgias’s Helen and his remarks about λόγος in isolation from their
intellectual context. Following this, I provide that context by situating Gorgias’s comments about
λόγος against the intellectual backdrop of Pre-Socratic speculation regarding the correspondence
between words and things in the world.

10 It is worth noting that the “vorrationalen Ansicht” (Schmitter 2000: 349), which modern scholars see as having
preceded the moment when Greeks explicitly distinguished between words and referents, is frequently and
misleadingly described as a magical view of language: “the magical identification of name and object” (Guthrie 1969:
20), “magischen Weltansicht” (Kraus 1987: 18), “magical semiotics” (Manetti 1993: 39-41). As Kirk explains: “a more
or less irrational belief in a natural connexion between names and things recurs again and again in Greek thought.
Such a belief is perhaps magical in origin: knowledge of the exact name of a person, which is an essential part of him,
confers power over him” (Kirk 1951: 240). Similar to Kirk, Ineke Sluiter explains how “an understanding of names
was taken to imply an understanding of the corresponding realities. This same presupposition explains certain
magical practices in which names and things named do not essentially differ from each other” (Sluiter 1997: 156).
This notion of ‘magic’ has filtered into modern psychology as well as the modern language sciences as a technical
term that marks out an early, pre-rational thought process that instinctively blurs levels of reference or causality. The
language of magic made its way into child and developmental psychology by way of Piaget 1929 and into modern
linguistics by way of G. K. Ogden and I. A. Richard’s influential 1923 book, The Meaning of Meaning – a post-war
manifesto against the dangers of treating words as things (Richards and Ogden 1946). As we shall see, when Greeks
begin to describe moments when words appear to function more like things, they too turn to the language of magic.
However, the developmental model of magical thinking as a pre-rational phenomenon that gives way to reason does
not line up with the way ancient authors use the language of magic. In the case of Gorgias and later authors, the
move to reconceive of words as thing-like and magical in their ends and efficacy is made after and in spite of the
growing interest in distinguishing levels of linguistic correspondence.
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1.2. What to make of Gorgias’s Encomium of Helen
1.2.1. ἐγκώµιον/παίγνιον
A cursory glance over the scholarly reception of Gorgias’s Encomium of Helen reveals that it
can be quite a ticklish text to interpret. One ambiguity, which provides a fine entry point to
Gorgias’s account of λόγος, involves the ostensible target of the encomium. At least since Isocrates
in the fourth century BCE, readers have sensed that the Helen is not so much an ἐγκώµιον as an
ἀπολογία.11 Gorgias suggests, at the outset, that his motive is to praise (ἐπαινεῖν § 1) and ultimately
labels the speech an “encomium of Helen” (Ἑλένης […] ἐγκώµιον § 21). However, not much of
what intervenes can easily be called encomiastic. Only briefly does Gorgias pay tribute to Helen’s
famed beauty (§ 3) before launching into a short defense of her lineage (§ 4) and a lengthy defense of
her notorious flight from Sparta to Troy (§§ 5-21). As he argues, Helen must have either been
compelled by divine fate (§ 6), overpowered by physical force (§ 7), persuaded by λόγος (§§ 8-14), or
overwhelmed by eros (§§ 15-19). In each case, it may be right to pity her (ἐλεεῖν; οἰκτίρειν § 7) and
to defend her (ἀπολογήσασθαι § 8), but hardly to praise her.
The fact is, Gorgias does not write the Helen with a singular purpose in mind. As he puts it at
the very end of the work: “I wanted to write this speech as an encomium of Helen and as a game for
myself” (ἐβουλήθην γράψαι τὸν λόγον Ἑλένης µὲν ἐγκώµιον, ἐµὸν δὲ παίγνιον § 21). He has
thus threaded throughout the text a twofold account (or δισσὸς λόγος). Helen’s encomium runs
along the surface of the text only to be subverted by the authorial game running beneath. The subtle

“He gave an account about a woman who excelled by far in birth, beauty, and reputation. Yet, he too made a small
oversight: for he claims to have written an encomium about her but ends up giving a defense on behalf of her
actions“ (περὶ τοιαύτης ἐµνήσθη γυναικός, ἣ καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ κάλλει καὶ τῇ δόξῃ πολὺ διήνεγκεν. οὐ µὴν
ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτον µικρόν τι παρέλαθεν· φησὶ µὲν γὰρ ἐγκώµιον γεγραφέναι περὶ αὐτῆς, τυγχάνει δ᾿ ἀπολογίαν
εἰρηκὼς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκείνῃ πεπραγµένων. Isoc. Hel. 14).
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interplay of these motives produces an unstable landscape where Gorgias’s claims often appear to
give way to tacit counterclaims, where categories collapse into new categories, where eulogy
morphs into antilogy.12 There is little doubt that, for a casual reader, this playful Möbius-like quality
to the text proves quite thrilling; however, it becomes a problem for scholars who endeavor to
extract from it a stable point of view.13
1.2.2. Encomium of Helen or Encomium of λόγος?
In the face of such interpretive difficulties, scholars often build around one fundamental
assumption: Gorgias’s display-speech aims, at bottom, to display his skill at constructing a speech. If
there is any proper ἐγκώµιον to be found, it is implicitly embedded within Gorgias’s account of the
irresistible powers of λόγος (§§ 8-14).14 His account of λόγος stands out conspicuously from the rest
of the work both in its elevation of style and its relative size, taking up about a third of the entire

As Arthur Adkins cautions: “we shall observe Gorgias several times introducing a distinction that is valid in one
context and subsequently applying it more widely” (1983 [1977]: 109). For instance, Gorgias’s central proofs for
Helen’s innocence – against divine necessity, violent force, persuasive speech, and eros – tend to overextend and
undermine themselves: “upon closer inspection, Gorgias manages, through a never-spoken logic of entailments and
verbal repetitions, to equate without quite conflating necessity, violence, persuasion, and eros, by ‘showing’ in effect
that each of the terms may be viewed as an aspect of the remaining terms [… ultimately,] his four alternatives
dissolve into a series of approximations and analogies. They are convergent to the point of identity” (Porter 1993: 274;
cf. Blondell 2018: 119). At other times, Gorgias’s claims implicitly backfire, such as when Gorgias’s account
concerning the (dangerous) power of λόγος conspicuously calls into question his own rhetoric: “Gorgias elaborates
so fully on the dangerous power of artful language that it is hard to avoid a suspicion that he is throwing a sort of
veil of uncertainty over his own persuasive prowess” (Halliwell 2011: 268).
13“The Encomium […] defies easy categorization or understanding” (Halliwell 2011: 267); “one of Gorgias's principal
intentions is probably to baffle us about his intentions” (Barney 2016: 3). Simon Goldhill describes how the game
may, in fact, enact the slipperiness of language which it describes: “Perhaps his parody is so sharp that it raises
serious questions about contemporary grand theories about man and language: any doubt about whether you have
apprehended Gorgias’ seriousness or playfulness seems to enact his argument […] Does Gorgianic seriousness exist,
can you apprehend it and can you interpret it?" (Goldhill 2002: 55).
14 Gorgias’s discussion of λόγος has been called “the most important and interesting passage” of the work
(MacDowell 1993 [1982]: 12), and the outsized scholarly interest in the passage corroborates the claim (Robinson 1973:
53 calls it Gorgias’s “favorite theme”; cf. Kerferd 1981a: 78–82; Verdenius 1981; Connors 1986: 44–49; et al.). “The
speech itself, in fact, is as much an encomium on the power of the logos as on Helen herself” (Segal 1962: 102); “His
real ‘client’ is not Helen but the personiﬁed art of rhetoric, and with it the sophist himself” (Blondell 2018: 121).
Halliwell calls the account of the powers of speech the “central topos […] which even displaces Helen herself from the
foreground of the picture” (2011: 268).
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speech. Whatever the upshot of Gorgias’s crossfire agenda in the Helen, it is plain to see that the
power of human speech is an important theme, just as it is in Gorgias’s writings more generally.15
Although most readers of the Helen agree that Gorgias gives pride of place to his account of
λόγος, there is much less agreement about what to make of that account. Many have endeavored to
extract a more or less unified theory of speech, poetics, or aesthetics from it.16 Others have treated the
entire discussion of λόγος as little more than a game (cf. παίγνιον) with no serious point.17 My
reading will forge a middle path between these two approaches.
1.2.2. Gorgias’s account of λόγος (Helen §§ 8-14)
How seriously should we take Gorgias’s account of λόγος? Gorgias’s parting remark about
his speech being a παίγνιον suggests strongly that the Encomium of Helen is not meant to be viewed
as a monument for all time. His discussion of λόγος in sections 8-14 is part and parcel of the very

In this chapter, my focus will be limited to Gorgias’s linguistic thoughts expressed in the Encomium of Helen and On
Not Being. For a reflection on Gorgias’s recurrent interest in speech and language throughout all three works, see
Kerferd 1981a: 78-82. It may be noted that the Funeral Oration – Gorgias’s fourth, partially surviving work – also
betrays minor signs of Gorgias’s preoccupation with the value of different types of speech: “For these men had
possessed divine excellence, but only human mortality, greatly preferring lenient fairness to stubborn justice,
correctness of speech to the strictness of law” (οὗτοι γὰρ ἐκέκτηντο ἔνθεον µὲν τὴν ἀρετήν, ἀνθρώπινον δὲ τὸ
θνητόν, πολλὰ µὲν δὴ τὸ πρᾷον ἐπιεικὲς τοῦ αὐθάδους δικαίου προκρίνοντες, πολλὰ δὲ νόµου ἀκριβείας λόγων
ὀρθότητα, DK 82B6 = Syrian. In Hermog. 90.17–91.16). On the notion of ὀρθότης λόγων in the sophistic theories of
speech, see below (pp. 48-9).
16 These readings regard Gorgias’s statements about language and perception in the Helen as final rather than
speculative and provisional. Jacqueline de Romilly, for instance, states that (“[Gorgias’] theory is too complete and
too eloquently put forward not to have represented, more or less exactly, its author’s view about speech and
speeches” (1975: 21-2). Many of these readings also begin from the assumption that the “theory of literature and
rhetorical art was largely a sophistic creation” (Kerferd 1981a: 78–82). Eric Havelock, for instance, calls the Helen “a
rationalisation of this whole emotive apparatus to which Hesiod alludes” (1963: 161 n. 25), while Jonathan Barnes
reconstructs from the Helen “a genuine theory of […] literature and painting” based on deception (ἀπάτη, 1982: 366).
Others have focused on Gorgias’s mention of fear and pity as well as his drug metaphor and have extracted from this
signs of a unified, pre-Aristotelean ‘catharsis-theory’ of poetry: “In diesen Ausführungen haben wir nichts weniger
als die Lehre von der κάθαρσις παθήµατων, wie sie uns Bernays verstehen gelehrt hat” (Süss 1910: 85–86, followed
by Pohlenz 1965 [1920]: 466-7; pace Halliwell 1986: 170, 188-9). In a parallel reading, Augusto Rostagni (1922)
presents Gorgias as systematizing Pythagorean speculations about the power of musicality.
17 “…one may imagine the twinkle in Gorgias’ eyes as he reveals in the very last word that he regards the whole
paradoxical composition as a game” (MacDowell 1993 [1982]: 43). For a denunciation of the Helen as an intellectually
bankrupt exercise in sophistry, see especially Gomperz (1912), who calls the Helen “rein epideiktische” (18).
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same παίγνιον which runs through the text and, thus, his claims about the nature and substance of
human communication should not be read as Gorgias’s final word on the power of words.18 The lack
of seriousness in Gorgias’s account of λόγος is sensed most clearly in the conspicuous ambiguity
and high-flown hyperbole with which his claims are often presented. Already in section 8, Gorgias’s
definition of λόγος smacks of something strange and superlatively schizoid:
λόγος δυνάστης µέγας ἐστίν, ὃς σµικροτάτῳ σώµατι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ θειότατα ἔργα
ἀποτελεῖ.19
Speech is a mighty dynast, which accomplishes the most divine deeds with the tiniest and
most invisible body.
As Gorgias presents it, speech is a powerful, physical, albeit imperceptible entity, pitched
ambivalently (but also superlatively) between the mighty and the minuscule, the human and the
divine. As we read on, Gorgias’s schizoid λόγος continues to flicker between a new atomic element
and a powerful mythic agent. At one moment, λόγος is described in terms of a mighty actor and, in
that role, it becomes almost indistinguishable from the mythical Paris himself as the active (and
grammatically masculine) perpetrator responsible for persuading (πείσας) and deceiving
(ἀπατήσας) the passive (and grammatically feminine) targets of soul (ψυχή) and opinion (δόξα). At
the next moment, λόγος is described in terms of a tiny and invisible body – one reminiscent of the
imperceptible, material substances that were being variously theorized about in contemporary

In his recent book-length project on play in antiquity, Stephen Kidd sums up Gorgias’s use of the word παίγνιον as
follows: “the word paignion suggests that if Gorgias had some grand masterwork in mind to commit himself to and
base his reputation on, the Encomium of Helen is not it” (2019: 200).
19 Unless otherwise noted, the Greek of all texts and fragments of sophists and Pre-Socratic philosophers corresponds
to the recent editions by Andre Laks and Glenn Most (2016).
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medical and cosmological accounts.20 By deftly weaving together the theoretical with the traditional,
the most minute with the most mighty, Gorgias effectively does just what silver-tongued
intellectuals of his day were known to do: he makes the great seem small, and the small seem great,
the old seem new, and the new seem old.21 Gorgias essentially gives us a loose and provocative
account of what will have been the nature of human speech and, to this end, he sacrifices coherence
for novelty, credibility (πίστις) for pleasure (τέρψις) – as he himself well recognizes: “telling those

The understanding of language as a partially material entity is, no doubt, already obliquely evident in Homer’s
“winged words.” The seemingly materialistic view of language which Gorgias puts forward riffs on the materialistic
theories of perception bandied about by Pre-Socratic thinkers – most notably Empedocles (DK 31A92 = Pl. Men. 76a-e;
DK 31B89 = Plut. Quaest. nat. 916d; DK 31B109 = Arist. De an. 1.2 404b13-15 (et al.) cf. DK 31A57 = Arist. Sens. 6
446a26-28) and Democritus (DK 68A135 = Theophr. Sens. 50). Gorgias seems to splice these theories of perception
together with contemporary cosmological and medical interest in the element of air and breath, which is not only
apparent in fragments of Diogenes of Apollonia (DK 64B5 = Simpl. in Phys., 152.22-153.16 Diels; DK 64A20 = Arist. De
an. 1.2 405a 21-25) and some early Hippocratic treatises (de Flat. passim; Morb. sacr. §16) but also Aristophanes’s
satirization of flighty philosophy in the Clouds which was produced (423 BCE) several years after Gorgias’s arrival in
Athens (427 BCE). One may also recall how the Derveni Papyrus seems to conflate air (ἀήρ) and breath (πνεῦµα) and
elevates the importance of this element (cols. 18.1-2; 19.3-4; 23.3 Laks and Most). If it is true that Gorgias’s brother
was a doctor by the name of Herodicus, Gorgias would putatively have a clear point of contact with the ins and outs
of medical theory of the time (DK 82A2 = Suda Γ.388; DK 82A22 = Pl. Grg. 456b cf. Pl. Grg. 448b). On other possible
materialist influences on Gorgias more generally, see Segal 1962: 104–106 and Ford 2002: 175-187. A note of caution
should be sounded against reading Gorgias’s materialistic theory of language too seriously. Gorgias himself breeds
skepticism toward the astronomers and philosophers whom he clearly draws upon when he undercuts the authority
of philosophical disputations (φιλοσόφων λόγων ἁµίλλας), the public oration (cf. εἷς λόγος πολὺν ὄχλον ἔτερψε),
astronomical speculation (τοὺς τῶν µετεωρολόγων λόγους, Helen § 13). Brooke Holmes is probably right to note
how Gorgias’s “breezy confidence in conflating the mechanics of the physical body with what happens in the soul
may very well be a challenge to the alibis created out of the new physics, a wink at an audience too easily transfixed
by its desires and its fears” (2010: 215).
21 For example, “[w]ill we allow Gorgias and Tisias to rest undisturbed, who saw likelihoods as more venerable than
truths and, furthermore, make small things appear great and great things appear small through the power of speech, and new
things seem old, and the opposite seem new” (Τισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε ἐάσοµεν εὕδειν, οἳ πρὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα
εἶδον ὡς τιµητέα µᾶλλον, τά τε αὖ σµικρὰ µεγάλα καὶ τὰ µεγάλα σµικρὰ φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσιν διὰ ῥώµην λόγου,
καινά τε ἀρχαίως τά τ᾿ ἐναντία καινῶς, Pl. Phaedr. 267a-b = DK 82A25 = Radermacher 7.18). But, of course, not
everyone saw these powers of rhetoric as a danger in the way Plato does. However, Isocrates makes the same claim
and presents it as a virtue of oratory: “but since speeches have such a nature that they can explain the same things in
many different ways—to make the great things seem humble or to invest minor things with greatness, to report old
things in a new way or to speak about recent matters in an old fashioned manner—it is the case then that one must
not avoid the subjects which others have spoken about before, but must try to speak better than they” (ἐπειδὴ δ᾿ οἱ
λόγοι τοιαύτην ἔχουσι τὴν φύσιν, ὥσθ᾿ οἷόντ᾿ εἶναι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πολλαχῶς ἐξηγήσασθαι, καὶ τά τε µεγάλα
ταπεινὰ ποιῆσαι καὶ τοῖς µικροῖς µέγεθος περιθεῖναι, καὶ τά τε παλαιὰ καινῶς διελθεῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν νεωστὶ
γεγενηµένων ἀρχαίως εἰπεῖν, οὐκέτι φευκτέον ταῦτ᾿ ἐστὶ περὶ ὧν ἕτεροι πρότερον εἰρήκασιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἄµεινον
ἐκείνων εἰπεῖν πειρατέον, Isoc. Paneg. 7–8).
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who know the things that they already know is persuasive but it does not bring delight” (τὸ γὰρ
τοῖς εἰδόσιν ἃ ἴσασι λέγειν πίστιν µὲν ἔχει, τέρψιν δὲ οὐ φέρει).22
If Gorgias’s account of λόγος is more of a game than a coherent theory, does this mean that
there is nothing serious or theoretical about the account? As we shall see, Gorgias’s remarks anout
speech are, in fact, quite novel in the way they challenge the earlier speculation about human
communication and how it works. Unlike other Pre-Socratic linguistic theories, which focus on the
role of linguistic reference, Gorgias’s λόγος is presented as a substance that is apprehended
somewhat like a sense perception. I suggest that this innovation is a serious one, even if it is not
made in all seriousness.
According to Aristotle, Gorgias understood well how effective lightness and humor could be
at undercutting a rival claim:
δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν µὲν σπουδὴν διαφθείρειν τῶν ἐναντίων γέλωτι τὸν δὲ γέλωτα
σπουδῇ.
Gorgias used to say that it is necessary to diffuse the seriousness of others with laughter and
their laughter with seriousness.23
Elsewhere, Aristotle praises Gorgias’s capacity to produce comic metaphors that are neither too
“ridiculous” (γελοῖον) nor “too solemn and tragic” (σεµνὸν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν), nor even “far-fetched”
(πόρρωθεν) or “obscure” (ἀσαφεῖς).24 He also approvingly compares Gorgias’s ironic use of enthusiasm

Helen § 5.
Arist. Rh. 3.18 1419b3-5 = DK 82B12 = Radermacher 7.22 with note ad loc.
24 Arist. Rh. 3.3 1406b4-19 = DK 82A23. In the Politics, Aristotle recounts how Gorgias questions the idea of
autochthonous citizenship by remarking – “partly out of aporia and partly ironically” (τὰ µὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δ᾿
εἰρωνευόµενος) – that just as Larissan craftsmen (δηµιουργοί) are pot-makers, Larissan leaders who bestow
citizenship are Larissan-makers (Arist. Pol. 3.1 1275b26-30 = DK 82A19). Part of the humor rests on the punning
ambiguity of δηµιουργός (which means ‘craftsman’ but looks like ‘people-maker’). For other examples with
discussion, see Noël 1994.
22
23
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and bombast with Plato’s ironic display speeches in the Phaedrus.25 Gorgias’s playfulness may then carry
with it an undercurrent of polemic. It is the type of provisional and playful argumentation that would
have been right at home in the competitive context of a symposium.26 Prior to Gorgias, Pre-Socratic
speculation about language centered on the question of linguistic reference. His account of λόγος
conspicuously and, I suggest, provocatively omits any model for linguistic reference. His λόγος is not
passive and semantic but active and somatic. Gorgias’s λόγος is able to produce fear (ἐφόβησαν § 14)
and stop fear (φόβον παῦσαι § 8; εἰς θάρσος κατέστησαν τοὺς ἀκούοντας § 14), cause pain (ἐλύπησαν
§ 14) and remove pain (λύπην ἀφελεῖν § 9), bring delight (χαρὰν ἐνεργάσασθαι § 9; ἔτερψαν § 14) and,
ultimately, persuade (§§ 8-14 passim). In this capacity, it does not correspond to reality so much as shape
(πλάττειν § 11), impress (τυποῦν § 13), and fashion (ἐνεργάζεσθαι § 8, 13) the very arrangement (τάξις
§ 14) of the soul (ψυχή passim) and opinion (δόξα passim) to line up with what is or what is not, in fact,
real.27 The various frames through which he projects his account of λόγος – such as his agent-object
narrative, notions of atomistic materialism and psychology, as well as the hazy domain of magic – all

25 “For inspired speakers say these sorts of things with the result that audiences accept them as something clear
because they are in a similar state of mind […] it is necessary [to use this style] in this way [i.e., in the way Isocrates
had] or with irony as Gorgias had and as is found in the Phaedrus” (φθέγγονταί τε γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνθουσιάζοντες,
ὥστε καὶ ἀποδέχονται δῆλον ὅτι ὁµοίως ἔχοντες […] ἢ δὴ οὕτω δεῖ, ἢ µετ᾿ εἰρωνείας, ὅπερ Γοργίας ἐποίει καὶ τὰ
ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ, Arist. Rh. 3.7 1408b17-20).
26 Plato’s depiction of Gorgias’s pupil Agathon in the Symposium is quite similar: “Let this speech of mine, Phaedrus,
[…] be dedicated as an offering to the god – a speech which, as much I could muster, shares in matters of amusement
and matters of measured seriousness” (Οὗτος […] ὁ παρ᾿ ἐµοῦ λόγος, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῷ θεῷ ἀνακείσθω, τὰ µὲν
παιδιᾶς, τὰ δὲ σπουδῆς µετρίας, καθ᾿ ὅσον ἐγὼ δύναµαι, µετέχων, Pl. Symp. 197e). Alcidamas, another pupil of
Gorgias’s, likewise ends his (written) speech by remarking how the written medium lends itself to playful content:
“[…] if he were to put effort into extemporaneous speaking always and in every effort, turning his attention to
writing only as an amusement and as a diversion, would he not be judged to reason well by those who reason well?“
(οὐκ εἰκότως ἂν τοῦ µὲν αὐτοσχεδιάζειν ἀεί τε καὶ διὰ παντὸς ἐνεργὸν τὴν µελέτην ποιοῖτο, τοῦ δὲ γράφειν ἐν
παιδιᾷ καὶ παρέργῳ ἐπιµελόµενος, εὖ φρονεῖν κριθείη παρὰ τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν; Alc. Soph. 34 Radermacher). It
may be noted (since it is often overlooked) that Gorgias’s speech is explicitly written (cf. γράψαι § 21).
27 Ford 2002: 180 stresses the physical dimensions of the verb ἐνεργάζεσθαι citing Plato’s Philebus 47a.
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supply new conceptual starting-points from which one may begin thinking and speaking about those
modes of speech which cannot be explained simply by the framework of name and referent.28

To appreciate just how Gorgias’s account undercuts earlier preoccupations with linguistic
reference, we must draw on a thread of intellectual history that leads back to early Pre-Socratic
thinking about language and reality. It is there, in the early speculations of cosmologists, that
ontology splinters into onomatology and that the gap between words and things becomes a tangible
problem. Only after reaching this broader vantage point can we hope to attain a clearer perspective
on how Gorgias’s encomium of λόγος breaks from earlier views about language and, in doing so,
helps propagate a longstanding interest in the qualities of speech which seem to produce uncommon
effects and to function less like speech per se and more like a spell.
1.3. Pre-Socratics on λόγος
While Gorgias’s Helen omits any discussion of linguistic reference, most prior intellectual
interest in speech circles tightly around this very issue. Figures such as Xenophanes, Heraclitus,
Parmenides, and Empedocles stumble upon the problem of linguistic reference at different angles as
they all inquire into the nature of reality. According to these thinkers, the true nature of things is
hidden behind a veil of appearances. In order to grasp true nature, one must, in one way or another,
penetrate past these appearances and correct human opinions about them. It is from this loftier
cosmological concern regarding the correspondence between appearances and reality, opinion and
truth, that Pre-Socratic thinkers are led to the secondary, linguistic concern about the
correspondence between words and referents. As they see it, if words denote what we perceive in

As Michael Gagarin notes well: “It does not matter whether anyone is persuaded of Helen’s innocence; the
important thing is that Gorgias’s arguments open up new ways in which to think about language, emotion,
causation, and responsibility. His case may be shocking, even perverse; it may be completely unconvincing; but his
logos remains one of the most interesting and intellectually stimulating works of the sophistic period” (2001: 285).
28
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the world and if what we perceive in the world is mere appearance, how can words be used to
describe anything other than mere appearance? Different Pre-Socratics tackle the issue in different
ways, and, in order to illustrate the evolution of this early concern with linguistic correspondence, it
will be helpful to look at how the problem manifests in the fragments of Xenophanes, Heraclitus,
Parmenides, and Empedocles before turning back to Gorgias who, in his On Not Being, faces down
the problem directly.
1.3.1. Xenophanes
Central to the cosmology of Xenophanes of Colophon (c. 570 – c. 475 BCE) are the epistemic
gaps between appearance and reality, opinion and truth, words and things. In what most take to be
a programmatic statement, he claims:
καὶ τὸ µὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ γένετ’ οὐδέ τις ἔσται
εἰδὼς ἀµφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ µάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσµένον εἰπών,
αὐτὸς ὅµως οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ᾽ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.
And, so, there never has nor will be any man with clear knowledge about the gods and
however much I say about all things. For, even if he happened, for the most part, to speak
what is perfect, he himself nevertheless does not know it. For opinion has been set upon all
things.29
Xenophanes’s concern with the deficiency of human knowledge appears to be motivated by a sense
of deference toward divine omniscience: what mortals know is absolutely inferior to what gods
know.30 Xenophanes recognizes how humans frequently and foolishly make pronouncements that
require superhuman knowledge, and he takes no small amount of relish in pointing out these sites

DK 21B34 = Sext. Emp. Math. 7.49, 7.110 (cf. 7.51), 8.326 (et al.). Note the emphatic hyperbaton (τὸ µὲν οὖν σαφὲς
[…] εἰδὼς ἀµφὶ θεῶν) perhaps underscoring the gap between mortal and divine.
30 This type of epistemic pessimism is characteristic of Archaic Greek poetry and serves as a broader backdrop against
which Pre-Socratic speculation about the cosmos initially emerges (Lesher 2008). Xenophanes’s rather hard-lined
epistemic pessimism leads him even to reject divination as a way of accessing more-than-mortal knowledge (DK
21A52 = Aët. 5.1.2; Cic. Div. 1.5).
29
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of epistemic hubris. For instance, he declares that, when mortals claim to depict the gods, they
merely depict themselves,31 and when mortals sing of the gods, they sing only of their own false
wars and shameful actions.32 The same epistemic pessimism applies to simple claims about the
reality of the phenomenal world, which, for Xenophanes, are likewise undermined by the limitations
of the mortal perspective.33 When Xenophanes makes his own pronouncement about the
limitlessness of the earth, the identity of the primal elements, and their cyclicality, he holds himself
to the same epistemic standards and advises his audience against taking his remarks as hard facts:
“let these be taken as opinions resembling real things” (ταῦτα δεδοξάσθω µὲν ἐοικότα τοῖς
ἐτύµοισι).34
Thus, for Xenophanes, humans are blinkered by the world of appearances and are far from
attaining a divine perspective on reality. In certain fragments, this sense of an insuperable epistemic
deficiency problematizes not only the relation between our perception of things and how they truly
are but also our names for things and the things themselves. In fragment 32, Xenophanes states:
ἥν τ’ Ἶριν καλέουσι, νέφος καὶ τοῦτο πέφυκε,
πορφύρεον καὶ φοινίκεον καὶ χλωρὸν ἰδέσθαι.

31 DK 21B14 = Clem. Al. Strom. 5.109.1 (et al.); DK 21B15 = Clem. Al. Strom. 5.109.1 (et al.); DK 21B16 = Clem. Al.
Strom. 7.22.1; cf. DK 21A12 = Arist. Rh. 2.23 1399b6-8.
32 DK 21B1 = Ath. 11.7 462c. In specific reference to Homer and Hesiod, see DK 21B11 = Sext. Emp. Math. 9.193; DK
21B12 = Sext. Emp. Math. 1.289; cf. DK 21B13 = Aul. Gell. Noct. 3.11.2.
33 For instance, “If god had not created pale honey, they [i.e., mortals] would assert that figs are much sweeter” (εἰ µὴ
χλωρὸν ἔφυσε θεὸς µέλι, πολλὸν ἔφασκον | γλύσσονα σῦκα πέλεσθαι, DK 21B38 = Hdn. Mon. Lex. 2, p. 946.23
with Lesher 1992: 180-2).
34 DK 21B35 = Plut. Quaest. conv. 746b. For his claims about the limitlessness of the earth: DK 21B28 = Ach. Tat. Intr.
Arat. 4; cf. DK 21A47 = Aët. 3.9.4. The elements: DK 21B29 = Philop. in Phys. 125.30 Vitelli. Cyclicality: DK 21B27 =
Sext. Emp. Math. 10.313. For other claims about nature, see DK 21B30 = Crates in Schol. Genav. in Il. 21.196; DK 21B31
= Heracl. Alleg. 44.5; DK 21B33 = Sext. Emp. Math. 9.361, 10.314, (et al.). As James Lesher notes, “there is no suggestion
that Xenophanes considered himself exempt from these [sc. epistemic] limitations” (Lesher 1992: 181). Compare how
Xenophanes’s caps the verses wherein he calculates his own age: “Sixty-seven are the years already shaking my
thought across the Greek lands, and from birth, there were twenty-five years added to those – if, in fact, I know how to
speak truly of these things”( ἤδη δ᾽ ἑπτά τ᾽ ἔασι καὶ ἑξήκοντ᾽ ἐνιαυτοί | βληστρίζοντες ἐµὴν φροντίδ᾽ ἀν᾽ Ἑλλάδα
γῆν· | ἐκ γενετῆς δὲ τότ᾽ ἦσαν ἐείκοσι πέντε τε πρὸς τοῖς, | εἴπερ ἐγὼ περὶ τῶνδ᾽ οἶδα λέγειν ἐτύµως. DK 21B8 =
Diog. Laert. 9.19).
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…and what they call Iris, this too is by nature a cloud, purple, red, and greenishyellow to look on.35
Here, Xenophanes recognizes how the gap between humans and celestial bodies can lead to a
misunderstanding of phenomena and, by extension, names for those phenomena.36 And as we already
saw in fragment 34, Xenophanes elevates his skepticism toward language one notch higher when he
claims that even if one could speak in a way that aligns perfectly with reality, this speech does not
necessarily correlate with any knowledge of that reality (εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ µάλιστα τύχοι
τετελεσµένον εἰπών, αὐτὸς ὅµως οὐκ οἶδε supra). Only a god – that is, Xenophanes’s god – can
stand outside of it all, know it all, and circumvent the problems of speech and perception.37 For
mortals, all that can be hoped for is that a slightly better knowledge of things may be gleaned from
constant investigation.38
When Heraclitus and Parmenides begin inquiring into the nature of reality, they will raise
similar concerns with the veil of appearances and its trickle-down effect on language; yet, unlike
Xenophanes, they will insist more overtly on the human capacity to circumvent this veil of

35 DK 21B32 = Schol. BLT Eust. ad Il. 11.27b. For Xenophanes’s cloud-metaphysics, see, in general, see Mourelatos
2008.
36 The problem of ancient color perception and description adds an extra (albeit unintentional) layer of proof to
Xenophanes’s argument for the instability of human perception and naming: “it is striking that while both
Xenophanes and Aristotle, for instance, discuss the rainbow, the colours they identify in it, with the exception of
‘red’, phoinikoun, differ: Aristotle talks of prasinon and halourgon, where Xenophanes (Fr. 32) sees chloron and
porphuroun” (Lloyd 2006: 17-8).
37 Xenophanes’s god differs from humans in form and thought (DK 21B23 = Clem. Al. Strom. 5.109.1, DK 21B24 = Sext.
Emp. Math. 9.144; cf. Philop. Aetern., 582.21-23 Rabe). It seems that Xenophanes’s god even lacks a voice (φωνή, DK
21B14 = Clem. Al. Strom. 5.109.1 (et al.)) and moves all things by the cognitive organ of his mind (νόου φρενὶ, DK
21B25 = Simpl. in Phys., 23.20 Diels).
38 It seems that, despite Xenophanes’s doubt, he maintained a small hope that investigation could yield better
understanding (DK 21B18 = Stob. 1.8.2; 3.29.41 with commentary in Lesher 1992: 149-155).
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appearances and will present their own pronouncements about nature and reality as truth rather
than conjecture.
1.3.2. Heraclitus
For Heraclitus of Ephesus (fl. c. 500 BCE), the veil of appearances can be circumvented, and
the nature of reality can be glimpsed noetically. The fundamental nature which appearances conceal
is, for Heraclitus, a deep concordia discors or a backsprung union (παλίντροπος ἁρµονίη) of all
things. This aspect of nature cannot be perceived from a normal, mortal perspective because mortals
perceive only one side of nature at a time.39 That is to say, humans perceive and conceive of life as
life, of waking as waking, of youth as youth. According to Heraclitus, when these things are viewed
from a synoptic or god’s eye perspective, life is death, waking is sleeping, young is old.40 To take one

39 “They do not understand how in differing it agrees with itself: a backsprung union as of a bow and lyre” (ξυνιᾶσιν
ὅκως διαφερόµενον ἑωυτῷ ὁµολογέει· παλίντροπος ἁρµονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης, DK 22B51 = Hippol. Haer.
9.9.2 (et al.); cf. DK 22B54 = Plut. An. proc. 1026c); “For as many as encounter things, many do not consider them such
as they are, nor do they recognize after learning, but they suppose they do” (οὐ γὰρ φρονέουσι τοιαῦτα πολλοί,
ὁκόσοι ἐγκυρεῦσιν, οὐδὲ µαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἑωυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι. DK 22B17 = Clem. Al. Strom. 2.8); “Without
understanding, after hearing they resemble the deaf – the utterance bears testimony about them: while present they
are absent” (ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν ἐοίκασι· φάτις αὐτοῖσιν µαρτυρεῖ παρεόντας ἀπεῖναι, DK 22B34 =
Eus. PE 13.42 (et al.); cf. DK 22B19 = Clem. Al. Strom. 2.24.5). For Heraclitus’s notion of concordia discors see also DK
22B10 = Porph. Quaest. Hom. ad Il. 14.200; DK 22B61 = Hippol. Haer. 9.10.5; DK 22B62 = Hippol. Haer. 9.10.6), DK
22B111 = Stob. 3.1.177); DK 22B126 = Schol. in Tzetz. in Il., p. 126. Heraclitus criticizes the earlier poets who did not
understand this underlying feature of reality, such as Homer (DK 22A22 = Arist. EE 7.1 1235a25-28) and Hesiod (DK
22B57 = (Ps.-?)-Hippol. Haer. 9.10). A similar critique may also be beneath the further criticisms of Hesiod,
Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Hecataeus (DK 22B40 = Etym. Gen. B.338), of Homer and Archilochus (DK 22B42 = Diog.
Laert. 9.1), of Homer again (DK 22B56 = (Ps.-?) Hippol. Haer. 9.9.6), and of Pythagoras again (DK 22B129 = Diog.
Laert. 8.6).
40 “The same is in what is living and what is dead, what is waking and what is sleeping, and what is young and what
is old” (ταὐτό γ’ ἔνι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν·, DK 22B88 = Ps.-Plut.
Cons. Ap. 106e). For life and death, see also DK 22B62 = Hippol. Haer. 9.10.6 cf. Philo Quaest. Gen. 4.152, 359.34–360.6;
Philo Leg. alleg. 1.33.107–8. See also the discussion of DK 22B48 below.
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example, when we perceive a road, we perceive it sloping downwards; yet, as Heraclitus reminds
us, a road, in its totality, goes both upwards and downwards (ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω µία καὶ ὡυτή).41
For Heraclitus, then, we are all blinkered by our mortal and contingent perspective on the
world and, just as our perspective distorts our ideas about the world, our language too is skewed by
our distorted ideas. As Heraclitus writes in fragment 67:
ὁ θεὸς ἡµέρη εὐφρόνη, χειµὼν θέρος, πόλεµος εἰρήνη, κόρος λιµός· ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ
ὅκωσπερ, ὁκόταν συµµιγῇ θυώµασιν, ὀνοµάζεται καθ’ ἡδονὴν ἑκάστου.
God: day night, winter summer, war peace, fullness hunger – it alters just as, when mixed
with incense, it is named in accordance with the pleasure of each one.42
What Heraclitus hints at here is that each word tends to point out a particular referent – just as the
word for ‘day’ points to the idea of day, ‘winter’ to winter, ‘war’ to war, and so forth. A word does
not effectively designate both a thing and its opposite, and yet, from a synoptic, Heraclitean
perspective, this is how things are: day is night, winter is summer, war is peace, satiety is hunger.43
Words, by their very nature, are defective insofar as they denote only the partial appearance of
things and not the reality running beneath – or, to follow Heraclitus’s analogy in fragment 67, words
name only the changing scents and incense but not the underlying fire.44

41 DK 22B60 = Hippol. Haer. 9.10.4. Compare also: “The path of carding-combs: straight and crooked” (γνάφων ὁδὸς
εὐθεῖα καὶ σκολιή, DK 22B59 = Hippol. Haer. 9.10.4; cf. DK 22B103 = Porph. Quaest. Hom. ad Il. 14.200); “The sea,
water most clean and most foul, potable and salubrious for fish, while unpotable and destructive to humans”
(θάλασσα, ὕδωρ καθαρώτατον καὶ µιαρώτατον, ἰχθύσι µὲν πότιµον καὶ σωτήριον, ἀνθρώποις δὲ ἄποτον καὶ
ὀλέθριον, DK 22B61 = Hippol. Haer. 9.10.5).
42 DK 22B67 = Hippol. Haer. 9.10.8.
43 Elsewhere, Heraclitus suggests that although words do not denote their opposites, they still may implicitly entail
them, as in the case of the word ‘justice’: people could not grasp ‘justice’ without a corresponding category of
‘injustice’ (DK 22B23 = Clem. Al. Strom. 4.10.1).
44 “The question is, can we stand outside language in its entirety, outside everything that makes human experience
human, so as to view ourselves in this godlike perspective? I believe that Heraclitus’ most profound contribution to
philosophy is the realisation that we cannot. There is no naming except from a particular point of view” (Burnyeat
2012 [1982]: 203).
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For Cratylus and later Heracliteans, this changeable quality of words seemed to undercut the
possibility for human communication quite severely.45 However, Heraclitus himself seems only to
have wanted to bend speech, not break it. Unlike Xenophanes, who maintains a pious skepticism
about human claims to knowledge and promotes a humble program of natural investigation,
Heraclitus’s fragments betray a certain expectation that reality can be known and communicated in
spite of deceptive appearances and our shoddy system of communication.46 His solution seems to be
that mortals can circumvent their private perspective on the phenomenal world noetically – that is to
say, if we can know that appearances reveal only half the truth, we may be able to think our way
around them and supply the other half. For instance, even though the road may appear to slope
downward, we can, nevertheless, reason that the road slopes both upward and downward in toto.47
Heraclitus’s trademark obscurity (coupled with his disciplinary tone) may be the mechanism
by which he aims to trigger a reasoned, dianoetic response in his audience.48 To be sure, the knots of
amphibole and oracular ambiguity which riddle the fragments of Heraclitus establish language as
an obstacle to be scrutinized and reasoned through. To take the most familiar example, in fragment
48, Heraclitus states:

45 We learn from Aristotle that Cratylus, at some point, gave up speech altogether and resorted to merely pointing at
things (Arist. Metaph. 4.5 1010a7-9).
46 Heraclitus says that he will account for things in accordance with their nature (κατὰ φύσιν, DK 22B1 = Sext. Emp.
Math. 7.132 (et al.)). For Heraclitus’s rejection of Xenophanes’s provisional reliance on investigation and polymathy,
see DK 22B40 = Diog. Laert. 9.1 (et al.) = BNJ 1 (Hekataios of Miletos) T21. Aristotle will later take Heraclitus to task
for treating his conjectures about nature as knowledge (Arist. EN 7.5 1146b29-30 cf. Ps.-Arist. MM 2.6 1201b5-9).
47 The notion that some may be able to work their way past mere appearances, seems to underpin Heraclitus’s remark
that “poor witnesses for humans are the eyes and ears of those who have foreign souls” (κακοὶ µάρτυρες
ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλµοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἐχόντων, DK 22B107 = Sext. Emp. Math. 7.126) as well as his
observation that “Although the λόγος is common, many go on as though they have their own private thought” (τοῦ
λόγου δ’ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν, DK 22B2 = Sext. Emp. Math. 7.133 cf. DK
22B113 = Stob. 3.1.179 and DK 22B116 = Stob. 3.5.6).
48 On the role of Heraclitean ambiguity more generally, see Hussey 1982: 54-6. Heraclitus’s statements about oracles
are often thought to be a metacommentary on his own opaque style (DK 22B93 = Plut. Pyth. orac. 404d; cf. DK 22B92 =
Plut. Pyth. orac. 397a with commentary Kahn 1979: 123-6).
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τῷ οὖν τόξῳ ὄνοµα βίος, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος.
The bow has the name of life but the deed of death.49
The word βιος, when unaccented, can signify ‘life’ (βίος) and/or 'bow' (βιός). Thus, Heraclitus uses
the ambiguity of language to hint connotatively at the totality of 'life' (βίος) and non-life (βιός ≈
‘death’). Similarly, in fragment 32, Heraclitus states:
ἓν τὸ σοφόν µοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνοµα.
One, wise alone, does and does not want to be called by the name of Zeus.50
Here, Heraclitus engages in some more trademark wordplay; the genitive form of the name of Zeus
recalls the word for living (Ζηνός ≈ ζῆν), and the unitary, wise principle does and does not want to
be called by this name because the name represents one side of a totality: living without dying. To
take one final example, Heraclitus states in fragment 57:
διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων Ἡσίοδος· τοῦτον ἐπίστανται πλεῖστα εἰδέναι, ὅστις ἡµέρην καὶ
εὐφρόνην οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἕν.
The teacher of most is Hesiod: they decide that he knows most things – he who did not
recognize day and night, for they are one.51
Here, Heraclitus hints at the unity of day and night by using two words – ἠµέρα and εὐφρόνη –
which share the secondary meaning of ‘kindly.’ Thus, the seeming opposites (day/night) collapse
into one another connotatively when the audience is invited to peer past what the words at first
appear to denote. By playing on partial ambiguities in language and foregrounding them in this
way, Heraclitus’s fragments seem to trigger a sense of suspicion toward the poverty of mere words

DK 22B48 = Etym. Mag. s.v. βίος, p. 198.26, with commentary in Kahn 1979: 201-2.
DK 22B32 = Clem. Al. Strom. 5.115.1.
51 DK 22 B57 = Hippol. Haer. 9.10.
49
50
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and, by extension, the ability of the mind to overcome this poverty by reasoning around language.52
But, of course, to conjecture further about the motives underlying Heraclitus’s notorious
obscurantism is a tricky bit of business even in the best of circumstances. At the very least, what
remains clear is that Heraclitus, like Xenophanes, betrays strong misgivings about the capacity of
normal language to penetrate the veil of appearance and pick out the hidden reality of things. Yet,
he may also betray a certain expectation that problems with linguistic reference can be overcome
through the connotative (and oftentimes ambiguous) use of words and syntax.
1.3.3. Parmenides
For Parmenides of Elea (fl. c. 504/500 BCE), the truth about nature can be derived from the
recognition of two fundamental suppositions: (1) nothing can arise from nothing and (2) ‘what is’
(ἐόν) cannot become ‘what is not’ (µὴ ἐόν). What results from this is a highly unintuitive picture of
reality – namely, that nature simply is and that not-being is unreal. Furthermore, all things must be,
in some sense, changeless, ungenerated, and unitary, since, without not-being, there is no longer
room for x and not-x, road and not-road, life and not-life. All plurality, change, generation, and
destruction which we always perceive in the world, are, for Parmenides, mere illusion. They are
products of our well-worn habit (ἔθος πολύπειρον) of taking false appearances as true.53

Note how Seneca extracts a lesson about the instability of language from the famous river fragment: “This is what
Heraclitus says: ‘Into the same river we step and do not step twice.’ For the name of ‘river’ remains the same while
the water carries on by” (hoc est, quod ait Heraclitus: ‘in idem flumen bis descendimus et non discendimus.’ manet enim idem
fluminis nomen, aqua transmissa est, Sen. Ep. 58.23).
53 DK 28Β7.3. Whether or not Parmenides was a ‘monist’ is unclear. My interest here is merely to extract from the
fragments the basic Eleatic ontology which Gorgias will eventually react to. From Aristotle onwards, Parmenides was
viewed as a monist of one stripe or another, and Parmenides’s followers, such as Melissus, seem to present
themselves as monists (Arist. Ph. 1.2 184b15-1.3 186b4; Metaph. 1.5 986b28–31). As Jaap Mansfeld and others have
shown, later accounts of Eleatic philosophy were likely drawn (via Aristotle) from writings of Hippias and Gorgias,
who may have schematized the theories of their predecessors (Mansfeld 1990 [1986]; 2006; cf. Palmer 2009: 35ff.). For
Gorgias, this meant “emphasizing the oppositions between thinkers and the contradictions within their own works”
52
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When Parmenides’s unnamed goddess gives her account of the correct and incorrect ways of
understanding the world, she describes it in terms of three paths. The idea of being and the idea of
not-being are two utterly distinct paths – the former is real, thinkable, and speakable, while the latter
is unreal, unthinkable, and unspeakable.54 Most mortals tend to follow a third, backsprung path
(παλίντροπός κέλευθος) which muddles together being and not-being.55 This third path is the way
of opinion (δόξα) and, although one may speak it and think it, their thinking and speaking are not
correct; the path of mortals is deceptive since they consider things both to be and not to be at once –
that is to say, they think day to be day and day not to be night, life to be life and life not to be death.
According to Parmenides, each of the three paths has a distinct impact on speech: the true path of
being corresponds to correct and trustworthy speech, the unreal path of not-being is unthinkable
and unutterable and, thus, cannot correspond to speech at all, and the mortal path of opinion
corresponds to speech which is misleading (ἀπατηλὸν) since it suggests a notion of not-being which
is impossible.56 As Parmenides describes it, mortals, who follow the third path and embrace
appearances, end up with incorrect opinions and, in turn, impose (κατέθεντο) words onto those

(Runia 2008: 33). Or, as Jaap Mansfeld puts it: “Gorgias […] stressed what he took to be the philosophers' insoluble
disagreements […] he amusingly went on to argue that all were wrong” (2006: 27). If Parmenides was not himself a
monist, he seems to have become one in the eyes of later thinkers.
54 “And it is, in fact, decided, as is necessary, to leave one [path] as unthinkable and unnameable (for it is not the true
path), and for the other to exist and to be real” (κέκριται δ’ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη, | τὴν µὲν ἐᾶν ἀνόητον ἀνώνυµον
(οὐ γὰρ ἀληθής | ἔστιν ὁδός), τὴν δ’ ὥστε πέλειν καὶ ἐτήτυµον εἶναι. DK 28B8.16-8). On the unthinkability and
unutterability of not-being, see also DK 28B8.7-9; DK 28B2.3-7; DK 28B3.
55 “For [I keep] you away from this first path of inquiry [i.e., the path on not-being], and yet also from this one that
two-headed mortals fabricate knowing nothing. For the helplessness in their breasts steers a wandering mind. And
they are carried along, deaf and at the same time blind, dumbstruck, an undiscerning tribe who consider that ‘being’
and ‘not-being’ are the same and not the same, and for all the path is backsprung” (πρώτης γάρ σ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ ταύτης
διζήσιος <εἴργω>, | αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ’ ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν | πλάττονται δίκρανοι· ἀµηχανίη γὰρ ἐν
αὐτῶν | στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλαγκτὸν νόον· οἱ δὲ φοροῦνται | κωφοὶ ὁµῶς τυφλοί τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα, |
οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταὐτὸν νενόµισται |κοὐ ταὐτόν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος, DK
28B6.3-9; cf. DK 28B8.50ff.; DK 28B1.28-32).
56 DK 28B8.53.
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false opinions.57 This δόξα-derived speech falsely suggests that things come to be (γίγνεσθαί) and
pass away (ὄλλυσθαι), that, in reality, we may find both being and not-being (εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί);58 it
suggests that things were born (ἔφυ τάδε), now are (νυν ἔασι), and, after growing, will pass away
(τελευτήσουσι τραφέντα).59 All such speech is out of joint with the true nature of reality, according
to Parmenides.
Since language is naturally founded upon ideas of change and difference, we are left to
wonder what correct speech looks like to Parmenides and how Parmenides thinks he can
circumvent the pitfalls of speaking incorrectly. On these questions, Parmenides is even less
forthcoming than Heraclitus. Yet, so far, the epistemic-cum-linguistic predicament which
Parmenides sets up is not unlike Heraclitus’s: there is a gap between appearance and reality and,
since words tend to correlate with appearances, there is a concomitant gap between words and
reality. One difference is that Parmenides drives a much deeper wedge between appearance and
reality. While Heraclitus had supposed that the true nature of things underlies false appearances
and yet, in a partial sense, accounts for those appearances, Parmenides gives no indication that true
nature correlates in any way with appearances. Instead, reality is only grasped when all appearances
are eliminated as false, through and through. Since Parmenides drives a deeper wedge between
reality and appearances, he likewise drives a deeper wedge between words and reality. For

“For they established two forms to name their views; one of which is not necessary (in this they have gone astray)”
(µορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώµας ὀνοµάζειν· | τῶν µίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστιν (ἐν ᾧ πεπλανηµένοι εἰσίν), DK
28B8.53-4).
58 “for this [i.e., ‘what is’] all things will be a name, as many things as mortals, having been persuaded that they are
true, establish as both coming to be and passing away, being and not being, changing place, and altering their bright
color” (τῷ πάντ’ ὄνοµ’ ἔσται, | ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ, | γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι,
εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί, | καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διά τε χρόα φανὸν ἀµείβειν, DK 28B8.38-41).
59 “Thus, according to opinion, these things grew, now are, and, after growing up, will perish. And, to these, humans
establish a name for each” (οὕτω τοι κατὰ δόξαν ἔφυ τάδε καί νυν ἔασι | καὶ µετέπειτ’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε τελευτήσουσι
τραφέντα· | τοῖς δ’ ὄνοµ’ ἄνθρωποι κατέθεντ’ ἐπίσηµον ἑκάστῳ, DK 28B19).
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Heraclitus, words maintain a partial bearing on reality since they derive from a partial view of
reality which underlies things and, therefore, words may be bent and finessed into clusters of
amphibole and ambiguity (e.g., βιος ≈ life/death, see above), which encourage a view toward the
backsprung nature of the word. For Parmenides, there is no explicit or implicit indication that
conventional words can be or even need to be manipulated to serve the purpose of communicating
correctly.60 We might say that, for Parmenides, words (like numbers or computer code) may be
helpful tools for deduction even if they are faulty tools for description. As long as speech allows the
audience to assent to the underlying logic of the Parmenidean refutation (ἔλεγχος) – namely, that
nothing can arise from nothing and that ‘what-is’ cannot become ‘what-is-not’ – then the speech in
question is correct even if the words themselves are generally defective and misleading. That is to
say, for Parmenides, correct speech naturally follows from correct conceptions about the world.61 It
is for this reason that those who presuppose the Parmenidean way of truth can ‘speak’ (λέγειν DK
28Β2.1; 8.1; 6.1), ‘express’ (φράζειν 2.6; 3.1; 7.2), and ‘affirm’ (φάσϑαι 1.23; 8.8) things correctly,
whereas those who do not presuppose the way of truth are only able to ’utter names‘ (ὀνοµάζειν
DK 28B8.53; 9.1) and ’impose’ words (κατατιθέναι 8.29; 8.53; 19.3) that reflect their false opinions
about fleeting appearances. All Parmenides must do to communicate the nature of reality is to
remind his auditors of the logic of his starting principle and flag words that imply change,
generation, and destruction as necessarily false.

Parmenides makes no comparable attempt to communicate figuratively. Although Parmenides’s plain style is often
the butt of criticism by modern readers, his poem was admired by some in antiquity for its ‘unadorned’
(ἀκαλλώπιστος), ‘crisp’ (ἰσχνός), and ‘pure’ (καθαρός) mode of expression (DK 28A18 = Procl. In Parm., p. 665.12–
21).
61 The auditor must discern the truth of the argument: “But, by the discourse, decide the much-contested refutation
spoken by me” (κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον ἐξ ἐµέθεν ῥηθέντα, DK 28B7.5-6). “it [i.e., the idea of being] is
the path of persuasion for it attends upon reality” (πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος, ἀληθείῃ γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ, DK 28B2.4). “Nor
will a force of persuasion ever permit something to come to be beside itself out of not-being” (οὐδέ ποτ’ ἐκ µὴ ἐόντος
ἐφήσει πίστιος ἰσχύς | γίγνεσθαί τι παρ’ αὐτό·, DK 28B8.12-3).
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As we have seen thus far, early concerns with the correspondence between appearance and
reality result in a certain distrust of linguistic reference. Heraclitus and Parmenides are keen to take
on this problem of faulty appearances and to communicate their own versions of reality. However,
in this, they both face a conundrum: if speech has a limited bearing on reality, how can reality be
disclosed through speech? Heraclitus may have sought to utilize certain techniques of connotation
and ambiguity to evoke descriptively his own take on what the nature of reality looks like, while
Parmenides doubles down on the logical proof of his first principle and trusts that a logically sound
proposition about reality can cut through the smoke of words and appearances. The problem with
Parmenides’s approach, even more so than Heraclitus’s, is that it places a massive burden on his
ontological presuppositions. If an opponent should undercut the principle of pure being in any way,
all the rest of Parmenides’s claims would topple down. And, as we shall see, Gorgias does just that
in his treatise, On Not Being, which effectively swaps Eleatic ontology for a new, playful meontology
– trading the path of being, thinking, and speaking for the path of not-being, not-thinking, and notspeaking. But, before turning to Gorgias and the sophists, we must treat one more Pre-Socratic – one
who was singularly aware of the problems of linguistic reference and whose teachings seem to have
had a significant influence on Gorgias’s thought.
1.3.4. Empedocles
Empedocles of Acragas (c. 494 – c. 434 BCE) was an older contemporary and Sicilian
compatriot of Gorgias. According to tradition, Empedocles was Parmenides’s student62 and

DK 31A1 = Diog. Laert. 8.56; DK 31A2 = Suda Ε.1002. Others call him an emulator (ζηλωτής) of Parmenides (DK
31A1 = Diog. Laert. 8.55, 6; DK 311A7 = Simpl. in Phys. 25.20 Diels). Empedocles is also often linked with Pythagoras
and Pythagoreanism: DK 31A1.54 = Diog. Laert. 8.54 = BNJ 566 (Timaios) F14 = BNJ 84 (Neanthes) F26; DK 31A2 =
Suda Ε.1002; DK 31A7 = Simpl. in Phys. 25.21 Diels; DK 31A11 = Ath. 1.3e; DK 31A19 = Schol. lambl. VP. 150.10-12
Deubner cf. Procl. In Parm. 2.723.15–724.8.
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Gorgias’s teacher.63 Although most early philosophical pedigrees are highly disputed, it is quite
clear that, even if Empedocles did not know Parmenides personally, he was influenced by
Parmenidean ontological claims. Moreover, scholars are often willing to accept that Empedocles had
some influence on Gorgianic thought.64 We have evidence from Plato to indicate that Gorgias had
some interest in the Empedoclean theory of perception, which involves pores and effluences.65
According to the Satyrus who wrote in the second century BCE, Gorgias reports that he was
physically present when Empedocles was performing magic (γοητεύων).66 For now, we will pass
over the issue of Empedoclean magic and its possible influence on Gorgias in order to treat, instead,
Empedocles’s role as a predecessor to Gorgias’s ideas about speech and persuasion. To do so, let us
first quickly sketch out Empedocles’s central cosmological tenets from which extends his interest in
language.
Whether directly or not, Empedocles adopts into his theory of nature the Parmenidean
principle that nothing can arise from nothing and that ‘what is’ cannot become ‘what is not.’67 Thus,
for Empedocles, the notion that things can come into being and pass away is the result of false
appearances and is not in keeping with reality.68 However, this does not mean that the Empedoclean

63 DK 82A2 = Suda Γ.388; DK 82A3 = Diog. Laert. 8.58-59; DK 82Al0 = Olymp. In Gorg. Prooem. 9 (7.22-8.12 Westerink);
DK 82A14 = Quint. Inst. 3.1.8.
64 See Diels 1969 [1884] and Kerferd 1985. Diels admits that Gorgias betrays “ein bestimmender Einfluss;” however,
he notes that Empedocles was probably only around ten years older than Gorgias and, thus, a strict teacher-student
relationship may be unlikely (1969 [1884]: 160).
65 DK 82B4 = Pl. Men. 76a-e cf. DK 82B5 = Theophr. De Igne 73.
66 Diog. Laert. 8.58–59 = DK 82A3 = DK 31A1. On this account, see Schorn 2004: 372-8. On Empedocles as a
practitioner of magic and his use of incantations, see Faraone 2019.
67 DK 31B12 = Philo Aetern. mund. 5, p. 74.7–8 (v. 1–2); Ps.-Arist. MXG 2 975a3–4; cf. DK 31B13 = Aët. 1.18.2; DK 31B14
= Ps.-Arist. MXG 2 976b25. See Graham 1999 for a discussion of the relation between the cosmologies of Parmenides
and Empedocles.
68 “The fools. For they have no long-reaching thoughts, those who expect that what was not before comes to be or that
something dies and is destroyed completely” (νήπιοι· οὐ γάρ σφιν δολιχόφρονές εἰσι µέριµναι, | οἳ δὴ γίγνεσθαι
πάρος οὐκ ἐὸν ἐλπίζουσιν | ἤ τι καταθνῄσκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἁπάντῃ. DK 31B11 = Plut. Adv. Col. 1113c).
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cosmos is stuck forever in changeless unity as it seems to have been for the Eleatics. Empedocles
allows nature to admit a major process of change. This process of change is anchored to four eternal
elements or ‘roots’ (ῥιζώµατα) – namely, earth, water, fire, and air – which undergo seasons of
mixture and separation.69 These seasons of change are governed by natural forces of attraction and
repulsion, which Empedocles calls ‘strife’ (νεῖκος) and ‘love’ (φιλότης).70 Love drives like elements
to like, whereas strife draws all four different elements into a spherical mixture that occludes their
true form.71 When Empedocles writes his cosmology, the cosmos seems to be in a season dominated
by strife, where false appearances largely conceal reality and where reality is commonly conceived
of and spoken of in terms of generation and destruction.
As with previous Pre-Socratics, we can see that Empedocles distrusts appearances and the
human perspective on things. In fragment 2, he remarks upon the tenuousness of mortal resources
(στεινωποὶ […] παλάµαι), how impinging weaknesses (δείλ’ ἔµπαια) blunt mortal thoughts
(ἀµβλύνουσι µερίµνας), and how humans, with a swift fate (ὠκύµοροι), gaze upon only a small
part of life (παῦρον […] βίου µέρος ἀθρήσαντες).72 This limited perspective tricks humans into
misinterpreting nature and, in particular, it causes them to perceive generation and destruction in
the world. When humans use language, they use it in ways that reflect such false appearances. Like
Parmenides, Empedocles betrays a particular distrust in words that suggest any false notion of

DK 31B6 = Aët. 1.3.20.
Love is also called by the name of ‘Aphrodite’ (Ἀφροδίτη) and ‘Cypris’ (Κύπρις) as well as, perhaps also, Calliope
(Καλλιόπεια, DK 31B131.3 = Hippol. Haer. 7.31) and “his much-courted white-armed virgin muse” (πολυµνήστη
λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα, DK 31B3.3 = Sext. Emp. Math. 7.125 (et al.)).
71 “For at one time it grew to be one from many, and, again, at another time it grew apart to be many from one – fire
and water and earth and the boundless height of air, and destructive strife, separate from these, is balanced in every
direction, and love among these is equal in length and width” (τοτὲ µὲν γὰρ ἓν ηὐξήθη µόνον εἶναι | ἐκ πλεόνων,
τοτὲ δ᾽ αὖ διέφυ πλέον᾽ ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι, | πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ ἠέρος ἄπλετον ὕψος, | νεῖκός τ᾽ οὐλόµενον
δίχα τῶν, ἀτάλαντον ἁπάντηι, | καὶ Φιλότης ἐν τοῖσιν, ἴση µῆκός τε πλάτος τε·, DK 31B17.16-20 = Simpl. in Phys.,
158.1–159.4 (et al.) Diels).
72 DK 31B2 = Sext. Emp. Math. 7.123 (et al.).
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generation out of nothing or destruction into nothing.73 Yet, at the same time, Empedocles seems to
go farther than earlier Pre-Socratics in addressing the fact that he himself uses defective words in his
explanation of nature.74 For instance, in a somewhat corrupt passage from Plutarch, Empedocles
seems to admit to the necessity of bending to convention:
οἱ δ’ ὅτε µὲν κατὰ φῶτα µίγη φύσις αἰθέρι <γαίης>
ἢ κατὰ θηρῶν ἀγροτέρων γένος ἢ κατὰ θάµνων
ἠὲ κατ’ οἰωνῶν, τότε µὲν τὸν <φασὶ> ‘γενέσθαι.’
εὖτε δ’ ἀποκρι<ν>θῶσι, τὸ δ’ αὖ ‘δυσδαίµονα πότµον’
<ἢ ………………‘θάνατον’ καλέουσιν ‘ἀλοίτην.’>
ᾗ θέµις, <οὐ> καλέουσι· νόµῳ δ’ ἐπίφηµι καὶ αὐτός.
When the nature of <earth> was mixed with aether in a man, or in the race of savage beasts
or in the race of plants or in the race of birds, then <they say> he ‘came to be.’ When they are
parted, that again <they name> ‘unhappy fate’ <or … ‘avenging death.’> They do <not> name
them rightly; but by custom I too call them so. 75
Empedocles thus knows that the words humans use by convention (νόµῳ) may not always
correspond to reality in any legitimate way (θέµις). Yet he seems confident that he can check and
harness the illegitimate and merely conventional speech of mortals in a way that successfully
discloses the true nature of the cosmos.
To determine just how Empedocles thinks he can circumvent the problem of linguistic
reference, we must first recognize his interest in the problem of appearances more generally. We can
tell from Empedocles’s interest in the nature of human perception that he was not simply interested
in accounting for how things are but also for how things seem. That is to say, for Empedocles,

DK 31B8 = Aët. 1.30.1 (et al.); DK 31B15 = Plut. Adv. Col. 1113d.
… as Andreas Willi rightly notes: “Innovativ ist also nicht Empedokles' Interesse für die sprachliche Abbildung
von Wirklichkeit, sondern erst die Konsequenzen” (Willi 2008: 246).
75 DK 31B9 = Plut. Adv. Col. 1113a-b. The text and translation are from Janko 2017, slightly adapted, and the italics are
my own. As noted, the Greek is quite corrupt. Janko’s is the most recent attempt to solve the textual problems.
Fortunately for us, most important is the final line, the reading of which Plutarch partially corroborates by quoting it
a second time elsewhere (Plut. Praec. Ger. 820f).
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appearances are as much a part of nature as the nature which they happen to obscure, and any
cosmology must include an account of appearances as well as an account of reality.76 In a similar
vein, Empedocles seems interested not simply in true speech but also in conventional and deceptive
speech. He notes that, like appearances, the conventional speech of mortals can be persuasive
(πίστιος) and that this persuasion works like a force against the mind (ἐπὶ φρένα […] ὁρµή) which
distracts from truth (ἀληθείη).77 Just as Empedocles is attuned to the workings of sense perceptions
and how they mislead, so, too, is he attuned to the workings of conventional speech and how it
misleads.
In order to disclose the truth about reality without succumbing to the deceptive and
distracting forces of conventional speech, Empedocles puts to use two different methods of checking
and harnessing the persuasive power of certain words. The first method can be seen in passages
where Empedocles freely intervenes and flags certain misleading words, like ‘birth,’ so as to
renegotiate their semantic boundaries. For instance, in fragment 8, Empedocles remarks:
ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω· φύσις οὐδενός ἐστιν ἁπάντων
θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλοµένου θανάτοιο τελευτή,
ἀλλὰ µόνον µῖξίς τε διάλλαξίς τε µιγέντων
ἐστί, φύσις δὲ βροτοῖς ὀνοµάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν.

Theophrastus notes how Empedocles is exceptional for his explicit focus on sense-perception (DK 31B86 = Theophr.
Sens. 27). On Empedocles’s interest in sense-perception more generally, see Long 1966.
77 “Friends, I know that truth is in the words that I will speak. But certainly troublesome and overeager for men is the
impulse of persuasion onto the mind” (ὦ φίλοι, οἶδα µὲν οὕνεκ’ ἀληθείη πάρα µύθοις | οὓς ἐγὼ ἐξερέω· µάλα δ’
ἀργαλέη γε τέτυκται | ἀνδράσι καὶ δύσζηλος ἐπὶ φρένα πίστιος ὁρµή. DK 31B114 = Clem. Al. Strom. 5.9.1). See
also: “It is not accessible for us to draw near with our eyes, to grasp with hands – by which the greatest highway of
persuasion for humans assails the mind” (οὐκ ἔστιν πελάσασθαι ἐν ὀφθαλµοῖσιν ἐφικτόν | ἡµετέροις ἢ χερσὶ
λαβεῖν, ᾗπέρ τε µεγίστη | πειθοῦς ἀνθρώποισιν ἁµαξιτὸς εἰς φρένα πίπτει, DK 31B133 = Clem. Al. Strom. 5.81.2;
Theod. Cur. 1.74).
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I’ll tell you another thing: of all mortal things, there is no birth, nor is there an end coming
from destructive death, instead only mixture and separation of things mixed exist, and birth
is a name given by mortal humans.78
Rather than reject a word, Empedocles reminds his audience of the Parmenidean principle of being
and shows that the sense of total generation or destruction implied by the word is impossible.79 This
limiting and denotative method of correcting speech is supplemented by a positive and more
connotative method used tacitly to foreground and reinforce correct ways of thinking about certain
words or concepts. The key to this second method is to be found in Empedocles’s strange, poetic
style. At least as early as Aristotle, readers have been perplexed by Empedocles’s figurative and
somewhat outlandish mode of expression, and modern scholars have found that Empedocles’s
poetry is, indeed, filled with an outsized quantity of hapax legomena, irregularities in syntax and
usage, as well as many odd metaphors, kennings, and paretymologies.80 Thus, Empedocles uses
language in a highly unconventional, even baffling, way; yet, like Heraclitus, he is not twisting
conventional speech without a purpose. According to Andreas Willi, Empedocles’s strange style is
best understood in terms of oracular speech or ‘studied ambiguity.’81 Empedocles not only uses
ambiguous and unconventional speech to disrupt the passive and conventional interpretation of

78 DK 31B8 = Aët. 1.30.1 (et al.). Compare also: “A man, wise in his mind, would not divine such matters – namely
that, as long as they live (this thing they call ‘life’), they then exist for this time and have good and lesser things, but
that, before mortals are composed and after they dissolve, they are nothing” (οὐκ ἂν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ
µαντεύσαιτο, | ὡς ὄφρα µέν τε βιῶσι, τὸ δὴ βίοτον καλέουσι, | τόφρα µὲν οὖν εἰσίν, καί σφιν πάρα δειλὰ καὶ
ἐσθλά, | πρὶν δὲ πάγεν τε βροτοὶ καὶ <ἐπεὶ> λύθεν, οὐδὲν ἄρ’ εἰσίν, DK 31B15 = Plut. Adv. Col. 1113d).
79 It is worth noting that Plutarch already recognized this method. When he quotes fragment 9 (quoted in n. 78
above), he indicates rightly that Empedocles “did not drive a wedge between speech and convention, rather after
doing away with only the deceptive element that was harming the things [named] he returned to the words their
customary usage […] after teaching in what way [these words] fall short, he did not do away with using customary
expressions regarding these things” (µηδὲ τὴν φωνὴν ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας, ἀλλ᾿ ὅσον εἰς τὰ πράγµατα
βλάπτουσαν ἀπάτην παρεῖχεν ἀφελὼν αὖθις ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς ὀνόµασι τὸ νενοµισµένον […] ᾗ σφάλλονται
διδάξας οὐκ ἀφείλετο τὸ χρῆσθαι ταῖς εἰθισµέναις φωναῖς περὶ αὐτῶν, Plut. Adv. Col. 1113a-b).
80 Willi 2008: 193-229 collects and discusses many of these peculiarities.
81 The phrase ‘studied ambiguity’ is borrowed from Charles Kahn, who likewise sees similarities between the stylistic
peculiarities of Heraclitus and Empedocles (Kahn 1969: 441).
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words (much like Heraclitus) but also invests these words and phrases with new meaning through
the use of figurative associations and paretymology.82 For instance, in fragment 105, Empedocles
describes the heart:
αἵµατος ἐν πελάγεσσι τεθραµµένη ἀντιθορόντος,
τῇ τε νόηµα µάλιστα κικλήσκεται ἀνθρώποισιν·
αἷµα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόηµα.
[the heart is] nourished in the oceans of pumping blood and that is for the most part why
humans call it by the name of mind: since the mind, for humans, is the blood around the
heart.83
As Andreas Willi has shown, Empedocles’s comment about the word νόηµα makes sense only if we
understand that he is implicitly hinting at a family of paretymologies – namely, νάω ‘flow,’ νέω
’swim,’ and νοά ’spring.’84 By tapping this network of phonetic resemblances, Empedocles invites
his audience to rethink νόηµα in terms of these points of resonance which reflect what, according to
Empedocles, νόηµα truly is – namely, a current of blood flowing around the heart. For another
example, we might turn to fragment 17, where Empedocles describes the cosmic force of Love and
remarks approvingly on its conventional associations with Joy and Aphrodite:
καὶ φιλότης […]
τὴν σὺ νόωι δέρκευ, µηδ᾽ ὄµµασιν ἧσο τεθηπώς·
ἥτις καὶ θνητοῖσι νοµίζεται ἔµφυτος ἄρθροις,
τῆι τε φίλα φρονέουσι καὶ ἄρθµια ἔργα τελοῦσι,
Γηθοσύνην καλέοντες ἐπώνυµον ἠδ᾽ Ἀφροδίτην·
τὴν οὔ τις µετὰ τοῖσιν ἑλισσοµένην δεδάηκε
θνητὸς ἀνὴρ·
And Love […] gaze you upon her with your mind – and do not sit bewildered with your
eyes. She who mortals think is even implanted in the joints and by whom they think loving

See Willi 2008: 230-63, who, like Kahn, links the strange use of language up with the cultural notion of oracular
speech.
83 DK 31B105 = Porph. in Stob. 1.49.53.
84 Willi 2008: 245.
82
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thoughts and perform acts of union, calling her Joy fittingly85 and Aphrodite, she who no
mortal man has learned of twirling among them [i.e., the elements].86
Here Empedocles flags the appropriate way of thinking and speaking about φιλότης by
foregrounding one aspect of love – namely, love as a force of joining (cf. ἄρθρον, ἄρθµιος). From
there, he commends the way people associate φιλότης with Γηθοσύνη (‘joy’) and Ἀφροδίτη
(‘Aphrodite’). Similar to the tacit paretymology in fragment 105 above, a subtle network of phonetic
resonances legitimize the words Γηθοσύνη and Ἀφροδίτη:
φιλότης = Ἀφροδίτη =

Γηθοσύνη

τῆι τε φίλα φρονέουσι καὶ ἄρθµια ἔργα τελοῦσι
Γηθοσύνην καλέοντες ἐπώνυµον ἠδ᾽ Ἀφροδίτην
Here, Empedocles again subtly plays on similar sound patterns in order to invite his audience to
rethink the semantic range of certain words – this time, the role of love, joy, and Aphrodite. But
instead of casting love as the loosener of limbs (λυσιµελής), he presents it as the cosmic joiner.87
Similar wordplay and ambiguity can be found across the fragments of Empedocles;88 when he
instructs his audience to trust their gut (σπλάγχον) and their noggin (πραπίδες) regarding the
account which he gives, he is likely calling for them to work out the meaning that he conjures up at
the periphery of the words and phrases.89

LSJ s.v. ἐπώνυµος for ‘fittingly,’ ‘rightly,’ or ‘in conformity with the name.’
DK 31B17.20-6 = Simpl. in Phys., 158.19-23 Diels.
87 Hesiod’s foam-born Aphrodite (Ἀφροδίτη ≈ Ἀφρογενής Theog. 196) is the most popular way of etymologizing
Aphrodite’s name in antiquity, followed by Euripides’s mindless Aphrodite (Ἀφροδίτη ≈ ἀφροσύνη Tro. 990). To my
knowledge, Empedocles’s etymological wordplay is not paralleled unless perhaps in Plutarch’s Dialogues on Love
750c.
88 Empedocles even riffs on his own name at DK 31B17.11 = Simpl. in Phys., 158.1-159.4 (et al.) Diels; DK 31B26.10 =
Simpl. in Phys. 33.19-34.3 (et al.) Diels and DK 31B77 = Plut. Quaest. conv. 649c). He may also riff on the name of his
addressee, Pausanias, at DK 31B111.3 = Diog. Laert. 8.59 cf. Obbink 1993: 88-9 with n. 91; Wright 1981: 224.
89 “But it is certainly the case that bad people distrust what prevails. And, as the proofs of our muse command, you
know this in your gut once the discourse has been teased apart [i.e., analyzed]” (ἀλλὰ κακοῖς µὲν κάρτα πέλει
κρατέουσιν ἀπιστεῖν. | ὡς δὲ παρ’ ἡµετέρης κέλεται πιστώµατα Μούσης, | γνῶθι διατµηθέντος ἐνὶ σπλάγχοισι
85
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In sum, Empedocles is not unique in his attempt to articulate the hidden nature of things.
However, he does appear to go farther than previous Pre-Socratics in considering the implications of
accounting for the unapparent nature of reality through speech. As a result, he betrays an attitude
toward linguistic reference that looks something like a synthesis of Parmenidean and Heraclitean
attitudes. Like Parmenides, Empedocles is careful to note the illusive (ἀπατηλός) quality of words
which derive from false ideas about generation and destruction; yet, somewhat like Heraclitus,
Empedocles betrays a certain hope that words can be used unconventionally to disclose truths
which go beyond the semantic and syntactical boundaries of conventional language. Moreover,
rather than simply triggering an aporetic and noetic response through formal and syntactic twists, as
Heraclitus appears to, Empedocles uses pockets of parechesis and paretymology to generate
associations between different words and across semantic categories. As we look ahead to the
sophists, Empedocles is an important predecessor precisely for the steps he takes to remedy and
renegotiate the problem of linguistic reference through methods of explicit denotation and implicit
connotation – methods that, we shall see, are roughly mirrored in the two ways sophists discuss the
phenomenon of human speech.
1.4. The sophists on λόγος
Sophists were purveyors of wisdom. Many lived as itinerant teachers, and many sold their
wisdom at a price. The wisdom on offer varied widely; however, the one category of knowledge that
all sophists shared was the skill at speaking. Not only was this skill at effective speaking in high

λόγοιο, DK 31B4 = Clem. Al. Strom. 5.18.4). “For if, after planting them on your sturdy noggin, you gaze upon them
favorably with pure attention, these things will all be very present to you throughout life, and you will have obtained
many other things besides. For these [i.e., the roots] grow into each kind of character, according to the nature of each”
(εἰ γάρ κέν σφ’ ἀδινῇσιν ὑπὸ πραπίδεσσιν ἐρείσας | εὐµενέως καθαρῇσιν ἐποπτεύσῃς µελέτῃσιν, | ταῦτά τέ σοι
µάλα πάντα δι’ αἰῶνος παρέσονται, | ἄλλα τε πόλλ’ ἀπὸ τῶνδ’ ἐκτήσεαι· αὐτὰ γὰρ αὔξει | ταῦτ’ εἰς ἦθος
ἕκαστον, ὅπῃ φύσις ἐστὶν ἑκάστῳ. DK 31B110.1-5 = Hipp. Haer. 7.29.26 (et al.)).
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demand amongst wealthy Greek males aspiring toward success in public life, but it would also be a
prerequisite for any sophist who aspired to sell (and communicate effectively) any sort of wisdom.
The problem of linguistic reference continues to feature in sophistic writings; however, in the hands
of the sophists, the once ontological-cum-onomatological problem of linguistic reference transforms
into more of a practical problem of effective – that is, persuasive – communication. When faced with
the possibility that language has no fundamental connection to what it refers to in the world, the
sophists focused less on probing the ontological boundaries between words and objects than on
producing practical methods for how to speak clearly and persuasively in spite of the potential
arbitrariness of language.90
Of the various approaches to the harnessing of speech, it is helpful to distinguish two main
varieties, which we may call the sticklers and the stylists. The sticklers endeavor to stitch words and
sentences back onto the surface of things by imposing grammatical and lexical rules designed to
tighten up conventional semantics and tidy away aberrant usage. The stylists sidestep the question
of linguistic reference and univocity in order to explore how utterances communicate below or
beyond the threshold of linguistic reference – that is, through connotation, emotion, or even sound.91
As we shall see, Gorgias is firmly in the stylist camp. Not only does his attitude toward speech differ

For classic treatments of the sophists and their views on language, see Classen 1976 [1959] and Kerferd 1981a: 68-77.
Mark Griffith has argued that Greek wisdom (σοφία) can be split up into three categories: “(a) knowledge and
factual accuracy (the sophos-poet knows how things were and are, tells them 'truly,' gets names, pedigrees, and events
right, and is therefore valuable to the community as a repository of information); (b) moral and educational integrity
(the sophos presents advice or instruction, or unambiguous examples of good and bad conduct, by which the
community is supposed to be collectively and individually improved); (c) technical skill and aesthetic/emotional
impact (the sophos’ uncanny verbal, musical and histrionic powers can excite the ear and the eye as well as the mind,
dazzle and delight an audience, and arouse in it irresistible feelings of wonder, sympathetic engagement, and
emotional release – ‘tears and laughter,’ ‘pity and fear’” (1990: 188-9). If we map the stickler/stylist distinction onto
this framework, we can say that the stickler’s interest in speech and communication centers on ‘knowledge and
factual accuracy,’ whereas the stylist’s interest in speech and communication centers on ‘technical skill and
aesthetic/emotional impact.’
90
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from those of the sticklers, but it seems partially motivated by a certain dissatisfaction with the very
notion of linguistic reference. This becomes clearer in his treatise On Not Being. But before turning to
this work, it is worth giving an account of both sophistic avenues of inquiry into language and
communication.
1.4.1. Protagoras and Prodicus
The stickler camp of sophistic inquiry into speech and language is best exemplified by the
lexical and grammatical developments attributed to Protagoras of Abdera (c. 490-420 BCE) and
Prodicus of Ceos (c. 465-395 BCE). According to Plato, Protagoras was interested in ‘correct
speaking’ (ὀρθοέπεια) – a practice that, at some level, involved structuring and promoting certain
grammatical rules.92 For instance, Protagoras is remembered for having developed four different
verbal moods or ‘foundations’ (πυθµένες): entreaty (εὐχωλή), question (ἐρώτησις), answer
(ἐπόκρισις), and command (ἐντολή).93 He is also credited with distinguishing three grammatical
genders: masculine (ἄρρενα), feminine (θήλεα), and inanimate (σκεύη).94 From Aristotle, we learn
that Protagoras used these grammatical criteria to offer several critiques of Homer. In one instance,
he critiques Homer for using a command – “sing (ἄειδε), muse, of the wrath …” – when he should
have (politely) begun his poem with an entreaty – “would you sing (ἀείδοι), muse, of the wrath…”95
Elsewhere, Protagoras is said to have corrected Homer’s use of the words “wrath” (µῆνις) as well as
“helmet” (πήληξ) which appear as feminine nouns when they should (at least according to

Pl. Phdr. 267c = DK 80A26 = Radermacher 3.4. Hermias ad loc. defines Protagorean ὀρθοέπεια as κυριολεξία – i.e.,
the use of words in their literal sense as opposed to a metaphoric (παράβολος) or secondary (ἐπίθετος) sense.
93 Diog. Laert. 9.53-4 = DK 80A1 = Radermacher 3.10 cf. Quint. Inst. 3.4.10 = Radermacher 3.12. Protagoras may also
have been interested in verb tenses (µέρη χρόνου, Diog. Laert. 9. 52 = DK 80A1 = Radermacher 3.24), although it is
unclear just what Diogenes means by this (Pfeiffer 1968: 38-9).
94 Arist. Rh. 3.5 1407b6 = DK 80A27 = Radermacher 3.6.
95 Arist. Poet. 19 1456b15–19 = DK 80A29 = Radermacher 3.13.
92
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Protagoras) function as masculine nouns.96 The upshot of all this grammatical nitpicking seems to
have been less dogmatic than pragmatic. Protagoras’s students were encouraged to critique the
merits and weaknesses of verses of poetry as a way of sharpening their own skills in debate and
verbal expression.97 In other words, for Protagoras, the better one becomes at scrutinizing and
debating the language, syntax, and morals of a poem, the better one will be at monitoring and
controlling the cut and thrust of public discourse – a skill which would become helpful in achieving
excellence (ἀρετή).98 Protagorean ὀρθοέπεια can, thus, be understood as a practice in which
semantic and grammatical categories are created and imposed with the aim of establishing short
term authority in open debate.99

Arist. Soph. El. 14 173b17–22 = DK 80A28 = Radermacher 3.7. The words are, in fact, treated as feminine in most
places. Protagoras’s reasoning for treating them as masculine is unclear. It may be due to a belief that ‘wrath’ and
‘helmet’ are masculine concepts. If we look to his word for ‘neuter’ (σκεύη, which, in later grammatical accounts, is
changed to οὐδέτερον), we might infer that Protagoras’s grammatical genders are more biological than purely
linguistic categories. Otherwise, Protagoras may be making this criticism with the belief that nouns with sibilant
endings reflected a family of masculine words (Willi 2003: 99). Whatever Protagoras’s argument was, his concerns
with grammatical gender seem to become the butt of Aristophanic satire when Socrates is shown, in the Clouds, to
quibble over the gender of the word ‘chicken/rooster’ (Ar. Nub. 658–693 = DK 80C3; cf. Ar. Nub. 228, 251).
97 “I consider […] the greatest part of a man’s education to be cleverness concerning words. That is to say, being able
to know the things said by the poets, both to understand and to distinguish things spoken correctly and incorrectly,
and to offer an account of this when questioned” (ἡγοῦµαι […] ἀνδρὶ παιδείας µέγιστον µέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν
δεινὸν εἶναι· ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόµενα οἷόν τ’ εἶναι συνιέναι ἅ τε ὀρθῶς πεποίηται καὶ ἃ µή,
καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώµενον λόγον δοῦναι. Pl. Prt. 338e6-339a3 = DK 80A25).
98 Like many other sophistic era teachers coming after him, Protagoras was broadly interested in teaching/selling
ἀρετή (Pl. Prt. 349a; cf. Pl. Prt. 320–24). On the commodification of ἀρετή at this period, according to Aristotle, see
Arist. Pol. 7.6 1341a 28-32.
99 Diogenes Laertius, citing Timon, is perhaps describing the Protagorean practice of ὀρθοέπεια when he remarks
that: “He was the first […] to introduce sophisms to the squabblers. Doing away with the meaning, he elicited
discussion about the word itself, and he gave birth to the tribe of eristics common today” (καὶ πρῶτος […] καὶ
σοφίσµα<τα> τοῖς πραγµατολογοῦσι προσήγαγε· καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀφεὶς πρὸς τοὔνοµα διελέχθη καὶ τὸ νῦν
ἐπιπόλαιον γένος τῶν ἐριστικῶν ἐγέννησεν, Diog. Laert. 9.52 = DK 80A1). On the fact that the onomastic and
grammatical hair-splitting which Protagoras and Prodicus engaged in were effective tools in establishing authority in
open debate, see Arist. Soph. el. 14 173b17ff. = DK 80A28 = Radermacher 3.7. It is worth noting also that the root επεια, from ἔπειν, denotes the act of speaking and, thus, the term ὀρθοέπεια would seem to suggest a concern with
the active process of the right way of speaking more than the static study of correct speech per se. There is no
indication that Protagoras thought of language as anything other than conventional. Indeed, his eponymous
character in Platonic dialogues suggests that language was a creation of humankind (Pl. Prt. 322a). See also, Pl. Cra.
391c = DK 80A24 = Radermacher 3.9; Pl. Prt. 339a = DK 80A25 = Radermacher 3.14.
96
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Born about twenty years after Protagoras, Prodicus seems to have had more interest in
sorting out the seeming arbitrariness of language. He was particularly interested in the correctness
of specific words (ὀνοµάτων ὀρθότης) and put a great deal of effort into developing a practice of
synonymics or what he called “dividing” (διαίρεσις).100 Prodicean lexical distinctions crop up across
Plato’s dialogues, such as the distinctions found in the Protagoras between ‘impartial’ (κοινός) and
‘equal’ (ἶσος), ‘to contest’ (ἀµφισβητεῖν) and ‘to vie’ (ἐρίζειν), ‘to respect’ (εὐδοκιµεῖν) and ‘to
praise’ (ἐπαινεῖσθαι), ‘to enjoy’ (εὐφραίνεσθαι) and ‘to take pleasure in’ (ἥδεσθαι).101 Although
Plato is sometimes dismissive of these Prodicean divisions, we know that Prodicean exercises in
synonymy had plenty of admirers.102 Unlike Protagoras, Prodicus seems to have aimed more
squarely at establishing a univocity of language by forging stiffer bonds between words and what
they conventionally refer to. Yet, in the case of both, the goal seems only to establish a provisional
type of certainty about words and what they denote referentially.
1.4.2 Gorgias and Thrasymachus
The stylist camp of sophistic inquiry into speech and language focuses less on linguistic
content and denotation than on emotional content, form, and connotation. Figures such as

100 “First, as Prodicus says, one must learn about the correctness of words” (πρῶτον γάρ, ὥς φησι Προδίκος, περὶ
ὀνοµάτων ὀρθότητος µαθεῖν δεῖ, Pl. Euthyd. 277e3-4 = DK 84A16 = Radermacher 8.10). Plato notes that Prodicus
devoted whole lectures to the topic of διαίρεσις (Pl. Cra. 384b = DK 84A11 = Radermacher 8.6 with note ad loc.).
101 Pl. Prt. 337a-c = DK 84A13. For other Prodicean distinctions in Plato, see Euthyd. 277e = DK 84A16 = Radermacher
8.10 with note ad loc.; Pl. Prt. 340-341b = DK 84A14; Chrm. 163d = DK 84A18); Lach. 197b-d = DK 84A17. cf. Men. 75e =
DK 84A15 and Prot. 358a–e.
102 … including, it seems, Thucydides who is said to have “emulated” (ἐζήλωσε) Prodicean “precision with words”
(τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόµασιν ἀκριβολογίαν, Marcellin. Vit. Thuc. 36 = DK 84A9; cf. Thuc. 3.82–83). Aristophanes may be
parodying Prodicus or, at least, the Prodicean interest in diaresis in the battle of the prologues in Frogs 1119-97
(Pfeiffer 1968: 39-40). Segal 1970 argues that the target is actually Protagoras. It may be noted that the practice of
synonymy may have been more widespread. The Hippocratic writers, who worked toward establishing a more
technical language of medicine, also practiced diaresis. See, for instance, Hippoc. Nat. Hom. 5 where the author selfconsciously ‘distinguishes’ (διωρίσθαι) the names for blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile by convention (κατὰ
νόµον).
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Thrasymachus and Gorgias are the best exemplars of this approach. Their interest in speech is less
grammatical and lexical than it is stylistic. For this reason, both Gorgias and Thrasymachus were
regarded, throughout antiquity, as pioneers in the development of various rhetorical techniques.103
Thrasymachus is remembered for his focus on rhythm104 and periodic composition,105 while Gorgias
is remembered for his development of a range of rhetorical figures and techniques,106 which he
exemplified in his own pathbreaking prose style.107 To be sure, when we look at the surviving
writings of both Thrasymachus and Gorgias, we can sense heightened attention to sound and affect.
The one extended fragment that survives from Thrasymachus is not only written in a highly
periodic style but also almost entirely without hiatus.108 When we look at the texts that survive from
Gorgias’s speeches, we find an even more affected style; not only are his writings filled with many of

“Thrasymachus […] and Gorgias, who are said to be the first to arrange words artfully” (Thrasymachus […] et
Gorgias, qui tamen primi traduntur arte quadam verba vinxisse, Cic. Or. 3.40 = Radermacher 9.16; cf. Cic. Or. 12.39 = DK
85A30 = Radermacher 7.34 et 9.14; Athan. Alex. In Hermog. Περὶ στάσεων 14.180.9–16 = DK 82B5a).
104 Arist. Rh. 3.8 1409a1–3 = DK 85A11 = Radermacher 9.12. Cicero also notes Gorgias’s interest in prose rhythm
(numerosus, Cic. Or. 52.175). Plato remarks on Hippias’s study of ῥυθµοί (Pl. Hp. mi. 368d = DK 86A12 = Radermacher
11.10; Pl. Hp. mai. 285d = DK 86A11 = Radermacher 11.11); this could be a study of prose rhythm, yet, since Hippias
was himself a poet, it may refer to poetic rhythm.
105 Suda Θ. 462 = DK 85A1; Radermacher 9.17. As Denniston points out, “besides its logical value as a means to the
clearer exposition of ordered thought, the period has an aesthetic value. It gives artistic shape to the combination of
words, and thus to some extent takes the place of metre” (1952: 14).
106 Plato remarks on Gorgias’s interest in concision and amplification (βραχυλογία Pl. Grg. 449c = DK 82A20 =
Radermacher 7.14; συντοµία/ µῆκος λόγων Pl. Phdr. 267a–b = DK 82A25 = Radermacher 7.18). Gorgias also came to
be known for his practice of extemporaneous speaking (Philostr. V S 1.1 proem. p. 3.19–24 Kayser = DK82A1) as well
as his invention of a set of rhetorical figures, such as antithesis, isocolon, parison, homeoteleuton (Diod. Sic. 12.53.4 =
DK 82A4 = Radermacher 7.32).
107 Gorgias seems to have had many imitators. Apart from his pupils (e.g., Alcidamas, Polos, Licymnius, and
Polycrates), we might say that the Gorgianic style lives on in the Hippocratic On Breaths and On the Art as well as
Antisthenes's Ajax, the so-called Hibeh sophist, all the way up to Epicurus' πρὸς µενοικέα and the ‘asianic’ texts of
Hegesias and Herakleides Kritikos (to name a few).
108 On Thrasymachus’s periodic style, see Denniston 1952: 14-5. Dover recognizes how there are only ten instances of
hiatus in Thrasymachus’s fragment of 600+ syllables (Dover 1997: 178). It is a curiosity that Thrasymachus’s one
extended surviving fragment does not include the paeonic rhythms that Aristotle associates with him; Dover
suggests that it must simply be atypical in this regard (Dover 1997: 173). When Plato describes Thrasymachus’s skill
at enchanting audiences, he seems to affect a rather rhythmical style himself (cretic and choriambic), which may
parody Thrasymachus’ own penchant for prose rhythm (Radermacher 9.6 with note ad loc.).
103
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the rhetorical figures of which he became eponymous, but also plenty of other jingles and metrical
flourishes.109
Thus, whereas Protagoras and Prodicus seem to value accuracy and clarity in speech and
focus on correct grammar and lexical definitions, Gorgias and Thrasymachus value affect and
musicality and seem to focus more on style. For the latter two, speech was not so much a tool for
picking out the identity of things in the world as much as a tool for instilling feelings and beliefs in
auditors. Whereas Protagoras put effort into correcting Homeric grammar, Gorgias put effort into
tricking out Homeric verses and themes and spinning them into his own brand of prose rhapsody.110
Likewise, whereas Prodicus taught how to divide words in accordance with their precise meanings,
Thrasymachus taught how to charge words with emotion. According to Plato and Aristotle, he even
designed rhetorical techniques towards such an end – an end which he (like Gorgias) described as a
matter of enchantment (κήλησις).111
These experiments with style and affect proved quite divisive among ancient and modern
readers of Gorgias and Thrasymachus.112 Since so little remains from Thrasymachus, it is impossible

109 In the Gorgianic corpus, we can find patterns of paeon: ⏑⏑⏑⏓, molossus: – – –, dispondaeus: – – – –, cretic: – ⏑ –,
choriamb: – ⏑ ⏑ –, cretic-trochee: – ⏑ – – ⏓, and ditrochee: – ⏑ – ⏓ peppered throughout. On Gorgianic style generally,
see Norden 1915: 15-75.
110 DK 82B17 = Arist. Rh. 3.17 1418a32-37 = Radermacher 8.19; DK 82B14 = Pl. Phdr. 261b-c = Radermacher 8.1.
111 DK 85B6 = Pl. Phdr. 267c = Radermacher 9.6 (see n. 108 above).
112 De Romilly remarks how “Gorgias made the glamour of elevated style available to all” and calls it “a remarkable
conquest” of which Gorgias “could be proud” – even though the whole endeavor is “charged with dynamite” and
bound to result in “scandal” (1975: 21). Dodds calls Gorgias “an indefatigable stylist, a man who polished painfully
every sentence that he wrote” and, yet, finds the writing to be “affected and boring: the well-drilled words execute ad
nauseam the same repetitive manoeuvres with the mechanical precision of a platoon on a barrack square” (1959: 8).
Many, like Denniston, are even more contemptuous: “Gorgias […] and Thrasymachus, and perhaps other sophists in
a less degree, did exercise considerable influence on Greek prose. In the case of Gorgias, the influence was, I believe,
wholly bad […] starting with the initial advantage of having nothing particular to say, he was able to concentrate all
his energies upon saying it […] we are left wondering how it was that Gorgias, performing in the πρυτανεῖον τῆς
σοφίας, before an audience whose taste had been educated by a century of great literature, was able to ‘get away
with it’” (1952: 10-2). Pfeiffer is probably correct in suggesting that Gorgias’s stylistic flourishes tend to attract
ridicule because “this is easier than to try to reach a balanced judgment on them” (1968: 49).
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to determine why he chose to focus so squarely on the stylistic, emotive, and connotative side of
speech. For Gorgias, however, we are on slightly better footing. As I shall suggest, Gorgias’s extreme
stylistic experiments may correspond to his tendency to reject Pre-Socratic concerns with linguistic
reference. He is far less concerned than his predecessors with distinguishing paths toward truth and
falsity, being and not-being, and much more interested in understanding the third path – the way of
δόξα – along which there lie many types of distraction, both destructive and delightful. Gorgias’s
most direct engagement with earlier, Pre-Socratic theories of language comes in a remarkable work
known as On Not Being, or On Nature (περὶ τοῡ µὴ ὄντος ἢ περὶ φύσεως). It is here we shall turn
next before returning to the Helen.
1.5. Gorgias on λόγος
1.5.1. περὶ τοῡ µὴ ὄντος
Gorgias’s On Not Being (henceforth ONB) has been preserved in paraphrase by two sources:
Sextus Empiricus’s Against the Logicians and the Pseudo-Aristotelean On Melissus, Xenophanes, and
Gorgias (henceforth MXG). As both versions of ONB agree, Gorgias’s original work was built upon a
triple-tiered thesis: (1) nothing is, (2) even if something is, what is cannot be known, (3) even if
something is and can be known, what is and is known cannot be communicated to others (οὐ
δηλωτὸν ἄλλοις).113 For our purposes, the third and final thesis, which is about noncommunicability, will be of the greatest importance.114

MXG 979a12-3. For Sextus: “inexpressible and inexplicable to another” (ἀνέξοιστον καὶ ἀνερµήνευτον τῷ πέλας,
Sext. Emp. Math. 7.65 = DK 82B3).
114 My treatment of ONB will aim to synthesize both redactions of the work rather than reject one in favor of another.
Regarding the dates of the works, it seems that both versions were composed around the same time. Jaap Mansfeld
(1988) has persuasively argued that MXG was written by a “Pyrrhonizing Aristotelean” sometime in the 2nd century
CE. Sextus, too, seems to have written in the 2nd century. However, it is likely that the source material for each
113
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As we analyze the final thesis of ONB, we ought to tread carefully just as with the account of
λόγος in the Helen, since here too, Gorgias’s claims are probably not to be taken too seriously. On
the one hand, it has been long recognized that Gorgias’s ONB is conspicuously constructed to
undercut Eleatic philosophy by negating not only being but also thinking and speaking – the very
three things Parmenides had united.115 For Parmenides, the notion of being is real, thinkable, and
speakable, whereas the idea of not-being is unreal, unthinkable, and unspeakable. Gorgias merely
swaps out what is real and unreal and runs with the Eleatic claim of unthinkability and
unspeakability as far as he can. What results is an absurd travesty of Eleatic philosophy.116 On the
other hand, we should recall that arguing for impossible, self-undermining, or highly unintuitive
claims (such as Gorgias’s triple-tiered negation of being, thinking, and speaking) was the stock and
trade of many intellectuals at Gorgias’s time. We can think of Plato’s Euthydemus, in which the title
character argues that Ctesippus’s father is is a dog,117 or Pheidippides, in the Clouds, who argues that

version goes back to the 1st century CE; Jaap Mansfeld (1988) suggests that the material of MXG may go back to
Agrippa, the Pyrrhonist philosopher, while David Sedley (1992) suggests that Sextus’s material on Gorgias may have
been drawn from Aenesidemus. Despite a similar pedigree, the perceived reliability of the two versions has varied
dramatically over time. Hermann Diels preferred Sextus’s version of Gorgias’s treatise and relegated MXG to a
footnote in his edition of the Pre-Socratic fragments. His opinion prevailed until the mid-20th century when scholars
began to privilege MXG largely because Sextus’s version is freighted with later philosophical jargon. Despite this fact,
there is some reason to believe that Sextus’s version is more faithful to the structure of Gorgias’s argument insofar as
it mirrors more closely the argument structures favored in Gorgias’s other speeches (Rodriguez 2019). All in all, I
agree with George Kerferd and Mario Untersteiner that in order to understand what Gorgias himself wrote, we must
take both versions into account and find a suitable synthesis of both redactions (Kerferd 1981b: 321; cf. Untersteiner
1954: 97).
115 Kerferd lays this position out nicely (1981a: 99).
116 “Whatever his own position, he reflects the prominence of Eleatic theory in the fifth century and offers a reaction
against it by a leading intellectual” (Graham 2010: 725). If we can date the treatise to the 440s (DK 82A10 = Olymp. in
Gorg. Proem. 9 (7.22-8.12 Westerink)), then ONB may be in contemporary conversation with Melissus, who wrote
around the same time (see n. 53 above).
117 Pl. Euthyd. 298d-e.
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it is a just thing for a son to punish his father.118 The proper response to these types of arguments
(and most knew it) was not to capitulate and assent to the unintuitive claim, but to admire the clever
way in which the argument was constructed and, perhaps, to reflect upon the slipperiness of
broader philosophical questions about, say, justice – or, in Gorgias’s case, ontology and language.
That being said, Gorgias’s ONB should not be thought of as a mere rhetorical trick or as a mere
travesty of Eleatic thought with no philosophical value, as some have claimed.119 Even if Gorgias’s
unbelievable claims about non-communicability do little to arrest our intuitive trust in the human
capacity to speak, it nevertheless invites us to question the way we speak about speaking. That is, it raises
questions about whether or not speech can be reduced to a matter of linguistic reference as the PreSocratics tended ostensibly to do, and whether or not an alternative, non-referential account of
speech is possible.
As I shall illustrate, Gorgias’s ONB challenges the Pre-Socratic model of linguistic reference
and opens up a new theoretical space for an alternative model to be drawn. As we shall see, this
suggestion of an alternative model of speech can be found in an important set of concessions made

118 Ar. Nub. 1405. We can also, of course, recall the practice of offering encomia on unlikely or difficult subjects – such
as Polycrates’s praise of mice (Arist. Rh. 2.24 1401b15 = Radermacher 21.10 with note ad loc.) and pebbles (Alex. Rh.
3.10-2 = Radermacher 21.9 with note ad loc.) and the anonymous encomium of salt we hear of from Plato (Symp.
177b) and Isocrates (Hel. 12). Gorgias’s pupil Alcidamas is also said to have given an encomium on death (Cic. Tusc.
1.48.116 = Radermacher 22.12). To be sure, Gorgias’s Encomium of Helen may be regarded as a species of these.
119 E.g., “man darf den Gedankengehalt dieser παίγνια nicht 'ernst' nehmen […] Der ‘philosophische Nihilismus’ des
Gorgias ist aus der Geschichte der Philosophie zu streichen. Seine Scherzrede fiber die Natur hat ihren Platz in der
Geschichte der Rhetorik” (Gomperz 1912: 35); “There is nothing here of philosophical importance; only a kind of
clever-silliness” (Robinson 1973, 58). As will become apparent, my position on the relative seriousness of Gorgias’s
ONB aligns more closely with Gisela Striker’s: “How seriously are we to take Gorgias’ arguments? They are certainly
not serious in the sense of being honest attempts at establishing their conclusions. But they might be serious
objections to Parmenides – if, that is, they are good enough to show that there must be something wrong with
Parmenides’ way of reasoning […] surely the question should not be whether we find these arguments intelligent or
compelling, but whether they were as good as or rather worse than Parmenides’s or Melissus’ own arguments […] I
for one would be inclined to say that Gorgias is no worse than Parmenides” (1996: 13-14). Patricia Curd argues that
Gorgias’s treatise was specially designed to “demonstrate that Parmenides’ requirements are self-defeating, for they
allow the reality of what-is-not just as they demonstrate the reality of what-is” (2006: 188 cf. Gagarin 2001: 286).
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at the close of Sextus’s version of ONB. There, Gorgias offers both an exit clause to his absurd
reduction of Pre-Socratic linguistic models as well as the primary criteria for a new theory of
communication which is most fully realized in the playful and speculative account of λόγος which
he puts forth in the Helen. To illustrate this, we shall briefly treat Gorgias’s sequence of arguments
made in his final proof and, after this, his final concessions, which set the foundation for the model
of speech found in the Helen.
1.5.1.1. On non-communicability
In both versions of ONB, the third and final thesis – namely, that reality cannot be
communicated – begins by targeting the fraught correspondence between words and things: speech
(λόγος) refers to things in the world yet it is not equivalent to the things to which it refers. Since
speech is distinct from all of the things to which it might refer, it cannot manifest meaning in the
way that things in the world can. As Gorgias puts it, things in the world (which he equates with
perceptible phenomena) are apprehended by organs of perception, such as sight and hearing. The
meaning of speech is apprehended neither by sight nor hearing per se nor any faculty of senseperception any more than the eyes can see sound or the ears can hear color:
ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἡ ὄψις τοὺς φθόγγους γιγνώσκει, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἡ ἀκοὴ τὰ χρώµατα
ἀκούει, ἀλλὰ φθόγγους· καὶ λέγει ὁ λέγων, ἀλλ’ οὐ χρῶµα οὐδὲ πρᾶγµα.
For just as sight cannot recognize sounds, so too hearing does not hear colors, rather sounds.
And so, the one speaking utters speech, not a color or a thing.120

Ps.-Arist. MXG 6 980b1-3. See also Sextus’s version: “For the thing by which we communicate is speech, and
speech is not the things which exist and are. Therefore, we do not communicate things that are to other people, rather
speech, which is distinct from things that exist. Then, just as what is visible could not become audible and vice versa,
so too, because what is exists separately [from speech], [what is] could not become our speech. And not being speech,
[what is] could not be signified to another person” (ᾧ γὰρ µηνύοµεν, ἔστι λόγος, λόγος δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ὑποκείµενα
καὶ ὄντα· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ὄντα µηνύοµεν τοῖς πέλας ἀλλὰ λόγον, ὃς ἕτερός ἐστι τῶν ὑποκειµένων. καθάπερ οὖν τὸ
ὁρατὸν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀκουστὸν καὶ ἀνάπαλιν, οὕτως ἐπεὶ ὑπόκειται τὸ ὂν ἐκτός, οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο λόγος ὁ
ἡµέτερος· µὴ ὢν δὲ λόγος οὐκ ἂν δηλωθείη ἑτέρῳ. Sext. Emp. Math. 7.84-5 = DK 82B3).
120
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By Gorgias’s account, λόγος stands apart from the phenomena to which it might refer, and it is
denied any faculty through which one might perceive its meaning. It is merely a mute kernel
reference, sealed away into a tautology: “the one speaking utters speech” (λέγει ὁ λέγων).121
1.5.1.2. Exit clause (Sext. Emp. Math. 7.85-6)
In the final part of the Pseudo-Aristotelean MXG, Gorgias is shown to pivot to a new claim
that, even if words could manifest meaning, no two individuals could have the same mental
representation of the same word.122 However, in Sextus’s version, Gorgias does not pivot to a new
topic about the correspondence between words and thoughts. Instead, he continues to flesh out his
claims about the correspondence between words and things. In this account, we can find two
important concessions which gesture toward an alternative account of language. First, Gorgias is
shown to remark that certain phenomena, such as taste and color, can, in fact, trigger verbal
responses which correspond to the quality of that particular taste or color:
ὅ γε µὴν λόγος, φησίν, ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν προσπιπτόντων ἡµῖν πραγµάτων συνίσταται,
τουτέστι τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς τοῦ χυλοῦ ἐγκυρήσεως ἐγγίνεται ἡµῖν ὁ κατὰ ταύτης
τῆς ποιότητος ἐκφερόµενος λόγος, καὶ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ χρώµατος ὑποπτώσεως ὁ κατὰ τοῦ
χρώµατος. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐχ ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἐκτὸς παραστατικός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκτὸς τοῦ
λόγου µηνυτικὸν γίνεται.

121 “The one speaking does not speak sound or color, but speech” (οὐ <ψόφον> λέγει <ὁ λέ>γων οὐδὲ χρῶµα, ἀλλὰ
λόγον, Ps.-Arist. MXG 6 980b6). Gorgias’s description of speech in ONB may have some affiliation with another
remark from his fragments: “but what no hand grasps and what no eye sees, how can the tongue express it or the
listener’s ear hear it?” (DK 82B28 [in Syriac] trans. Laks and Most 2016). Jacques Brunschwig notes that few would
actually consider problematic the fact that words are not concrete things like their referents – after all “qui a jamais
pensé qu'on pouvait se nourrir en lisant le menu” (1971: 81). Instead, the deficiency in language only becomes a
problem when viewed from a strict Eleatic perspective which aims to establish a unitary correspondence between
speech, thought, and being. Thus, Gorgias’s claims about non-communicability are intrinsically tethered to his
meontological (i.e., bizarro-Eleatic) hypothesis. I agree with Brunschwig that Gorgias’s claim about noncommunicability is not an expression of what he truly believes. Instead, “il voulait faire place nette pour un autre
modèle de la communication, libéré de la conception étroitement référentielle du langage qui fait toute la
vulnérabilité de celui qu'il critique” (Brunschwig 1971: 83).
122 In Ps.-Arist. MXG 6 980b8-19, Gorgias is shown to move on from his argument about the correspondence between
words and things and to present a new argument that targets the fraught correspondence between words and
thoughts. In this case, he, in a sense, doubles back to the second thesis of ONB – namely, that even if something
existed, it could not be known. What this claim adds is that, for Gorgias, speech is not only non-referential but also
non-representational: a word neither refers to a specific thing in the world nor represents a single idea to all minds.
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To be sure, speech, he says, is for us composed of things that strike us from the outside – i.e.,
perceptibles. For instance, from contact with flavor, there arises within us speech expressed by
that quality, and, from the encounter with color, the [speech expressed] by that color. But, if this
is the case, speech is not an indicator of the external, rather the external is revelatory of speech.123

Surprisingly, Gorgias rebuilds the bridge between words and things which he had only just before
tried to demolish. However, the traffic of the bridge moves in the opposite direction since it is things
in the world that give expression to speech, and not vice versa.124 While this passage does help to
rebuild a bridge between words and things, it does not entirely bridge the gap between words and
their interpretations – that is, it does not explain how the meaning of an utterance is apprehended.
If we read further, Gorgias makes one more concession which suggests that even if λόγος
does not exist in the same way as phenomenal objects exist in the world, λόγος may nevertheless
exist and somehow be apprehended differently:
εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὑπόκειται, φησίν, ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῶν λοιπῶν ὑποκειµένων, καὶ
πλείστῳ διενήνοχε τὰ ὁρατὰ σώµατα τῶν λόγων· δι’ ἑτέρου γὰρ ὀργάνου ληπτόν ἐστι τὸ
ὁρατὸν καὶ δι’ ἄλλου ὁ λόγος.
For even if speech exists, Gorgias says, it at the very least differs from the rest of things that
exist, and visible bodies would differ most of all from things spoken. For the visible is
apprehensible through one organ and speech through another.125
Here we are left with a final hope. Communication may be possible if speech “differs from the rest
of things that exist” and has its own way of being received. If we take this final remark into account
as we review the work of ONB as a whole, we might even be able to add an embedded fourth thesis:

1. Nothing is.

Sext. Emp. Math. 7.85-6 = DK 82B3.
Mourelatos 1987 also recognizes this first concession and extracts from it the conclusion that Gorgias had a
behavioralist theory of communication. As noted above, I am not sure that Gorgias develops any strict theory of
communication per se. In ONB, Gorgias seems to me to advertise how referential theories of language fall short and
hints at some possible alternatives, which he playfully explores in the Helen.
125 Sext. Emp. Math. 7.86 = DK 82B3.
123
124
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2. Even if something is, what is cannot be known.
3. Even if something is and can be known, what is known cannot be communicated
4. Even if something is and can be known and can be communicated, what is communicated
must be altogether different and received differently from other sensory experiences.
If this is correct, then Gorgias, after arguing at length that speech fails to be apprehended by any
sense organs, closes his speech by posing a new possibility: if communication does work like sense
perception, it would need something like a sixth sense. What I would like to claim is that Gorgias
develops this pseudo-sensory model of communication within his Helen and draws upon the
concept of magic as a frame for articulating it.
1.5.2. Encomium of Helen (§§ 8-14) as an alternate model of λόγος
When we turn back to Gorgias’s non-referential account of λόγος in the Helen, we find that
he accommodates for the criteria left open at the end of ONB. He does so, on the one hand, by
turning speech into a physical thing that differs from all other phenomenal things:
λόγος δυνάστης µέγας ἐστίν, ὃς σµικροτάτῳ σώµατι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ θειότατα ἔργα
ἀποτελεῖ.
Speech is a mighty dynast that achieves the most divine things with the smallest and most
aphenomenal body.126
Here, speech is a physical (perhaps atomic) entity that differs markedly from phenomenal entities. In
addition to giving speech substance while setting it apart, Gorgias also provides a way of
apprehending speech by invoking a new concept which had been emerging (messily) in Gorgias’s
own lifetime – namely, the soul (ἡ ψυχή). 127
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον ἔχει ἥ τε τοῦ λόγου δύναµις πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς τάξιν ἥ τε τῶν
φαρµάκων τάξις πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωµάτων φύσιν.

126
127

Helen § 8.
On the emergent concept of the soul, see Laks 1999.
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The power of speech has the same relation to the order of the soul as the order of drugs has
to the nature of the body.128
The word ψυχή appears only in Gorgias’s Encomium of Helen, and it is clearly a crucial ingredient for
the model of speech which he develops in sections 8-14. By including the soul as a receptor of
speech, Gorgias ensures that λόγος is no longer a mute kernel of inaccessible meaning. Instead, it is
apprehensible in a way somewhat parallel to sense perceptions. Gorgias shows how λόγος is able to
shape (πλάττειν § 11), impress (τυποῦν § 13), and fashion (ἐνεργάζεσθαι § 8, 13) the soul in ways
that recall the haptic mode of perception commonly associated with sense organs.129
Importantly, this verbal psychagogy differs markedly from the psychagogy which derives
from the faculty of sight. When Gorgias describes how vision works in sections 15-19, he paints a
picture which recalls the one he painted of λόγος; however, in accordance with the ONB, both
modes of apprehension differ from one another. According to Gorgias, the eyes passively receive
sights of whatever might happen to be there:
ἃ γὰρ ὁρῶµεν, ἔχει φύσιν οὐχ ἣν ἡµεῖς θέλοµεν, ἀλλ’ ἣν ἕκαστον ἔτυχε· διὰ δὲ τῆς
ὄψεως ἡ ψυχὴ κἀν τοῖς τρόποις τυποῦται.
For the things which we see do not have the nature we wish them to, but the one each
happens to have. And through sight, the soul is shaped even in its basic disposition.130
Moreover, when the eyes apprehend a sight, they react immediately and witlessly to it and their
reaction, in turn, affects the soul directly.
αὐτίκα γὰρ ὅταν πολέµια σώµατα […] εἰ θεάσηται ἡ ὄψις, ἐταράχθη καὶ ἐτάραξε τὴν
ψυχήν, ὥστε πολλάκις κινδύνου τοῦ µέλλοντος <ὡς> ὄντος φεύγουσιν ἐκπλαγέντες.

Helen § 14.
As Brooke Holmes has argued, Gorgias slots ψυχή into the role of σῶµα (as it appears in medical writings) where
it functions as “a kind of interval” fitted conceptually between the “external catalyst and a (visible) outcome”
(Holmes 2010: 214). He also, as I shall argue, slots δόξα into the role of a semi-somatic sense faculty.
130 Helen §15.
128
129
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For immediately, whenever martial bodies […] if sight sees them, it is perturbed and it
perturbs the soul so that often people are startled and flee approaching danger <as if> it were
present.131
As Gorgias describes, when people see an oncoming army, their eyes are perturbed and their eyes,
in turn, immediately perturb the soul. When it comes to the apprehension of words, on the other
hand, Gorgias writes that speech impacts the soul in whatever way it wants and does so not by
appealing to the ears or any organ of sense perception but to the human faculty of opinion (δόξα):
ὥστε περὶ τῶν πλείστων οἱ πλεῖστοι τὴν δόξαν σύµβουλον τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχονται. ἡ δὲ
δόξα σφαλερὰ καὶ ἀβέβαιος οὖσα σφαλεραῖς καὶ ἀβεβαίοις εὐτυχίαις περιβάλλει τοὺς
αὐτῇ χρωµένους.
So that, concerning most things, most people supply themselves with opinion as a counselor
for the soul. But, being slippery and unstable, opinion sends those who use it into slippery
and unstable fortune.132
Unlike sight, which passively receives images and transmits its reactions directly to the soul, human
opinion acts as “a counselor of the soul” (σύµβουλον τῇ ψυχῇ).133 In this capacity, it is “slippery”
(σφαλερὰ) and “unstable” (ἀβέβαιος). By appealing to the eyes of opinion (as opposed to the eyes
themselves or the ears per se), speech shapes the soul in whatever way it wants – making manifest
even things that are unclear and unbelievable.
ὅτι δ’ ἡ πειθὼ προσιοῦσα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐτυπώσατο ὅπως ἐβούλετο, χρὴ µαθεῖν
πρῶτον µὲν τοὺς τῶν µετεωρολόγων λόγους, οἵτινες δόξαν ἀντὶ δόξης τὴν µὲν
ἀφελόµενοι τὴν δ’ ἐνεργασάµενοι τὰ ἄπιστα καὶ ἄδηλα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς τῆς δόξης
ὄµµασιν ἐποίησαν

Helen §16.
Helen § 11.
133 The notion of a human faculty serving as a σύµβουλος to the soul is rare. However, it is also found in Plato who
describes confidence (θάρρος) and fear (φόβος) as senseless advisors (ἄφρονε ξυµβούλω) to the soul at Ti. 69c8-d4
and labels pleasure (ἡδονή) and pain (λύπη) as antagonistic and senseless advisors (συµβούλω ἐναντίω τε καὶ
ἄφρονε) at Leg. 644c6-7, see ch. 2, p. 116-8 with n. 63. Antiphon makes similar use of the term σύµβουλος when he
speaks of how anger (ὀργή) and prejudice (διαβολή) are the worst σύµβουλοι since anger destroys that faculty by
which one makes decisions – i.e., our judgment (αὐτὸ γὰρ ᾧ βουλεύεται, τὴν γνώµην, διαφθείρει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου,
Antiph. 5.73).
131
132
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For evidence that persuasion, while joining with speech, also shapes the soul in whatever
way it wants, it is necessary to study first of all the accounts of cosmologists, who, in
dispelling and instilling one opinion instead of another, have made unbelievable and unclear
things manifest to the eyes of opinion.134
Put simply, speech impacts the soul through the medium of human opinion (δόξα), just as sights
impact the soul through the medium of the eyes. Rather than functioning referentially or digitally,
Gorgias’s λόγος might be thought to act more like an analog frequency which, though
imperceptible, is nevertheless received and amplified by the faculty of opinion before it is
retransmitted to the soul.
In final analysis, when Gorgias’s remarks about speech are viewed against the larger
backdrop of Pre-Socratic concerns with linguistic reference, it becomes clear that Gorgias’s
description of how speech works runs counter to earlier preoccupations with language and
linguistic reference. Not only does Gorgias’s ONB portray the question of linguistic reference as selfdefeating, but it also opens the way toward a new model of communication, with which he
experiments in the Helen. There, he offers a loose, psychosomatic model of communication in which
a sub-phenomenal entity (λόγος) impinges upon the soul by way of human opinion in whatever
way it wants. When it comes down to explaining the actual mechanics of how this psychosomatic,
indeed, psychagogic, process of communication works, Gorgias is more provocative than precise.
He draws upon a collection of overlapping frames which offer different models for intuiting (if not
entirely understanding) the underlying mechanics of Gorgias’s mighty λόγος. And among these
frames, we find magic. In the next half of the chapter, we shall address what Gorgias means when he
uses the language of magic and how that language complements his psychagogic account of λόγος.

134

Helen § 13.
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2. Gorgias on enchantment
In sections 10 and 14 of the Helen, Gorgias associates the power of λόγος with the power of
magic. In these two short sections, we find a surprisingly wide variety of different words associated
with magic – such as ἐπῳδή, θέλγειν, γοητεία, ἐκγοητεύειν, µαγεία and words closely allied with
magic such as φάρµακον, φαρµακεύειν, ἐπαγωγοί, ἀπαγωγοί.135 Gorgias is even responsible for
the first appearance of the literal term for magic itself (µαγεία).136 Although the phenomenon of
magical enchantment is limited to a short section of the speech, it receives a rich treatment and is
often considered one of the more memorable and salient themes of the speech as a whole. That being
said, it is not immediately obvious why Gorgias felt the need to include magic and incantations as
examples of the powerful nature of speech in sections 8-14.137 He cites plenty of other examples of
powerful speech elsewhere – such as poetry (§ 9) and various forms of debate and oratory (§ 13) –
which could have putatively sufficed to exemplify the non-discursive δύναµις of speech. Thus, for
Gorgias, the category of enchantment is specifically picked out and included for the particular light

135 “In a luxurious bunch of words he combines all the expressions that can be used for magic and witchcraft” (De
Romilly 1975: 2); “most of the basic terms of magic in the technical sense are present in his description of rhetoric […]
only the term κατάδεσµος seems to be missing” (Braarvig 1999: 34-5). There are, in fact, some key terms missing –
notably, any word related to κήλησις – but, suffice to say, the breadth of diction is remarkable. One of the common
meanings of φάρµακον is “enchanted potion, philtre: hence charm, spell” (LSJ s.v. I 3) – a meaning which modern
readers often overlook (as noted by Pharr 1932: 272–274, Dickie 2001: 14, Edmonds 2019: 14, et al.). On a similar use of
ἐπαγωγοὶ and ἀπαγωγοὶ in the context of magic compare the Hippocratic, On the Sacred Disease: “He who can lead
away such an affliction by purifications and magic and also bring it on by devising other means” (Ὅστις γὰρ οἷός τε
περικαθαίρων ἐστὶ καὶ µαγεύων ἀπάγειν τοιοῦτον πάθος, οὗτος κἂν ἐπάγοι ἕτερα τεχνησάµενος, Hp. Morb.
Sacr. 3.10).
136 For the birth of the term ‘magic’ in ancient Greece, see Bremmer 2008.
137 “Gorgias likens the persuasive word of the charmer to the sorcerer’s spell, even though his culture would have
enabled him to make the distinction, if he had wanted to” (Graf 1997: 26).
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is casts onto his account of non-discursive λόγος.138 In the remaining pages of this chapter, we shall
determine what kind of light this is.
Scholars who have commented upon the role of magic in Gorgias’s Helen have tended to cut
directly to the question of whether Gorgias speaks of magic metaphorically139 or literally140 and
whether his account of a magical λόγος is meant to rationalize the concept of magic or irrationalize the
concept of λόγος.141 As we shall see, these are not the best questions with which to begin. Not only
are the dichotomies of literal and metaphorical, rational and irrational, quite slippery criteria to work

See the astute remark by Wilhelm Süss: “Die gorgianischen Vergleiche sind niemals ein müßiges Spiel der Worte,
sondern sie müssen sich eine dialektische Kelter gefallen lassen, die immer neue Ingredienzien aus ihnen zu ziehen
versteht” (1910: 83).
139 “…’the δύναµις of the incantation consorting . . .’ can really be read only as a metaphor. It explains nothing; […]
What Gorgias really offers is a verbal ‘slide,’ […] implying – without proof – that θέλγειν, when used to instill
pleasure and banish pain, is persuasion” (Adkins 1983 [1977]: 111-2). “This brings us to a case of magical language
which in fact is not necessarily magic per se, ‘magic’ used to describe another phenomenon, namely rhetoric. Magic
and rhetoric may have certain features in common, but one would be wrong to identify the two […] Gorgias does not
say that rhetoric is magic: it is rather like magic, speeches are magical, in the way one might say of a cunning speaker
even today, who influences and manipulates like a powerful master” (Braarvig 1999: 36-7). On the figurative quality
of Gorgias’s language, see also Lain Entralgo 1970: 63, 88.
140 Marie-Pierre Noël argues that Gorgias is giving an earnest account of magic – the type of magic he would have
been familiar with through his encounters with Empedocles: “Comme nous l'avons vu pour Gorgias, il ne faut pas
considerer ces termes comme de simples métaphores. Tous reposent sur une expérience magique, qui est celle du
pouvoir de la parole” (1989: 148). Similarly, Walter Burkert places Gorgias’s statements in the Helen neatly within the
tradition of what he calls ‘shamans’ – a tradition which included Empedocles, Epimenides, and the ἀγύρται whom
Plato denigrates in the Republic (1962: 48, 55).
141 De Romilly (under the influence of Dobbs) reads Gorgias’s discussion of magic and λόγος as a shift “from
irrational models to rational teaching” and, after citing the rational character of the word τέχνη, concludes that
Gorgias is a “theoretician of the magic spell of words” and that “he was deliberately shifting magic into something
rational” (1975: 16, 20). This approach of reading Gorgias as either a rationalizer or irrationalizer has been influential,
with only minor pushback. For instance, George Walsh prefers “nonanalytical or analogical” to irrational (1984: 83),
and Hugh Parry questions whether the word τέχνη carries that much of a rationalizing tone (1992: 151).
Nevertheless, Parry concludes that “Gorgias was, like Hippocrates, a rationalist, intent on pressing the claims of the
non-literal ‘magic’ of rhetorical persuasion” (1992: 152). James Porter sums up the different attitudes toward this
problem in the following way: “If the role played by magic in his speech stands out in curious contrast to the appeals
to scientificity, there are a few possible explanations available. The appeal to the invisible is as much a leap of faith as
it is a badge of rationalism: Gorgias could be parodying rather than endorsing the hyperconfidence of science.
Alternatively, magic could be a genuine sign of his recalcitrance towards the spirit of late fifth-century rationalism.
Or, finally, Gorgias’ stance could reflect the fact that magic and rationalism coexisted, however oddly to us, in late
fifth-century minds” (2010: 284).
138
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with, but they hinge largely upon one’s (unprovable) presupposition about Gorgias’s belief or lack
of belief in magic.142
In what follows, I take a different route by establishing first the context of Gorgias’s remarks
by surveying how earlier writers used the language of enchantment. As we shall see, Gorgias’s
discussion of magical incantations plays on a long tradition that had preceded him. Archaic poets,
from Homer onward, make rich use of the language of magic and enchantment. When they do, they
often use it to mark out a range of psychosomatic experiences which result in either highly positive
or highly negative sorts of diversion. As I shall illustrate at the close of this chapter, Gorgias evokes
and even builds upon this poetic category of enchantment as a way of complementing his pseudosensory model of speech which, much like enchantment, is presented as extraordinary in its power
yet dangerously ambivalent in its effects. In short, Gorgias turns to the language of enchantment not
only as a way of articulating unfamiliar channels of communication but also to underscore these
channels as strange or extraordinary.
2.1. Enchantment before Gorgias: experience, means, and ends
2.1.1. The experience of enchantment
When it comes to tracing the usage of the language of magic, we can begin at the beginning.
Words related to θέλγειν, κηλεῖν, and ἐπῳδή go all the way back to Homer and, from Homer
onwards, they are most often used by poets to refer to a family of psychosomatic experiences which
affect gods and mortals alike.143 Although it is often quite difficult to tease descriptions of real magic

On the problem of demarcating what is said literally from what is said metaphorically, see Introduction, pp. 9-11.
For a discussion of the problems with the Doddsian dichotomy of rational and irrational in relation to two other PreSocratics, Empedocles and Parmenides, see Laks 2013 [2003].
143 In the Iliad, gods are the sole agents of enchantment, and enchantment is denoted only by forms of θέλγειν. From
the Odyssey onwards, both mortals and gods perform enchantments which are denoted through forms of θέλγειν,
κηλεῖν, and ἐπαοιδή.
142
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apart from descriptions of metaphoric magic, the experience that this lexical category points to is
primarily one of diversion. In this capacity, the language of enchantment overlaps with a range of
neighboring experiences – such as delight (τέρψις), astonishment (ἔκπληξις), awe (ἄγη), ecstasy
(ἔκστασις), as well as forms of pleasure (χάρις/ἡδονή), desire (ἵµερος/πόθος), deception (ἀπάτη/
δόλος /ψεῦδος), persuasion (πειθός/πάρφασις), forgetting (λήθη), and even sleep (κῶµα/ὕπνος).144
Each of these experiences can be enchanting because each is able to change (µεθιστάναι), turn aside
(παρατρέπειν), or steal (κλέπτειν/ἀφαιρεῖν) one’s mind or attention to differing degrees of
intensity.
Scholars who have commented upon the lexical category of enchantment in Homer have
often highlighted the fact that it almost always carries with it a sense of “self-loss,” “amnesia,”
“unconsciousness,” or deep “immersion.”145 In the Iliad, for instance, we see that enchantment
denotes not only the experience brought on by Hermes’s hypnotic ῥάβδος,146 but also the confusion

144 Some readers have attempted to subsume enchantment under one of these experiences. Finkelberg, for instance,
takes θέλξις as an ‘intenser’ form of τέρψις (1998; 1985). As we shall see, this is inadequate. Although enchantment
does partially overlap with the semantic range of τέρψις, the category also floods well beyond it.
145 “Enchantment is a kind of unconsciousness” (Walsh 1984: 17); “the ‘loss of oneself’” (Pucci 1987: 193 followed by
Clay 1994); “The effect of thélxis, then, is not just a pleasurable feeling of relaxation and enjoyment; thélxis brings
amnesia: of unpleasant realities as well as of duties one should not forget” (Graf 2019: 135). Recently, a group of
classicists has intriguingly equated the poetics of enchantment in Homer with the modern, experiential criterion of
“immersion” recently popularized in virtual reality studies (Allan, De Jong, De Jonge 2017: 37, 46). Note too, Louis
Pratt’s remarks on the modern concept of literary absorption (1993: 79-80).
146 See also 14.252 when personified Sleep describes hypnotizing Zeus. The passages in which Hermes is described as
enchanting mortals with sleep have already ossified into a formula in both the Iliad and the Odyssey: “he took his
wand with which he enchants the eyes of the men whom he wants to; others, too, he wakes from slumber” (εἵλετο δὲ
ῥάβδον, τῇ τ᾿ ἀνδρῶν ὄµµατα θέλγει | ὧν ἐθέλει, τοὺς δ᾿ αὖτε καὶ ὑπνώοντας ἐγείρει, Il. 24.343-4 = Od. 5.47-8). A
variation of the formula occurs again at Od. 24.3-4: “he took in his hands the fine golden wand with which he
enchants the eyes of the men whom he wants to; others too he wakes from slumber” (ἔχε δὲ ῥάβδον µετὰ χερσὶν
καλὴν χρυσείην, τῇ τ᾿ ἀνδρῶν ὄµµατα θέλγει ὧν | ἐθέλει, τοὺς δ᾿ αὖτε καὶ ὑπνώοντας ἐγείρει). The folk
etymology linking θέλγω with ἐθέλω, which we find later in the Greek tradition (θέλγειν εἰς τὸ θέλειν ἄγειν,
Apollonius Sophista 86.30: ΘΕΛΓΕΙΝ), may already partially underpin the wording of this Homeric formula.
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cast by Zeus, Poseidon, and Apollo into the minds of soldiers on the battlefield.147 There is also the
experience of seduction brought on by the powers of Aphrodite’s κεστός, which steals even the
strong mind (ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα) with fondness (φιλότης), desire (ἵµερος), and intimate persuasion
(ὀαριστὺς πάρφασις).148 In the Odyssey, the language of enchantment can be found clustering
around a similar family of distractions ranging between hypnosis,149 seduction,150 and mental
delusion.151 The distracting force of enchantment, moreover, complements nicely the theme of
memory and forgetting, which echoes throughout the Odyssey when enchantresses (e.g., Calypso,152
Circe,153 and the Sirens154) all threaten to distract the unenchantable mind (ἀκήλητος νόος) of
Odysseus from remembering his duty to hearth and home.155
2.1.2. The ends of enchantment
The experience of enchantment is marked not only by an overriding sense of distraction, but
also by a radical sense of ambivalence. That is to say, enchantments may result in wanted or
unwanted distractions, dangerous delusions, or restorative diversions, which result in detriment or
benefit. Also, in the Odyssey, the tale of Odysseus’s survival which reaches Ithaca may be the truth or

147 Zeus uses enchantment against a group of Greek soldiers (Il. 12.255), Poseidon against Alcathous (Il. 13.435),
Apollo against a group of the Greek soldiers (Il. 15.321), Zeus once more against a group of Greek soldiers (Il. 15.594),
Apollo tricks (i.e., enchants) Achilles by shape-shifting into Agenor (Il. 21.604).
148 Il. 14.215. A scholiast ad loc. glosses ὀαριστὺς πάρφασις with πειθώ. Pindar uses the word for deceitful speech
(Pind. Nem. 8.32).
149 See note 146.
150 Aegisthus enchants/seduces (θέλγεσκ᾿) Clytemnestra with words (ἔπεσσι, Od. 3.264); Penelope can
enchant/seduce (θέλγειν) the suitors with her mere appearance (Od. 18.212).
151 Telemachus suspects that a δαίµων has been able to enchant/delude (θέλγειν) him into seeing his father alive and
well (Od. 16.195). Athena and Zeus are projected to enchant/delude (θέλγειν) the suitors (16.298).
152 Calypso attempts to enchant/divert (θέλγειν) Odysseus’s nostalgia with soft and wheedling words (µαλακοῖσι
καὶ αἱµυλίοισι λόγοισιν) so that he might forget Ithaca (ὅπως Ἰθάκης ἐπιλήσεται, Od. 1.57).
153 Circe fails in her attempt to enchant (θέλγειν) and to poison with drugs (φάρµακα) the unenchantable mind
(ἀκήλητος νόος) of Odysseus (Od. 10.318-26). There may be some affinity between ἀκήλητος (Od. 10.329) and
Odysseus’s defining characteristic πολύτροπος (Od. 10.330) – a word which, outside the prologue, appears only here
in this passage.
154 Sirens fail to enchant (θέλγειν) Odysseus with their sonorous song (λιγυρῇ ἀοιδῇ, Od. 12.40-4).
155 For a reading of how the motif of enchantment-qua-distraction works in the Odyssey, see Rabel 2002.
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a mere lie (ψεῦδος) fashioned to win favor (χαρίζειν); either way, whether a desired true tale or an
unwanted lie, the tale is powerful enough to enchant (θέλγειν) the heart (ἦτορ) of his auditor.156
Even when the enchanting speech is true, as with the enchantments (θελκτήρια) of Phemius’s songcraft, it may bring desired experiences of pleasure to some (such as Telemachus) or undesired pain
to others (such as Penelope).157 Very often, this shifting ambivalence embedded within the concept of
enchantment can be used to underscore the tragic irony of a particular scene. For instance, in the
Odyssey, the Trojan embassy ironically calls the wooden horse a potential enchantment (θελκτήρια)
of the gods and thereby ironically underscores the unwanted danger of the object while presenting it
as a desired benefit.158 In final analysis, the language of enchantment, in Homer, is inherently
ambiguous and unstable, and, because of this, it often transforms what it labels into something of a
pharmakon – an entity that shifts between medicine and poison, health and harm.159
In the subsequent poetic tradition, the language of enchantment continues to be used to
denote a comparable range of experiences that cluster around sites of distraction and float
ambiguously between the positive and the negative, the healthful and the harmful. For instance, in
the Hymn to Apollo, the delusive quality of enchantment becomes a boon rather than a bane when the
mimetic performances of the Delian choristers beguile the tribes of men (θέλγουσι […] φῦλ᾿

Od. 14.378; 17.514. For a discussion of these passages, see Pratt 1993: 80-1.
Od. 1.337. For an insightful reading of this scene, see Halliwell 2011: 1-5.
158 Hom. Od. 8.509.
159 Pietro Pucci, who recognizes the ambivalence inherent in the word θέλγειν, borrows the Derridean notion of
supplement to describe how “the incompatible effects or meanings [of the word] spin together […] and surface as
neatly opposite only through a domesticated and self-serving reading”(1987: 194; cf. Bergren 1981). Jenny Strauss
Clay describes the ambiguity of Homeric enchantment similarly: “The power to numb the mind, to cause
forgetfulness of self, is, of course, profoundly ambiguous, both pleasurable and dangerous. For every healing drug,
there is a lethal one; the delights of sex may be life-affirming, or they may entail disastrous consequences” (1994: 2).
See also Graf 2019: 135 quoted in n. 145.
156
157
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ἀνθρώπων) with no obvious threat of danger.160 In other cases, the delusive language of
enchantment is tinged with the threat of unwanted danger or detriment. Theognis, for instance,
warns against the disingenuous words of a fellow symposiast which might beguile (θέλγειν) the
intellect (φρήν).161 More subtly, Bacchylides’s compound moniker for Aphrodite – θελξίµβροτος
(’enchanter of mortals’) – takes on a sinister note only because it is mentioned in close conjunction
with the name of Deianira, the “destroyer of men” (δαϊ-άνειρα), whose magical pharmakon proved
fatal to Heracles himself.162 Further evidence for this radical ambivalence can also be found on the
tragic stage. For instance, in Aeschylus’s Oresteia, just as the plot moves from Argos to Athens, from
savage to civilized, the lexical category of enchantment likewise evolves from negative to positive –

Hymn Hom. Ap. 161. In a similarly positive light, Asclepius, the god of healing, is called a great boon for
humankind (χάρµα µέγ᾿ ἀνθρώποισι) and the enchanter (θελκτῆρ) of pain (Hymn. Hom. Ascl. 4). Pindar repeatedly
casts the power of song – especially epinician song – as a powerful force for good (Nem. 4.3, 8.49, Pyth. 1.11, 3.64) as
well as dance (Dith. 2.22 = Fr. 70b.22 Maehler = Strabo 10.3.13) and comments on the restorative powers of medical
magic (Pyth. 3.52). A more ambiguous instance is in a disputed fragment of Archilochus where song (ἀοιδή) itself is
said to enchant (κηλεῖν) humans and animals alike (Fr. 253 West = Phld. Mus. 4.49; cf. Delattre 2007: ad loc. and
Gigante 1993). Finally, in another contested line, this time from the Works and Days, fallow land (νειὸς) is called the
averter of evil (ἀλεξιάρη) and the good enchanter of children (εὐκηλήτειρα παίδων, Hes. Op. 464 Merkelbach and
West). Interpretations of the text vary widely, though Proclus may be correct in suggesting that, in Hesiod’s mind,
the relative silence of the fallow land would grant peaceful sleep to children – i.e., enchant (Procl. ad. loc.; cf. Ritoók
1989: 335-6).
161 Thgn. 981.
162 Bacchyl. Ep. 5.175; cf. Cairns 2010 ad loc. Enchantment, likewise, appears in a negative light when, in the Hymn to
Demeter, the vain hope (ἐλπὶς) of reuniting with Demeter can enchant/delude (θέλγειν) the great mind (µέγαν νόον)
of Persephone (Hymn Hom. Dem. 37). Also, just as Pindar discusses beneficial enchantments, so too does he discuss
the dangerous love magic of Jason (Pind. Pyth. 4.217), the necromancy of Asclepias (Pind. Pyth. 3.57), and the sirenlike power of the Κηληδόνες (Pind. Pae. 8.71). Less certain is a fragment from Hipponax that may contain a passage
in which someone (Hipponax?) negatively labels a shady (σκότος) wine vendor as a charmer (κηλήτης, fr. 79 Degani
= P. Oxy. 2174 fr. 11 col. I [79, 1-17]). However, the papyrus is too badly damaged to tell us exactly what is going on.
We also find the language of enchantment clustering around the γλυκύπικρος site of love and seduction. Sappho, for
instance, casts blame upon her target for allowing the bare ankles (σφυρά) of Andromeda – a mere rustic girl
(ἀγροίωτις) – to enchant/seduce (θέλγειν, fr. 57 Lobel and Page = Ath. 21bc [1.46 Kaibel] [et al.]). Ibycus laments his
unwilling submission to the enchantments (κηλήµατα) of ἔρως even in his old age (Fr. 287 Davies = Procl. in Plat.
Parmen. 5.316).
160

69

labeling, first, the negative (human) sacrifices aimed at controlling what is divinely ordained,163 and,
later the positive power of persuasive rhetoric found in Athens which, with Athena’s help, allays the
vengeful wrath of the Erinyes.164
2.1.3. The means of enchantment
What this survey has shown thus far is how, in the early Greek poetry that precedes Gorgias,
the lexical category of enchantment is distributed across a range of experiences of distraction and
diversion. These oscillate between wanted and unwanted, benefit and detriment. But what does this
all have to do with the cultural practice of curses, erotic binding spells, necromancy, and the social
practices of magic writ large? It seems quite likely that this notion of enchantment is linked to a
particular subdomain of the larger cultural category of magic. When poets use words related to
θέλξις and κήλησις in order to describe certain experiences, such as immersion or seduction, the
magic they are describing lies closer to the imagined effects of certain erotic binding spells and
curses than it does to the realm of necromancy or weather magic which we find attested
elsewhere.165 In fact, the poetic descriptions of this experience of enchantment might be read as

The chorus sings of Paris who is unable to enchant (παραθέλγειν) the implacable anger (ὀργή ἀτενής) of the gods
with either burnt or unburnt sacrifices (ὑποκαίων οὔτ᾿ ἐπιλείβων ἀπύρων ἱερῶν, Aesch. Ag. 71) and declares later
that no charm can call people back from the dead (πάλιν ἀγκαλέσαιτ᾿ ἐπαείδων, Aesch. Ag. 1021; cf. Eum. 649).
Finally, the sacrifice of Iphigeneia is described as a charm to soothe Thracian winds (ἐπῳδὸν Θρῃκίων ἀηµάτων,
Aesch. Ag. 1418).
164 After Clytemnestra’s failed attempts at enchanting Electra and Orestes in Argos (Aesch. Cho. 420, 670; cf. 1029),
Apollo directs plot action to Athens where there will be “jurors […] and enchanting words” (δικαστὰς […] καὶ
θελκτηρίους µύθους) which will be the means (µηχανὰς) of salvation (Aesch. Eum. 81). There in Athens, Athena
successfully enchants the Eumenides with the “reverent power of persuasion and the salve and enchantment of
[…her] tongue” (Πειθοῦς σέβας, | γλώσσης […] µείλιγµα καὶ θελκτήριον, Aesch. Eum. 886-890).
165 The latter are attested in Empedocles (DK 31B111 = Diog. Laert. 8.59 [et al.]) and, of course, the Homeric Nekyia.
163
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implicit attempts to theorize about the affinity (metaphoric or literal) between binding spells, on the
one hand, and the uncanny experience of total absorption and distraction, on the other.166
Although the exact mechanics of the experience of enchantment are never spelled out
explicitly by the early poets, we do find some traces of evidence for how states of enchantment were
thought to be brought about. Poets point to different organs of perception, sensation, and cognition,
which are affected by the power of enchantment as well as a variety the tools and techniques
involved. For instance, when a god or mortal experiences enchantment, the sites of that experience
float somewhere between the physical and the psychical167 – acting upon organs of perception, such as
sight (ὄσσε, ὄµµατα),168 touch (γυῖον),169 or hearing (ἀκοή)170 as well as occurring in the black box of
the mind (νόος),171 (φρήν),172 spirit (θυµός),173 or heart (ἦτορ).174 Although the soul (ψυχή) does not
appear as the anatomical site of enchantment in our earliest poetic sources (indeed, not until
Gorgias), we may nevertheless say that the poetic notion of enchantment functions

166 “Speculation about how incantation might work is doubtless as old as attempts to use language to help reflect
marvellous changes in the world” (Gordon 2002: 76). It is probably significant that the imagery of binding does
accompany some poetic description of enchanting seduction and delusion (cf. Hom. Il. 13.435; Ibycus Fr. 287 Davies =
Procl. in Plat. Parmen. 5.316).
167 Machemer notes how the verb θέλγειν takes as its object either “the person or animate being in whom a desired
change or deceit is wrought” or the psychic-sensory “organ of perception or reception through which it is wrought”
(1993:117).
168 ὄσσε φαεινά, Il. 13.435. ὄµµατα, Il. 24.343; Od. 5.47, 24.4; cf. Ibycus fr. 287 Davies = Procl. in Plat. Parmen. 5.316;
Aeschylus Supp. 1004.
169 Pind Nem. 4.5.
170 The word for hearing is not used, but the sense of hearing is very commonly implied.
171 Hom. Il. 12.255, 14.217, 14.252; Hom. Od. 10.321; Hymn Hom. Dem 37; Sapph. Fr. 57 Page and Lobel = Ath. 21bc (1.46
Kaibel) (et al.).
172 Theognis 981-3: Pind. Pyth. 1.12.
173 Hom. Il. 15.321, 15.594; Od. 18.211, 18.283; Aesch. Cho. 420; Pindar Pyth. 3.64; Pyth. 4.219; Pind. Pae. 8.78.
174 Hom. Od. 17.514; cf. καρδία at Pind. Pyth. 1.11. Enchantment also impacts reified emotions such as anger (κότος at
Aesch. Eum. 900; ὀργή at Aesch. Ag. 71).
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psychosomatically.175 This view is, moreover, entirely in keeping with the particular way in which
Greeks conceived of spells as working. The very notion that a curse or love spell might work upon a
target directly and psychosomatically is a feature not found so much in, say, Egyptian heka but quite
fundamental to Greek ideas about mageia from Homer to Plotinus and beyond.176
The different tools and techniques with which the experience of enchantment is brought
about are also quite numerous. Many physical devices are named, such as Apollo’s αἰγίς (Il. 15.318),
Hermes’s ῥάβδος (Il. 24.342; Od. 5.46, 24.2), Aphrodite’s κεστός (Il. 14.214), Circe’s φάρµακα (Od.
10.213ff.), the Trojan horse (Od. 8.509), and so on.177 Yet from at least Homer’s Odyssey onwards, the
most common means of enchantment are the many manifestations of speech and voice (λόγος/
ἔπος/ µῦθος/ ῥῆµα/ φθόγγος/ αὐδή/ ὄψ/ γῆρυς).178
It should be noted that the concept of enchanting speech, which we find in the early poets, is
not limited to (nor even primarily linked to) sung or poetic speech. The affiliation between the two

175 The conspicuous absence of ψυχή, in comparison to its relative abundance in later descriptions of enchantment, is
because ψυχή has not yet become the unified locus of an individual’s sensation and cognition in this period. We must
wait until Gorgias for the explicit inclusion of ψυχή within the discourse of psychosomatic enchantment. See more on
this below, pp. 84-6.
176 Gordon 2002: 76-81; cf. Gordon 1999: 221 and, mutatis mutandis, Lain Entralgo 1970: 27-28.
177 For a discussion of some of these magical devices and others in Homer, see Wathelet 2000.
178 There are only two points in the Iliad when speech comes close to being involved with the act of enchantment:
when Apollo can enchant (θέλγειν) the Achaeans as he shakes his Aegis and “he himself shouts a mighty shout at
them” (ἐπὶ δ᾿ αὐτὸς ἄυσε µάλα µέγα Hom. Il. 15.320-1) and when Achilles complains that Themis was able to
enchant (θέλγειν) him with lies (Hom Il. 21.276). Instances of verbal enchantments are much more common in the
Odyssey. They include Calypso’s attempt to enchant away (θέλγειν) Odysseus’s nostalgia with soft and wheedling
words (µαλακοῖσι καὶ αἱµυλίοισι λόγοισιν, Od. 1.57), the allurements (θελκτήρια) of Phemius’s songcraft (Od.
1.337), Aegisthus’s efforts to enchant/seduce (θέλγεσκ᾿) Clytemnestra (Od. 3.264), the Phaeacians’ silent
rapture/enchantment (κηληθµός) during and after Odysseus’s narration of his tales (Od. 11.333-4 = 13.1-3 cf. Peponi
2012: 29-32), the Sirens who enchant (θέλγειν) through song (Od. 12.40, 12.44), the lies of Odysseus that just might be
able to enchant (θέλγειν) Eumaeus (Od. 14.387), the tales that Eumaeus relays to Penelope and that had been able to
enchant (θέλγειν) him (Od. 17.514, 17.521), as well as the effective lies which Penelope uses to enchant/beguile
(θέλγειν) the suitors (Od. 18.283). The one outlier which does not explicitly refer to a psychosomatic state of
distraction is the actual incantation (ἐπαοιδή) which physically heals young Odysseus’s wound (Od. 19.457).
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domains tends to be exaggerated in scholarship.179 Nor is enchantment an experience linked
primarily to the form (as opposed to the content) of speech – another misleading correlation made by
scholars.180 Instead, enchanting speech, as the poets describe it, seems to transcend the dichotomies
of the sung and the spoken, poetry and prose, even form and content. It is true that early poets like
to underscore their craft’s capacity to enchant; we need only call to mind the figure of Phemius or
the Delian choristers in the Hymn to Apollo – each of whom has rightly attracted a great deal of
scholarly attention. However, most speech labeled as enchanting in early poetry is not explicitly
poetic speech. In a particularly telling example, Eumaeus’ simile in Book 17 of the Odyssey indicates
that enchanting speech may be explicitly non-poetic:
εἰ γάρ τοι, βασίλεια, σιωπήσειαν Ἀχαιοί·
οἷ᾿ ὅ γε µυθεῖται, θέλγοιτό κέ τοι φίλον ἦτορ.
[…]
ὡς δ᾿ ὅτ᾿ ἀοιδὸν ἀνὴρ ποτιδέρκεται, ὅς τε θεῶν ἒξ
ἀείδει δεδαὼς ἔπε᾿ ἱµερόεντα βροτοῖσι,
τοῦ δ᾿ ἄµοτον µεµάασιν ἀκουέµεν, ὁππότ᾿ ἀείδῃ·
ὣς ἐµὲ κεῖνος ἔθελγε παρήµενος ἐν µεγάροισι.
If the Achaeans, queen, would please keep quiet, for what he speaks would enchant your
dear heart […] Just as when a man looks upon a bard who sings to mortals desirable words
that he learned from the gods, and they are eager to listen endlessly whenever he sings, in
this way he [i.e., Odysseus] enchanted me when he sat in my hall. 181
Here, as in other places, the enchanting words of Odysseus are pointedly not sung, and yet their
effect is equivalent to the enchantment a bard might produce. Even if the categories of poetry and

Studies that touch upon enchantment in early Greek literature (e.g., Walsh 1984, Pucci 1987, Pratt 1993, Finkelberg
1998, 1985, Halliwell 2011, and Peponi 2012) treat enchantment under the aegis of poetry and song and have thus
exaggerated the affinity between the power of the bard and the power of enchantment broadly construed.
180 Those who focus on the dichotomy between poetry and prose, sung and spoken, often try to distinguish between
form and content within the semantic field of verbal enchantment. For instance, Finkelberg suggests that θέλξις can
be distinguished by τέρψις only insofar as θέλξις is “a ceaseless desire to hear, directed towards the narrative content
[as opposed to the form] of song“ (1998: 91; cf. “an insatiate desire” Finkelberg 1985: 3; cf. Walsh 1984: 79). As we
shall see, this is an untenable distinction. Both form and narrative content are equally capable of bringing about an
experience of enchantment in early Greek thought.
181 Hom. Od. 17.513-27.
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song are closely tied (even, perhaps, genealogically) to the idea of verbal enchantment, it is
nevertheless the case that already by the time of Homer, the experience of enchantment is not
tethered to the poetic or melic voice.182 The same goes for the dichotomy of form versus content. It is
certainly true that poets often foreground formal features of enchanting speech when they remark
upon the soft (µαλακός),183 gentle (µειλίχιος),184 sonorous (λιγυρός),185 sweet (γλύκειος),186 honeyvoiced (µελίγηρυς),187 honey-tongued (µελίγλωσσος),188 or shapely quality of words (µορφὴ
ἐπέων) that enchant.189 Moreover, it is true that when poets speak of a particular magical context,
the soundscape of the poem becomes more striking. For instance, we can look to a passage from
Sophron, the 5th century Syracusan writer of Mime:
αἴτε κα ἀπ᾿ ἀγχόνας ἀίξασα,
αἴτε κα λεχοῦν διακναίσασα,
αἴτε κ᾿ ἂν νέκρος µολοῦσα πεφυρµένα ἐσέλθηις,
αἴτε κα ἐκ τριόδων καθαρµάτεσσιν ἐπισπωµένατῶι παλαµναίωι συµπλεχθῆις
Whether having darted from the hanging, or having worn out the woman in childbirth, or
having come as a sullied corpse you enter, or attracted by off-scourings from the crossroads
you are entwined with the murderer.190

182 For the notion that song and incantation are genealogically linked, see Lain Entralgo 1970: 44ff. In a similar vein,
Boris Maslov has recently suggested that the early Greek language surrounding song and singer (ἀοιδός) may, in
fact, have been a back formation derived from the lexical domain of enchantment (ἐπαοιδός): “I suggested
tentatively that the rhetoric of enchantment was inherited by properly poetic professionals from a preexistent (and
possibly continuing) subliterary tradition of professional performers of ἐπῳδαί” (2009: 31). Other scholars have (less
tentatively) suggested that the very form and content of early poetry is derived from the ritualized rhymical
patternings and historiolae of the tradition of magical incantations. John Garcia, for instance, argues that Greek
poetry owes its look and feel less to a rhetorical register (à la Aristotle’s remarks on exoticism/poeticism in the Poetics)
than to a ritualistic register and that poetic speech hovers between the normal speech of humans and the divine
language of the gods (2003; cf. Garcia 2002; Furley 1995; Lord 1963: 200-2, et al.).
183 Hom. Od. 1.56; Pind. Pyth. 3.52.
184 Hom. Od. 18.283. Cf. Athena’s description of her own persuasive speech in the Eumenides as a salve (µείλιγµα,
Aesch. Eum. 886).
185 Hom. Od. 12.44.
186 Pind. Pae. 8.75.
187 Pind. Pyth. 3.64.
188 Aesch. PV 173; cf. “honey-minded” (µελίφρων, Pind. Pae. 8.78).
189 Hom. Od. 11.367.
190 Ascribed to his mime, The Women Who Say They are Expelling the Goddess, Fr. 8 = Plut. De Superst. 170b (trans.
Rusten 2003).
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Here, the excessive rhythm and rhyme are implicitly understood as salient features of magical
incantations. Indeed, the whole fragment does seem to calque the formal excesses found in actual
curses.191 Nor is this an isolated case. Other poetic representations of magical speech or magical
contexts tend to betray a similar tendency toward heightened formal effects – such as those found in
the necromancy scene of Aeschylus’s Persians,192 the binding songs of Clytemnestra and the Erinyes
in Aeschylus’s Oresteia,193 Demeter’s counter-curse in the Hymn to Demeter,194 and elsewhere.195
Despite the conspicuous poetic concern with the form and delivery of enchanting speech, poets do
not eschew the possibility that the content of speech may be responsible for imparting the
experience of enchantment as well. The Sirens’ song is only the most famous example where sound
and sense, form and content doubly determine the enchanting effect of their song. 196 Elsewhere too,
enchanting speech does not simply tickle the ear, but enchants by ingratiation (χαρίζειν;197
αἱµύλιος),198 by the sheer novelty of subject matter (ὅθεν κέ τις οὐδὲ ἴδοιτο),199 or by mimesis
(µιµεῖσθαι).200

For studies of the formal features of incantations, see Versnel 2002 and the remarks by Levi 1975: 212-3.
For an excellent reading of some of the strange formal elements of the necromancy scene in the Persians, see De
Romilly 1975: 17ff.
193 Clytemnestra: Aesch. Ag. 958ff. (see McClure 1996). Erinyes: Aesch. Eum. 235ff. (see Faraone 1985; Prins 1991).
194 Richardson comments on the “incantatory” character of the rhyme, chiasmus, and the anaphora of οἴδα (1974: 229–
31; cf. Faraone 2001).
195 Cf. βάρβαρα µέλη µαγεύουσ᾿ (Eur. Iph. Taur. 1337-8), et al. It should be noted that magic was a popular theme in
drama – especially satyr plays. Aeschylus wrote a Psychagogoi (Radt TrGF vol. 3 F 273a, 275), Sophocles, a Rhizotomoi
(Radt TrGF vol. 4 F 534–6). Comic poets such as Cratinus, Alexis, and Menander also explicitly took up magical
themes for their plays.
196 For a recent treatment of the form and content debate regarding the siren song, see Montiglio 2019.
197 Hom. Od. 14.387.
198 Hom. Od. 1.5.
199 Hom. Od. 11.366.
200 Hymn Hom. Ap. 162-4.
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In sum, the language of magic, which we find in the poetic tradition, regularly marks out a
certain psychosomatic experience of distraction which is radically ambivalent in its ends – either
highly positive or highly negative. Of the various means of enchantment, the most common are the
manifold manifestations of speech and voice. What this wide variety of enchanting speech shows us
is that the label of enchantment is neither limited to a single genre of speech nor linked solely to
form or content. The wide distribution suggests an awareness that the experience of enchantment
can be engendered through many extraordinary speech types and techniques. What binds these
types and techniques together under the lexical category of enchantment is the fact that they seem to
produce an extraordinary experience in mind and body. Thus at bottom, enchantment is less of a
special style than it is a special effect – with particular emphasis on special. With this in mind, it is
time for us to turn back to Gorgias and his account of non-referential speech.
2.2. Enchantment in the Encomium of Helen
In the remainder of the chapter, we will see that when Gorgias invokes magic in the Helen,
he is importing the concept of enchantment which we have traced through the preceding poetic
tradition. Yet unlike the poets, Gorgias theorizes more explicitly about the actual mechanics of this
process of enchantment. In doing so, he revises and builds upon the descriptions of enchantment
that came before him in important and lasting ways.201 As we shall see, the magic Gorgias describes

I thus generally agree with Richard Gordon, who remarks that “Gorgias’ reflections on this matter [i.e., magic] in
the mid-fifth century BC certainly stem from, while also decisively modernising in terms of current medical theory, a
tradition of more or less sophisticated interest in the matter, focussing on the word thelgo and its derivatives. His
treatment of the theme in the Helen […] might almost be part of a commentary upon the Homeric passages describing
the song of the Sirens” (1999: 220-1). Walsh makes a similar observation; however, I cannot agree that the “difference
between Gorgias's theory and traditional views” is the “rejection of the primitive belief that the relationship between
words and physical objects is naturally fixed, that words magically reflect the truth” (1984: 84). Enchantment does not
seem to be in any way aligned with truth in the early Greek thought. For a rebuttal of Walsh on this point, see
Halliwell 2011: 48 n.23.
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in the Helen is not the magic that heals physical wounds, alters the weather, or even raises the
dead.202 Instead, Gorgias’s incantatory λόγος, like the enchantments described by the poets,
produces a certain psychosomatic experience – an experience which Gorgias further defines as a
combination of “errors of the soul and deceptions of opinion” (ψυχῆς ἁµαρτήµατα καὶ δόξης
ἀπατήµατα § 10). Since Gorgias’s remarks about magic are often read in divergent ways, it is best to
treat them in detail in order to iron out several semantic disputes before positing reasons for
Gorgias’ inclusion of the category of magic in his Helen.
2.2.1. Textual difficulties: § 10-14
After introducing his third proof for the defense of Helen (namely, that she was helplessly
overcome by the mighty dynast, λόγος), Gorgias offers two examples which illustrate the peculiar
δύναµις of this dynast. In section 9, Gorgias describes the remarkable effects of poetry and notes
that these effects come about through speech (διὰ λόγων) since, in his words, poetry is nothing
more than ‘speech set to meter’ (λόγον ἔχοντα µέτρον). In section 10, Gorgias offers a second
example that illustrates the power of λόγος, namely, magical incantations. His account begins as
follows:
φέρε δὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ἀπ’ ἄλλου µεταστῶ λόγον. αἱ γὰρ ἔνθεοι διὰ λόγων ἐπῳδαὶ
ἐπαγωγοὶ ἡδονῆς, ἀπαγωγοὶ λύπης γίνονται·
Now I will switch from one argument to another. For, through speech, divine incantations
become bringers of pleasure and dispellers of pain.

Gordon, too, remarks in reference to the ἐπαοιδη scene in the Odyssey that “his [i.e., Gorgias’s] explicitly
psychological account […] seems to abandon any claim to be able to explain how incantation might halt bleeding” (2002: 76,
emphasis mine).
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As Gorgias describes it, the extraordinary effects associated with the domains of poetry and magical
incantations are carried out through speech (διὰ λόγων) and, in some sense, owe their power to
speech. Immediately following this passage, Gorgias explains how magical incantations work:
συγγινοµένη γὰρ τῇ δόξῃ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δύναµις τῆς ἐπῳδῆς ἔθελξε καὶ ἔπεισε καὶ
µετέστησεν αὐτὴν γοητείᾳ. γοητείας δὲ καὶ µαγείας δισσαὶ τέχναι εὕρηνται, αἵ εἰσι
ψυχῆς ἁµαρτήµατα καὶ δόξης ἀπατήµατα.
This passage has proven rather tricky for scholars to interpret and, thus, I have left it untranslated
for the moment. The crux of the problem centers on the phrase δισσαὶ τέχναι. To many scholars, this
phrase indicates that Gorgias is limiting the power of magic to two separate arts of speech and that
these two arts must be supplied from context. For instance, many have looked back to §9 assuming
that Gorgias’s claim about the δισσαὶ τέχναι refers to the shared magical arts of incantations and
poetry.203 Some who follow this tack have gone even further suggesting that the δισσαὶ τέχναι refer
not only to the arts of poetry and incantations but to the arts of poetry and prose – thus, interpreting
away the category of magic altogether.204 This move to link Gorgias’s remark about the δισσαὶ
τέχναι directly back to the earlier remarks about poetry in section 9, has rightly seemed unnecessary
to some scholars. For instance, MacDowell, in his commentary, proposes that the two arts in
question should correspond to the two genitives of µαγεία and γοητεία.205 While this reading is not
impossible, it problematically suggests that the phrase ‘γοητείας […] καὶ µαγείας’ is not another

De Romilly 1973, 1975: 3-22.
Untersteiner 1954: 116; cf. Duncan 1938: 406 (“inspired incantations in prose”). Verdenius counters these
interpretations and rather perplexingly proposes that the δισσαὶ τέχναι refer to “oratory and incantation” (1981: 122
n. 37).
205 Macdowell 1993 [1982]: 33.
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pleonasm (which would be quite characteristic of Gorgias’s style). Instead, it hints at some Prodicean
distinction between µαγεία and γοητεία which elsewhere function as close synonyms.206
I suggest that there are two possible solutions. One would be to read δισσαί not as ‘two’ but,
more strictly, as ‘twofold.’207 If the τέχναι of magic are not read as two in number but twofold by
nature, we no longer need to look for two separate arts of incantatory speech. Instead, we would say
that Gorgias depicts the τέχναι of magic as a family of various arts of speech which together have a
dual nature. Another solution, offered by Thomas Buchheim, is to take δισσαί as ‘two’ and to take
τέχναι as meaning not ‘arts’ per se, but the ‘products’ that result from certain arts.208 On both
readings, δισσαί – the twofold nature of the arts or two products of arts – would correspond to the
subsequent relative clause wherein Gorgias mentions errors of the soul and deceptions of opinion
(ψυχῆς ἁµαρτήµατα καὶ δόξης ἀπατήµατα).209 This reading receives further support from my
earlier interpretation of how speech works in the Helen – namely, it involves a dual process in which
λόγος is picked up by the eyes of opinion, and opinion then counsels the soul similarly to how
sights are picked up by the eyes themselves which in turn impact the soul. Following this line of
reasoning, a possible translation would run as follows:

206 Cf. Aeschin. 3.137. MacDowell admits that Gorgias makes no explicit distinction between these two τέχναι –
“Gorgias does not indicate what he thinks is the difference between them [i.e., γοητεία and µαγεία].” This admission is
especially glaring insofar as one of MacDowell’s arguments against reading the two τέχναι as, say, ‘prose and
poetry’ is that “if Gorgias had meant this, he would have given some sort of definition or indication of what the two
techniques were” (1993 [1982]: 34 my emphasis). Others who have followed this line of interpretation have fallen into a
similar predicament. For instance, Dickie raises the problem only to dismiss it: “Whether it is anything more than a
difference in name that leads Gorgias to speak of mageia and goeteia as separate crafts it is impossible to say.
However that may be, what is clear is that Gorgias cannot in fact distinguish between the pair, which is to say that
they are not really separate concepts” (2001: 34; cf. Collins 2008: 58-9).
207 Compare δισσαῖσιν ἀπείροις κλιθείς at Soph. Trach. 101 with Jebb 2004 [1892] ad loc.
208 Buchheim 1989: ad loc. Compare Aristotle’s comment: “For a τέχνη is used for the thing which comes from the
‘art’ as well as the artistic thing itself, and so to φύσις is used to denote the thing which comes from a ‘nature’ and the
natural thing itself” (τέχνη λέγεται τὸ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τὸ τεχνικόν, οὕτω καὶ φύσις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται καὶ τὸ
φυσικόν, Arist. Ph. 2.1 193a31-3; cf. Arist. Soph. el. 34 183b-184a).
209A similar conclusion is reached by Segal 1962: 112.

79

συγγινοµένη γὰρ τῇ δόξῃ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δύναµις τῆς ἐπῳδῆς ἔθελξε καὶ ἔπεισε καὶ
µετέστησεν αὐτὴν γοητείᾳ. γοητείας δὲ καὶ µαγείας δισσαὶ τέχναι εὕρηνται, αἵ εἰσι
ψυχῆς ἁµαρτήµατα καὶ δόξης ἀπατήµατα.
For the power of the incantation, joining with the opinion of the soul, enchants and
persuades and alters it with magic. And the arts of enchantment and magic are found to be
twofold by nature (or ‘the products of enchantment and magic are found to be two in
number’) – namely, the errors of the soul and the deceptions of opinion.
On this reading, the power of magic, which Gorgias refers to pleonastically as both γοητεία and
µαγεία, is in keeping with the concept of enchantment found in the poets – that is to say, the arts of
magic are not limited to two modes of speech but available to all types and techniques of speech which
happen to produce a certain psychosomatic effect. Gorgianic enchantment is, thus, not the sister art of
poetry, nor is it explicitly limited to a particular genre or style. 210 It is a special effect shared by many
types of speech. Unlike the poets, however, Gorgias grounds this special, psychosomatic effect in a
rough psychagogic model that hinges on the errors of the soul and deceptions of opinion.
In sections 11-13, Gorgias goes on to describe how speech produces deception of opinion and
errors of the soul; however, his label for this process changes from enchantment to persuasion. In
section 11, Gorgias tells his audience that, since mortals cannot know the past, present, or future,
knowledge is, for most (πλεῖστοι), founded upon slippery and unstable opinion (δόξα σφαλερὰ καὶ
ἀβέβαιος). Thus, those who persuade others (πείθουσι) do so merely by fabricating false speech
(ψευδῆ λόγον πλάσαντες) which deceives opinion (δόξα) – “the counselor to the soul” (σύµβουλον
τῇ ψυχῇ). In section 12, which is unfortunately quite corrupt, Gorgias describes the effect of
persuasive speech on the soul and compares this effect to a physical force (βία) or constraint

It is worth stressing that, like the poets, Gorgias nowhere links the magical effect with purely phonic or acoustic
tricks (as some have stressed, such as Gordon 2002: 76-7, Ford 2002: 161 ff., et al.). It is, perhaps, due to Gorgias’s own
formal flourishes that scholars frequently tend to equate Gorgias’s remarks about the magic of speech with the magic
of rhythm, rhyme, and sonority. While Gorgias would hardly deny that these features of speech are conducive of
enchantment, his remarks about the power of λόγος are not so limited.
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(ἀνάγκη). Finally, in section 13, Gorgias offers three examples of the persuasive λόγος which
“imprints the soul as it wishes” (τὴν ψυχὴν ἐτυπώσατο ὅπως ἐβούλετο). These examples are: (1)
the words of cosmologists, which “by removing and establishing one opinion for another, make
unbelievable and unclear things appear before the eyes of opinion” (δόξαν ἀντὶ δόξης τὴν µὲν
ἀφελόµενοι τὴν δ’ ἐνεργασάµενοι τὰ ἄπιστα καὶ ἄδηλα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς τῆς δόξης ὄµµασιν
ἐποίησαν); (2) the courtroom speech, which is “written with art, not spoken with truth” (τέχνῃ
γραφείς, οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ λεχθείς);211 and (3) philosophical debate, which shows “how the rapidity of
thought makes the trust in opinion easily changeable” (γνώµης τάχος ὡς εὐµετάβολον ποιοῦν τὴν
τῆς δόξης πίστιν).
It is not until section 14 that the category of enchantment reappears. In this section, Gorgias
offers a final analogy which acts as a summary statement about “the power of speech” (ἡ τοῦ λόγου
δύναµις). This time, the power of speech is not compared to the power of an incantation (ἡ δύναµις
τῆς ἐπῳδῆς), as it was earlier (§ 10), but to the power of drugs (φάρµακα). Gorgias claims that
λόγος affects the soul (ψυχή) just as drugs (φάρµακα) affect bodies (σώµατα); he qualifies his
comparison by drawing upon contemporary, medico-magical trends of cathartic healing and claims
that, just as a φάρµακον may expel one fluid or another, producing health or death, so too,
utterances may cause pain or pleasure, fear or bravery, and may even “drug and enchant the soul by
some evil persuasion” (πειθοῖ τινι κακῇ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφαρµάκευσαν καὶ ἐξεγοήτευσαν).

The parallel in Isocrates Antid. 1.4 indicates that “compulsory speeches” (τοὺς ἀναγκαίους διὰ λόγων ἀγῶνας)
ought to be taken as “courtroom speeches.”
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2.2.2. Why magic?
There are obvious complications with Gorgias’s account of magic. If Gorgias’s definition of
enchantment is not limited to a set of techniques or genres of speech but, instead, acts as a label for
all techniques which induce errors of the soul and deceptions of opinion, it becomes difficult to
distinguish enchantment from, say, persuasion. Matters are made worse when, later, persuasion
blends back into deception, and, finally, when enchantment, persuasion, and deception are all
lumped together with φάρµακα and are all slapped with the label of λόγος. Thus, Gorgias seems to
present λόγος through a collection of overlapping frames which, in final analysis, become rather
difficult to distinguish by the end of his account. Nevertheless, there is a tendency in scholarship to
pick one of these overlapping categories as a master category and to read the others as mere
subdomains which are epiphenomenal or metaphorical. It is for this reason that Gorgias’s account is
variously read as a doctrine of deception,212 a model of persuasion/rhetoric,213 a theory of catharsis,214
or an account of the magical power of the word.215
Gorgias is, unfortunately, not so straightforward. In fact, he seems to have expended some
effort in allowing for these various categories to blend together. And this process of blending is quite
characteristic of Gorgias’s style – especially in the Helen. We saw, in the first half of this chapter, how
Gorgias’s four carefully enumerated proofs for Helen’s defense (divine necessity, force, powerful

For instance, Verdenius 1981: 116: “Gorgias based his art of rhetoric on two principles, viz. (1) persuasion is a form
of deception, and (2) the cogency of a speech depends largely on its poetic qualities.” See also Bons 2004: 245.
213 For instance, Parry 1992: 152: “Gorgias was, like Hippocrates, a rationalist, intent on pressing the claims of the nonliteral “magic” of rhetorical persuasion.” See also Lain Entralgo 1970: 99: “metaphors that transform the persuasive
word into ‘glad satiety,’ ‘charm,’ and ‘witchery.’”
214 Collins has argued that a medico-magical theory of catharsis sits at the center of Gorgias’s account of λόγος (2009:
542; 2008: xiii, 58-60).
215 Gorgias is a “theoretician of the magic spell of words” (De Romilly 1975: 20). George Walsh, rightly, lets the
ambiguity stand, noting that the words for persuasion, deception, enchantment seem to be used interchangeably
(1984: 154 n. 9).
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speech, and eros) all bleed together increasingly in the course of the speech through the use of
recurrent diction and the tacit conflation.216 On a more minute, stylistic level, we can also see that
Gorgias frequently stirs separate yet neighboring semantic categories into eddies of assonance
wherein similar sounds seem to erode differences in meaning. We can take, for instance, λαβοῦσα
καὶ οὐ λαθοῦσα (‘choosing and not forgetting’ § 4), νοµίζω καὶ ὀνοµάζω (‘deeming and naming’ §
9), πεισθεῖσα ὡς ἀναγκασθεῖσα (‘being persuaded and being coerced’ § 12).217 By phonically
assimilating different terms and categories in this way, Gorgias can subtly coin new conceptual
domains which share semantic elements from each part of the blend. For instance, ignorance may be
framed variously as an ‘error’ (ἁµαρτία καὶ ἀµαθία § 1), as a ‘sickness’ (νόσηµα καὶ ψυχῆς
ἀγνόηµα § 19), and as an ‘injustice’ (µώµου ἀδικίαν καὶ δόξης ἀµαθίαν § 21). A similar process is
at play with Gorgias’s careful blending of the concepts of persuasion, deception, drugs, and
enchantment in sections 8-14. By eliding categories such as these in a sort of Prodicean nightmare,
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See n. 12 above.
Examples of this can be gathered from all parts of the speech:
ἁµαρτία καὶ ἀµαθία, § 1
ὁµόφωνος καὶ ὁµόψυχος, § 2
λαβοῦσα καὶ οὐ λαθοῦσα, § 4
προβήσοµαι καὶ προθήσοµαι, § 5
ἐρασθεῖσα εἴτε λόγωι πεισθεῖσα εἴτε βίαι ἁρπασθεῖσα εἴτε ὑπὸ θείας ἀνάγκης ἀναγκασθεῖσα, § 6 = § 20
βίᾳ ἡρπάσθη καὶ ἀνόµως ἐβιάσθη καὶ ἀδίκως ὑβρίσθη, § 7
ἀπολογήσασθαι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπολύσασθαι, § 8
σµικροτάτῳ σώµατι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ, § 8
νοµίζω καὶ ὀνοµάζω, § 9
πραγµάτων καὶ σωµάτων, § 9 and § 18
γοητείας δὲ καὶ µαγείας, § 10
ψυχῆς ἁµαρτήµατα καὶ δόξης ἀπατήµατα, § 10
πεισθεῖσα ὡς ἀναγκασθεῖσα, § 12
ἔτερψε καὶ ἔπεισε, § 13
ἐφαρµάκευσαν καὶ ἐξεγοήτευσαν, § 14
ἀπέσβεσε καὶ ἐξήλασεν, § 17
χρωµάτων καὶ σωµάτων, § 18
ἀπώσασθαι καὶ ἀµύνασθαι, § 19
νόσηµα καὶ ψυχῆς ἀγνόηµα, § 19
ἁρπάσας ὡς ὑβρίσας ἠδίκησεν, ἡ δὲ ἁρπασθεῖσα ὡς ὑβρισθεῖσα ἐδυστύχησεν, § 20
µώµου ἀδικίαν καὶ δόξης ἀµαθίαν, § 21.
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Gorgias allows the blend to constitute a new conceptual domain wherein the various semantic
ranges of persuasion, deception, drugs, and enchantment are all weighted towards one another
centripetally with λόγος at the center.218 In the end, Gorgias’s account is not a doctrine of deception,
nor persuasion, nor catharsis, nor enchantment only; instead, it is an account of the power of λόγος,
and this power of λόγος is colored in one way or another by each of these categories.
For us, it will be most important to determine what color the category of enchantment adds
to this blend. What I shall argue is that the category of enchantment serves as a suitable complement
to Gorgias’s account of non-discursive speech in two ways: (1) it provides a useful psychosomatic
analog for intuiting how Gorgias’s theory of λόγος works; and (2) it provides a frame for how to
judge the ends and efficacy of Gorgias’s λόγος. In particular, the category of enchantment helps
frame speech as an ambivalent agent of distraction – an attitude about speech that not only fits the
immediate context (which aims to portray Helen as a hapless victim), but also appears in line with
Gorgias’s own attitude about speech more generally.
2.2.2.1. Framework for psychagogy
As we saw in the first half of the chapter, Gorgias’s Helen presents a newfangled account of
how speech works. This account departs from previous Pre-Socratic theories of speech insofar as it is
not founded upon the concept of linguistic reference and instead promotes the idea that speech acts
upon the listener directly, just as sensory phenomena act upon the senses directly. However,
Gorgias’s λόγος is sub-phenomenal and imperceptible and, instead of impacting the organs of

It may be helpful to think of Gorgias’s move here as a studied form of ‘conceptual integration’ or ‘blending’, as
described by cognitive linguists Fauconnier and Turner 2002. For an application of this concept to the poetry of
Timotheus and New Music more broadly, see Budelman and LeVen 2014. Gorgias could be productively read in
juxtaposition with the poets of New Music who are experimenting with poetry in ways that may resemble Gorgias’s
experiments with prose.
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hearing and sight, it impacts the soul (ψυχή) through opinion (δόξα). In effect, Gorgias proposes a
psychosomatic account of speech which is not a far cry from how poets traditionally describe
enchanting speech. By drawing the category of verbal enchantment into his account of nondiscursive speech, Gorgias provides a complementary framework for intuiting how his model of
speech works.
Not only does Gorgias utilize the traditional framework of enchantment as an analog for his
theory of λόγος, but he also theorizes about it more explicitly than the poets had and updates it
slightly to fit his linguistic model. As we saw above, poetic descriptions of verbal enchantment often
hover between mind and body. But while the poets describe an array of mental and bodily organs
which are variously influenced by magic – ranging from, eyes (ὄσσε/ὄµµατα) to limbs (γυῖον) to
heart (ἦτορ) to spirit (θυµός) to mind (νόος/φρήν) – none speak of enchanting the soul (ψυχή) as
Gorgias does. This is because the word ψυχή had not yet taken on the meaning of soul per se. In
early texts, such as Homer, ψυχή refers primarily to the smoke-like substance which departs the
body at death. Thus, in magical discourse, ψύχή was primarily the organ associated with
necromancy (ψυχαγωγία).219 Over the course of the fifth century, ψυχή had slowly come to be
understood as the unified locus of an individual’s sensation and cognition.220 This new role makes
the soul an appealing target of not only Gorgias’s λόγος, which impacts the mind in the way
sensory phenomena impact the senses, but also the psychosomatic effect of enchantment, which,
likewise, flits between the physical and the psychical.221 By bringing discourses surrounding ψύχή

ψυχαγωγοῖς […] γόοις, Aesch. Pers. 687; cf. Ar. Av. 1555.
See Laks 1999.
221 We can find other contemporary ‘materialistic’ descriptions of the soul in Hippocratic writings; however, the
closest comparandum is Democritus and the Democritean descriptions of soul therapy. It seems that Democriteans
219
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into dialectic with traditional discourse surrounding magic, Gorgias opens up a new theoretical
space for understanding speech which is based on a process of psychagogy. Although Gorgias does
not use the word ψυχαγωγία explicitly, he may be in some way responsible for its popular
extension in meaning from necromancy to verbal enchantment, which likewise takes hold in the fifth
century.222 Whether or not Gorgias is a pioneer in revising the poetic concept of enchantment as a
type of soul-moving, the framework of psychagogy which he uses to justify these linguistic ideas
does prove to have lasting power.223
2.2.2.2. Frame for a powerful and distracting effect
In addition to providing a framework for how λόγος might be understood to work, the
concept of enchantment also provides Gorgias with a frame for judging the ends and efficacy of this
non-discursive form of λόγος. As we noted before, Gorgias’s account of enchantment is presented as
one part of a larger constellation of different frames (e.g., deception, persuasion, and drugs) that not

were developing theories of ψυχαγωγία around the same time as Gorgias was developing his ideas of psychagogic
speech (see my remarks on the comic poet Timocles and the Democritean Apollodotus in ch. 3, n. 12). Heraclitus is
another early outlier in the way he uses the word ψυχή as well as λόγος. The word ψυχή is reimagined as the organ
by which one may grasp the λόγος of the universe (DK 22B45 = Diog. Laert. 9.7; DK 22B85 = Plut. Cor. 22 (et al.); DK
22B107 = Sext. Emp. Math. 7.126; DK 22B115 = Stob. 3.l.180a). It may be tempting to trace a line of influence from
Heraclitus to Gorgias; however, much is still in dispute about what Heraclitus means by either term (Nussbaum 1972;
Betegh 2007; Johnston 2014).
222 It was once popular to theorize about Gorgias’s role in coining this use (Süss 1910: 77-9; Pohlenz 1965 [1920]: 2:43672). In the end, it is probably impossible to tell what hand Gorgias had in the semantic shift. It should be noted that
forms of ψυχαγωγία never cease to be used to refer to necromancy as well (De Romilly 1975: 15). The important role
of ψυχαγωγία in the history of rhetoric more generally, has been underappreciated, as Stauffer notes: “Obwohl sie in
rhetorischen Werken zumeist nicht als Stichwort expliziert oder gar diskutiert wird – und die Forschung sie daher
bislang kaum je beachtet hat – spielt die P. in jeder Phase der Rhetorikgeschichte von den Anfängen bis zum
heutigen Tag eine nicht zu unterschätzende Rolle” (2005).
223 Already, Euripides uses ψυχή as the locus of enchantment when Hippolytus is labeled as an enchanter (ἐπῳδός)
and magician (γόης) who might overpower Theseus’s soul (τὴν ἐµὴν […] ψυχὴν κρατήσειν, Eur. Hipp. 1038-1040).
An important and fascinating later comparandum for Gorgias’s concept of psychagogy is the Derveni Papyrus,
wherein verbal enchantments are explicitly said to strike fear into the daimons which are equated with souls (ψυχαί):
“the incantation of the magoi turn the daimons (i.e., souls) when they get in the way” (ἐπ̣[αοιδὴ δ]ὲ̣ τ(ῶν) µάγων
δαίµονας ἐµ[ποδὼν] γ[ινοµένου]ς µεθιστάν̣αι, § 17 Laks and Most). As Radcliffe Edmonds has shown, Gorgias and
the Derveni author seem to be playing similar epideictic games (2013: 124-35).
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only work together to frame Gorgias’s description of λόγος, but also frame one another in particular
ways. That is, each category frames and is framed by each other category. When Gorgias describes
λόγος in terms of enchantment (µαγεία, γοητεία, θέλξις, ἐπαοιδαί), for instance, this category of
enchantment is framed by the other categories of persuasion (πειθός), deception (ἀπάτη), and drugs
(φάρµακα) that Gorgias also brings in to describe the force of λόγος. This process of blending is
made possible because there already exists a great deal of overlap between these neighboring
semantic domains.224 As we saw in the survey of the poets above, the category of enchantment often
colors the categories of persuasion and deception. Gorgias seems to go farther than the earlier poets
by casting verbal enchantment as somehow equivalent to or interchangeable with verbal persuasion
or deception. This allows Gorgias to give the sense that λόγος does not simply deceive or persuade
but enchant. In other words, it deceives and persuades in an extraordinary way. Thus what the frame
of enchantment brings to Gorgias’s defense is the requisite sense of extraordinary distraction, while
the frames of persuasion and deception orient that experience towards the type of hapless
bamboozlement which one might imagine Helen undergoing (rather than, say, the experience of a
delightful diversion).
2.2.2.3. Frame for ambivalent ends and efficacy
With that being said, Gorgias’s discussion of the deceptive and persuasive qualities of
speech need not be read as entirely negative. In the Helen and elsewhere in Gorgias’s writing, the
categories of deception and persuasion are – like enchantments and φάρµακα – highly
ambiguous.225 For Gorgias, truth is certainly a desirable element of speech. Yet the difficulty in

See, in general, Pratt 1993: 73-81 for the semantic overlap between θέλξις, ἀπάτη, and πειθός. For the semantic
overlap between words for enchantment and drugs, see Dickie 2001: 13; cf. Collins 2008: 60.
225 “Magos and goes are coupled with the sense ‘deceivers’ by Gorgias, Helen, 10 (though Gorgias did not disapprove
of deception)” (Gordon 1987: 90 n.5).
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assessing the truth of speech leads Gorgias to explore the relative benefits and detriments of untrue
or only subjectively true speech.226 His ambivalence is especially evident in the opening of the Helen:
κόσµος πόλει µὲν εὐανδρία, σώµατι δὲ κάλλος, ψυχῇ δὲ σοφία, πράγµατι δὲ ἀρετή, λόγῳ
δὲ ἀλήθεια.
An ornament is manliness for a city, beauty for a body, wisdom for a soul, excellence for an
action, and truth for speech.
I have presented the most common reading of the passage. However, should we read truth as an
ornament for speech, or ornament as the truth for speech? The syntax allows for both and it is quite
likely that Gorgias welcomes the ambiguity.227 In the rest of the Helen and elsewhere in his writings,
Gorgias focuses not so much on how speech can be true but how speech can seem to be true in a
subjective manner. What interests him, primarily, are the various uses, applications, merits, and
faults of the subjective powers of speech. With the question of truth put to one side, Gorgias can
explore how deceptive speech or persuasive speech can carry out their effect for good or for ill. In a
well-known fragment preserved by Plutarch, Gorgias is said to have remarked on the positive
nature of becoming immersed in, or, more pointedly, deceived by a fictional stage performance:
ἀπάτην […] ἣν ὅ τ’ ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος τοῦ µὴ ἀπατήσαντος καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς
σοφώτερος τοῦ µὴ ἀπατηθέντος.
[Tragedy is] a deception […] wherein the one who deceived is more appropriate than the
one who did not deceive, and the one who is deceived is wiser than the one who is not
deceived.228

I agree, in broad outline, with Morgan that “Gorgias operates with two notions of truth, one factual and one
subjective. The diﬃculty of establishing the former leads to emphasis on the latter as criterion” (2000: 123).
227 Compare Gorgias’s comments about seeming and being (DK 82B26 = Procl. In Hes. Op. 83) and his genealogy of
Helen where Zeus seems to be the father because he is, Tyndareus merely says or is said to be the father (Helen § 4).
228 DK 82B23 = Plut. Gloria Ath. 348c. The sentiment is not uniquely Gorgianic. Plutarch quotes the fragment again in
another treatise wherein he couples the Gorgias quotation with Homer’s description of Aphrodite’s κεστός and
Simonides’s remark that the Thessalians were too ignorant to be deceived (ἐξαπατᾶσθαι) by him (Plut. Quomodo
adul. 15d). See also the Dissoi Logoi: “In tragedy and painting whoever deceives most in making things similar to true
things, is the best” (ἐν γὰρ τραγῳδοποιίᾳ καὶ ζωγραφίᾳ ὅστις <κα> πλεῖστα ἐξαπατῇ ὅµοια τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς
ποιέων, οὗτος ἄριστος, Dialex. 3.10; cf. 3.17, 2.28).
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Plutarch follows up with a highly probable explanation of what Gorgias means:
ὁ µὲν γὰρ ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος, ὅτι τοῦθ’ ὑποσχόµενος πεποίηκεν· ὁ δ’ ἀπατηθεὶς
σοφώτερος· εὐάλωτον γὰρ ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς λόγων τὸ µὴ ἀναίσθητον.
The one who deceives is more appropriate because he has carried out what he has promised.
The other who is deceived is wiser. For whatever is not without sensation is easily captured
by the pleasure of words.229
For Gorgias, ἀπάτη is not a dirty word.230 Nor is πειθος. Even though Gorgias cites ‘some evil
persuasion’ (πειθοῖ τινι κακῇ) at the close of section 14, he may be, as Halliwell suggests, tacitly
suggesting that there is a good form of persuasion as well.231 Thus, in the Helen, by including the
frames of enchantment and φάρµακα, Gorgias is able to underscore his ambiguous attitude toward
deception, persuasion, and λόγος, more generally. As he notes, λόγος, insofar as it functions like an
enchantment and like a φάρµακον, is capable of both positive and negative effects – of bringing
pleasure and pain (ἐπαγωγοὶ ἡδονῆς, ἀπαγωγοὶ λύπης §10; οἱ µὲν ἐλύπησαν, οἱ δὲ ἔτερψαν §14),
imparting courage and fear (οἱ δὲ ἐφόβησαν, οἱ δὲ εἰς θάρσος κατέστησαν τοὺς ἀκούοντας §14).
Thus, just as Gorgias orients the category of enchantment toward deception and persuasion, he
likewise infuses the categories of persuasion and deception with the ambivalence of enchantments.
As we shall see in later chapters, the ambivalence of Gorgianic enchantment is somewhat
peculiar. Gorgias seems to have wanted to embrace the ambiguous ends of the category magic,

Plut. Gloria Ath. 348c. “Plutarch proves to be a reliable and faithful ‘reporter’ of the fragment under consideration”
(Bons 2004: 248).
230 It is a word that differs from ψεῦδος, insofar as it describes a deception not solely linked to a factual falsehood:
“pseudos describes the objective falsity of (almost always) speech, while thelxis and apate describe a psychological
effect that may be caused not only by words but by deeds or things, not only by what is false (a pseudos) but by
anything that creates a lapse of perception or judgment” (Pratt 1993: 73-4; cf. 19 n.10). Similarly, Untersteiner writes
that ἀπάτη “denotes the subjective condition under which deception may occur” (1954: 109). Some have tried to
etymologize the word as having a sense of “leading away” (Verdenius 1981: 116; cf. Bons 2004: 245 and “‘leading
astray” Bons 2007: 43). But the etymology is actually unclear (Beekes 2010: ad loc.; cf. Aesch. Supp. 111 where ἀπάτη
is linked to ἄτη).
231 “…’evil persuasion,’ actually entails the possibility of ‘good persuasion’” (Halliwell 282 n.37).
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which oscillates between curse and miracle, boon and bane. Most other writers are careful to
indicate whether the enchantment they speak of is positive or negative, desirable or undesirable.
When we turn to Plato, we shall see how he not only inherits the Gorgianic concept of verbal
enchantment but also carefully harnesses that category in ways that fit his philosophical ends –
carefully demarcating positive uses of verbal enchantment from negative ones. Before moving
ahead, it is worth taking a sidelong glance toward the poetry of Pindar, an older contemporary of
Gorgias’s, who anticipates Plato’s program of distinguishing good enchantment from bad and, in
this way, serves as a useful foil for the description of incantatory rhetoric we find in the Helen and
helpful preface to Plato.
Coda: Pindaric Magic
Pindar’s poetry showcases the phenomenon of magic in various ways. Not only do Pindar’s
myths involve love magic and healing magic, but Pindar himself often compares the powers of his
own song with the powers of magic. When he does so, he is careful to comment upon this analogy
and frame it in ways that augment his claims to poetic excellence and personal righteousness.
In Pythian 3, an ode performed for Hieron of Syracuse, Pindar tells the story of the
corruption of Asclepius, who, although capable of magically healing plague-stricken people with
gentle incantations (µαλακαὶ ἐπαοιδαί), soothing (προσανέα) draughts, and drugs (φάρµακα),232
was tempted by profit and used his healing magic to raise the dead, thereby, incurring the
retribution of Zeus.233 After reaching this point in the story, Pindar draws a personal moral from the
tale:
χρὴ τὰ ἐοικότα πὰρ

Pind. Pyth. 3.47-54.
Elsewhere, Pindar describes wealth as a beguilement of pleasure (θέλγητρ᾿ ἁδονᾶς) which stings/pricks (νύσσει,
Fr. 223 Maehler).
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δαιµόνων µαστευέµεν θναταῖς φρασίν
γνόντα τὸ πὰρ ποδός, οἵας εἰµὲν αἴσας.
µή, φίλα ψυχά, βίον ἀθάνατον
σπεῦδε, τὰν δ᾿ ἔµπρακτον ἄντλει µαχανάν.
εἰ δὲ σώφρων ἄντρον ἔναι᾿ ἔτι Χείρων, καί τί οἱ
φίλτρον ἐν θυµῷ µελιγάρυες ὕµνοι
ἁµέτεροι τίθεν, ἰατῆρά τοί κέν νιν πίθον
καί νυν ἐσλοῖσι παρασχεῖν ἀνδράσιν θερµᾶν νόσων
ἤ τινα Λατοΐδα κεκληµένον ἢ πατέρος.
One should seek what is appropriate from the gods with mortal minds, knowing what lies at
our feet and what our lot in life is. Do not, my dear soul, seek an immortal life, rather
exhaust the practical means left to you. And if wise Chiron were still dwelling in his cave,
and if my honey-voiced hymns could put a spell on his heart, I would surely have
persuaded him to provide now a healer for the feverish illnesses of good men, either
someone called a son of Leto or Zeus.234
Unlike Asclepius, Pindar vows to stick within the limits of what is mortal and practicable. He does
not raise Chiron from the dead or even attempt to heal the sick himself; instead, he assures the
audience that if Chiron were alive, he would produce a charm (φίλτρον) of his own – namely, his
honey-sweet songs (µελιγάρυες ὕµνοι) – which would certainly (τοι) persuade Chiron to deliver
true healers with divine pedigrees. For Pindar, then, the power of song can produce extraordinary
benefit without exceeding the limits set upon human agency. Pindaric magic is a form of pragmatic
(ἔµπρακτον) magic that differs from divine magic more in degree than in its means, ends, or
efficacy. When Pindar uses it, he does so to persuade those in power, like Chiron (a lightly-veiled
stand-in for Hieron), to do good and not evil.235

Pind. Pyth. 3.58-68.
Sarah Iles Johnston has shown how, in Pythian 4, Pindar presents Jason’s deceptive love magic as a negative foil to
his own poetic program of truth-oriented enchantment: “Jason’s experiences stand in sharp contrast to those of both
Battus and Pindar. He was an accomplished rhetorician in his own right, but when he met the limits of his own
abilities, rather than subordinating himself to divine female voice, as Pindar and Battus did, he deployed a deceptive,
magical voice to constrain the divinity within Medea. His heroic program, appropriately, fell short of completion
while Pindar’s and Battus’ met with success. Just as peithô dolia is destined to fail in human relationships, so it fails to
establish the proper relationship between human and divine” (1995: 200).
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Pindar’s analogy between the power of song and the power of magic is echoed elsewhere in
his victory odes. In Nemean 8, performed in celebration of Deinias of Aigina, Pindar welcomes the
opportunity to apply a fitting boast (πρόσφορον κόµπον) to his family, and he compares his own
encomiastic song to incantations (ἐπαοιδαῖς) which a man (ἀνήρ τις) may use to make toil
(κάµατον) painless (νώδυνον).236 Pindar presses this analogy even further at the outset of Nemean 4:
Ἄριστος εὐφροσύνα πόνων κεκριµένων
ἰατρός· αἱ δὲ σοφαί
Μοισᾶν θύγατρες ἀοιδαὶ θέλξαν νιν ἁπτόµεναι.
οὐδὲ θερµὸν ὕδωρ τόσον γε µαλθακὰ τεύχει
γυῖα, τόσσον εὐλογία φόρµιγγι συνάορος.
ῥῆµα δ’ ἐργµάτων χρονιώτερον βιοτεύει,
ὅ τι κε σὺν Χαρίτων τύχᾳ
γλῶσσα φρενὸς ἐξέλοι βαθείας.
The best healer of toils which passed the test is celebration; and the wise daughters of the
Muses, song, enchant this with a touch.237 Nor does even warm water relieve limbs as much
as praise, the companion to the lyre. For the word lives longer than deeds, which the tongue,
with the help of the Graces, draws out from the depths of the mind.238
For Pindar, the effect of song is not unlike the effect of magical enchantments. Songs can persuade,
and encomiastic songs can heal “with a touch” (ἁπτόµεναι). By drawing upon the label of magic to
describe the power of his own song, Pindar, like Gorgias, can frame the powers of speech in the light
of uncanny efficacy. However, he must be careful to frame that efficacy as safe, positive, and
beneficial. As noted above, the language of enchantment swings ambivalently between the positive
and negative, delight and deceit. Pindar’s appropriation of magic is, thus, not without risk. To avoid
attracting accusations of flattery and deception with his use of the language of enchantment, Pindar

Pind. Nem. 8.48-51.
Machemer, following Aristarchus, argues for taking εὐφροσύνα as the antecedent of νιν – contra Bundy (and
Didymus) and others who take πόνων as the antecedent. In the end, Machemer shows that the passage hinges upon
a “… comparison between the relative effectiveness of the healer’s and the poet’s art” and ultimately contains “an
argument that song is superior to all other means of making hearts glad” (1993: 114, 140).
238 Pind. Nem. 4.1-8. A more truncated version of the same claim can be found at Pind. Nem. 3.17-18.
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carefully frames his comparison between song and incantation as positive and practicable but no
less efficacious. In Nemean 4 and 8, he frames his own poetic magic through the positive lens of
healing, and, in Pythian 3, he constructs a negative foil – Asclepius’s necromancy – as a way of
setting his own claim to magic in positive relief.239
Unlike Pindar, Gorgias foregrounds the ambiguity of enchantment and, in doing so, accents
his own attitudes about the ambivalent nature of speech – especially non-referential speech. Despite
Pre-Socratic concerns with linguistic correspondence, Gorgias insists that forms of speech do
communicate at the peripheries of language, that emotions, desires, pains, and pleasures continue to
body forth between individuals without ever being put into words. These extraordinary
transmissions of feeling and meaning are best thought of in terms of magical enchantments, speech
that takes hold of the soul itself, for better or for worse.

239

He also develops a negative foil in Pythian 4; see note 162 above.
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Chapter 2. Plato

For Plato, the experience of becoming enchanted by speech is not simply an alluring aspect
of human psychology (as it had been for Gorgias). It was a real problem whose moral-cum-social
implications posed a threat to the well-being of “individuals, whole households, and cities.”1 In this
chapter, I argue that Plato’s dialogues betray a thoroughgoing attempt to harness the category of
enchantment in ways that complement his philosophy. As we shall see, Plato incorporates into his
dialogues the psychagogic framework of incantatory rhetoric that Gorgias had developed in his
Encomium of Helen. However, Plato describes the effect of incantatory speech in greater detail than
Gorgias had. Unlike Gorgias, he is careful to separate out the positive and negative ends to which
the experience of enchantment should be directed and discusses with greater specificity some verbal
and acoustic techniques which are particularly conducive to that experience.
The current chapter is divided into two parts. The first part treats Plato’s views on the
category of magic more generally, and the second treats Plato’s views on incantatory speech more
specifically. After making some introductory remarks about the language of magic in the Platonic
corpus as well as the scholarly opinions about this language, I begin the first part by showing how,
for Plato, the category of magic always labels a phenomenon that produces an extraordinary
experience in an indirect manner. It is thus often indistinguishable from the psychagogic powers of

1

Pl. Leg. 909b5-6.
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rhetoric. The sheer difficulty of distinguishing supernatural efficacy from rhetorical efficacy in
matters of magic leads Plato to elide the two. Since the former is more difficult to account for than
the latter, Plato frames most of his remarks about magical power in terms of the rhetorical
dimension of magic – i.e., the uncanny ability to convince people that such extraordinary, indirect
effects are real. After this, I account for how Plato conceives of the experience of rhetorical
enchantment, which affects the body and soul. As several important passages from the Laws,
Republic, and Timaeus will illustrate, Plato treats enchantment as an independent category of human
experience in which a person’s opinions are involuntarily altered through the manipulation of the
sensory imagination. In the second part of the chapter, I show how Plato regulates the proper means
and ends of incantatory speech. He acknowledges that enchantment can be brought about through a
variety of verbal and acoustic techniques, of which Plato primarily stresses the psychagogic powers
of song, myth, and dialectic while, at the same time, indicating that each technique can be used
positively or negatively. What distinguishes good incantatory rhetoric from bad are the ends to
which that rhetoric is directed. To illustrate these aspects of Plato’s conception of incantatory
rhetoric, I close the chapter by turning to the Laws where I show how Plato, in his final dialogue,
harnesses the powers of verbal enchantment for good by incorporating it into the socio-political
framework of his Cretan city.
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1. Magic within the dialogues
Words associated with ἐπῳδή, γοητεία, φαρµακεία, κήλησις, µαγεία, µαγγανεία,
ψυχαγωγία, and, to a lesser extent, θέλγω/θέλξις all appear scattered throughout the dialogues.2
When faced with this cache of magical language, scholars often aim to determine whether or not
Plato or Socrates (be he the Platonic Socrates or historic Socrates) put any real stock in the ritual
practice of magic. As one might expect, answers to this question are often guided by one’s opinion
about who Plato or Socrates was or is – whether we ought to think of him as more of a ‘mystic,’ a
‘skeptic,’ a ’moralist,’ a ‘rationalist,’ or an ‘ironist.’ The differing presuppositions have shaped how
the language of magic has been interpreted in the dialogues. Plato is often portrayed either as a
staunch opponent of all things having to do with magic or the inventor/reviver of a good kind of
philosophical magic.3 This good/Platonic magic has, moreover, been interpreted in terms of

2 Although popular with other authors, words related to θέλγω/θέλξις appear only in Agathon’s speech at Pl. Symp.
197e3. Otherwise, they are only attested in several epigrams dubiously attributed to Plato. When words associated
with ψυχαγωγία appear in the dialogues, the older magical sense of the word, having to do with the practice of
necromancy, is never entirely lost (De Romilly 1974: 15; Taylor 1928 ad Pl. Tim. 71a6). Moreover, words associated
with µαγεία do not solely recall the political-cum-religious practices of the Persian µάγοι but also the Greek practice
of magic (cf. Pl. Plt. 280e1 and Denyer 2001 ad Alc. 122a1).
3 In antiquity and well on through the Renaissance, Plato was widely regarded as having a particular affinity for the
magical arts. Modern readers of Plato are (generally) less quick to label him as a fully-fledged magician. However,
scholars such as Dodds and Burkert see in Plato’s magical diction a faint echo of an earlier ‘shamanic’ influence
(Dodds 1951: 207-235; Burkert 1962). Other scholars move in the opposite direction and present Plato as the harshest
critic of all things magical while highlighting the moments in the dialogues when magical practitioners come under
fire (cf. Casadesús Bordoy 2002). De Romilly begins her chapter on Plato and magic in very much the same vein by
underscoring Plato’s apparent “hate of conjurers” (1975: 32). However, she notes that Plato’s attitude toward magic
broadly construed is not so one-sided and she ultimately finds that Plato distinguishes two types of magic: bad magic,
which is illusion, and good (Socratic) magic which “rests on the obstinate destruction of all illusions” and wherein
those affected are “bewildered by the power of thorough analysis” (De Romilly 1975: 36). For others who similarly
find a distinction between good and bad types of magic within the dialogues, see Gellrich 1994, Belfiore 1980, Laín
Entralgo 1970 [1958]: 122 (“As there are false soothsayers and true soothsayers [Charm., 173c], so there are false epôdoi
and true epôdoi. To this second and salutary class of charmers or enchanters Socrates and Plato wish to belong”). As
we shall see, my reading bears affinities with this latter trend of scholarship.
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rationality versus irrationality.4 There is still more uncertainty over whether many of Plato’s remarks
about ‘magic’ are meant to be taken as metaphoric or literal, ironic or serious.5 In this chapter, we see
how Plato’s notion of magic fails to fit neatly into any one of the scholarly binaries of
metaphorical/literal, ironic/serious, approving/disapproving. Instead, much like Pindar, Plato
always keeps the category of magic both at arm’s length and within arm’s reach; he is cautious of the
ambiguous category of magic which may entail positive or negative experiences but, nevertheless,
remains interested in harnessing its conceptual-cum-rhetorical value for his own philosophical ends.
1.1. The magic of rhetoric and the rhetoric of magic
We find Plato’s most important remarks about the category of magic in his longest and latest
dialogue: Laws.6 Plato’s most explicit discussion of magic per se comes in book 11 when our guiding

For Dodds 1951, Plato’s remarks about magic and incantations constitute a domain of irrationality. For those who
find, in Plato, two types of magic – one good and one bad – there is a tendency to align the category of bad magic
with ‘irrational’ forms of persuasion and the category of good, Socratic/Platonic magic with ‘rational’ forms of
persuasion (such as elenchus, dialectic, and the like) (De Romilly 1975, Belfiore 1980). Others, however, have rightly
resisted this distinction between a rational and irrational mode of magic: “it is not sufficient to maintain, as some
have done, that the incantation represents a purely rationalistic reinterpretation of the old Greek motif – prominent in
Homer and given a fresh statement in Gorgias’s Helen – of the ‘magic of words’” (Halliwell 2011: 199; cf. Laín
Entralgo 1970 [1958]: 122, Gellrich 1994). As I shall likewise illustrate, a strict dichotomy between rational and
irrational is not as helpful in defining Plato’s category of enchantment as it would first seem. The techniques of
philosophical, ‘Platonic’ enchantment found in the dialogues do appeal primarily to the irrational parts of the soul.
However, what makes this form of enchanting speech good and philosophical is the way in which it guides the
irrational parts of the soul toward rational ends and ultimately trains them to evaluate embodied experiences
properly.
5 “[L]’usage même métaphorique du mot épode” (Boyancé 1937: 36 quoted in Laín Entralgo 1970 [1958]: 113 n. 8; cf.
“metaphorical sense,” Dodds 1951: 226 n. 20). Those who read Plato as developing a new category of philosophical
magic often stress the metaphorical nature of this new category: “simile of magic” (De Romilly 1975: 31 et passim);
Belfiore reads Plato’s category of philosophical magic as a metaphoric “counter-magic” (1980: passim). Laín Entralgo
begins by separating out completely what he considers the “concrete meaning” and the “new metaphorical or
analogical meaning” of incantation, which both appear in Plato’s dialogues. However, he ends up feeling rather
uncomfortable with calling the latter a simple metaphor and falls back on the label of “true analogy” wherein, real
magic and metaphoric magic overlap in the domain of what one might call the power of “suggestion” or “suggestive
action” (1970 [1958]: 120). Others have likewise hesitated to present Plato’s use of magical language as
straightforwardly metaphorical, such as Gellrich, who recognizes a “family resemblance” between ritual magic and
Plato’s rhetorical magic (1994: 25; cf. Hobbs 2017: 109-111 and n.30). As will become apparent, my position shares
some affinities with this latter trend.
6 “Plato, an attentive if untrusting student of the sophists, will elaborate on [Gorgias’s] cognitive theory of mageía and
goeteía, especially in his late Laws” (Graf 2019: 120; cf. Graf 2002).
4
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interlocutor, an unnamed Athenian, frames and drafts a law concerning ‘poisoning’ (φαρµακεία).7
As we shall see in this passage and elsewhere, magic is defined by its rhetorical effect as much as by
its supernatural effect. That is to say, for Plato, magicians are not simply those who use the
supernatural devices of spells and curses to create extraordinary harm or benefit; they are also (and,
perhaps, more so) those who use rhetorical devices to create the expectation in others (and,
sometimes in themselves) that such supernatural harm/benefit is possible.8
1.1.1. Laws 11.932e-933e
To illustrate this, let us turn to the discussion of magic in Laws 932e-933e. The Athenian
begins by making a crucial division between two types of poisoning (φαρµακεία), as it pertains to
the human race (τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων […] γένος): one class of poisoning results in actual harm and the
other results in suspected harm.
Ὅσα τις ἄλλος ἄλλον πηµαίνει φαρµάκοις, τὰ µὲν θανάσιµα αὐτῶν διείρηται, τῶν δ᾿
ἄλλων περι βλάψεων, εἴτε τις ἄρα πώµασιν ἢ καὶ βρώµασιν ἢ ἀλείµµασιν ἑκὼν ἐκ
προνοίας πηµαίνει, τούτων οὐδέν πω διερρήθη. διτταὶ γὰρ δὴ φαρµακεῖαι κατὰ τὸ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων οὖσαι γένος ἐπίσχουσι τὴν διάρρησιν. ἣν µὲν γὰρ τὰ νῦν διαρρήδην εἴποµεν,
σώµασι σώµατα κακουργοῦσά ἐστι κατὰ φύσιν· ἄλλη δὲ ἣ µαγγανείαις τέ τισι καὶ
ἐπῳδαῖς καὶ καταδέσεσι λεγοµέναις πείθει τοὺς µὲν τολµῶντας βλάπτειν αὐτούς, ὡς
<ὄντως> δύνανται τὸ τοιοῦτον, τοὺς δ᾿ ὡς παντὸς µᾶλλον ὑπὸ τούτων δυναµένων
γοητεύειν βλάπτονται.
Of the cases wherein one person harms another with drugs, the types that result in death
were treated earlier, but nothing has yet been said about those that result in harm, whether
someone caused it willingly with forethought by means of drink, food, or ointment. The
reason is that poisoning is of two kinds with respect to human beings. One, which we
already spoke of explicitly, is when harm is carried out through bodies in accordance with
nature. The other is that which, through certain magic tricks and incantations and so-called

Richard Gordon describes the passage as “by far the most interesting and suggestive of any account we possess for
the Classical and Hellenistic period” (1999: 251).
8 Collins is right to note how “Plato concedes that his fellow Greeks practice magic, although he stops short of
claiming that their activities exert anything other than psychological effects. He further adds that such activities also
reinforce the practitioner’s belief in his own powers – a statement that might have come right out of the writings of
Frazer, Malinowski, or Tambiah” (2008: 44).
7
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binding curses, persuades those who dare to do harm that they are able to do such a thing in reality
and others that they really are being harmed by those capable of doing magic.9
The Athenian’s division of φαρµακεία into two types correlates with a larger, categorical division
between the art of the medical doctor (ἰατρὸς) and the art of the magical seer (µάντις). Doctors can do
actual (ἐστι) and natural (κατὰ φύσιν) harm through direct contact (σώµασι σώµατα), whereas
magicians use tricks (µαγγανεῖαι), incantations (ἐπῳδαί), and binding spells (καταδέσεις) to create
the fearful expectation that harm is being done – an expectation so powerful that it borders on
(παντὸς µᾶλλον) the actual experience of harm.10 This does not mean, however, that the Athenian
thinks all magic can be boiled down to mere rhetoric. After separating magical φαρµακεία from
medical φαρµακεία, he explicitly brackets the question of whether the former is effected by
supernatural means or by mere rhetorical means:
ταῦτ᾿ οὖν καὶ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ξύµπαντα οὔτε ῥᾴδιον ὅπως ποτὲ πέφυκε γιγνώσκειν,
οὔτ᾿ εἴ τις γνοίη, πείθειν εὐπετὲς ἑτέρους. ταῖς δὲ ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων
δυσωπουµένους πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπιχειρεῖν πείθειν, κἄν11 ποτε
ἄρα ἴδωσί που κήρινα µιµήµατα πεπλασµένα, εἴτ᾿ ἐπὶ θύραις εἴτ᾿ ἐπὶ τριόδοις εἴτ᾿ ἐπὶ
µνήµασι γονέων αὐτῶν τινές, ὀλιγωρεῖν πάντων τῶν τοιούτων διακελεύεσθαι µὴ σαφὲς
ἔχουσι12 δόγµα περὶ αὐτῶν.

Pl. Leg. 932e1-933a5.
This division between two types of φαρµακεία is foreshadowed in book 1 of the Laws when the Athenian discusses
the effects of wine. Wine is a φάρµακον which induces confidence (θάρρος) when physically imbibed. However, the
Athenian stresses how, unlike wine, no φάρµακον exists which can instill fear and notes that only a γόης would
suggest that such a thing does exist: “god, it seems, bestowed on humans no such drug for fear nor have we
ourselves contrived one – for I do not count magicians to be in our company” (τοῦ µὲν δὴ φόβου σχεδὸν οὔτε θεὸς
ἔδωκεν ἀνθρώποις τοιοῦτον φάρµακον οὔτε αὐτοὶ µεµηχανήµεθα· τοὺς γὰρ γόητας οὐκ ἐν θοίνῃ λέγω, Pl. Leg.
649a2-4). As De Romilly notes, this is probably a reference to the rhetorical power which is at the heart of Plato’s
category of magic (1975: 97 n.3). Compare also the immaterial nature of magic protections in the Statesman (τὴν
µαγευτικὴν τὴν περὶ τὰ ἀλεξιφάρµακα, Pl. Plt. 280e1 with 279c-d). A similar conception of magic also seems to be
implicit in Xenophon’s Socratic dialogues (Xen. Mem. 2.6.31).
11 The text has seemed problematic to editors. However, with Schöpsdau, I accept Schramm’s κἄν as the only
necessary emendation (2011: ad loc.).
12 Saunders notes the difficulty of the participle ἔχουσι (1991: 320-321). Is the agent to be understood as ‘us’ or ‘them’?
One could potentially leave it ambiguous since the passage already indicates that matters about magic are generally
difficult to grasp (οὔτε ῥᾴδιον… γιγνώσκειν) – presumably for ‘us’ and for ‘them.’ However, it does not follow that
opinion (δόγµα) about such matters is also unclear both to us and to them. I find it more likely that those who actually
fear wax poppets have quite vivid opinions about what they see, whereas the speaker of this passage is among those
who ‘have no clear opinion’ (µὴ σαφὲς ἔχουσι δόγµα).
9
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Regarding these matters, and all such things surrounding them, it is not easy to know how
in the world they have come about, and, even if someone did know, it is no simple matter to
persuade others of it. It is not appropriate to attempt to persuade those people who bear
mistrust in their souls towards one another, and even if they should ever happen to see
certain wax-molded-poppets upon thresholds, crossroads, or graves of their ancestors it is
not appropriate for us to order them to dismiss all such matters when we have no clear
opinion concerning them.13
In this passage, which has struck readers as quite strange and even unacceptable,14 the Athenian
suggests that since it is difficult for humans to understand or even discuss matters surrounding
φαρµακεία, it is unreasonable to try to convince the populace not to be suspicious of, say, a
maleficent wax poppet positioned upon a threshold, a crossroad, or a grave.15 Regardless of whether
magic has any actual, supernatural effect, it is inevitable that the practice of cursing (real or not) will
produce a potent rhetorical-cum-psychological effect on a population. For the Athenian, the practice
of malign magic suggests a threat, and that suggestion of magical harm poses a danger irrespective

Pl. Leg. 933a5-933b5.
Even some of the most seasoned readers of the Laws, such as Trevor Saunders, have found it hard to accept that the
Athenian, our guiding interlocutor in the dialogue, would remain aporetic about the topic of magic when he had so
firmly opposed the pretensions of magicians earlier in book 10. The confusion arises from the unnecessary
presupposition that “In this intriguing and ingenious set of laws we meet again our old friends the magicians of the
law of impiety” (Saunders 1991: 318; cf. Mayhew 2008: 202). In fact, there is no indication that book 10 and book 11
legislate against the same types of magic. In book 10, the magicians in question are those impious people who
pretend to persuade the gods, and as a result, their punishment is life imprisonment. In book 11, there is no mention
of the persuasion of the gods, only the persuasion of people, and the price to pay is not imprisonment but execution.
As we shall see below, a critical difference between these two passages and these two practices of magic is the
expectation that each act of magic rhetorically produces. The magic mentioned in book 10 spreads a dangerous kind of
hope – namely, that gods can be bought – whereas the magic in book 11 spreads a dangerous fear – namely, that
certain hidden individuals possess the power to harm others in untold and unknowable ways. It is because these two
magical practices have two different rhetorical effects that they receive two different punishments and should not be
lumped together as they often are.
15 As André Laks has noted, throughout the Laws the Athenian tends to assume an aporetic stance regarding matters
which lie beyond the ken of mortals; he labels these moments as “retreats from the sacred line” (2000: 269-73). The
Athenian’s aporetic stance regarding magic is best read as yet another one of these retreats. See also Pl. Leg. 738b-c,
739a1-5.
13
14

100

of whether it carries any weight.16 The law against poisoning is thus presented as a means of curbing
the suggestive powers of malign magic over and above the suggested powers themselves.
When the Athenian turns to the law itself, he makes little distinction between those who
attempt curses and those who successfully execute them and focuses more on the practitioners’
relative claims to knowledge of magic and calibrates the punishment in accordance with these
claims.
[…] πρῶτον µὲν δεῖσθαι καὶ παραινεῖν καὶ συµβουλεύειν µὴ δεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν τοιοῦτο
δρᾷν µηδὲ καθάπερ παῖδας τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων δειµαίνοντας φοβεῖν, µηδ᾿ αὖ
τὸν νοµοθέτην τε καὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἀναγκάζειν ἐξιᾶσθαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς τοιούτους
φόβους, ὡς πρῶτον µὲν τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα φαρµάττειν οὐκ εἰδότα τί δρᾷ, τά τε κατὰ
σώµατα, ἐὰν µὴ τυγχάνῃ ἐπιστήµων ὢν ἰατρικῆς, τά τε αὖ περὶ τὰ µαγγανεύµατα, ἐὰν
µὴ µάντις ἢ τερατοσκόπος ὢν τυγχάνῃ. λεγέσθω δὴ λόγος ὅδε νόµος περὶ φαρµακείας·
[…] ἐὰν δὲ καταδέσεσιν ἢ ἐπαγωγαῖς ἤ τισιν ἐπῳδαῖς ἢ τῶν τοιούτων φαρµακειῶν
αἱστισινοῦν δόξῃ ὅµοιος εἶναι βλάπτοντι, ἐὰν µὲν µάντις ὢν ἢ τερατοσκόπος, τεθνάτω,
ἐὰν δ᾿ ἄνευ µαντικῆς, ὣν τῆς φαρµακείας ὄφλῃ, ταὐτὸν καὶ τούτῳ γιγνέσθω· περὶ γὰρ
αὖ καὶ τούτου τιµάτω τὸ δικαστήριον ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς δεῖν αὐτὸν δόξῃ πάσχειν ἢ
ἀποτίνειν.
[…] we must first urge and exhort and advise them not to attempt to do such a thing and not
to frighten a large swath of the population startled like children and force the lawgiver and
judge to cure the people of such fears, since the one who first attempts to poison knows not
what he does, both in respect to physical reactions (unless he happens to have the
knowledge of a doctor) and with respect to those things concerning magical practices (unless
he happens to be seer or watcher of portents). Now, let this be the law regarding poisoning:
[…] If he is harming someone with spells of binding or attraction or certain incantations or
any such type of poisoning, he will be put to death, if he happens to be a seer or watcher of
portents, but, if the one convicted of this type of poisoning is ignorant of the mantic art, the
same procedure will also be followed [as with all layman]: the court will dole out the
punishment for the person that seems necessary for him to suffer or pay.17

“Once again, psychology is at the centre of Plato’s attention” (Saunders 1991: 319). Fritz Graf terms it
“psychological poisoning […] since magical spells, as Plato understands them, rely on psychological means based on
ritual action, […] in order to persuade (πείθειν) or, rather, to frighten” (2002: 97).
17 Pl. Leg. 933b7-933e5. My text differs from Bury’s, where I follow the mss reading. See Schöpsdau 2011 ad loc. with
Saunders 1972: 115.
16
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According to the Athenian, both the expert and the layman count as practitioners of the larger
phenomenon of magic. The penalty for practicing malign magic correlates not with how much
supernatural power a magician actually has but with how much power he or she rhetorically claims
to have, since the greater the claim, the greater the fear and expectation of harm that ultimately spreads
throughout the population – that is to say, the more authority a practitioner of malign magic is
perceived to have, the harder it will be for “the lawgiver and judge to cure the people of such a
fear.”
We may ask now whether the Athenian is abolishing all magical ritual with this law. Some
readers of the Laws have answered in the affirmative.18 However, the law is actually limited in two
important respects. First off, the law is only concerned with malign magic ritual (i.e., the practice of
using spells and incantations with the intent to harm).19 Second, the law is not even particularly
concerned with the supernatural effects of malign magic. Instead, the danger of malign magic is
projected onto its rhetorical-cum-psychological effect (i.e., the widespread fear and suspicion it
spreads). Thus, maleficent wax poppets are not outlawed for the harm they physically cause but for
the harmful intent they imply and the fearful expectation of harm they produce amongst the
citizens.
1.1.2. Laws 10.907e-909c
This same attitude toward magic can also be traced in book 10 of the Laws, where we find a
second important condemnation of harmful magical practices. There, the Athenian proposes a piece
of legislation directed against irreverence towards the gods in which the negative rhetorical effect of

Such as Casadesús Bordoy 2002: 193. See also n. 14 above.
…insofar as the entire law is aimed at penalizing “someone … who harms willing and with forethought” (τις …
ἑκὼν ἐκ προνοίας πηµαίνει Pl. Leg. 932e3-4). Not all diviners are treated as dangerous (Pl. Leg. 828b).
18
19
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magic is again discussed and penalized. In this passage, the Athenian distinguishes three categories
of irreverent beliefs: 20
1. gods do not exist;
2. gods do exist but have no concern for human affairs;
3. gods do exist and may be bribed by human enticements.
At the close of book 10, when it is time to mete out punishments for these impious individuals, the
Athenian introduces an additional division regarding all three categories of irreverent belief: an
individual who holds one of these beliefs is either genuine in this belief or dishonest and ironic about
it.21 The Athenian sentences the honest individual to no less than five years in a correctional prison.
However, for the dissembling individual, he reserves one of the greatest punishments in the entire
work – life imprisonment away from all civilization with no burial after death.22
Within the category of dissembling impiety, the Athenian includes many (πολλοί) diviners
and practitioners of magic.23 He also includes tyrants, demagogues, generals, itinerant mystagogues,
and sophists as potential members of the same class; however, the magician is, for the Athenian, the
most salient exemplum. When he sets out to describe the punishment of those who are impious and

20 Pl. Leg. 885a-b, 901c-d; cf. Pl. Resp. 365d-366a. Plato may borrow this tripartite division from the sophists – perhaps
from Protagoras’s writings on the gods or Gorgias himself. The logical structure nicely mirrors that of Gorgias’s On
Not Being.
21 Pl. Leg. 908a-e. The opposition is between one who exhibits παρρησία and one who is εἰρωνικός, cf. Pl. Soph. 268a
(ἁπλοῦς versus εἰρωνικός).
22 Pl. Leg. 909b-d. In Athens, the practice of denying burial (ἀταφία) was reserved for the worst criminals – temple
robbers, traitors, and the like. This severe punishment effectively fulfills the Athenian’s earlier remark that this ironic
(εἰρωνικὸν) class of impious individuals would deserve more than one or even two deaths (οὐχ ἑνὸς οὐδὲ δυοῖν
ἄξια θανάτοιν, Pl. Leg. 908e2).
23 “The [dissembling individual], although opining the same things as the other [i.e., the honest individual], since he
has a gift, as they call it, and is truly full of deceit and treachery, it is this class from which a good many diviners are
drawn and those versed in every magic trick…” (ὁ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων µὲν καθάπερ ἅτερος, εὐφυὴς δὲ ἐπικαλούµενος,
δόλου δὴ καὶ ἐνέδρας πλήρης, ἐξ ὧν µάντεις τε κατασκευάζονται πολλοὶ καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν τὴν µαγγανείαν
κεκινήµενοι …, Pl. Leg. 908d1-4). I follow the manuscripts (κεκινήµενοι) over Bury’s popular conjecture:
γεγενηµένοι (cf. LSJ s. v. κινέω B. 6).
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dissembling, he singles out magicians once again and this time on their own as the prime example of
this worst kind of impiety:
ὅσοι δ᾿ ἂν θηριώδεις γένωνται πρὸς τῷ θεοὺς µὴ νοµίζειν ἢ ἀµελεῖς ἢ παραιτητοὺς εἶναι,
καταφρονοῦντες δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαγωγῶσι µὲν πολλοὺς τῶν ζώντων, τοὺς δὲ
τεθνεῶτας φάσκοντες ψυχαγωγεῖν καὶ θεοὺς ὑπισχνούµενοι πείθειν, ὡς θυσίαις τε καὶ
εὐχαῖς καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς γοητεύοντες, ἰδιώτας τε καὶ ὅλας οἰκίας καὶ πόλεις χρηµάτων χάριν
ἐπιχειρῶσι κατ᾿ ἄκρας ἐξαιρεῖν.
For those who have become bestial and, in addition to not believing in the gods or believing
that the gods do not care or can be bought off, they, in contempt of humankind, enchant
many of the living while claiming to commune with the dead and while promising to
persuade the gods, just as if they were doing magic through sacrifices, prayers, and
incantations; and they endeavor to destroy utterly private individuals, whole households,
and cities, all for the sake of money.24
The wordplay, which pulls together the dual meaning of ψυχαγωγεῖν, underscores the salience of
rhetoric to the very practice of magic. However, it is pointedly not all magicians, but many (πολλοί)
– specifically those who both maintain impious beliefs and also aim to deceive. The assertions
(φάσκοντες) and promises (ὑπισχνούµενοι) that these magicians make about raising the dead and
persuading the gods are what pose the greatest threat to the “private individuals, whole households,
and cities.” In this law against impiety, we see once again that magic as a category is shorthand for a
form of rhetoric that convincingly imparts beliefs, fears, and hopes in the hearts of the populace.
1.1.3. Outside the Laws
Throughout Plato’s dialogues, magic continues to be represented as an act that relies more
on a psychological, rhetorical type of efficacy than any supernatural, ritual efficacy. In the Republic,
for instance, Adeimantus complains about the negative rhetorical effect that is caused by
practitioners of magic who claim to know incantations (ἐπῳδαί), sacrifices (θυσίαι), and binding

24

Pl. Leg. 909a8-b6.
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spells (κατάδεσµοι, ἐπαγωγαί). What Adeimantus finds so contemptible about these magical
practitioners is not the dangerous supernatural effect that they might have on putative victims so
much as the corrosive, rhetorical effect that they do have on general beliefs about the gods and virtue
– in particular, their astonishing claims (θαυµασιώτατοι […] λόγοι) that mortals can persuade gods
into harming the just and unjust alike (ὁµοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ).25 We find a similar ambivalence in
the Charmides where Socrates’s headache spell (ἐπῳδή) – which he describes in positive terms – is
first introduced as a ritual technique, but quickly and tacitly becomes equated with Socrates’s own
philosophical-cum-rhetorical technique of dialectic.26 To take one final example, we can look at
Socrates’s remarks about speech-writers in the Euthydemus. After censuring Euthydemus and
Dionysodorus for their Protean form of rhetoric that aims more at enchanting (γοητεύοντε) than
displaying real wisdom,27 Socrates launches into his own rhetorical display. In it, he discusses the

“The most astonishing of all are accounts given about gods and virtue – how gods dole out misfortune and a
wretched life to many good people, and to the opposite an opposite fate. Itinerant priests and seers traveling to the
doors of the wealthy persuade them that they have a power, procured from the gods through sacrifices and
incantations, that, if an injustice has been committed by the individual or their ancestors, it is remedied through
pleasure and feasting, or, if one should want to harm some enemy, it will (together with a minor payment) harm the
just and unjust alike with certain spells of binding and attraction, persuading the gods, so it goes, to serve a subsidiary
role” (τούτων δὲ πάντων οἱ περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς θαυµασιώτατοι λέγονται, ὡς ἄρα καὶ θεοὶ πολλοῖς
µὲν ἀγαθοῖς δυστυχίας τε καὶ βίον κακὸν ἔνειµαν, τοῖς δ’ ἐναντίοις ἐναντίαν µοῖραν. ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ µάντεις ἐπὶ
πλουσίων θύρας ἰόντες πείθουσιν ὡς ἔστι παρὰ σφίσι δύναµις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζοµένη θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς, εἴτε
τι ἀδίκηµά του γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἢ προγόνων, ἀκεῖσθαι µεθ’ ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἑορτῶν, ἐάν τέ τινα ἐχθρὸν πηµῆναι
ἐθέλῃ, µετὰ σµικρῶν δαπανῶν ὁµοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ βλάψει ἐπαγωγαῖς τισιν καὶ καταδέσµοις, τοὺς θεούς, ὥς
φασιν, πείθοντές σφισιν ὑπηρετεῖν. Pl. Resp. 364b3-c5).
26 Most interpreters of the Charmides are quick to read all of Socrates’s remarks about the headache spell as somehow
metaphoric for types of philosophical discourse (Van der Ben is representative, glossing ‘incantation’ and ‘charm’
with “i.e., philosophy”; see 1985: 4,14). Others go some way in the opposite direction, stressing that Socrates’s
remarks should be read as a serious artifact of Greek or Vedic magic ritual (Brisson 2000a; Faraone 2010). Still other
interpreters underscore the difficulty of marking where real magic ends and rhetorical magic begins before offering
their own solutions (e.g., McPherran 2004, Redfield 2011). The disparity between interpretations underscores the
problems that come with trying to shoehorn Plato’s remarks about enchantment into dichotomies of
metaphorical/literal, belief/non-belief.
27 “Ctesippus, I’ll tell you now the same thing I told Cleinias, that you do not recognize the wisdom of these
strangers, what a marvel it is. Yet they are unwilling to display it to us in any serious manner and instead imitate the
Egyptian sophist, Proteus, by simply enchanting us” (Ὦ Κτήσιππε, καὶ νῦν δὴ ἃ πρὸς Κλεινίαν ἔλεγον, καὶ πρὸς
25
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extraordinary efficacy of speeches and speech-writing, which he describes as an integral element of
magical incantations:
καὶ γάρ µοι οἵ τε ἄνδρες αὐτοὶ οἱ λογοποιοί, ὅταν συγγένωµαι αὐτοῖς, ὑπέρσοφοι, ὦ
Κλεινία, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ τέχνη αὐτῶν θεσπεσία τις καὶ ὑψηλή. καὶ µέντοι
οὐδὲν θαυµαστόν· ἔστι γὰρ τῆς τῶν ἐπῳδῶν τέχνης µόριον σµικρῷ τε ἐκείνης
ὑποδεεστέρα. ἡ µὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπῳδῶν ἔχεών τε καὶ φαλαγγίων καὶ σκορπίων καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων θηρίων τε καὶ νόσων κήλησίς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ δικαστῶν τε καὶ ἐκκλησιαστῶν καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ὄχλων κήλησίς τε καὶ παραµυθία τυγχάνει οὖσα.28
Whenever I’m in their company, Cleinias, men who write speeches seem to me to be
extraordinarily wise, and the art of theirs is something divine and lofty indeed. And yet, this
is no surprise; for it is part of the art of incantations and only a slightly subordinate part. While
the art of incantations involves the enchantment of snakes, spiders, scorpions, and other
beasts and illnesses, the other art simply happens to involve the enchantment and
encouragement of jurors, assemblies, and other gatherings.29
Here, Socrates is clear in stressing the contiguous relationship between rhetoric and magic. A
magician is as much an orator as an orator is a magician. Both produce a similar effect on their
audience. What distinguishes them is simply how bestial their audience happens to be.30 What these
passages illustrate is that, for Plato, rhetorical power is central rather than peripheral to his concept
of magic as a whole. Although Plato never entirely dismisses the possibility that some magical

σὲ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγω, ὅτι οὐ γιγνώσκεις τῶν ξένων τὴν σοφίαν, ὅτι θαυµασία ἐστίν· ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἐθέλετον ἡµῖν
ἐπιδείξασθαι σπουδάζοντε, ἀλλὰ τὸν Πρωτέα µιµεῖσθον τὸν Αἰγύπτιον σοφιστὴν γοητεύοντε ἡµᾶς. Pl. Euthyd.
288b4-8). Socrates uses the label of Proteus to dismiss Euthyphro (Pl. Euthyphr. 15d) and Ion (Pl. Ion. 541e), who
similarly change subjects rapidly. The closest parallel is in the Republic when Socrates declares that the divine forms
do not change before our eyes – like Proteus (Pl. Resp. 381d4) – thereby deceiving and bewitching us (ἐξαπατῶντες
καὶ γοητεύοντες, Pl. Resp. 381e; cf. 380d1, 383a3).
28 Gifford 1905: ad loc. draws attention to the similar wording and similar sentiment at Pl. Phdr. 271c where Socrates
describes the art of speaking as a matter of psychagogy (λόγου δύναµις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὖσα).
29 Pl. Euthyd. 289e1-290a4.
30 For a similar analogy to beast-charming, we can turn to the Republic, where it is Socrates who is able to enchant
(κηλεῖν) the beastly Thrasymachus like a snake charmer (Pl. Resp. 358b). Later in the same dialogue, Socrates labels
tyrant-makers (τυραννοποιοὶ) as terrific magicians (δεινοὶ µάγοι) who can turn a potentate into a giant winged
drone (ὑπόπτερον καὶ µέγαν κηφῆνά τινα, Pl. Resp. 572e3-573a1). As we shall see later on, enchantment, as Plato
conceives of it, plays on the lower, more infantile, and, indeed, most bestial part of the human soul. In this capacity, it
can be used either to stoke the bestial nature of a person or lead that nature back into alignment with human reason.
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practices are founded upon supernatural or divine causes,31 he consistently focuses on the rhetorical,
psychological causes that all magical practices naturally and necessarily involve.
At this point, we may ask: how metaphorical are Plato’s remarks about enchantment? If
Plato consistently portrays magicians as persuasive speakers and elides the supernatural efficacy of
magic with a type of rhetorical efficacy, then how metaphorical is Plato being when he describes
persuasive speakers as magicians and elides powerful rhetorical effects with the supernatural effects
of spells and incantations? In Laws 932e-933e and elsewhere, Plato shows us that ‘doing magic’ is not
simply the practice of using spells, incantations, wax puppets, or other traditional magical devices.
Instead, it is the practice of rhetorically convincing others (and even oneself) that such things are
possible. When Plato labels speakers as various types of enchanters – be they magicians,32 animal
charmers,33 midwives,34 nurses singing enchanting lullabies,35 or Orpheus himself36 – he is
underscoring a contiguous relationship between the rhetoric of the magician, sophist, and
philosopher alike. In the remainder of this chapter, we shall explore the nature of this rhetorical
power which Plato labels as incantatory.
2. The experience of enchantment
Like Gorgias, Plato considers what the effect of enchantment consists of. He also remarks
throughout his dialogues on the sources of this experience and the proper ends toward which this
experience should be directed. In what follows, we shall examine first how Plato conceptualizes this

In the Symposium, for instance, we find rather earnest and more or less positive remarks about magic in the speech
of Diotima (Pl. Symp. 203a, 203d with Bury 1909: ad loc..; cf. Pl. Symp. 197e).
32 Pl. Men. 80b, Resp. 572e, 598d, Soph. 234c-235a; cf. Pl. Soph. 241b, Plt. 303c, Hp. mai. 371a.
33 Pl. Resp. 358b; cf. Euthphr. 289e-290a; Pl. Grg. 483e; Pl. Plt. 268b.
34 Pl. Tht. 149d, 157c.
35 Pl. Phd. 77e, 114d; cf. Pl. Leg. 790e, 887d.
36 Pl. Prt. 315a.
31
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experience of enchantment before turning to Plato’s remarks about what the appropriate means and
ends of incantatory rhetoric are.
2.1. Enchantment as a specific category of experience
As with his predecessors, Plato describes enchantment as a psychosomatic experience of
distraction and, like Gorgias, he describes this experience as a type of ψυχαγωγία. Although it
would be wrong to say that Plato had developed a fully-fledged theory of enchantment, his various
remarks about the rhetorical powers of magical acts and the magical powers of rhetorical acts do
reflect a much more expansive and still more focused attempt to understand and articulate the
experience of enchantment than can be gleaned from any earlier discussion of incantatory rhetoric.
First of all, Plato is our earliest author to treat enchantment explicitly as an independent
category of experience. As we saw in the previous chapter, Gorgias and the poets blend the
experience of enchantment with neighboring experiences of sleep (κῶµα/ὕπνος) or forgetting
(λήθη), and often cast it as a sort of mental theft (κλέπτειν/ἀφαιρεῖν) or compulsion (βιάζειν).37
These competing frames make for rather fuzzy semantic boundaries. As we saw, Gorgias takes full
advantage of these in the Helen, where he aims to represent speech and persuasion as literal acts of
physical compulsion. Plato is far stricter in his usage and more careful to distinguish the experience
of enchantment from the neighboring experiences which his predecessors freely and poetically
intertwine.
In book 3 of the Republic, Plato offers something of a definition for his concept of
enchantment. The passage occurs when Socrates is describing how to select those guardians whose
firm devotion to the city cannot be swayed – lit. ‘compelled’ (βιάζειν), ‘robbed’ (κλέπτειν), and

37

See ch. 1, p. 66.
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‘enchanted’ (γοητεύειν).38 After Glaucon expresses confusion over the bold choice of terms, Socrates
apologizes for speaking so much like a tragic poet (τραγικῶς) and specifies what he means by
compulsion, theft, and enchantment. As he notes, these three categories correspond to three types of
experience wherein one is involuntarily (ἀκουσίως) deprived of their belief (δόξα). People who have
been ‘robbed’ (κλαπέντας) are those who have, in fact, been persuaded (µεταπεισθέντας) by an
argument (λόγος) or made to forget (ἐπιλανθανοµένους) by the passing of time.39 Those who are
‘compelled’ (βιασθέντας) are those who are made to change their opinion (µεταδοξάσαι) through
some bodily pain or suffering (ὀδύνη τις ἢ ἀλγηδὼν).40
Τοὺς µὴν γοητευθέντας, ὡς ἐγᾦµαι, κἂν σὺ φαίης εἶναι οἳ ἂν µεταδοξάσωσιν ἢ ὑφ’
ἡδονῆς κηληθέντες ἢ ὑπὸ φόβου τι δείσαντες.
And those who have been ‘enchanted,’ as it seems to me, and as you would agree, are those
who have their opinions changed either being bewitched by pleasure or stricken with fear.41
Glaucon recognizes and accepts this use of the language of enchantment and even offers his own
more economical definition by equating γοητεία with ἀπάτη: “‘to enchant’ seems to mean

38 “It is necessary then to select from the rest of the guardians those men who appear under our close scrutiny to
work with extreme enthusiasm through their whole life toward whatever they consider benefits the city and are, on
the other hand, in no way willing to produce the opposite […] it seems to me that it is necessary to look closely over
these men in all stages of their lives, whether they are observant of this conviction and are not enchanted or
compelled to stray, forgetting the conviction that it is necessary to do what is best for the city” (Ἐκλεκτέον ἄρ’ ἐκ
τῶν ἄλλων φυλάκων τοιούτους ἄνδρας, οἳ ἂν σκοποῦσιν ἡµῖν µάλιστα φαίνωνται παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον, ὃ µὲν
ἂν τῇ πόλει ἡγήσωνται συµφέρειν, πάσῃ προθυµίᾳ ποιεῖν, ὃ δ’ ἂν µή, µηδενὶ τρόπῳ πρᾶξαι ἂν ἐθέλειν. […]
Δοκεῖ δή µοι τηρητέον αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἡλικίαις, εἰ φυλακικοί εἰσι τούτου τοῦ δόγµατος καὶ µήτε
γοητευόµενοι µήτε βιαζόµενοι ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐπιλανθανόµενοι δόξαν τὴν τοῦ ποιεῖν δεῖν ἃ τῇ πόλει βέλτιστα.
Pl. Resp. 412d9-e7).
39 “By ‘robbed,’ I mean those who are dissuaded and made to forget something, either because passing time or an
argument snatches it away from them unawares.” (κλαπέντας µὲν γὰρ τοὺς µεταπεισθέντας λέγω καὶ τοὺς
ἐπιλανθανοµένους, ὅτι τῶν µὲν χρόνος, τῶν δὲ λόγος ἐξαιρούµενος λανθάνει, Pl. Resp. 413b4-6).
40 “Now by ‘compelled,’ I mean those for whom some bodily pain or suffering causes a change of opinion” (Τοὺς
τοίνυν βιασθέντας λέγω οὓς ἂν ὀδύνη τις ἢ ἀλγηδὼν µεταδοξάσαι ποιήσῃ. Pl. Resp. 413b9-10).
41 Pl. Resp. 413c1-3.
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everything that deceives” (Ἔοικε γάρ […] γοητεύειν πάντα ὅσα ἀπατᾷ).42 After distinguishing
enchantment from mental theft and compulsion, Socrates discusses how to test a person’s
susceptibility to this experience of enchantment by drawing an analogy to husbandry. Just as
herdsmen might test the grit of a young foal with loud noises, he says, one can test how enchantable
a youth is by bringing him into contact with pleasures (εἰς ἡδονὰς) and fearsome things (εἰς δείµατ’
ἄττα) where his involuntary reactions may be gauged.43 The youth who remains well-disposed
(εὐσχήµων), well-composed (εὔρυθµος), and well-balanced (εὐάρµοστος) in the face of fearsome
and pleasurable things is the one who is difficult to enchant (δυσγοήτευτος) and, thus, a good
candidate for the guardians of the city.44
What this passage of the Republic shows us is, first of all, that enchantment constitutes a
specific category of experience and, second, that this experience is conceived of as a type of ἀπάτη
which is triggered by passions such as pleasure (ἡδονή) or fear (φόβος). Later in the Republic, we
find several more remarks about the specific psychology of enchantment. In these passages,
enchantment is described as a psychosomatic experience that affects the sensory imagination. For
instance, in book 9, Socrates links enchantment (γοητεία) to the relative and illusory way in which

42 Pl. Resp. 413c4. As noted in ch. 1, n. 230, the language of ἀπάτη, in early Greek literature, is not precisely equivalent
to ψεῦδος. While it can denote ‘deception,’ it also often denotes a state of ‘distraction’ that allows for deception.
While I translate the term here as ‘deception,’ it should be understood as less severe than the lying deception implied
by ψεῦδος.
43 “Well then we must also test for the third type, that of enchantment, and watch for it. Just as people observe foals
while bringing them into contact with loud noises or commotions to see whether they exhibit fear, so too we must
bring these young men face to face with fearsome things and then transfer them to pleasures, testing them even more
thoroughly than gold in the fire” (Οὐκοῦν […] καὶ τρίτου εἴδους τοῦ τῆς γοητείας ἅµιλλαν ποιητέον, καὶ
θεατέον—ὥσπερ τοὺς πώλους ἐπὶ τοὺς ψόφους τε καὶ θορύβους ἄγοντες σκοποῦσιν εἰ φοβεροί, οὕτω νέους
ὄντας εἰς δείµατ’ ἄττα κοµιστέον καὶ εἰς ἡδονὰς αὖ µεταβλητέον, βασανίζοντας πολὺ µᾶλλον ἢ χρυσὸν ἐν πυρί.
Pl. Resp. 413d6-e1).
44 “If one appears difficult to enchant and well-disposed in all of this, he is a good guardian of himself and of the
cultural training he has learned, showing himself to be well-composed and well-balanced in all of this, the type who
would be most useful for the city and himself” (εἰ δυσγοήτευτος καὶ εὐσχήµων ἐν πᾶσι φαίνεται, φύλαξ αὑτοῦ ὢν
ἀγαθὸς καὶ µουσικῆς ἧς ἐµάνθανεν, εὔρυθµόν τε καὶ εὐάρµοστον ἑαυτὸν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις παρέχων, οἷος δὴ ἂν
ὢν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ πόλει χρησιµώτατος εἴη. Pl. Resp. 413e1-5).
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humans experience pleasure and pain. He notes that even when the soul is in a neutral, restful state
(ἡσυχία), that state of rest can be experienced as pleasant (ἡδὺ) if one imagines a relatively painful
state (τὸ ἀλγεινὸν). Conversely, it can be experienced as painful (ἀλγεινὸν) if one imagines a
relatively pleasant state (τὸ ἡδὺ).45 These phantom pleasures or pains triggered by the sensory
imagination are what Socrates labels as a kind of enchantment (γοητεία τις). He alludes to this
illusory experience of enchantment again, later in the Republic, when he compares the experience of
enchantment with σκιαγραφία. As he puts it, what σκιαγραφία produces is nothing short of
enchantment (γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει) insofar as it stirs our inborn passion (πάθηµα) and
creates a disruption in the soul (ταραχὴ […] ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ).46 In both passages, enchantment denotes a
particular psychosomatic experience in which either external, sensory illusions trick the psyche or
internal, psychic illusions trick the senses. Just as illusory art can strike the senses and trigger a false
perception within our soul, so too our sensory imagination within us can trigger illusory sensations
of pleasure or pain.
The basic picture of enchantment that emerges from these passages in the Republic, is
reflected in other dialogues, where it is similarly described as a psychosomatic experience affecting

45 “This [state of rest between pleasure and pain] does not exist, rather this state of rest appears pleasant when
juxtaposed to pain and appears painful when juxtaposed to pleasure, and there is nothing healthy in these
appearances as it pertains to the inherent truth of pleasure, instead, it is a type of enchantment” (Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα
τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται […] παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν ἡδὺ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀλγεινὸν τότε ἡ ἡσυχία, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς
τούτων τῶν φαντασµάτων πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις. Pl. Resp. 584a6-10).
46 “And the same are objects that look bent and straight to those who look at them in and out of the water, or concave
and convex through the error of sight regarding color, and each kind of thing that is a clear disruption present by
itself in our soul. Thus, skiagraphia, insofar as it takes advantage of our natural passions, differs in no way from
enchantment, any more than wonderworking and many other such techniques” (Καὶ ταὐτὰ καµπύλα τε καὶ εὐθέα
ἐν ὕδατί τε θεωµένοις καὶ ἔξω, καὶ κοῖλά τε δὴ καὶ ἐξέχοντα διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ χρώµατα αὖ πλάνην τῆς ὄψεως, καὶ
πᾶσά τις ταραχὴ δήλη ἡµῖν ἐνοῦσα αὕτη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· ᾧ δὴ ἡµῶν τῷ παθήµατι τῆς φύσεως ἡ σκιαγραφία
ἐπιθεµένη γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει, καὶ ἡ θαυµατοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τοιαῦται µηχαναί. Pl. Resp. 602c10d4).
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hearing, touch, and sight as well as spirit (θυµός), thought (νόηµα), and soul (ψυχή).47 Like Gorgias,
Plato fundamentally tethers the experience of enchantment to the soul (ψυχή), which he conceives of
as the seat of both cognition and sensation.48 As we saw in the examples in the Republic, this
psychosomatic experience of enchantment can be externally or internally motivated. Sometimes, an
external, somatic experience affects the soul;49 other times, it is an internal, psychic experience that
resonates through the body.50 In the dialogues, we find many examples in which an individual’s
soul is said to be enchanted by certain external, somatic experiences – be it the rhythmic murmur of
a mother’s lullaby51 or popular music.52 This external, somatic dynamic of enchantment is most
clearly expressed in the Phaedo when Socrates remarks how the sensual corruptions of the body are,
by their very nature, sources of enchantment for the soul.
Ἐὰν δέ γε οἶµαι µεµιασµένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώµατος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἅτε τῷ σώµατι
ἀεὶ συνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρῶσα καὶ γοητευοµένη ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ὑπό τε τῶν
ἐπιθυµιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, ὥστε µηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ σωµατοειδές, οὗ
τις ἂν ἅψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς

θυµός: Pl. Resp. 411a5-b3. νόηµα: Pl. Symp. 197e2-5.
For ψυχή, see Pl. Phd. 81b3, Crat. 403e1, Leg. 659d1, 664b4, 906b7, et Pl. Charm. passim. Plato also invokes the
language of ψυχαγωγία: see Pl. Leg. 909b2, 3, Phaedr. 261a8, 271d1, Tim. 71a6 (cf. ἕλκει τὴν ψυχήν, Pl. Ion 536a).
49 …as with the perception of illusory art (Pl. Resp. 602c10-d4 above).
50 …as with the phantom pleasures and pains originating in the sensory imagination (Pl. Resp. 584a6-10 above).
51 “Thus, when mothers want to soothe the restlessness of their children, they do not give them rest but, on the
contrary, motion, as when they constantly rock them in the crook of their arm, and not silence but a certain singing,
and through this cast an utter spell over the children (not unlike those in a Bacchic frenzy) using the combined
dancing movement and song as a remedy” (ἡνίκα γὰρ ἄν που βουληθῶσι κατακοιµίζειν τὰ δυσυπνοῦντα τῶν
παιδίων αἱ µητέρες, οὐχ ἡσυχίαν αὐτοῖς προσφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον κίνησιν, ἐν ταῖς ἀγκάλαις ἀεὶ σείουσαι,
καὶ οὐ σιγὴν ἀλλά τινα µελῳδίαν, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς οἷον καταυλοῦσι τῶν παιδίων, καθαπερεὶ τῶν ἐκφρόνων
Βακχείων, ἰάσει ταύτῃ τῇ τῆς κινήσεως ἅµα χορείᾳ καὶ µούσῃ χρώµεναι. Pl. Leg. 790d5-e4)
52 “Therefore, whenever someone gives himself over to music, to enchant and rain down upon his soul, through his
ears just as through a funnel, things which we would now describe as sweet and soft and mournful harmonies, and
passes his whole life warbling, overjoyed by the song, if he had any spirit, he would first off soften it like iron and
make it into something usable rather than raw and hardened. And whenever he does not let up from pouring in
music, he is enchanted and melts and drips away until he dissolves and cuts away his spirit just as cords from the
soul and is made into ‘soft spearman’” (Οὐκοῦν ὅταν µέν τις µουσικῇ παρέχῃ καταυλεῖν καὶ καταχεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς
διὰ τῶν ὤτων ὥσπερ διὰ χώνης ἃς νυνδὴ ἡµεῖς ἐλέγοµεν τὰς γλυκείας τε καὶ µαλακὰς καὶ θρηνώδεις ἁρµονίας,
καὶ µινυρίζων τε καὶ γεγανωµένος ὑπὸ τῆς ᾠδῆς διατελῇ τὸν βίον ὅλον, οὗτος τὸ µὲν πρῶτον, εἴ τι θυµοειδὲς
εἶχεν, ὥσπερ σίδηρον ἐµάλαξεν καὶ χρήσιµον ἐξ ἀχρήστου καὶ σκληροῦ ἐποίησεν· ὅταν δ’ ἐπιχέων µὴ ἀνιῇ
ἀλλὰ κηλῇ, τὸ δὴ µετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη τήκει καὶ λείβει, ἕως ἂν ἐκτήξῃ τὸν θυµὸν καὶ ἐκτέµῃ ὥσπερ νεῦρα ἐκ τῆς
ψυχῆς καὶ ποιήσῃ “µαλθακὸν αἰχµητήν”. Pl. Resp. 411a5-b3)
47
48
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ὄµµασι σκοτῶδες καὶ ἀιδές, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ αἱρετόν, τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισµένη µισεῖν
τε καὶ τρέµειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὕτω δὴ ἔχουσαν οἴει ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτὴν εἰλικρινῆ
ἀπαλλάξεσθαι;
As I see it, if [the soul] is released from the body after being polluted and corrupted –
because of being in constant contact with the body, serving it, loving it, and being enchanted
by all of its sundry desires and pleasures, so that it thinks that nothing else is true except that
which is embodied, which one can touch and see and drink and eat and use for sexual
gratification, and thereby becoming accustomed to hate, fear, and avoid that which is
invisible and unseen by the eyes yet thinkable and graspable by philosophy – do you think
that the soul faring in this way would be released free and untarnished?53
By this account, our very embodiment gives rise to the experience of enchantment insofar as it
accustoms the soul to desire and fear various somatic experiences rather than heed more intellective
motivations. In other places in the dialogues, the opposite trajectory is found where the experience
of enchantment originates in the soul and spreads to the body. For instance, in the Meno, Socrates’s
spellbinding arguments lead Meno’s soul directly into a state of aporia, and this mental state is
psychosomatically experienced as a sensation of numbness.54 Likewise, in the Charmides, Socrates

Pl. Phd. 81b1-c1.
“Socrates, before I ever encountered you, I used to hear that you did nothing else but express your doubt and make
other feel doubt. And now, it seems, you are enchanting, bewitching, and simply ensorcelling me into a state of utter
doubt. If I must put it in jest, you seem to me to be the spitting image of a flat torpedo fish both in form and in other
respects. For it benumbs anyone, whoever comes near and touches it. You, too, seem to have benumbed me in some
way. For truly, my soul and mouth are numb, and I have nothing to respond to you. Even though I have spoken
about virtue thousands of times at length and to many people – and quite well, if I do say so myself – I now have no
idea what to say it is. You would seem well-advised not to travel from here or move from home. For if you were ever
to do these sorts of things as a stranger in a foreign city, you would be taken as a magician.” (Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤκουον
µὲν ἔγωγε πρὶν καὶ συγγενέσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν· καὶ
νῦν, ὥς γέ µοι δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις µε καὶ φαρµάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπᾴδεις, ὥστε µεστὸν ἀπορίας γεγονέναι·
καὶ δοκεῖς µοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁµοιότατος εἶναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ τἆλλα ταύτῃ τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ
θαλαττίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ αὕτη τὸν ἀεὶ πλησιάζοντα καὶ ἁπτόµενον ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ· καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς µοι νῦν ἐµὲ τοιοῦτόν τι
πεποιηκέναι [ναρκᾶν]. ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ στόµα ναρκῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι ἀποκρίνωµαί
σοι. καίτοι µυριάκις γε περὶ ἀρετῆς παµπόλλους λόγους εἴρηκα καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, καὶ πάνυ εὖ, ὥς γε ἐµαυτῷ
ἐδόκουν· νῦν δὲ οὐδ᾿ ὅ τι ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἔχω εἰπεῖν. καί µοι δοκεῖς εὖ βουλεύεσθαι οὐκ ἐκπλέων ἐνθένδε οὐδ᾿
ἀποδηµῶν· εἰ γὰρ ξένος ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει τοιαῦτα ποιοῖς, τάχ᾿ ἂν ὡς γόης ἀπαχθείης., Pl. Men. 79e8-80b6). As
David Blank has shown, Socrates’s dialectical and elenctic types of rhetoric have as much of an emotional and
visceral effect on interlocutors as they have an intellectual effect (1993). Laura Candiotto has linked the emotional
charge created by aporia to the concept of “extended mind” or “extended emotion,” as is described by cognitive
science (2019).
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specifically defines ἐπῳδαί as a family of techniques which affect the body through the medium of
the soul.
δεῖν οὖν ἐκεῖνο καὶ πρῶτον καὶ µάλιστα θεραπεύειν, εἰ µέλλει καὶ τὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ τὰ
τοῦ ἄλλου σώµατος καλῶς ἔχειν. θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν […] ἐπῳδαῖς τισιν· τὰς δ᾿
ἐπῳδὰς ταύτας τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς καλούς· ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς
σωφροσύνην ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἧς ἐγγενοµένης καὶ παρούσης ῥᾴδιον ἤδη εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν
καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώµατι πορίζειν.
Now it is necessary to treat [the soul] first and foremost if one intends to treat well the
matters of the head and the rest of the body. To treat the soul […] involves certain
incantations. These incantations are words of a fine sort: from such words, prudence is
produced within the soul, and when it is produced and made present, it is, at that time, a
simple matter to secure health for the head and the rest of the body. 55
In the course of the Charmides, Socrates will use the fine, incantatory λόγοι of his dialectic, which
might better incentivize an ethos of prudence (σωφροσύνη) within the soul of Charmides and
thereby prevent future headaches (or, in this case, hangovers). Whatever the trajectory, the
experience of enchantment consistently involves give and take between soul and body, imagination
and sensation.
To get a clearer picture of how Plato conceptualizes this psychosomatic experience of
enchantment, it will be helpful turn to several passages from the Laws and Timaeus that offer
evidence for what the enchanting passions (παθήµατα) of pleasure (ἡδονή) and fear (φόβος) are
and how they stir the soul (ψυχή) into a state of spellbinding distraction (ἀπάτη). They also offer a
framework for understanding how enchantments can induce their psychosomatic effect both
externally and internally. In the famous human puppet analogy in the Laws, we find a framework
for understanding the psychosomatic quality of the experience of enchantment, which sits at the
tidal zone between physical experience and psychical expectation and imagination. In particular, the
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Pl. Charm. 157a1-b1.
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language of enchantment marks out instances in which there is a blurring of the line between
physical pleasures or pains and psychic pleasures or pains that are imagined or expected. In the
Timaeus, we see how this experience plays out on a more anatomical-cum-psychological level. In that
dialogue, we find a description of how ψυχαγωγία affects the part of the soul that is most deeply
entangled with somatic, embodied experiences. As we shall see, enchantment occurs when images
and apparitions, pleasures and pains that arise from external or internal sources effectively
intimidate or placate the soul in ways that may or may not ally with reason.
2.2. Between experience and expectation, sensation and imagination (Laws 1.644d7-645c6)
In book 1 of the Laws, the Athenian famously describes a human as a divine puppet (θαῦµα)
attached to five cords: four iron cords that correspond to the passions of pleasure (ἡδονή), pain
(λύπη), fear (φόβος), and confidence (θάρρος); and one golden cord that corresponds to calculation
(λογισµός) – and ultimately, to law itself (νόµος).56 In order to live a good life, the human puppet
must follow the tug of the golden cord of calculation and law. And since gold is malleable, the cord
of calculation and law requires support from the iron cords as well. These iron cords are arrayed
along two tiers: pleasure and pain are physical experiences,57 whereas fear and confidence are psychical
expectations (ἐλπίδες).58 These two tiers correspond to one another insofar as fear (φόβος) is the
expectation (ἐλπίς) of pain (λύπη) and confidence (θάρρος) is the expectation (ἐλπίς) of pleasure
(ἡδονή). 59

Pl. Leg. 644d7-645c6.
Plato labels pleasure (ἡδονή) and pain (λύπη) as antagonistic and senseless advisors (συµβούλω ἐναντίω τε καὶ
ἄφρονε, Pl. Leg. 644c6-7).
58 These “expectations” are synonyms for opinions (δόξαι, Pl. Leg. 644c9–d1). In the Philebus, they are described as
pleasures and pains which belong to the soul alone (αἵ γε διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἡδοναὶ καὶ λῦπαι, Pl. Phlb. 39d1–5).
59 For an instructive reading of this passage, see Sauvé-Meyer 2012; 2015: ad loc.
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According to this motivational framework, which is echoed in earlier dialogues, human
actions and beliefs are largely motivated through the manipulation of physical experiences of
pleasure and pain as well as psychic expectations of pleasure of pain.60 If we slot Plato’s category of
magic into this framework, we find that it marks an intervallic point between physical experience
and psychical expectation. As we saw in Laws 932e-933e, the psychosomatic effect of magic is what
distinguishes medical poisons from magical poisons. The former harm the body naturally through
direct contact (σώµασι σώµατα), whereas the latter produce an indirect, psychic expectation of harm
that is so powerful that it borders on (παντὸς µᾶλλον) a physical experience of harm. Elsewhere we
also saw how enchantment always involves an interplay between mind and body, imagination and
sensation. It can be triggered by external, physical experiences or internal, psychical expectations.
Plato’s category of enchantment thus labels moments when the iron cords cross and the
differentiation between experience and expectation becomes blurred. These enchantments may be
powerful, physical experiences that instill psychical expectations (such as sensual pleasures, which
instill a state of confidence or desire) or powerful, psychic expectations that induce physical
experiences (such as psychological fears, which manifest as physical presentiments or intimations of
harm being done).
2.3. Psychology of psychagogy in the Timaeus
To grasp how Plato conceptualizes the psychosomatic experience of enchantment on a more
minute, anatomical level, we can turn to the Timaeus, where we find a description of ψυχαγωγία as

As Sauvé-Meyer notes, this framework is not limited to the Laws but can be found present in many other dialogues
as well (2012: 317). We will see in the next chapter that Plato’s fourfold motivational framework is later taken over by
the Stoics and incorporated into their theory of emotion. For the Stoics, the experience of enchantment is a subcategory of pleasure alone (ἡδονή).
60
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it occurs within the soul itself.61 Here Plato accounts for how the body (σῶµα) serves as a vehicle
(ὄχηµα) for the mortal form of the soul (ψυχή).62 This form of the soul – which consists of the
thumetic and epithumetic parts – experiences all of the terrible and necessary passions (δεινὰ καὶ
ἀναγκαῖα […] παθήµατα) that include not only pleasure (ἡδονή) and pain (λύπη) but also the
senseless advisors (ἄφρονε ξυµβούλω) of confidence (θάρρος) and fear (φόβος),63 inconsolable
machismo (δυσπαραµύθητος θυµός), and, finally, expectation (ἐλπίς) which is so easily led
(εὐπαράγωγος). Here we have all the iron cords from the puppet analogy accounted for – ἡδονή,
λύπη, θάρρος, φόβος – with the extrapolation of ἐλπίς and the addition of θυµός.64 Naturally,
θυµός is located in the spirited part of the soul (θυµοειδές), which is said to be located in the chest,
near the deliberative part of the soul, which he locates in the head. The rest of the psychic passions –
all those that necessarily result from being embodied (ὅσων ἔνδειαν διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώµατος ἴσχει
φύσιν) – are felt in the appetitive part of the soul (ἐπιθυµητικόν), which is located in the belly, just
above the navel.65 It is in this lower part of the soul that we also find the experience of ψυχαγωγία.66
εἰδότες δὲ αὐτὸ ὡς λόγου µὲν οὔτε ξυνήσειν ἔµελλεν, εἴ τέ πῃ καὶ µεταλαµβάνοι τινὸς
αὐτῶν αἰσθήσεως, οὐκ ἔµφυτον αὐτῷ τὸ µέλειν τινῶν ἔσοιτο λόγων, ὑπὸ δὲ εἰδώλων καὶ
φαντασµάτων νυκτός τε καὶ µεθ᾿ ἡµέραν µάλιστα ψυχαγωγήσοιτο […]

61 There is some scholarly debate about whether or not Plato is working with the same concept of the soul in the Laws
as he is in the Republic and the Timaeus – particularly, whether or not Plato still maintains the idea of tripartition in
the Laws. Although I agree with those who see tripartition latently maintained in the Laws (see, for instance, Brisson
2012: 292-300 with bibliography), my remarks here do not depend on this stance. What I hope to offer is a framework
for understanding how Plato conceptualizes ψυχαγωγία in the most general terms. For a recent treatment of the role
of thumoeides, see Wilburn 2014.
62 Pl. Ti. 69c5-d4.
63 Pl. Ti. 69c8-d4. This use of the term σύµβουλος is rare. Plato uses the term in a similar context in the puppet
analogy of the Laws; however, it appears there in reference to pleasure and pain rather than fear and confidence (Pl.
Leg. 644c6-7 with n. 57 and 58 above). The closest antecedent to this use of σύµβουλος is Gorgias’s remark about
δόξα as an unstable advisor to the soul (see ch. 1, n. 133).
64 There are also phrasal resonances between this passage and the passage in the Laws (e.g., ἄφρονε συνβούλω at n.
63 above).
65 Pl. Ti. 70d6-e3.
66 On this passage, see Taylor 1928: ad loc., who rightly stresses the magical inflection of the word ψυχαγωγεῖν.
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Knowing that this part of the soul would not comprehend reason, and even if it could
somehow partake in a certain apprehension of this, it would not be naturally inclined to
concern itself with any type of reason, and instead it would mostly enchant itself by images
and appearances night and day […]67
In this passage, Plato uses the language of ψυχαγωγία to denote a non-discursive experience located
in the lower parts of the soul. This psychagogic process is here described as a negative, irrational
experience motivated from outside images (εἴδωλα) and phantoms (φαντάσµατα) which stir a host
of embodied passions. This external, irrational process recalls the passage in the Phaedo where our
very embodiment is said to involve a constant experience of enchantment. However, this passage
goes on to describe an alternative way of harnessing ψυχαγωγία positively and internally in order
to serve rational ends.68 In this process, the more rational parts of the soul use the medium of the
liver (ἧπαρ) to communicate with the lowest part of the soul for the purpose of incentivizing or
disincentivizing certain passions. The liver can communicate non-discursively with the lowest part
of the soul by using its surface to reflect images (εἴδωλα) as on a mirror (οἷον ἐν κατόπτρῳ), while
contorting in painful or pleasant ways and emitting a complementary sweetness (γλυκύτης) or
bitterness (πικρότης). To disincentivize certain passions, the liver reflects threatening images full of
bilious colors (χολώδη χρώµατα) that frighten (φοβοῖ) the appetitive part of the soul. It also emits a
certain bitterness and blocks various passages and ducts, resulting in pain (λύπη) and nausea (ἄση).
To incentivize certain passions, the liver smooths out its form, emits a certain sweetness (γλυκύτης),
and is colored (ἀποζωγραφεῖν) with the opposite kinds of images (ἐναντία φαντάσµατα) that
render the appetitive part of the soul more amenable (ἵλεων) and serene (εὐήµερον). It is through

Pl. Ti. 71a3-7.
Whether or not one should label this internal process of ψυχαγωγία as rational or irrational is up for debate. For
two recent opposing views on whether the process is irrational or involves ‘reasoned evaluation’, see Moss 2012 and
Lorenz 2012. See also p. 138.
67
68
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this intra-psychic process of ψυχαγωγία that the rational part of the soul asserts its power over the
lowest part of the soul. It does so when the lowest part does not and, indeed, cannot heed the
rational orders that are described as being issued from the “acropolis” of the head.69
What this section reveals is that ψυχαγωγία is imagined to affect the part of the soul that is
farthest away from reason and most entangled with somatic experiences. The process is largely nondiscursive and experiential, and the experiences that motivate it may be external or internal to the
soul. They also may either support or disobey reason. It is quite telling that immediately following
this passage in the Timaeus, we find an excursus on dream divination which is described as the
moment at which the higher, rational part of the soul is at rest and the lower, somatically oriented
part of the soul is left free to arrive at bits of knowledge or illusion non-discursively.70 Like
divination, ψυχαγωγία appeals to the lowest part of the soul. In the case of dream divination, this
part of the soul arrives independently and non-discursively at certain pieces of knowledge, whereas,
in the case of enchantment, the same part of the soul is led in a similarly non-discursive manner
toward assuming feelings, attitudes, or beliefs that may or may not be guided by reason. It is no
coincidence that the seer is a master not only of interpreting dreams but also of uttering spells since
both phenomena, according to Plato, are coded in the same, non-discursive language of the bestial
ἐπιθυµητικόν.
The passages we have looked over in this section, from the Republic, Laws, and Timaeus, show
us not only that Plato uses the language of magic to mark out an independent category of experience

Pl. Ti. 70a6. It might be added, here, that this positive form of enchantment, starting from knowledge and ending in
a sort of self-habituation, is alluded to in the dialogues when arguments of types of knowledge are described as
wards or antidotes (ἀλεξιφάρµακα) against worldly enchantments (see, for instance, Pl. Alc. 132b, Resp. 595b, Leg.
947d cf. Pl. Resp. 598d, Plt. 279c-280e, Epist. 7.333). In the Republic, Socrates notes how one must repeat to oneself the
argument against the value of the poetic arts as an antidote to the charm of poetry itself (Pl. Resp. 608a).
70 For a recent interpretation of this passage, see Struck 2016: 73-90.
69
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but also that he has reflected upon what that experience might involve, even on a psychologicalcum-anatomical level. Enchantment marks out the moment when psychic experiences blend with
somatic experiences and function as powerful motivational forces on the human subject.
Enchantment can be used to lead souls by incentivizing or disincentivizing certain beliefs, attitudes,
fears, confidences, and desires. On an anatomical level, this process of enchantment (ψυχαγωγία)
occurs when the appetitive part of the soul is led toward or away from reason by various nondiscursive means – some sensory (akin to the sweetness and bitterness of the liver), others
imagistic/mimetic (akin to the reflection of images [εἴδωλα] and apparitions [φαντάσµατα]
projected upon the liver), and still others coercive/aporetic (akin to the way the liver painfully shuts
off ducts and passages). As we shall see, the anatomical-cum-psychological picture of ψυχαγωγία
that we get, particularly in the Timaeus, serves as something of a microcosm for how incantatory
rhetoric functions politically. It does so between speaker and audience as well as state and citizenry.
When Socrates, a sophist, a state-run chorus, or self-aggrandizing seer utilizes incantatory speech,
the one speaking or singing is shown to use a variety of non-discursive, rhetorical techniques – some
sensory, some mimetic/imagistic, and still others aporetic/elenctic. These encourage or discourage
the desires (ἐπιθυµίαι) of the auditor. In the following section, we shall account for such rhetorical
techniques, which Plato primarily labels as incantatory. What becomes clear is that Plato’s division
between good and bad enchantment is not so much based on the means of enchantment as the ends
to which that enchantment is directed.
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3. The means and ends of enchanting speech
In an influential article on Plato’s Phaedrus, Elizabeth Asmis shows that the unifying element
of the dialogue is found in the overarching revision of the concept of ψυχαγωγία.71 Initially, when
Socrates defines the art of speaking as a type of ψυχαγωγία, the term stands for an ambivalent
process of beguiling or (mis)leading a listener’s opinions and emotions.72 As the dialogue progresses,
this definition proves inadequate, and the ψυχαγωγία which Socrates places at the heart of the art of
rhetoric is reinterpreted as the process of consciously leading a listener’s soul into alignment with
truth and reason.73 As we shall see, this latent agenda of separating out good types of enchanting
speech from bad types of enchanting speech which characterizes the Phaedrus also persists through
many of Plato’s other dialogues, especially in his final work, the Laws.
Some scholars have assumed that Plato has in mind a good and bad type of enchantment,
each characterized by a different rhetorical technique.74 For instance, bad enchantment involves song
and myth, whereas good enchantment involves dialectic and elenchus. However, this type of
dichotomy between correct and incorrect techniques of enchantment is not so clear-cut. At times, the
enchanting power of acoustically and mythically ornamented speech is pressed into the service of
Platonic philosophy. Likewise, the spellbinding techniques of dialectic and elenchus are not only
rhetorical tools used by Socrates in the service of philosophy, but also by sophists to the detriment of
philosophy. As I shall argue, the experience of being enchanted by speech is fundamentally
ambiguous for Plato – just as it had been for his predecessors. But unlike Gorgias, Plato works hard

Asmis 1986.
Pl. Phdr. 261a7-b2.
73 Pl. Phdr. 271c9-272b4: “a transition from psychagogia as beguilement to psychagogia as guidance of the soul.
Throughout this progression, Socrates serves as an example of a true rhetorician and true ‘psychagogue’” (Asmis
1986: 157).
74 Such as Morrow 1993 [1960]: 309-310.
71
72
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to flag instances of enchanting speech as positive or negative. His criterion for doing so ultimately
rests upon the ends to which the act of speech is directed, rather than the means through which it
achieves its psychagogic effect.
In the following pages, we shall survey the various rhetorical techniques that attract the label
of enchantment in the course of the dialogues and show how the techniques are directed toward
positive or negative ends. In closing, we turn to the Laws, which contains Plato’s final thoughts on
how one might harness the experience of enchantment in the service of philosophy.
3.1. The techniques of enchantment and the enchantment of technique
Plato was aware that rhetorical enchantment might be induced in various ways. Indeed, in
the Phaedrus, Socrates notes that the rhetorical techniques for generating ψυχαγωγία are as
numerous and diverse as people’s souls.75 Throughout the dialogues, we find that enchantment is
produced by many different types of speech, which may be roughly organized into three categories:
acoustic, elenctic, and imagistic. As we look over each, we shall see that no single category is
deemed by Plato to be the right or wrong way of achieving the experience of enchantment. Instead,
as we shall see later, it is the ends of enchantment that justify the means.
Acoustic techniques enchant by means of the sound and rhythm of the voice. For instance, in
the Republic, Socrates points to meter, rhythm, and harmony as fundamental to the enchanting effect
of poetry.
ἐάντε περὶ σκυτοτοµίας τις λέγῃ ἐν µέτρῳ καὶ ῥυθµῷ καὶ ἁρµονίᾳ, πάνυ εὖ δοκεῖν
λέγεσθαι, ἐάντε περὶ στρατηγίας ἐάντε περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν· οὕτω φύσει αὐτὰ ταῦτα
µεγάλην τινὰ κήλησιν ἔχειν.

Pl. Phdr. 271c9-272b4. See also how Socrates describes using an array of philosophical arguments to see which one
would maieutically induce intellectual labor (Pl. Tht. 157c6-d5).
75
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Whether someone speaks about shoemaking, or generalship, or some other such thing in
meter, rhythm, and harmony, everything seems to be spoken well. In this way, such things
have a great type of enchantment to them.76
Although the acoustic mode of enchantment is here and elsewhere implicitly cast in a negative light,
there are also passages in which acoustic enchantments are treated more positively. For instance, in
the Statesman, the good πολιτικός is described as a herdsman who knows the right music to play or
sing in order to soothe enchantingly or enliven the souls of his herd.77 This positive application of
acoustic enchantment is especially well evidenced in the Laws, where, as we shall see below, the
enchanting musicality of the voice is exploited in the service of the city.78
On the other end of the spectrum, the effect of dialectical or elenctic speech frequently
attracts the label of enchantment.79 This type of enchanting speech induces aporia by refuting or
undermining habituated beliefs and desires. We already witnessed this in the passage of the Meno,
when Socrates enchants the title character into a state of aporia regarding virtue.80 Perhaps the most

76 Pl. Resp. 601a7-b1. Isocrates makes a similar claim about the acoustic techniques available to poets (Isoc. Ev. 8-11).
See also Socrates’s description of audiophiles at Pl. Resp. 411a5-b3 (quoted in n. 52) and the opening description of
Protagoras’s enchanting voice in the Protagoras: “People were following behind, listening to what was being spoken –
a great part of them strangers, whom Protagoras led from each of the cities through which he passed, enchanting
them with his voice like Orpheus; others follow having just now been enchanted by his voice” (τούτων δὲ οἳ ὄπισθεν
ἠκολούθουν ἐπακούοντες τῶν λεγοµένων, τὸ µὲν πολὺ ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο, οὓς ἄγει ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν πόλεων ὁ
Πρωταγόρας, δι᾿ ὧν διεξέρχεται, κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ ὥσπερ Ὀρφεύς, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἕπονται κεκηληµένοι·,
Pl. Prt. 315a5-b1).
77 “[T]he herdsman is himself the tender of the herd, himself the doctor, himself the matchmaker, he alone knows the
midwife’s art of aiding the labor and birth of their offspring. Furthermore, as far as each nursling is naturally
disposed toward play and music, no one else better enlivens and soothes them, enchanting with musical instruments
or with voice alone performing the music best for his own herd” (ἀλλ᾿ αὐτὸς τῆς ἀγέλης τροφὸς ὁ βουφορβός,
αὐτὸς ἰατρός, αὐτὸς οἷον νυµφευτὴς καὶ περὶ τοὺς τῶν γιγνοµένων τόκους καὶ λοχείας µόνος ἐπιστήµων τῆς
µαιευτικῆς· ἔτι τοίνυν παιδιᾶς καὶ µουσικῆς ἐφ᾿ ὅσον αὐτοῦ τὰ θρέµµατα φύσει µετείληφεν, οὐκ ἄλλος
κρείττων παραµυθεῖσθαι καὶ κηλῶν πραΰνειν, µετά τε ὀργάνων καὶ ψιλῷ τῷ στόµατι τὴν τῆς αὑτοῦ ποίµνης
ἄριστα µεταχειριζόµενος µουσικήν, Pl. Plt. 268a7-b5). See also Agathon’s praise of Eros at Pl. Symp. 197e3-5 and the
description of Thrasymachus’s rhetorical techniques at Pl. Phdr. 267c6-d4 with Yunis 2011: ad loc., who points out the
formal and metrical flourishes therein.
78 See pp. 126-43.
79 See, in general, Louis 1945: 69-70.
80 Pl. Men. 79e8-80b6 quoted in n. 54.
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expansive description of this elenctic technique of enchantment is found in the speech of Alcibiades
toward the end of the Symposium. There, Alcibiades states that Socrates’s powers of enchantment are
more marvelous (θαυµασιώτερος) than Marsyas who, with his pipe-playing, enchanted humankind
(ἐκήλει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους). Socrates, on the contrary, produces the same effect (ταὐτὸν τοῦτο) with
no instrument (ἄνευ ὀργάνων) and only naked prose (ψιλοῖς λόγοις) which astounds and
mesmerizes even when it is transferred into the mouth of a poor speaker. Socrates’s powerful
rhetoric – which makes a heart jump (καρδία πηδᾷ), tears flow (δάκρυα ἐκχεῖται) and utterly
compels the soul as if it were enslaved (ἀνδραποδωδῶς διακειµένου) – derives its effect from the
way it forces one to agree (ἀναγκάζει […] ὁµολογεῖν) that he or she is greatly deficient (πολλοῦ
ἐνδεὴς).81 Like the acoustic enchantments, these more elenctic, aporetic techniques which block
habituated beliefs and passions through dialectical argument are not cast solely in a positive or
negative light. Just as elenchus can be used in the service of philosophy, so too can it be used in the
service of sophistry. For instance, in the Sophist, wily intellectuals are said to frequently enchant
people into aporia with Eleatic arguments (not unlike what we saw Gorgias doing in On NotBeing).82

81 Pl. Symp. 215b3-216c3. Also of note is how Socrates describes the enchanting sound of the siren-like cicadas (Pl.
Phaedr. 259a-b). He interprets their chirping less as music and more as a type of dialectic. The enchantment the
chirping induces is then interpreted less as an opportunity to become passively immersed in sound and more as a
siren song calling one to engage in philosophical conversation. See Yunis 2011: ad loc.
82 “for you see how deft and powerful they are at producing objections and impasses if we track him down in the
class defined by the art of falsifiers and enchanters” (τὰς γὰρ ἀντιλήψεις καὶ ἀπορίας, ἐὰν αὐτὸν διερευνῶµεν ἐν
τῇ τῶν ψευδουργῶν καὶ γοήτων τέχνῃ τιθέντες, ὁρᾷς ὡς εὔποροι καὶ πολλαί, Pl. Soph. 241b5-7). As Nehamas has
argued: “Antilogic seems to be not a method distinct from dialectic, but rather the use of dialectic for the purpose of
generating (or avoiding) a contradiction. And how different is this from what Socrates actually succeeds in doing
time after time in Plato’s early dialogues, whatever his stated purpose may have been?… Socrates cannot have
differed in method from those sophists who practiced the method of question-and-answer and who did not
intentionally use fallacious reasoning” (1999: 114-5). Eventually, Aristotle will enumerate four different types of
dialectical rhetoric – didascalic, dialectic, peirastic, and sophistic – all distinguished by their presuppositions (Arist.
Soph. el. 165a37-b8). Although the line between, say, peirastic and sophistic types of argument is not so clearly
distinguished in Plato, the difference between sophistic and Socratic uses of aporia-inducing dialectic does seem to
come down to the presupposed ends rather than the means.
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Between the poles of acoustic and elenctic techniques of enchantment fall a wide variety of
other rhetorical techniques, which may be labeled as imagistic or imitative. These include a vast
array of ways in which speech can be used to paint certain virtual realities that are, in turn, capable
of enticing the lower parts of an individual’s soul.83 Myth is often pinpointed as one of these
imagistic, mimetic techniques that can be used for positive or negative ends.84 In the Phaedo, Socrates
describes his cosmological myth as an enchantment which one should utter to oneself throughout
his or her life.85 On the other hand, the Great Myth uttered by Protagoras, in the eponymous
dialogue, is no less enchanting in its effects. Yet, it is cast in a negative (or ironically positive) light.86
What distinguishes these two types of mythic enchantment is not the means of myth-telling itself
but the ends – i.e., the upshot of generating or arresting certain desires or fears, pleasures or pains in

A sophist is able to enchant (γοητεύειν) from afar (πόρρω) the ears of the young with spoken images of all things
(εἴδωλα λεγόµενα περὶ πάντων, Pl. Soph. 234c1-7; cf. µιµητὴς ὢν τῶν ὄντων, Pl. Soph. 235a1, Pl. Phdr. 267c, Pl. Resp.
607c-d). In the Laws, the Athenian notes how language can be tweaked on the most minute level in order to project a
different tableau to the mind and, in some cases, bias our own misfortunes in positive or negative ways – “there are
myriad excuses one might find to sing an incantation in the consolation of such matters” (ἢ µυρί᾿ ἂν ἔχοι τις τοιαῦτα
παραµυθούµενος ἐπᾴδειν, Pl. Leg. 944b2-3). A defeated soldier can either call himself a ‘shield-flinger’ (ῥίψασπις)
or a ‘dropper of gear’ (ἀποβολεὺς ὅπλων); each label calls a different image to the mind and thereby enchants the
soldier’s own opinion about his misfortune for better or for worse (Pl. Leg. 944b7-c1).
84 On the magic of myth, see Edelstein 1949; Brisson 1998: 10, 77-8. Isocrates likewise points to myth as a potent
source of ψυχαγωγία (Nic. 48).
85 “To rely upon these things [i.e., myth] as I have related them is not befitting of a man of sense. Yet, it does seem
appropriate and worth the risk for the one believing them to infer that either these remarks or remarks like them
about the soul and its dwelling place are, in fact, the case, since indeed the soul seems to be immortal – this leap is a
fine one to make – and one ought to sing such things to oneself like an incantation. It is for that reason that I spent so
much time on telling the myth” (Τὸ µὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν
ἔχοντι ἀνδρί· ὅτι µέντοι ἢ ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡµῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατόν
γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν µοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰοµένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν—καλὸς γὰρ ὁ
κίνδυνος—καὶ χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι µηκύνω τὸν µῦθον. Pl. Phd. 114d1-7
with Rowe 1993: ad loc., who notes the difference in character from the enchantment proposed at Pl. Phd. 77e7-8).
86 “After Protagoras performed such great things as these, he fell silent. And I, enchanted for some time, stared at
him, desiring that he say something more. When I perceived that he had, in reality, stopped speaking, I scarcely
brought myself back together, so to speak…” (Πρωταγόρας µὲν τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἐπιδειξάµενος ἀπεπαύσατο
τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπὶ µὲν πολὺν χρόνον κεκηληµένος ἔτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔβλεπον ὡς ἐροῦντά τι, ἐπιθυµῶν
ἀκούειν· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ᾐσθόµην ὅτι τῷ ὄντι πεπαυµένος εἴη, µόγις πως ἐµαυτὸν ὡσπερεὶ συναγείρας…, Pl. Prt.
328d3-7).
83
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the lower part of an individual’s soul.87 The same goes for all other modes of enchantment. Acoustic
enchantments generate passions in the soul that can be beneficial or detrimental, and elenctic
enchantments neutralize passions which can likewise turn out to be beneficial or detrimental. 88
Plato’s most explicit remarks on the proper application of incantatory rhetoric are found in
his final work, the Laws, which acts as something of a collecting point for his prior thought about the
enchanting nature of speech. It is there that we shall turn for the remainder of the chapter in order to
gather Plato’s final thoughts on how best to harness the experience of enchantment in a positive and
beneficial manner.
3.2. Enchantments in the Laws
As we saw at the beginning of the chapter, the Laws contains several important discussions
of the negative use of enchantment. In book 11, while legislating against φαρµακεία, the Athenian
penalizes the practice of cursing because of the negative rhetorical effect it has on the souls of the

87 Another technique that could very well fit in this category is flattery. Very often, the enchanting effect of flattery is
cast in a negative light, as in the Menexenus when Socrates is enchanted by encomia embedded in funeral orations:
“decorating the most beautiful things with words, they enchant our souls […] so that, when I am praised by them,
Menexenus, I am disposed to feel ennobled and each time I listen and am enchanted I stand tall, considering myself
to be bigger and nobler and more beautiful than I am in reality” (κάλλιστά πως τοῖς ὀνόµασι ποικίλλοντες,
γοητεύουσιν ἡµῶν τὰς ψυχάς … ὥστ᾿ ἔγωγε, ὦ Μενέξενε, γενναίως πάνυ διατίθεµαι ἐπαινούµενος ὑπ᾿ αὐτῶν,
καὶ ἑκάστοτε ἕστηκα ἀκροώµενος καὶ κηλούµενος, ἡγούµενος ἐν τῷ παραχρῆµα µείζων καὶ γενναιότερος καὶ
καλλίων γεγονέναι, Pl. Menex. 235a1-b2 with Tsitsiridis 1998: ad loc., who stresses the acoustic valence of κήλησις).
In the Lysis, we find that flattery appears to enchant (κηλεῖν) in a soothing manner, but often it ends up causing the
young ἐρώµενοι to go wild (ἐξαγριαίνειν) with self-pride (Pl. Lys. 206b1-2). And again, this technique of flattery is
not cast in a wholly negative light by Plato. Socrates himself enchants through flattery from time to time (e.g., Pl.
Symp. 194a). In Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Socrates is shown to speak of knowing spells of flattery, which are tailored
specifically for each target (Pl. Mem. 2.6.10-13 cf. 2.6.31).
88 It has been argued that Plato’s positive valuation of elenctic modes of enchantment is limited to the ‘Socratic’
dialogues, whereas in the ‘Platonic’ dialogues, myth and rhetorical ornamentation are modes of enchantment that are
valued more positively (Vallejo 2000). Although there is some room for debate, the observation does indicate a
general trend. Whether or not it reflects a chronological evolution of Platonic thought concerning the appropriate use
of incantatory rhetoric or simply a change in emphasis varying between dialogues, which center on different issues and
are populated by different dramatis personae, is probably impossible to know – as Vallejo likewise suggests. What I
hope to show, at the very least, is that, in the course of Plato’s dialogues, the label of enchantment is attracted to a
variety of rhetorical techniques, which can all be directed toward positive or negative ends, and, when taken
together, it is these ends which primarily color an enchanting speech act as good or bad in Plato’s eyes.
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citizens.89 Earlier in book 10, we find a second important discussion of bad magic when the Athenian
legislates against the worst kinds of impious individuals (including many magicians) whose
enchanting rhetoric and loose morals pose a threat to “individuals, whole households, and cities.”90
In these passages, magic, as a category, is intrinsically tied to a pernicious form of rhetoric that
convincingly imparts dangerous beliefs, fears, and hopes into the hearts of the populace. To combat
this, the Athenian develops a complex form of state-sanctioned enchantment which aims at
imparting positive beliefs, fears, and hopes into the hearts of the citizens.
These positive forms of rhetorical enchantment are fused directly onto the armature of the
state as a rhetorical support system for the laws themselves. In one instance, formal choruses are
marshaled together to enchant the souls of the young into becoming better disposed toward the
laws. In another, rhetorically affective preambles are appended to (or sometimes, entirely replace)
the city’s laws. Their purpose is to enchant the citizens into becoming more accepting of the coercive
nature of the laws to which they are connected. When a citizen proves to be particularly irreverent
toward the city’s laws and even scoffs at the divine power that underpins them, city officials may
resort to a different mode of rhetorical enchantment that aims to correct the citizen’s deviant and
irreverent attitude toward the law and the divine.
All in all, the project of spelling out the laws and institutions of the second-best city is also a
project of spelling out, more clearly than in any other dialogue, a positive and state-wide application
of incantatory rhetoric. In the remainder of the chapter, I shall focus on the enchantment produced
by choral songs and legislative preambles. What should become apparent is that, for Plato, the
experience of becoming enchanted by speech is not to be taken lightly. Instead, enchantment is a

89
90

See pp. 98-102.
Pl. Leg. 909b5-6. See pp. 102-4.
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powerful source of human motivation which can, in time, shape a person’s character for better or for
worse. In his ‘second best’ city, this powerful incantatory rhetoric must not be banished from the
borders of the city so much as harnessed by the city itself.91
3.2.1. Choruses
At the close of book 1 of the Laws, the Athenian has finished arguing that the φάρµακον,
wine, can be used in a societally beneficial way by providing a window into a person’s true
character: in vino veritas. When book 2 begins, the Athenian sets out (on a somewhat meandering
path) to discover what use wine might have in social education. As he will eventually argue, wine
provides certain liquid confidence, which may not only reveal a person’s true character but also
encourage those of good character to educate the young through choral song and dance. Within this
overall argument, the Athenian introduces choral performance, reconceptualizes its role as a
mechanism of social education, and, crucially, redefines it as a form of incantatory rhetoric.
According to the Athenian, young people are innately loud and full of energy.92 At the
periodic festivals which dot the city’s calendar and, particularly, during choral performances at
these festivals, the young are afforded an opportunity to express their pent-up vocal energy in the
production of harmonies (ἁρµονίαι), and physical energy in the stomping out of rhythms (ῥυθµοί)
through dance.93 However, as the Athenian stresses, these choral performances are not simply acts of

For a recent reading of the role of incantations in the Laws, see Helmig 2003 who shows how the language of
incantations (ἐπῳδαί) is used to describe three positive rhetorical practices which can be categorized as pedagogical,
political, and philosophical. Roughly speaking, Helmig’s category of pedagogical incantation corresponds to my
larger discussion of the choral enchantments, whereas his categories of political and philosophical incantation
correspond to legislative preambles.
92 Pl. Leg. 653d-e; cf. 664e–665a.
93 Pl. Leg. 653e-654a. It should be noted that, for Plato, dance is conceptually subordinated to vocal performance: “In
general, anyone who speaks, whether in song or speech, cannot keep his body still. Wherefore, an imitation through
91
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needed recreation (παιδιά) but also sites of social education (παιδεία).94 As he notes, the young are
not only full of vocal and physical energy but also underdeveloped with respect to the rational part
of their soul and are thus highly impressionable when it comes to the motivational forces of pain
and pleasure, desire and hate,95 as well as the influential power of mythic tales96 and mimetic
attractions.97 The choral performances that occur on festive occasions not only offer a space for the
young to release their youthful energy, but also serve as a mechanism through which to harness and
habituate youthful souls into alignment with the community’s values – values that are expressed, in
their final form, as the laws of the city.98 While the main focus of this practice of choral education is
on the children whose souls are still most raw and malleable, the rhetoric of these lawful songs,
performed at periodic festivals, is also directed at the re-education of adult citizens whenever their
characters lapse naturally and periodically throughout life.99 Ultimately, these choral songs are used

gestures of things uttered is what gave rise to the entire art of dancing” (ὅλως δὲ φθεγγόµενος, εἴτ’ ἐν ᾠδαῖς εἴτ’ ἐν
λόγοις, ἡσυχίαν οὐ πάνυ δυνατὸς τῷ σώµατι παρέχεσθαι πᾶς. διὸ µίµησις τῶν λεγοµένων σχήµασι γενοµένη
τὴν ὀρχηστικὴν ἐξηργάσατο τέχνην σύµπασαν, Pl. Leg. 816a3–6; cf. Pl. Resp. 400d). Thus, speech and vocal effects
are fundamental to the choral enchantments which the Athenian describes.
94 Pl. Leg. 656c, 798b-d, 803c-804d. At times in the Laws, παιδεία becomes synonymous choral education, as when the
uneducated person (ἀπαίδευτος) is ἀχόρευτος and the one educated well (ὁ καλῶς πεπαιδευµένος) is described as
“one capable of dancing and singing well” (ᾄδειν τε καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι δυνατὸς καλῶς, Pl. Leg. 654a-b).
95 Pl. Leg. 636d–e, 653a-c, 656b, 659d; cf. 732e–733d.
96 Pl. Leg. 663e-664a.
97 Pl. Leg. 643b; cf. Pl. Resp. 395c.
98 “Our conversation seems to have been carried around in a circle for the third or fourth time arriving back at the
same position – namely, that education is the dragging and leading of children toward the principle pronounced as
correct by law and jointly confirmed through experience as indeed correct by the most venerable and aged
individuals” (Δοκεῖ µοι τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν περιφερόµενος ἥκειν, ὡς ἄρα παιδεία µέν ἐσθ᾿ ἡ
παίδων ὁλκή τε καὶ ἀγωγὴ πρὸς τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόµου λόγον ὀρθὸν εἰρηµένον καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικεστάτοις καὶ
πρεσβυτάτοις δι᾿ ἐµπειρίαν ξυνδεδογµένον ὡς ὄντως ὀρθός ἐστιν, Pl. Leg. 659b7-d4). Morrow and others have
rightly linked this recurrent language of “leading” (ἀγωγὴ) with Plato’s concept of ψυχαγωγία (Morrow 1993 [1960]:
301).
99 …what the Athenian calls the ‘slackening’ and ‘corruption’ of human character which occurs in the course of one’s
life (χαλᾶται […] καὶ διαφθείρεται κατὰ πολλὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ, Pl. Leg. 653c8–9). Elsewhere, the Athenian describes how
the entire population, male and female, old and young, free and enslaved, must sing these songs to themselves (Pl.
Leg. 665c quoted in n. 115 below).

129

to convince the young and remind the old that the best (ἄριστος) life, according to law, is also the
most pleasant (ἥδιστος) life.100
Although children and young adults need minimal coaxing to participate in choral
performance, it is not their characters that must shine forth from the performance. Instead, it is the
elderly who have lived long and law-abiding lives and serve as the moral benchmark for the rest of
the citizens. As the Athenian stresses, choral performances are reflections (µιµήµατα) of character
and only when a choral performance reflects (and instills) a good character can it be deemed a good
song.101 Thus, in the end, it is the elderly – those who are, oxymoronically, the least eager to perform
in dance and song – who are now the most qualified practitioners of choral performance, as the
Athenian has now redefined it.102
At the close of book 2, the question regarding the proper role of wine in education finally
resurfaces. To solve the problem of getting the elderly to perform, the Athenian suggests using wine
as a φάρµακον that might stir these individuals into educating younger generations through the
proper use of song and dance.
τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐπιβαίνοντα ἐτῶν, ἐν τοῖς ξυσσιτίοις εὐωχηθέντα, καλεῖν τούς τε
ἄλλους θεοὺς καὶ δὴ καὶ Διόνυσον παρακαλεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτῶν τελετὴν ἅµα καὶ
παιδιάν, ἣν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπίκουρον τῆς τοῦ γήρως αὐστηρότητος ἐδωρήσατο
φάρµακον ὥστ᾿ ἀνηβᾷν ἡµᾶς, καὶ δυσθυµίας λήθῃ γίγνεσθαι µαλακώτερον ἐκ

100 Pl. Leg. 664b7–8. At Pl. Leg. 840b-c, the Athenian speaks of how children will learn to regard victory over pleasure
as the greatest type of victory all because “we will enchant them from childhood, it seems, by communicating it with
myths and sayings and singing it with melodies” (ἐκ παίδων πρὸς αὐτοὺς λέγοντες ἐν µύθοις τε καὶ ἐν ῥήµασιν
καὶ ἐν µέλεσιν ᾄδοντες, ὡς εἰκός, κηλήσοµεν).
101 Pl. Leg. 655d-e.
102 It is for this reason that the eldest chorus of the city – the chorus of Dionysus – is said to sing the most beautiful
song (κάλλιστα Pl. Leg. 665d3; cf. κυριώτατον […] τῶν καλλίστων τε καὶ ὠφελιµωτάτων ᾠδῶν, Pl. Leg. 665d4-5,
τῆς καλλίστης ᾠδῆς, Pl. Leg. 666e1) – one that is, in fact, finer than the music of the other choruses and the music
found in public theaters (µοῦσαν τῆς τῶν χορῶν καλλίω καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς θεάτροις, Pl. Leg. 667a10-b1). What
is most beautiful about their song is not the fine sounds and rhythms but the beauty of the performers’ characters
that shines through. As the Athenian states, the good character, which is reflected in a good performance, is itself an
assimilation (ὁµοιοῦσθαι) to the good and the beautiful (ἐκείνην τὴν ὁµοιότητα τῷ τοῦ καλοῦ µιµήµατι, Pl. Leg.
668b1–2).
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σκληροτέρου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, καθάπερ εἰς πῦρ σίδηρον ἐντεθέντα τηκόµενον, καὶ
οὕτως εὐπλαστότερον εἶναι; πρῶτον µὲν δὴ διατεθεὶς οὕτως ἕκαστος ἆρ᾿ οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοι
προθυµότερόν γε, ἧττον αἰσχυνόµενος, οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς ἀλλ᾿ ἐν µετρίοις, καὶ οὐκ ἐν
ἀλλοτρίοις ἀλλ᾿ ἐν οἰκείοις, ᾄδειν τε καὶ ὃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαµεν ἐπᾴδειν;
The man who reaches the age of forty, in joining in the common meals, calls upon the other
gods and calls Dionysus to join the rite and recreation of the old men, which was the gift he
bestowed upon humankind as an aid to the harshness of old age, the pharmakon that renews
youth, and through the forgetfulness of despair, softens the hardened character of the soul,
just as iron melts when placed in fire, and in this way becomes more malleable. In this
disposition, would not each, first of all, become more eagerly willing and less ashamed to
sing both songs and also incantations (as we have often called them), not in a large crowd of
strangers but in a modest gathering of familiars.103
As the Athenian notes, the chorus of tipsy elders is not only to perform a song but an incantation
(ἐπᾴδειν). As he indicates, this is not the first time he uses the language of enchantment to describe
these songs. Earlier, we hear that it is not just the elderly, but all three of the city’s choruses (young,
adult, and old) who are responsible for “enchanting the souls of children, still young and tender.”104
Indeed, elsewhere he states that every member of the city must participate in this process of musical
enchantment.105
Just as in the Phaedrus where Socrates redefines what proper ψυχαγωγία is, here, too, the
Athenian has redefined what a proper choral performance is – and he goes on to relabel it.106 This is
explicit when the Athenian notes, midway through book 2, that the choral performances he has been
describing are not so much songs (ᾠδαί) as incantations (ἐπῳδαί):

Pl. Leg. 666 b2-c6.
“For I say that the three choruses must enchant the souls of the children, which are still young and tender” (φηµὶ
γὰρ ἅπαντας δεῖν ἐπᾴδειν τρεῖς ὄντας τοὺς χοροὺς ἔτι νέαις οὔσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ ἁπαλαῖς τῶν παίδων; Pl.
Leg. 664b3–5).
105 Pl. Leg. 665c4 with n. 99 and n. 115. Those beyond the age of sixty are not expected actually to sing and dance but
instead utter myths (µυθολόγους) in an inspired manner (διὰ θείας φήµης, Pl. Leg. 664d1–4). However, it should be
noted that the exact age brackets vary slightly throughout the Laws (see Morrow 1993 [1960]: 318).
106 See Elizabeth Asmis’s reading of Phaedrus at p. 120 above. In commenting on the choral songs and legislative
preambles of the Laws, scholars, such as Morrow, have seen “the climactic fulfillment of the art of psychagogy that he
[sc. Plato] had outlined in the Phaedrus” (1953: 242, also Yunis 1996: 212 et al.)
103
104
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ἵν᾿ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ παιδὸς µὴ ἐναντία χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐθίζηται τῷ νόµῳ καὶ τοῖς
ὑπὸ τοῦ νόµου πεπεισµένοις, ἀλλὰ ξυνέπηται χαίρουσά τε καὶ λυπουµένη τοῖς αὐτοῖς
τούτοις οἷσπερ ὁ γέρων, τούτων ἕνεκα, ἃς ᾠδὰς καλοῦµεν, ὄντως µὲν ἐπῳδαὶ ταῖς
ψυχαῖς φαίνονται νῦν γεγονέναι, πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἣν λέγοµεν συµφωνίαν
ἐσπουδασµέναι.
So that the soul of a child does not get into the habit of feeling enjoyment or pain towards
things which are at variance with the law and the people who obey it, but instead accords
with delighting and feeling pains at those very things which the old man does – for these
reasons there seem to exist those things which we call songs, but are in reality incantations
for souls, purposefully designed for that certain thing we call consonance.107
The wordplay makes sense on multiple levels. On one level, choral performance (as the Athenian
has now redefined it) is, in fact, a song (ᾠδή) sung with a specific orientation or end (ἐπ-). On a
higher level, the experience this performance induces for the purpose of educating and re-educating
the population fits neatly within the larger Platonic idea of enchanting speech. When citizens
participate in these choral performances, they undergo a psychosomatic experience that involves the
transfer of the physical pleasures derived from the performance into psychical expectations of future
pleasure and vice versa. The Athenian sums up the psychosomatic principle of choral enchantment
in the following way:
Ἆρ᾿ οὖν θαρροῦντες λέγωµεν τὴν τῇ µουσικῇ καὶ τῇ παιδιᾷ µετὰ χορείας χρείαν ὀρθὴν
εἶναι τοιῷδέ τινι τρόπῳ; χαίροµεν ὅταν οἰώµεθα εὖ πράττειν, καὶ ὁπόταν χαίρωµεν,
οἰόµεθα εὖ πράττειν αὖ;
May we confidently say that the correct application of music and play in choral performance
is, in a certain way, the following – namely, that we feel enjoyment whenever we believe we
are acting rightly, and we believe we are acting rightly whenever we feel enjoyment?108
For the young, who look on and participate in the choral dance, the physical enjoyment of the
performance shades into a positive, psychic evaluation of the lawful and prayerful content being

Pl. Leg. 659d4-e2. England 1921: ad loc. wrongly dismisses the passage as mere wordplay. Others have since noted
that Plato’s use of the language of enchantment is programmatic (Morrow 1953: 238-243; 1993 [1960]: 301-2).
108 Pl. Leg. 657c2-6. Welton 1996 similarly points to this passage (which he labels as the “Pleasure-Belief Principle”)
and connects it with the phenomenon of enchantment within the Laws.
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performed. For adults, the positive, psychic evaluation of these lawful songs, which has been
conditioned within them repeatedly since youth, encourages them to re-perform the dance and
thereby re-enchant themselves through the very pleasure of the performance.109 The selfperpetuating process of enchantment and re-enchantment repeats throughout the city and
throughout life, continuously tugging the iron chords of the marionette back into alignment with the
golden chord of reason and law.
3.2.1.1. The means and ends of choral enchantment
The specific means for imparting this belief through choral performance include certain
harmonies (ἁρµονίαι) and rhythms (ῥυθµοί) as well as various levels of mimesis – be it horizontal,
person to person imitation through vocal and somatic participation in choral performance or
vertical, ideational imitation through mythic or pantomimic recreation of things imagined.110
Although the Athenian makes judgments here and there about the propriety of certain modes of
song,111 dance,112 and myth,113 he fundamentally tethers his judgment of the relative propriety of a
choral performance to the overall, ethical-cum-religious orientation of that performance. As he often
stresses, what distinguishes the training of the average poet from his enchanters (ἐπῳδοί) is the
ability to recognize the compositions of song and dance which are oriented toward positive ends:
τὸ γὰρ τρίτον οὐδεµία ἀνάγκη ποιητῇ γιγνώσκειν, εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε µὴ καλὸν τὸ µίµηµα,
τὸ δ᾿ ἁρµονίας καὶ ῥυθµοῦ σχεδὸν ἀνάγκη· τοῖς δὲ πάντα τὰ τρία τῆς ἐκλογῆς ἕνεκα τοῦ
καλλίστου καὶ δευτέρου, ἢ µηδέποτε ἱκανὸν ἐπῳδὸν γίγνεσθαι νέοις πρὸς ἀρετήν.

For the tendency of a person’s evaluations of music to become ossified with age: Pl. Leg. 802c-d; cf. Pl. Resp. 424c425a. Clienias claims that, as an old man, he is utterly unable to perform any song that he did not pick up in his youth
(Pl. Leg. 666d).
110 Choral performance as an imitation of imagined actions: Pl. Leg. 655d-656a, 798d-e, 814d-817d.
111 … such as dirges and threnodic choruses which he considers unbecoming to the citizens of Magnesia (Pl. Leg. 800ce). For a recent interpretation of this passage, see Prauscello 2014: 182-191.
112 … such as when he criticizes comedic dances (Pl. Leg. 815b-816e with Prauscello 2014: 173-181).
113 …such as the tale of the Theban Spartoi (Pl. Leg. 663e-664a; cf. 636c-d).
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For while a poet must know what is fitting in terms of rhythm and harmony, he does not
need to know this third thing – whether the representation is or is not fine and good. Our
choristers have all three for the selection of what is finest and second finest, otherwise, a
chorister would not be a sufficient enchanter of the young toward virtue.114
It is this tertium quid of correct orientation – in conjunction with pleasant harmonies and rhythms –
that fundamentally distinguishes a mere poet (ποιητής) from an enchanter (ἐπῳδός), a mere song
(ᾠδή) from a proper incantation (ἐπῳδή).115 Thus it is, at bottom, the maintenance of virtuous and
lawful ends that elevate these musical performances to the status of good magic in the eyes of the
Athenian.
Taken together, this network of choral enchantments is used to produce a certain
gravitational pull that, through the sheer incantatory power of song and dance, draws citizens into a
willing alignment with the laws of the state. If we look back over earlier dialogues, there are clear

Pl. Leg. 670e4-671a1. The Athenian will repeat this point later: “We said, I think, that the sixty-year-old singers of
Dionysus need be exceedingly perceptive regarding both rhythms and arranging harmonies, so that, when it is a
matter of imitation through melodies, imitating the good or bad, whenever the soul becomes involved with passions,
someone, who is capable of picking out the things which are approximations of the good and those which are the
opposite, can reject the latter and, carrying the former in public, sing it and enchant the souls of the young, inviting
each of them to follow in trail toward the acquisition of virtue through these imitations” (Ἔφαµεν, οἶµαι, τοὺς τοῦ
Διονύσου τοὺς ἑξηκοντούτας ᾠδοὺς διαφερόντως εὐαισθήτους δεῖν γεγονέναι περί τε τοὺς ῥυθµοὺς καὶ τὰς τῶν
ἁρµονιῶν συστάσεις, ἵνα τὴν τῶν µελῶν µίµησιν τὴν εὖ καὶ τὴν κακῶς µεµιµηµένην, ἐν τοῖς παθήµασιν ὅταν
ψυχὴ γίγνηται, τά τε τῆς ἀγαθῆς ὁµοιώµατα καὶ τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας ἐκλέξασθαι δυνατὸς ὤν τις τὰ µὲν ἀποβάλλῃ,
τὰ δὲ προφέρων εἰς µέσον ὑµνῇ καὶ ἐπᾴδῃ ταῖς τῶν νέων ψυχαῖς, προκαλούµενος ἑκάστους εἰς ἀρετῆς ἕπεσθαι
κτῆσιν συνακολουθοῦντας διὰ τῶν µιµήσεων, Pl. Leg. 812b9-c7; cf. 654c-d).
115 Whatever the chosen sound pattern, a good choral song must fundamentally be εὐφηµία – involving prayerful
and lawful sentiments (Pl. Leg. 800e10-801a4; cf. Resp. 607a). Likewise, dances performed to whatever rhythm must
fundamentally be a manifestation of a person “self-consciously acting in the right way” (ἐν δόξῃ τοῦ πράττειν εὖ, Pl.
Leg. 815d7; cf. ὅταν οἰώµεθα εὖ πράττειν, Pl. Leg. 657c5). Although the Athenian praises the Egyptians for sticking to
a single mode of performance (Pl. Leg. 656d – 657b, 798e-799a) and warns of the dangers of adopting new styles of
performance (Pl. Leg. 700a-701a; cf. Pl. Resp. 424), he nevertheless still advises all Magnesians to innovate continually
as they enchant themselves forever with their songs: “That all men and children, each free person and each slave,
male and female, and, in fact, the entire city, should not ever cease from enchanting itself with these songs which we
described, always changing things up in one way or another and in all cases supplying variety, so that there may be
pleasure and an insatiable desire for these songs” (Τὸ δεῖν πάντα ἄνδρα καὶ παῖδα, ἐλεύθερον καὶ δοῦλον, θῆλύν
τε καὶ ἄρρενα, καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει ὅλην τὴν πόλιν αὐτὴν αὑτῇ ἐπᾴδουσαν µὴ παύεσθαί ποτε ταῦτα ἃ
διεληλύθαµεν ἁµῶς γέ πως ἀεὶ µεταβαλλόµενα καὶ πάντως παρεχόµενα ποικιλίαν, ὥστε ἀπληστίαν εἶναί τινα
τῶν ὕµνων τοῖς ᾄδουσι καὶ ἡδονήν. Pl. Leg. 665c1-7).
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precedents for this idea. For instance, in the Gorgias, we can see how Callicles attacks a similar sociocultural practice of enchantment which is already occurring in Athens:
πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωµενεστάτους ἡµῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαµβάνοντες,
ὥσπερ λέοντας, κατεπᾴδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες καταδουλούµεθα λέγοντες, ὡς τὸ
ἴσον χρὴ ἔχειν καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον.
… molding our best and strongest, taking them from youth, just like lions, bewitching and
enchanting we enslave them, saying that it is necessary to have an equal share and that this
is fine and just.116
Callicles, of course, sees such enchantments as a fool’s errand since, as he believes, a powerful
individual will inevitably rise up, “trampling our writings, magic tricks, incantations, and laws
which are all transgressions of what is natural;” (καταπατήσας τὰ ἡµέτερα γράµµατα καὶ
µαγγανεύµατα καὶ ἐπῳδὰς καὶ νόµους τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας).117 In the Laws, Plato refines
this concept of socio-cultural enchantment in ways that, ideally, will not succumb to the rise of the
Übermensch. His best tactic against this, however, is not his network of choral song. It is a second
arm of state-sanctioned enchantment, namely, legislative preambles.
3.2.2. Preambles
After defining choral performance as a form of incantation, the Athenian is quick to note that
lawgivers, too, engage in a similar practice, only on a higher level:
ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν ὁ ὀρθὸς νοµοθέτης ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς ῥήµασι καὶ ἐπαινετοῖς
πείσει τε καὶ ἀναγκάσει µὴ πείθων τὰ τῶν σωφρόνων τε καὶ ἀνδρείων καὶ πάντως
ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔν τε ῥυθµοῖς σχήµατα καὶ ἐν ἁρµονίαις µέλη ποιοῦντα ὀρθῶς ποιεῖν.
In the same way, the upright lawmaker persuades – and if he cannot persuade, compels –
the poet, with fine phrases and praises, to make things correctly in producing dances in
rhythms and songs in harmonies which befit prudent and courageous and altogether good
men.118

Pl. Gorg. 483e4-484a2.
Pl. Gorg. 484a4-5.
118 Pl. Leg. 660a3-7; cf. 719b.
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Thus before the choral performers can spread their enchanting song through the population, the
lawgiver must first use his own brand of enchanting speech to inspire the institution of choral
enchantment in the first place. Unlike the choristers, however, the lawgiver’s tool for enchantment is
not so much song as a type of rhetorical persuasion (especially in the form of the legislative
preamble) that convinces each citizen to not only embrace the rule of law broadly construed but
individual laws themselves.119
These legislative preambles are introduced in book 4, where the Athenian, after breaking off
from an imaginary address to the Magnesian citizens, realizes that laws must be presented in two
forms.120 One form includes the dictates of the law itself, and the other the persuasive sentiment
behind it.121 The Athenian goes on to explain this division by offering an analogy to the medical
profession and, in particular, to the difference between doctors of slaves and doctors of free citizens.
While the doctor of slaves may prescribe whatever remedy he finds most effective, no matter how
unpleasant, the doctor of free citizens must first persuade his patients into accepting his remedies
irrespective of how unpleasant they may at first appear.122 In this way too, the lawgiver must
persuade the Magnesians to accept the law willingly rather than have it foisted upon them.123
To persuade these citizens of the necessity and desirability of individual laws, the Athenian
proposes the use of rhetorically persuasive preambles. They are, as he notes, not too different from

As Morrow notes: “The purpose of these enchantments [i.e., preambles] is to bring about conformity to the law,
not merely in the public relations of citizen to citizen, but in all the details, even the most intimate, of private life”
(Morrow 1953: 242).
120 Pl. Leg. 718b-723d.
121 One might think of it in terms of ‘good cop’ and ‘bad cop,’ as Fossheim memorably puts it (Fossheim 2013: 87).
122 This analogy correlates closely with the medical analogy used to explain the function of choral enchantments: just
as a doctor can habituate patients toward enjoying healthier foods, so too can incantatory choral performances
habituate the young toward embracing the laws (Pl. Leg. 559e-660a; cf. 667b).
123 The whole project of the Laws is, in part, guided by this larger attempt to establish “the natural rule of law over
willing subjects and without violent force" (κατὰ φύσιν δὲ τὴν τοῦ νόµου ἑκόντων ἀρχὴν ἀλλ᾿ οὐ βίαιον
πεφυκυῖαν, Pl. Leg. 690c2-3).
119

136

the practice of clarifying or prefacing what one intends to say or do – a practice that all speakers of
any language engage in constantly.124 The closest cousin to this concept of legislative preamble is
said to be the musical preamble which effectively warms up the audience for the musical
performance to follow:
καὶ δή που κιθαρῳδικῆς ᾠδῆς λεγοµένων νόµων καὶ πάσης Μούσης προοίµια
θαυµαστῶς ἐσπουδασµένα πρόκειται. τῶν δὲ ὄντως νόµων ὄντων, οὓς δὴ πολιτικοὺς
εἶναί φαµεν, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτ᾿ εἶπέ τι προοίµιον οὔτε ξυνθέτης γενόµενος ἐξήνεγκεν
εἰς τὸ φῶς, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος φύσει.
To be sure, marvelously elaborated preambles can be plainly seen in the form of the
kitharodic song which we call νόµοι and all other music. And as for the real νόµοι, which
we label as political, no one has ever yet offered a preamble nor has any composition of one
come to light, as if such a thing does not exist.125
By exploiting the slippage between the legal and musical meanings of the word νόµος, the Athenian
explains the role of the lawgiver as not only legislative but also poetic.126 Just as poets must
sometimes perform a preamble before their song, so, too, lawgivers must sometimes perform a
preamble before (or even in place of) their laws in order to train the listeners’ ears and souls to
become more well-disposed toward the content of these laws.
Like choral song, these preambles are described as enchantments. However, they differ
slightly in both their orientation and their means. Choral performance is a collective enchantment,
whereas the preamble is a corrective enchantment. That is to say, choral enchantments act as a

Beginning with a prefacing remark of his own, the Athenian explains as follows: “What kind of thing do I speak
of? I mean to say this, that such a thing is present in all speech and all activity involving the voice and that these
preambles are really a kind of warm-up, bearing a certain design which is handy for getting one started on what is
intended to be done” (τί δὲ ταῦτ’ εἴρηκα; τόδε εἰπεῖν βουληθείς, ὅτι λόγων πάντων καὶ ὅσων φωνὴ κεκοινώνηκεν
προοίµιά τέ ἐστιν καὶ σχεδὸν οἷόν τινες ἀνακινήσεις, ἔχουσαί τινα ἔντεχνον ἐπιχείρησιν χρήσιµον πρὸς τὸ
µέλλον περαίνεσθαι. Pl. Leg. 722d1-6).
125 Pl. Leg. 722d6-e4.
126 The lawmaker is the composer of the “truest tragedy” (τραγῳδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην, Pl. Leg. 817b5 with a recent
interpretation of the entire passage by Laks 2010). See also Pl. Leg. 734e and 822e-823a with Morgan 2013, who draws
similarities between the role of Plato’s lawmaker and the role of epinician poets. Moreover, it should be noted that
the equivocation of poet with lawgiver is, in fact, quite traditional to early Greek thought (Steiner 2015: 32-36).
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central, rhetorical magnet, drawing all citizens into performing one assimilated song or incantation;
legislative preambles function on the periphery of society where they, in conjunction with law itself,
set limits to human action within the city. In addition to having a slightly different orientation,
preambles also utilize slightly different techniques of enchantment. To create effective preambles,
the lawgiver must not only know which types of speech produce goodness but also how different
types of souls respond to different types of speech. In order to be an effective psychagogue, then, the
lawgiver must be a good psychologist, and just as people’s souls vary widely, so do rhetorical
techniques.127 Legislative preambles vary from law to law and range from strong emotional and
stylistic set pieces to cool and collected argumentation.
There is a longstanding scholarly debate over whether or not these preambles appeal to
reason. For Christopher Bobonich, the preambles represent a form of “rational persuasion.”128 Others
cite the emotionality and stylistic flourishes of the preambles to stress how they are closer to
“sermon preaching” than rational argumentation.129 André Laks proposes to break up the preambles
into three groups: one group which uses rhetorical techniques of praise and blame, another which
uses the technique of myth, and the final group (comprised only of the preamble regarding the law
of impiety in book 10) which uses reasoned argumentation.130 Luc Brisson generally agrees with
Laks; however, he stresses that book 10 is an exception that proves the rule that preambles generally
do not appeal to reason.131 If we loop the discussion of legislative preambles back into Plato’s

The Athenian stresses that the art of politics comes down to knowing the souls of one’s citizens: “So this would be
one of the most useful tools – namely, knowing the natures and dispositions of souls – for that art which involves
tending for matters; and by this, I suppose we mean politics” (Τοῦτο µὲν ἄρ᾿ ἂν τῶν χρησιµωτάτων ἓν εἴη, τὸ
γνῶναι τὰς φύσεις τε καὶ ἕξεις τῶν ψυχῶν, τῇ τέχνῃ ἐκείνῃ ἧς ἐστὶ ταῦτα θεραπεύειν· ἔστι δέ που, φαµέν, ὡς
οἶµαι, πολιτικῆς. Pl. Leg. 650b6-8).
128 Bobonich 1991.
129 Stalley 1994, Yunis 1996: 211-236.
130 Laks 1991.
131 Brisson 2000b; 2005: 117.
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broader conception of enchantment, we may not need to draw such a strict line between rational and
irrational persuasion. It is true that the preamble, as a form of Platonic enchantment, appeals
primarily to the lower, less rational parts of the soul. However, this appeal may come from irrational
songs and images or from reason itself – as we saw in Plato’s Timaeus. Outside of the Laws, we have
already seen how dialectical arguments, while functioning on a rational plane, can still enchant the
lower parts of the soul, especially when they block habituated desires and beliefs by inducing types
of aporia.132 Preambles, like all enchantments, may appeal to the lower part of the soul through
rational or irrational means. Before closing, it will be helpful to look closely at two preambles, which
the Athenian explicitly labels as incantatory, in order to get a sense of how this mode of
enchantment works.
3.2.2.1. Preamble to marriage law
In book 6, the Athenian discusses the marriage customs of the city of Magnesia and, in
particular, the guidelines for choosing a spouse.133 As he goes on to state, these guidelines are so
counterintuitive and controversial that they will not only invite ridicule but also produce resentment
in a large part of the population (πρὸς τῷ γελοῖα εἶναι θυµὸν ἂν ἐγείραι πολλοῖς).134 As a result,
they cannot be written into law and must be enforced solely through the enchanting (ἐπᾴδοντα)

“Platonic psychagogia is not opposed to the dialectical argumentation of Plato's Socrates – it consists in large
measure in Socrates' argumentation” (Blank 1993: 439).
133 Pl. Leg. 773a-e. The problem of legislating marriage customs is, for the Athenian, the clearest example of why
legislative preambles are necessary: Magnesia’s “single law” (ἁπλοῦς νόµος) regarding marriage – namely, that male
citizens must, in their early thirties, marry a woman – is offered as the primary example of the type of law which
would require a preamble (Pl. Leg. 721b-c). It may be noted here that the Athenian never actually persuades both of
his interlocutors of the necessity of enforcing heterosexual relationships. Although he persuades Megillus, he fails to
convince Cleinias and, thus, promises to attempt to enchant him (ἐπᾴδων) into approving of the mandate sometime
later (Pl. Leg. 837e1-7). This promise is never fulfilled in the course of the dialogue.
134 Pl. Leg. 773c7-8.
132

139

performance of the preamble.135 Before a young man even looks for a spouse, he must first listen to
this enchanting preamble which, in effect, urges him to choose a spouse who not only balances out
his own temperament but also comes from a less well-off family.136 The preamble goes on to explain
that this practice is necessary to balance out the city both economically and temperamentally. After
admitting that most citizens cannot actually envision how their personal marriage choices can
stratify a community, the preamble offers an infamously florid metaphor as an aid:
οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον ἐννοεῖν ὅτι πόλιν εἶναι δεῖ δίκην κρατῆρος κεκραµένην, οὗ µαινόµενος
µὲν οἶνος ἐγκεχυµένος ζεῖ, κολαζόµενος δὲ ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἑτέρου θεοῦ καλὴν κοινωνίαν
λαβὼν ἀγαθὸν πῶµα καὶ µέτριον ἀπεργάζεται.
It is not easy to know that a city must be blended like a mixing bowl where the mad wine,
when poured, bubbles up, but after being chastised by the other sober god of water and
assuming a fine partnership, it is turned into a good and measured drink.137
In conjunction with the style and argumentation of the preamble, this highly-wrought sympotic
metaphor engenders within the soul of the young bachelor an expectation that this is the best and
most pleasant marital custom for the city collectively to follow.138 It enchants him into rejecting
marriages based on money or intemperate passion and into following, instead, the tale (µῦθος)

“For this reason, it is necessary to omit these matters from the law, and rather try to persuade, by enchantment…”
(τούτων δὴ χάριν ἐᾷν µὲν νόµῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκαῖον, ἐπᾴδοντα δὲ πείθειν πειρᾶσθαι …, Pl. Leg. 773d5-6).
136 Pl. Leg. 773a-b. For similar marriage advice, see Pl. Plt. 310b–d.
137 Pl. Leg. 773c7-d3. According to pseudo-Longinus, this metaphor had become infamous among critics: “they say
that labeling water as the ‘sober god’ and mixture as ‘chastisement,’ smacks of a poet who is himself not sober”
(νήφοντα γάρ, φασί, θεὸν τὸ ὕδωρ λέγειν, κόλασιν δὲ τὴν κρᾶσιν, ποιητοῦ τινος τῷ ὄντι οὐχὶ νήφοντός ἐστι, Ps.Long. Subl. 32.7).
138 It is worth noting also the other rhetorical figures such as figura etymologica (γάµους χρὴ γαµεῖν, Pl. Leg. 773a1;
κρατῆρος κεκραµένην, Pl. Leg. 773d1), chiastic constructions (φεύγειν τὸν τῶν πενήτων µηδὲ τὸν τῶν πλουσίων
διώκειν, Pl. Leg. 773a2-3, θάττους δὲ ἤθεσι πρὸς βραδυτέρους καὶ βραδυτέρους πρὸς θάττους, Pl. Leg. 773c5–6) and
plenty of other jingles to tickle the ear: οἵ σοι παραινοῖεν, Pl. Leg. 773a2; ἀλλ᾿ ἐὰν τἆλλα ἰσάζῃ, Pl. Leg. 773a3; et al.
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which the lawgiver tells about marriage – namely, that one must seek a union that is best for the city,
not sweetest for oneself.139
3.2.2.2. Preamble to the law against impiety
The next legislative preamble worth discussing comes from book 10, where the Athenian
addresses how best to deal with impiety in the city. This preamble, taking up almost the entirety of
the book, is far more expansive and variegated than the one previously discussed. If we take up,
again, the analogy to music, this long exhortation against irreverent beliefs is not so much a prelude
as a concert consisting of entire movements that together utterly dwarf the νόµος tagged on at the
end.140
The sheer size and grandiosity of this preamble are internally warranted when one considers
the audience which it aims to persuade.141 The impious citizens whom the Athenian hopes to reform
are, in effect, all those who are (by their very natures) immune to the rest of the city’s enchantments.
οὐ πειθόµενοι τοῖς µύθοις, οὓς ἐκ νέων παίδων ἔτι ἐν γάλαξι τρεφόµενοι τροφῶν τε
ἤκουον καὶ µητέρων, οἷον ἐν ἐπῳδαῖς µετά τε παιδιᾶς καὶ µετὰ σπουδῆς λεγοµένων […]
τούτων δὴ πάντων ὅσοι καταφρονήσαντες οὐδὲ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἱκανοῦ λόγου, ὡς φαῖεν ἂν ὅσοι
καὶ σµικρὸν νοῦ κέκτηνται, νῦν ἀναγκάζουσιν ἡµᾶς λέγειν ἃ λέγοµεν, πῶς τούτους ἄν
τις ἐν πραέσι λόγοις δύναιτο νουθετῶν ἅµα διδάσκειν περὶ θεῶν πρῶτον ὡς εἰσί;
In not believing the myths, which they have been weaned on from infancy as sucklings,
hearing them from their mothers and nurses, the type that were uttered, in seriousness or in
play, as incantations, […] When all these people condemn all these things – and for no
single, sufficient reason as everyone with a smidgen of sense would admit – and now
compel us to have this discussion, how does one put these people into the right frame of

“All in all, let there be one story we tell about marriage: each man must seek out a marriage that is best for the city,
not most pleasurable for himself” (καὶ κατὰ παντὸς εἷς ἔστω µῦθος γάµου· τὸν γὰρ τῇ πόλει δεῖ συµφέροντα
µνηστεύειν γάµον ἕκαστον, οὐ τὸν ἥδιστον αὑτῷ. Pl. Leg. 773b4-6). England notes the poetic flavor of µνηστεύειν
γάµον which recalls µνηστεύω γάµους οὐκ ὄντας ὡς εἴξασιν at Eur. IA 847 (England 1921 on Pl. Leg. 773b5).
140 The legislation which does come at the end of the book essentially restricts the use of private shrines (Pl. Leg. 909de, 910b-d). This has felt a bit underwhelming to commentators: “Laws 10 ends not with a bang, but with a whimper”
(Mayhew 2008: 212).
141 The preamble is meant to prevent “all things in word or deed which someone commits through their speech or
action in disrespect to the gods” (ὅσα δὲ λόγῳ καὶ ὅσα ἔργῳ περὶ θεοὺς ὑβρίζει τις λέγων ἢ πράττων, Pl. Leg.
885b2–3).
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mind, and at the same time teach them about the gods – firstly, that they exist – and do so in
gentle terms?142
Although steeped from infancy in the musical and socio-cultural modes of education about the gods,
the soul of the irreverent individual, which is often described as bestial in nature, remains
unaffected.143 On the contrary, many of these bestial individuals (especially the clever beasts) work
their own antinomian and impious enchantments on other citizens – and thereby pose a major threat
to the city. Like wolves who enchant away the attention of guard-dogs with bait, many such
impious individuals are experts at enchanting other citizen by appealing to the lowest and most
bestial parts of their souls.144 As we saw earlier in the chapter, many magicians are included in this
category of irreverent individual who is clever and dissembling since they enchant many of the
living (ψυχαγωγῶσι πολλοὺς τῶν ζώντων) in claiming to raise the dead (τοὺς δὲ τεθνεῶτας
φάσκοντες ψυχαγωγεῖν) and promising to persuade the gods (θεοὺς ὑπισχνούµενοι πείθειν).145
In order to combat the enchanting rhetoric of these individuals, the Athenian composes his
special preamble, which includes reasoned argumentation146 as well as an enchanting myth.147 These

142 Pl. Leg. 887d2-888a2. Elsewhere, he describes similarly recidivous characters – temple robbers and the like – as that
“stubborn bean” (κερασβόλος) that just will not soften in the pot (Pl. Leg. 835d; cf. 880a-b).
143 Pl. Leg. 906b, 909a8. Note also how bad choral enchantments tend to imitate bestial sounds (Pl. Leg. 669e7). In
general, bad enchantments drive a person wild, whereas good enchantments humanize the bestial part of the soul: cf.
Pl. Euthyd. 289e1-290a4 with n. 30 above, as well as Pl. Lys. 206b2-3 with n. 87 above. See also a similar observation by
Graf 1997: 25-6 with note, Brisson 2000a: 279.
144 On the analogy to ‘certain watchdogs enchanted by wolves’ (τισι κυσὶ κεκηληµένοις ὑπὸ λύκων), see Pl. Leg.
906b-e. The passage is explicitly about the possibility of individuals enchanting gods (understood as watchdogs);
however, it implicitly looks forward to the way in which the dissembling and impious individual enchants the
masses (see Schöpsdau 2011 on Pl. Leg. 609b7).
145 Pl. Leg. 909a8-b6 quoted at p. 103 above. Elsewhere, the Athenian describes this promise to persuade the gods in
terms of enchanting the gods (Pl. Leg. 885d, 906b).
146 It explicitly contains arguments (λόγοις, Pl. Leg. 887a5) and functions as a rational demonstration (ἀπόδειξις, Leg.
887a5, 893b2; ἐπίδειξις, Pl. Leg. 892c6). On the highly rational dimension of the preamble in book 10, see Laks 1991
and Brisson 2000b.
147 “Indeed, [we are done] with compelling him with our arguments to agree that what he says is wrong. But
enchantments still seem necessary in the form of certain myths” (Τῷ γε βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις ὁµολογεῖν αὐτὸν µὴ
λέγειν ὀρθῶς. ἐπῳδῶν γε µὴν προσδεῖσθαί µοι δοκεῖ µύθων ἔτι τινῶν, Pl. Leg. 903a10-b2). For an interpretation of
this myth, see Vorwerk 2003.
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rhetorical tactics are marshaled together to persuade citizens to abandon their irreverent belief
regarding the nature and existence of the gods.148 In the end, it is this particular preamble against
impiety (the one that Cleinias suggests should preface the entire project of legislation),149 which aims
at preventing the rise of the powerful and destructive individual (the one that Callicles described as
“trampling our writings, magic tricks, incantations, and laws”150 or that the Athenian claims can
destroy “individuals, whole households, and cities”).151 The preamble aims to enchant and
rehumanize this type of bestial soul. If it falls on deaf ears, more coercive types of reform are
introduced. If this coercion proves useless against the most belligerently irreverent individual,
whose soul is beyond reform, the state imposes a permanent exile into the wildest and most remote
part of the city – a place that is, in the eyes of the Athenian, most befitting for the one with the most
bestial soul. 152
Conclusion
Like Gorgias, Plato uses the language of enchantment as a way of articulating extraordinary
experiences produced by speech. He uses this language particularly to mark out psychosomatic
experiences in which sensations give way to opinions or when opinions give way to sensations.
Enchanting rhetoric may appeal to the ear and terminate in a new belief instilled in the mind, or it
may appeal to the mind by way of an argument which sends a sensation through the body. Plato not

As the Athenian notes, the impiety of these individuals makes him afraid (φοβοῦµαί, Pl. Leg. 886a) and his speech
is designed to put that fear back onto them (τὸν δὲ εἰς φόβον τρέψαιµεν, Pl. Leg. 887a). In addition to the use of
argument and myth, the preamble is also rife with references to and quotations of poetry – including Homer and
Hesiod as well as, perhaps, Euripides and Critias – as positive or negative exempla.
149 Pl. Leg. 887b-c.
150 Pl. Gorg. 484a4-5 quoted at p. 134; cf. Pl. Leg. 890a.
151 Pl. Leg. 909b5-6 quoted at p. 103.
152 Earlier, the Athenian notes that the preamble has no effect on the one who has an utterly savage soul (παντάπασιν
ὠµῆς ψυχῆς, Pl. Leg. 718d).
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only deepens Gorgias’s earlier musings on enchantment but also explicitly distinguishes between
positive and negative uses of enchanting speech. For Plato, our susceptibility to enchantment
represents an extraordinary weakness in human nature, which is often exploited for ill, but can and
should be harnessed for good.
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Chapter 3. Hellenistic continuities

According to Jacqueline de Romilly and Pedro Laín Entralgo, the notion of enchantment – as
it appeared in the writings of Plato, Gorgias, and the early poets – drops away in the Hellenistic age
and does not reappear until the birth of Christianity1 or even the second sophistic.2 As we shall see,
this narrative is not entirely accurate. In the centuries following Aristotle, the traditional notion of
verbal enchantment is not somehow driven underground. Instead, it persists, not only in poetry3
and common idiom4 but also in philosophical debates regarding the role of literature and the nature
of pleasure. In this chapter, we shall trace how this semantic habit persists in the latter philosophical

1 For Laín Entralgo, the category is resurrected “only with Christianity – within which the divine person who
‘became flesh’ will be called Logos, ‘Word’” (1970 [1958]: 240).
2 According to De Romilly, “the theorists of the fourth century had equally refused all the different meanings this
simile [i.e., of speech as incantation] could involve: they had disregarded the irrational impact of oratory, the poetical
strangeness in style, and any reliance on inspiration. They had made a choice” (1975: 70).
3 Theocritus: θέλξει, Epigr. 5; ἀκηλήτω, Id. 22.169. Lycophron: ἀθέλκτους, Alex. 1335. Moschus: κατέθελγε, Europ.
94. Bion of Smyrna: θέλγονται, fr. 2 Gow. In his Argonautica, Apollonius of Rhodes speaks of magic and enchantment
mostly with words related to θέλξις (1.27, 1.31, 1.515, 1.777, 2.772, 3.4, 3.28, 3.33, 3.86, 3.143, 3.738, 3.766, 3.820, 4.147,
4.150, 4.436, 4.442, 4.667, 4.894, 4.1080, 4.1665, cf. κήλησις 1.515). Some appearances seem to be learned echoes of
Homer (e.g., 3.33, 4.894, 4.1080). Callimachus does not speak of enchantment as frequently. However, he does speak
of the so-called Telchines who represent an opposing aesthetic to his own. Callimachus may be playing upon the old
etymological connection between the name Τελχῖνες and θέλξις (Hsch. τ 448 s.v. Τελχῖνες). The etymology is made
as early as the fifth century by Xenomedes (BNJ 442 [Xenomedes of Keos] F 4a). We know, moreover, that
Callimachus read Xenomedes (Aet. 3 fr.75.54 Pfeiffer = BNJ 442 [Xenomedes of Keos] F 1). On Callimachus’s possible
connections to contemporary trends in literary criticism, see Romano 2002.
4 Outside of high poetry, we find idiomatic uses of words related to γόης (Alex. fr. 222 Kock; Lysim. 3 Müller = BNJ
621 [Lysimachos, Aigyptiaka] F 4), κήλησις (Theopomp. Com. fr. 30 Kock; Bato fr. 5 Kock; Chariclid. fr. 1 Kock),
ἐπαοιδή (Anaxandr. fr. 33 Kock), ψυχαγωγία (Hypsicl. Eucl. Lib. XIV pr. 12; P.Hamburg 1.91 with Clarysse 2002: 1036). See also “the magic tricks of haute cuisine” (µαγειρικὰς µαγγανείας, BNJ 594 [Dioscurides] F 8 with Graf 2019
135 n. 80).
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and literary critical discourse of the Hellenistic age, beginning with Aristotle’s Poetics and carrying
on up through the works of Philodemus.
As we shall see, enchantment continues to occupy an ambivalent position, oscillating
between positive and negative judgments, rationality and irrationality, delight and harm – much as
it had in the writings of Plato and Gorgias. The authors whom we shall be treating in this chapter
specifically draw upon this language of enchantment in order to negotiate the social-cumintellectual value of the verbal arts, to debate the efficacy of form versus content, and to stake out
what they regard as the rational or irrational limits of our own experiences of speech and song. For
them, enchantment comes quite close to being terminus technicus for the extraordinary and elusive
experience produced by powerful poetry, music, or rhetoric. It is a label that not only categorizes
this family of experiences, but also captures their exceptional and ambiguous status.
Relatively little remains of Hellenistic literature and, thus, much of the material we pick
through from here on is fragmentary. That is to say, it comes down to us in quotations of lost works,
scraps of papyri, or, in some cases, quotations of lost works partially preserved upon scraps of
papyri. The excellent recent advances in collecting, editing, and interpreting this Hellenistic material
allow for a fresh reassessment of the idea of enchantment after Aristotle. One source central to this
chapter is the collection of charred (and subsequently mangled) papyri found in the Villa dei Papiri
at Herculaneum. The first century BCE Epicurean philosopher Philodemus, whose works comprise
about half of what has been recovered there, will be crucial – especially his writings on the arts of
poetry, music, and rhetoric.5 Fortunately for us, Philodemus’s writings contain not only Epicurean

For general discussions of Philodemus and his work, see Sider 1997: 3-23; Capasso 2020. In what follows, quotations
from On Music are from Delattre 2007. Quotations from the first four books of Philodemus’s On Poems are all taken
5

146

doctrine about the verbal arts but also a great deal of material from earlier Hellenistic writers who
would have otherwise been lost.
This archival slant to Philodemus’s writings is partially a product of the time in which he
wrote. The Mithridatic wars caused an exodus of philosophers (and their libraries) from Athens.
These later philosophers, unmoored from the Athenian Academy, Lyceum, Garden, and Stoa, began
to write from new abodes – such as Rhodes, Alexandria, and Roman Italy – and to engage in a new
type of philosophy characterized by a desire to record, revise, refute, and resolve philosophical
disputes and doctrines of past authorities.6 For our purposes, this back-turning gaze is quite helpful
for recovering earlier Hellenistic discussion surrounding the idea of enchanting song and speech.
In the first part of this chapter, I trace how Hellenistic authors continue to debate the means
and ends of enchantment within the realm of literary theory. I begin by showing how Aristotle did
not suppress the concept of enchantment so much as apply to it a teleological framework that
Hellenistic literary theorists largely adopt. But where Aristotle had primarily associated the means
of enchantment with plot and content, later Hellenistic authors would primarily associate poetic
enchantment with the sound of a poem. Their strict association between poetic enchantment and
sound leads naturally into another Hellenistic habit in which authors sharply distinguish the ends of
poetry/enchantment from the ends of prose/education. When Philodemus writes at the end of the
Hellenistic period, he brings us closer to Aristotle again by opposing the tendency to hold sound

from Janko 2000, 2011, 2020. When necessary, I follow the updated readings suggested in Janko 2020, which
supersedes the earlier volumes. Quotations of the fifth book of On Poems are taken from Mangoni 1993. Philodemus’s
long work On Rhetoric is waiting on new editions. I use the text of Longo 1977 for books 1 and 2, Hammerstaedt 1992
for book 3, Sudhaus 1892-6 and Blank 2003 for the rest, unless otherwise noted.
6 According to Sedley, Philodemus writes at a time in which “the history of philosophy had itself come to an end”
(2003: 36).
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primarily responsible for poetic enchantment, and plumps, instead, for content. Yet as with many
other Hellenistic writers, he denies that poetic enchantment has any educative value.
In the second part of the chapter, I turn to how Hellenistic Stoics discussed the psychological
experience of enchantment. Although there was clearly broad interest in the concept of enchantment
throughout the Hellenistic period, there are not many substantial accounts of what the experience of
enchantment consisted of. The one exception is the Stoic discussions of enchanting pleasures. I begin
this part of the chapter by setting this notion of enchanting pleasure against the larger backdrop of
the Stoic theory of emotions. I show that what Stoics call enchantments are physical pleasures.
Within the highly rationalizing framework of Stoic emotions, enchanting pleasures are outliers,
existing on the cusp of reason and unreason. In the final part of the chapter, I bring this picture of
enchanting pleasures into communication with Diogenes of Babylon’s Stoic writings on music which
Philodemus preserves. I use this text to provide a window into what a Stoic, psychological model of
aural enchantment might look like. As I show, the Stoic experience of aural enchantment is a
rationalized experience of psychic tuning in which sounds pass over the soul and harmonize with it
in ways that produce psycho-physical effects.
1. Literary enchantment, Aristotle and after
1.1. Aristotle
Aristotle (384-322 BCE), in what remains of the Poetics, twice remarks upon the means
through which tragedy produces enchantment (ψυχαγωγία) – a word that, in his time, still
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maintains a close relation to the domain of magic.7 According to Aristotle, a tragedy not only
enchants through its plot (µῦθος)8 but also through its spectacle (ὄψις).9 This general association
between magic and the effect achieved by a good poetic performance is, of course, deeply
traditional. Homer and the early poets as well as Gorgias and Plato all agree that poetry enchants,
for better or for worse. But by the fourth century, these types of remarks were beginning to enter
increasingly formalized aesthetic debates surrounding the verbal arts. These debates were in fact
common enough for parody. The comic poet, Timocles, for instance, takes a shot at contemporary
intellectuals when he has an unnamed speaker wax philosophical about the tremendous value of a
tragedy – how it is capable of leaving an audience edified (παιδευθεὶς) and at the same time of
providing an experience of consolation (παραψυχή) as well as enchantment (ψυχαγωγία).10
Scholars have noted before the similarities of this remark to Aristotle’s own theory of tragedy –
especially in connection with the use of the term ψυχαγωγία.11 Yet Timocles need not be targeting

7 There is a tendency to water down the magical connotations of the word (Lucas 1968: 104; Gudeman 1934: 182–183).
Stephen Halliwell rightly challenges this (Halliwell 1986: 64 n. 24, 189; 2011: 223-6, 259). As De Romilly recognized,
the language of ψυχαγωγία never entirely loses its magical connotations (1974: 15; cf. Plut. De sera 560f; Luc. Dial. D.
7.224.1; Paus. 3.17.8; et al.). See Barnes 2022. It is worth noting also that Aristotle is not opposed to making casual
references to magical spells in his biological works (Arist. Hist. an. 505b18-22, 577a7-13, 605a2-7, cf. 616b24, [Pr.]
926b20-31). He may even be responsible for writing a treatise which disambiguates the concept of µαγεία by
distinguishing Greek magical practices from the religious practices of the Persian Magoi (Diog. Laert. 1.1 = Arist. Fr.
35 Rose; cf. Rives 2004). His pupil, Theophrastus, maintains a similar intellectual interest in the topic of magic. From
the Hellenistic period onwards, his biological writings came to be treated as a treasury of magico-pharmaceutical lore
(Gordon 1997: 131). He also has an interest in the therapeutic uses of song (Theophr. Frs. 719a-726c Fortenbaugh et
al.). There is no hard and fast theoretical reason to believe that Aristotle would have resisted the idiomatic use of
words related to enchantment. In fact, there is clear evidence that he did not: see Arist. EE 3.2 1230b31-35 with n. 20
below.
8 Arist. Poet. 6 1450a33-5.
9 Arist. Poet. 6 1450b16-20.
10 “[Humankind] invented these [tragedies] as consolations of anxious thoughts. For the mind, having forgotten its
own problems and having been enchanted by the suffering of another, goes off well pleased and edified”
(παραψυχὰς οὖν φροντίδων ἀνεύρετο | ταύτας· ὁ γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ἰδίων λήθην λαβὼν | πρὸς ἀλλοτρίῳ τε
ψυχαγωγηθεὶς πάθει, | µεθ᾿ ἡδονῆς ἀπῆλθε παιδευθεὶς ἅµα, Timocles fr. 6 KA). On this passage, see Olson 2007:
169-172 and Rosen 2012, who elucidates some of the humor.
11 For instance, Rudolf Stark suggests that the passage parodies Aristotle directly (1972: 83-90).
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Aristotle in particular.12 Already, we find Isocrates (436-338 BCE) discussing how poetry produces
ψυχαγωγία both with its contents and its form.13 Similarly, in the ps.-Platonic Minos (most likely
written in the fourth century), the character of Socrates discusses tragedy as the most enchanting
genre of poetry (τῆς ποιήσεως […] ψυχαγωγικώτατον).14 As we shall see below, this interest in
poetry’s capacity to enchant only intensifies further as we progress into the Hellenistic period.
Contrary to what has been suggested by Laín Entralgo and De Romilly, Aristotle’s most
significant impact on the semantic tradition of incantatory rhetoric is found not in the way he resists
it so much as in the way he absorbs it – particularly the way he incorporates it into his teleological
framework for defining literary genres. Part of Aristotle’s project in the Poetics is to list the essential
components of a tragedy and rank them in their relative importance as follows: plot (µῦθος),
character (ἦθος), thought (διάνοια), diction (λέξις), lyric poetry (µέλος), and spectacle (ὄψις). As we
shall see, this ranking process establishes an important distinction between the types of enchantment
that are either more or less essential to the realization of the genre of tragedy. Crucially, Aristotle
places a plot-driven type of enchantment at the heart of a good tragedy:
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὰ µέγιστα οἷς ψυχαγωγεῖ ἡ τραγῳδία τοῦ µύθου µέρη ἐστίν, αἵ τε
περιπέτειαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεις.
The elements of the plot – namely, reversals and recognitions – are the greatest in regard to
what makes tragedy enchanting.15

If Timocles targets any specific doctrine, he may be targeting Democritean discourse. Democritus resembles the
speaker of Timocles’s fragment by promoting the practice of observing the lives of those worse off as a way of
helping one approach the goal (τέλος) of life – namely, εὐθυµίη (DK 68B191 = Stob. 3.1.210). Moreover, a certain
Democritean by the name of Apollodotus is said to have traded the label of εὐθυµίη for the label of ψυχαγωγία in
describing that same τέλος of life (Clem. Al. Miscell., 2.130.4-5 = BNJ [Hekataios] 264 T 3b, see Warren 2002: 182-3).
See ch. 1, n. 221.
13 He notes that much of poetry’s enchantment derives from its contents – namely, myth (Isoc. Nic. 48–9). Elsewhere,
he stresses that sound also factors into poetic ψυχαγωγία since, if one were to strip poetry of its meter and
ornamentation, it would lose much of its effect (Isoc. Ev. 8-11). On Isocrates’s literary theories, see Halliwell 2011: 285304. On Isocrates and the concept of enchantment, see De Romilly 1975: 52-58.
14 [Min.] 321a4-5.
15 Arist. Poet. 6 1450a33-5.
12
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Aristotle famously regards plot as the soul (ψυχή) and greatest goal (τέλος µέγιστον) of a tragic
poem.16 Thus, in the context of a tragic performance, a good plot (one involving reversal and
recognition) is what will naturally produce the greatest experience of enchantment.17 Further on in
the Poetics, we find that although plot is the chief means of tragic enchantment, it is not the only
means. Aristotle notes how an enchanting effect (ψυχαγωγικὸν) also arises from sheer spectacle
(ὄψις) – that is, the sights and sounds of the performance, including the sets, the costumes, and the
delivery of lines.18 However, since ὄψις is, according to Aristotle, both the least integral part of the
poetic art (ἥκιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς ποιητικῆς) and the least technical (ἀτεχνότατον) insofar as it is not in
the job description or τέχνη of the playwright per se, this type of spectacle-driven enchantment
ranks lower than plot-driven enchantment in the realization of the genre of tragedy.19
In sum, Aristotle treats enchantment as a product of both plot and spectacle, content and
form. Plot-driven enchantment is a more intellective experience of mentally tracking the twists and
turns of the narrative. In contrast, spectacle-driven enchantment is a more aesthetic experience of
appreciating the sights and sounds of the performance. In the end, Aristotle treats plot and plot-

Goal: Arist. Poet. 6 1450a22-3. Soul: Arist. Poet. 6 1450a37.
As Stephen Halliwell has shown, Aristotle predicates his later claims about the superiority of complex plots on this
earlier remark about the enchanting powers of reversals and recognitions (2011: 223-4). Why are complex plots the
most desirable? Because they enchant the most. As proof for the primacy of plot, Aristotle argues that, even without
scenery and enactment, plot would somehow produce the same tragic emotions (Arist. Poet. 14 1453b1–6). Plot and
the proper structuring of events (τὰ πράγµατα συνίστασθαι) are also, according to Aristotle, the most difficult thing
for a tragedian to master – harder even than mastering diction and character (Arist. Poet. 6 1450a35-39).
18 Arist. Poet. 6 1450b16-20. On ὄψις, see recently Sifakis 2013.
19 Arist. Poet. 6 1450b16-20.
16
17
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driven enchantment as more essential to the aims of a tragedy than spectacle and spectacle-driven
enchantment.20
Later, Peripatetics will continue in Aristotle’s teleological tradition by dividing and ranking
the elements essential to specific literary genres.21 One of the most significant developments in
Hellenistic literary theory will be the radical reversal of the Aristotelian hierarchy of content over
form, plot over performance.22 As we shall see, Hellenistic theorists will increasingly treat the sound
and sensation of a poem as the definitive source of poetic enchantment, over and above its content.
Before proceeding to these Hellenistic critics, it will be helpful to take a sidelong glance
toward the realm of Attic oratory, where the language of enchantment also shows up with some
regularity and where similar debates over the source of enchantment provide a helpful entree into
Hellenistic discussions of the topic.

20 In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle briefly mentions the enchanting effect of a more purely aesthetic experience of a
sight or a sound. There, Aristotle notes how the distanced pleasures taken in the sight of a beautiful statue or the
sound of a beautiful harmony are blameless types of pleasure since they are experiences that are not directly
instrumentalized towards basic desires for sex, food, or drink. They are, thus, comparable to the inescapable and yet
blameless experience of those enchanted (κηλούµενοι) by the Sirens’ song (Arist. EE 3.2 1230b31-35). On this
passage, see Tatarkiewicz 1970: 153: “It was not in the Poetics, but in the Ethics, particularly the Eudemian Ethics, that
Aristotle characterized aesthetic experience.” James Porter and Anastasia Peponi have both interpreted this Siren-like
pleasure described in this passage as a Kantian type of “pure” and “disinterested pleasure” (Porter 2010: 52-3 and
Peponi 2012: 71-3). For a critique of these readings, see Konstan 2015: 375-376; cf. Destrée 2014: 18-20; Destrée 2015:
473-4.
21 On Aristotle’s outsized influence on later literary criticism, see Richardson 1994; Montanari 2012. These scholars
rightly challenge Pfeiffer’s narrative, which oddly downplays Aristotle’s role in the rise of ancient scholarship
(Pfeiffer 1968: 67). Despite downplaying it, however, Pfeiffer does note that Aristotle’s “new and central” idea to sort
and rank literature teleologically is of “importance for the understanding of the great literary tradition” (1968: 67).
22 Signs of this move toward a more sensual and acoustic appreciation of the verbal arts are detectable in Aristotle’s
time. As James Porter has shown, Aristotle, especially in his Rhetoric, fights against proto-euphonist theories of
rhetoric and poetry, which had sprouted up amongst the sophists and their successors (2004, 2010: 312-319). It was
not until the Hellenistic period that these theories became formalized and intimately associated with the concept of
enchantment.
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1.2. Attic Oratory
Orators such as Aeschines, Demosthenes, Lycurgus, Apollodorus, Demades, and Dinarchus
all utilize the language of enchantment and do so primarily as a tool for discrediting their
opponents. In the realm of forensic oratory (as opposed to poetry), a somewhat greater premium is
put on truth and the perspicacity of speech. Thus, when an orator invokes terms related to
ψυχαγωγία, γοητεία, κήλησις, or ἐπῳδή, with their traditional connotations of psycho-somatic
distraction and deception, he uses them primarily as terms of abuse. Aeschines, for instance, warns
how enchanting words are those which can carry away a person’s judgment (πρὸς ἑτέρῳ τινὶ τὴν
γνώµην ἔχουσιν).23 Elsewhere, he warns jurors how enchantment is not sent by the gods, as it is in
tragedy, but comes about through the impetus of human expectation.24 In their speeches, orators
advance and parry accusations of verbal wizardry between one another, and, in doing so, they
engage in a latent debate over what constitutes as enchanting speech.25 One particularly illustrative
(and, as we shall see, influential) exchange is found in the paired speeches of Aeschines’s Against
Ctesiphon and Demosthenes’s On the Crown.
In Against Ctesiphon, Aeschines warns his audience that his opponent, Demosthenes, will call
him a Siren for his smooth verbal delivery and natural talent (εὔροιαν λόγων καὶ τὴν φύσιν µου).
In case there arises any confusion about what Demosthenes means, Aeschines clarifies that, by

Aeschin. 3.192.
“… they are enchanted by those things which they expect to take pleasure in after having succeeded” (ἐφ᾿ οἷς
κατορθώσαντες εὐφρανθήσονται, τούτοις κεκήληνται, Aeschin. 1.191). See also Aeschin. 2.124, 3.137, 3.207; Dem.
4.49; 4.54, 19.109, 27.32, 44.63; Apoll. Neaer. 59.55.
25 For example, Lycurgus remarks on his opponent’s ability to enchant by words (τοῖς λόγοις ψυχαγωγῆσαι) and to
draw out, with his own tears (τοῖς δακρύοις …προαγαγέσθαι), the feeling of pity from his audience (Lycurg. Leoc.
33). Aeschines laments becoming entangled (συµπέπλεγµαι) with his opponent, Demosthenes, – the enchanter and
lowlife (γόητι καὶ πονηρῷ) – who does not speak the truth, even unwillingly (ἄκων ἀληθὲς οὐδὲν εἴποι) and who
“adds no meaningful content to his rhetorical marvels and his composition of words” (πρὸς τῇ τερατείᾳ τοῦ τρόπου
καὶ τῇ τῶν ὀνοµάτων συνθέσει νοῦν οὐκ ἔχει, Aeschin. 2.153). Earlier, he expresses his disturbance that people
were enchanted (ψυχαγωγηθέντες) by Demosthenes's accusations and antitheses (ἀντιθέτοις, Aeschin. 2.4).
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‘Siren,’ his opponent is suggesting a person who is able not only to enchant (οὐ κηλεῖσθαί) but also
destroy (ἀπόλλυσθαι). He then goes on to deny that he is capable of such enchantment and stresses
that the label is far more fitting for Demosthenes, who is “a man composed only of words” (ἐξ
ὀνοµάτων συγκείµενος ἄνθρωπος).26 When Demosthenes responds to Aeschines’s slander, in On
the Crown, he admits that his own brand of rhetoric has a certain power: “I am well aware of my
rhetorical forcefulness – so be it” (εὖ οἶδ᾿ ὅτι τὴν ἐµὴν δεινότητα—ἔστω γάρ).27 However, he
protests that one cannot enchant through rhetorical forcefulness alone since it is up to the audience
to assent to what is said.28 According to Demosthenes, it is not rhetorical ornamentation so much as
a lying character and false words that enchant an audience. Thus the real enchanter is not
Demosthenes, but Aeschines.29
Underneath all of this name-calling are various latent queries regarding the means and ends
of incantatory rhetoric. The orators dance around questions of whether enchantment is a matter of
formal flourish or deceptive content, whether it involves assent on the part of the audience or
whether it simply arises irrationally from the impingement of sounds onto the soul or senses,

26 Aeschin. 3.228-9. Demosthenic rhetoric frequently attracts the accusation of enchantment. Similar to Aeschines,
Demades calls Demosthenes “a little homunculus composed of syllables and a tongue” (συγκείµενον ἀνθρώπιον ἐκ
συλλαβῶν καὶ γλώττης, Demad. Fr. 89 de Falco 1955 = BNJ [Demades] 227 F 36 = Tzetz. Chil. 6 112 sqq.). Dinarchus
speaks of Demosthenes’s enchanting laments and quackeries (τοὺς οἴκτους καὶ τοὺς φενακισµοὺς, Dinarch. In Dem.
92; cf. In Dem. 66, 95-96). Orators will invoke Demosthenes’s semi-foreign status (i.e., Scythian on his mother’s side)
to complement these charges of rhetorical wizardry – he is an ‘other’ who persuades through ‘other’ unsavory means.
27 Dem. 18.277.
28 “… though I, for one, observe that the listeners are primarily in control of the power of the speakers. For the one
speaking gains a reputation for wisdom only when you show approval and you confer favor to each” (καίτοι ἔγωγ᾿
ὁρῶ τῆς τῶν λεγόντων δυνάµεως τοὺς ἀκούοντας τὸ πλεῖστον κυρίους· ὡς γὰρ ἂν ὑµεῖς ἀποδέξησθε καὶ πρὸς
ἕκαστον ἔχητ᾿ εὐνοίας, οὕτως ὁ λέγων ἔδοξε φρονεῖν, Dem. 18.277).
29 “[Aeschines seems to think] that, if someone is ever the first to speak of his own attributes in reference to another,
these things will seem true, and that the audience will no longer scrutinize what kind of person the speaker is. I know
that all of you recognize this man and suppose that these epithets are more applicable to him than they are to me”
(ὡς ἐὰν πρότερός τις εἴπῃ τὰ προσόνθ᾿ ἑαυτῷ περὶ ἄλλου, καὶ δὴ ταῦθ᾿ οὕτως ἔχοντα, καὶ οὐκέτι τοὺς
ἀκούοντας σκεψοµένους τίς ποτ᾿ αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ ταῦτα λέγων. ἐγὼ δ᾿ οἶδ᾿ ὅτι γιγνώσκετε τοῦτον ἅπαντες, καὶ
πολὺ τούτῳ µᾶλλον ἢ ἐµοὶ νοµίζετε ταῦτα προσεῖναι, Dem. 18.276-277).
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somewhat like Gorgias’s λόγος. The remarks that Aeschines and Demosthenes make hardly
constitute well-reasoned theories of rhetorical enchantment; however, they do probe some semantic
issues that become more explicit in the Hellenistic period. One interesting piece of evidence for this
is a passage from the first century CE author Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who provides a surprising
interpretation of Aeschines’s remarks about enchantment in Against Ctesiphon:
καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα πάλιν οὐ δέδοικε, µὴ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν µεγαλοπρέπειαν αὐτοῦ τῶν
ὀνοµάτων ἀγαπήσωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλὰ µὴ λάθωσιν ὑπὸ τῆς συνθέσεως γοητευθέντες,
ὥστε καὶ τῶν φανερῶν αὐτὸν ἀδικηµάτων ἀφεῖναι διὰ τὰς σειρῆνας τὰς ἐπὶ τῆς
ἁρµονίας. ἐκ δὲ τούτων οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν, ὅτι δεινότητα µὲν αὐτῷ, ὅσην οὐχ ἑτέρῳ,
µαρτυρῶν καὶ ταῖς σειρῆσιν ἀπεικάζων αὐτοῦ τὴν µουσικήν, ἀγάµενος δὲ οὐ τῆς
ἐκλογῆς τῶν ὀνοµάτων αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ τῆς συνθέσεως, ἀναµφιλόγως αὐτῷ ταύτην
παρακεχώρηκε τὴν ἀρετήν.
Here again, Aeschines is not afraid that the Athenians might show affection toward the
beauty and grandeur of Demosthenes’s words, but that they may not notice how they were
enchanted by his verbal composition and, as a result, let him off from his obvious injustices
because of the Siren-song produced by his musical style. On account of these things, it is not
difficult to recognize that, in comparing him with the Sirens, Aeschines acknowledges how
Demosthenes’s unique brilliance is in his musicality and, in praising him not for his word
choice but his verbal composition, Aeschines concedes this latter quality without dispute.30
For a later writer like Dionysius, Aeschines’s remarks about verbal enchantment are viewed as a
full-blown theoretical reflection on how verbal composition or word order (σύνθεσις), as opposed
to word choice (ἐκλογή), produces the effect of enchantment (γοητεία) rather than mere affection
(ἀγάπη). As we shall see, in the centuries between the Attic orators and Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
the language of enchantment and the latent queries about it (evidenced in the speeches of Aeschines
and Demosthenes) become deeply embedded within rhetorical and literary debates over form and
content. The mere mention of enchantment in a quasi-theoretical context links Dionysius’s mind to
these intervening debates. He supports his views about verbal artistry with a patchwork of

30

Dion. Hal. Dem. 35.37-46.
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Hellenistic critical terms (such as σύνθεσις and ἐκλογή) that are, over the centuries, woven in and
through the semantic territory of verbal enchantment itself.31 In what follows, I discuss not only
theorists who, like Dionysius, associate literary enchantment with verbal composition or word order
(σύνθεσις), but also those who link the experience with word choice (ἐκλογή) and even pure sound
(ἦχος). In the wake of Aristotle, these theorists are in the business of dividing and ranking poetry
into its most and least essential components. Unlike Aristotle, they emphatically privilege the magic
of sound and form at the exclusion of meaning and content.
1.3. οἱ κριτικοί and the means of enchantment
In his work, On Poems, Philodemus takes as his opponents a group of Peripatetics whom he
groups together under the moniker οἱ κριτικοί. These critics include the names of Andromenides,
Heracleodorus, and Pausimachus, who are little known outside of Philodemus’s text but who
nevertheless represent an undoubtedly influential strand of discourse regarding the nature of
poetry. As Philodemus indicates, what binds these figures together is their shared belief that the
defining quality of poetry qua poetry is sound rather than content or plot:
‘τους̣
ποητὰς̣ [µ]ῦθον παρ᾽ ὲτέρων λαβόντας καὶ ταῖς ὑποκ[ε]ι̣[µέ]ν[αι]ς λ̣έ̣ξ[ε]σ̣ιν
̣ ̣ δ̣ηλ]ω[µένους µόνηι τῆι
σ̣υ̣νθέ[σ]ε̣ι̣ [ψυχαγωγίαν ἐξἐργάζεσθαι’, κ̣[αὶ τὸ ‘τὴν ἐπ̣[ιφαι]νοµενένην [ε]ὐφωνίαν ἴδιον // [εἶ]ναι, τὰ δὲ νοή{ι}µατα κα//ὶ τ̣ὰς λέξεις ἐκτὸς
εἶναι κα//ὶ κοινὰ συνάγεσθαι δεῖ̣[ν]’, // πα̣ρὰ πᾶσι µὲν ὡς
συν̣θ̣ή/̣ /κ̣ηι µέν̣ει τοῖς κρι-

On Dionysius’s use of the language of enchantment and its connection to Hellenistic criticism, see the discussion by
de Jonge 2008: 333-340.
31
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τικοῖ[ς]
[the claims that] ‘poets, in borrowing a plot from others and making it clear with pre-existent
words, achieve enchantment by composition alone,’ and that ’the supervening euphony is
the quiddity of poetry, but the thoughts and words are external to poetry and must be
considered common,’ persist as by treaty among all κριτικοί.32
The remarks which Philodemus quotes here are drawn specifically from the critic Heracleodorus
and, in large part, they do reflect the fundamental assumptions shared by other κριτικοί.
Andromenides and Pausimachus would agree that a good poem produces enchantment and that
this poetic enchantment is more of a product of form than content.33 But a closer inspection of these
critics’ remarks reveals that, despite sharing some fundamental beliefs about poetic enchantment,
Andromenides, Heracleodorus, and Pausimachus differ in several important ways – especially in
assumed means for producing this enchantment. Andromenides finds that it comes down to word
choice (ἐκλογή), Heracleodorus to word order (σύνθεσις), and Pausimachus to a particular atomic
sound (ἦχος).
Below, I reconstruct the theories of Andromenides, Heracleodorus, and Pausimachus in turn,
showing that within this strand of poetic theory, the concept of verbal enchantment continues to

De poem. 2.69.26-70.10. Translation adapted from Janko.
On the centrality of enchantment to these critics’ definition of poetry: “a feature common to all the critics was their
detailed theoretical analysis of the means by which poetic language produced ψυχαγωγία” (Gutzwiller 2010: 340; cf.
Schenkeveld 1968: 190; Porter 1995b: 88, 102). Throughout Philodemus’s On Poems, enchantment is primarily denoted
by terms related to ψυχαγωγία (De poem. 1.109.11, 1.133.7, 1.136.16, 1.136.19, 1.151.8, 1.159.12, 1.159.19, 1.161.9,
1.162.15, 1.162.20, 1.162.22, 1.166.3, 1.208.12-13, 1.209.18-19, 2.41.27, 2.43.10, 2.52.22, 2.54.21, 2.68.24, 2.70.2, 2.70.25,
2.71.13, 2.73.6, 2.74.15, 2.159.19, 2.161.1, 2.161.9, 2.179.8, 2.193.21, 5 P.Herc. 1425 col. 16.6). For Philodemus and those
he quotes, ψυχαγωγία denotes something stronger than mere entertainment (Fraser 1972: 759; Chandler 2006: 148;
Gutzwiller 2006: 396 n. 54, “quasi-magical, physically entrancing effect”, 2010: 340, Halliwell 2011: 324 n. 155 contra
Wigodsky 1995: 65–68, 2009: 19 n. 67 who argues for the translation ‘entertainment’). Janko favors the translation
‘enthrallment.’ I will use the translation ‘enchantment’ since term ψυχαγωγία is closely linked with the terms related
to θέλξις (De poem. 1.37.11, 1.37.16-7, 1.164.7-8, 1.164.12, 1.166.1, 2.76.26), κήλησις (De poem. 1.130.21, 1.130.22,
2.191.2), ἐπῳδή (De poem. 1.12.18, 1.166.1-2), γοητεία (De poem. 1.111.25; cf. Dem. Lac. De poem. 1 col. 4.1 Romeo). On
the meaning of ψυχαγωγία in Philodemus, see Barnes 2022.
32
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serve as an important conceptual framework through which thinkers explore the limits of λόγος and
mark out extraordinary instances in which words and the voice do more than speak.
1.3.1. Andromenides on enchantment and word choice (ἐκλογή)
Each of the three critics treated here is concerned with defining the quality most essential to
the art of poetry and, thus, most responsible for poetic enchantment. For the earliest of the three
critics, Andromenides (early 3rd cent. BCE), the primary job (ἔργον) of a poet comes down to word
choice (ἐκλογή).34 A good poet chooses words that not only have a particular appropriateness
(οἰκειότης) to their context35 but also have beauty.36 The effect of a good poem that arises from
appropriately chosen words is, then, partly intellective and partly aesthetic – partly derived from a
word’s meaning that suits the context and partly from a word’s form that strikes the ear as beautiful.
Although Andromenides labels both the intellective and aesthetic effects as enchantment,37 his
poetic theory places a much greater emphasis on the aesthetic impact of a well-chosen word than on

On Andromenides more generally, see Janko 2000: 143-154. He is a relatively obscure figure; however, he shows up
again in an earlier piece of Epicurean literary theory, Demetrius Laco’s On Poems. In that text, Andromenides may
again be speaking about “the enchantment of poetry” (ἡ τοῦ] ποήµατο[ς] γο[ητεία, Dem. Lac. De poem. 1 col. 4.1
Romeo). The correlation between enchantment and word choice (ἐκλογή) is not only found again in Dionysius of
Halicarnassus (quoted at pp. 154-5) but also in Ps-Longinus (Subl. 30): “It is probably redundant to discuss at length
to someone who knows, how the choice of effective and grand words moves and enchants an audience marvelously
so that it is the chief pursuit of all orators and prose writers” (ὅτι µὲν τοίνυν ἡ τῶν κυρίων καὶ µεγαλοπρεπῶν
ὀνοµάτων ἐκλογὴ θαυµαστῶς ἄγει καὶ κατακηλεῖ τοὺς ἀκούοντας καὶ ὡς πᾶσι τοῖς ῥήτορσι καὶ συγγραφεῦσι
κατ᾿ ἄκρον ἐπιτήδευµα, […], µὴ καὶ περιττὸν ᾖ πρὸς εἰδότας διεξιέναι).
35 Andromenides advises poets “to select words that are most suited to the thing so that they are fitting and
convincing” (οἰκειότα|τα τοῦ πρά[γ]µατος ἐγλ̣[έγεσ]|θαι τὰ ῥήµα`θ´ʼ ἵνα προ[σαρ|µόσῃ] καὶ τὸ πιθαν[ὸν| ἔχηι]
Phld. De poem. 1.17.26-18.4). He means that the diction must fit the (heroic) character of the speaker – i.e. a lofty word
for a lofty hero or god (Phld. De poem. 1.172.14-22; cf. De poem. 5 col. 34.35-35.20).
36 “[T]he job of the poet will be brought about if he selects the more beautiful of the words used in respect to the
work, but passes over the more shameful ones” (γενή|σεσθαι τοὖργον ἂν τὰ| κα[λ]λίω τῶν κατ’ αὐτοῦ|
τιθεµένων ῥήµατ’ ἐ|γλέγηται, τὰ [δ]’ αἰσχίω| περιίστητ[αι], Phld. De poem. 1.167.20-25).
37 “The common person is enchanted by the diction conventionally deemed suitable for poets, both in the way that it
excels in accordance with the mind’s comprehension and in the way it produces enchantment in this type of person
[…] and one is enchanted naturally and not irrationally” (⸤ψυχαγ̣ω⸥[γεῖσθαι | τ]⸤ὸν πολὺν ὑπὸ τῆς⸥
[νενο]|⸤µισµένης τοῖς π⸥οηταῖς| [λέξεως] ⸤προσ⸥ήκειν, κα<ὶ ἐπ>ὶ| τ̣ῆ[̣ ι κατὰ // δια]ν̣οίας σύνεσιν|
δ[ια]φε[ρο//]µ̣ένη̣<ι> κ̣αὶ ἐπὶ| τ[ῆι ἐ]ν τ̣[οιού//]τωι π̣οιούσηι| ψυχα[γωγ//]ίαν […] καὶ| [φυσι]κῶς ἀλλ’ οὐκ
ἀλόγως| ψ̣υχαγωγεῖσθαι, Phld. De poem. 1.159.12-19 and 1.162.15-20).
34
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the intellective experience.38 The essential quality that an effective and enchanting word must have is
a beautiful sound, because beautiful sound, according to Andromenides, is the element that has the
capacity to stir souls by nature (φύσει).39 His proof for the natural power of beautiful sound is the
phenomenon of the wordless lullaby (τῆς ὠιδῆς τῆς ἀγραµµάτου) which nurses use to mollify
infants.40 Like a lullaby, a poem holds sway over an audience by dint of its beautiful sounds.
Although a degree of semantic precision and appropriateness is necessary – and may, in fact,
impress some audience members – it is the aesthetic dimension of poetic diction that gives poetry its
mass appeal.41 In sum, Andromenides’s theory of word choice (ἐκλογή) treats poetry primarily as a
process of cobbling together beautiful words and, thus, presents poetic enchantment primarily as an
aural phenomenon.

38 Andromenides is quite persistent about stressing the need for poets to seek out beautiful words: Phld. De poem.
1.18.17-26, 1.21.1-14, 1.24.1-12, 1.131.5-132.2, 1.161.2-16, 1.170.13-171.9, 1.181.4-22, 1.182.18-20, 1.187.5-8. Elsewhere, he
seems to distinguish between the intellective and aesthetic dimensions of poetry at Dem. Lac. De poem. 1 col. 1.1-8
Romeo.
39 “Beautiful diction is one kind of natural thing” (τὴν καλὴν| λ̣έξιν ἕν τ[ι] τῶν φυσικῶν| [ὑπ]ά̣ρχειν, Phld. De
poem. 1.162.25-7 cf. 1.159.12-20 and 1.162.15-20 quoted in n. 36; Dem. Lac. De poem. 1 col. 10.2-10, 13.1-8 Romeo.
Andromenides seems to have developed a psychological basis for the enchanting effect that pleasing/beautiful sound
has on the soul of an auditor: “’Enchantments please the … of the soul. For (one) recognizes that bringing something
about by way of pain does not set in motion any of the parts of the soul. For it is everyday speech’ he says, ‘and not
poetic speech in which, they say, the arguments are trusted to be useful’” ([τῆς ψ]υ͙χῆς κατ[…|τ]ὰ̣ς ἐπῳδὰς
τ[έρπ]εσθ͙[αι. ἐπι|γ]νῶναι γὰρ ὅτι <τὸ> κατὰ λ̣[ύ|π]ην περαινό̣µενον [οὐ]|θὲν ἂν ψυχικῶν [κινοίη. δι|ά]λεκτον
γὰρ εἶναί”, [φησιν, “οὐ]|δὲ πόησιν, ἐν [ᾗ] φ͙ασιν [τοὺς λό]|γ͙ους χρησίµους πισ[τεύες]|θαι, Phld. De poem. 1.12.1825).
40 Andromenides notes how people “by nature have a certain concern for and automatic kinship with the Muses, as is
evident in the lulling of infants to sleep with a wordless lullaby” (φύσε[ι τοῖς| ἀνθρώπο]ις ἐπιµέλ{λ}ε[ι|άν τινα]
καὶ συγγένειαν εἶ|ναι Μούσαις αὐτοµαθῆ,| καθάπερ ἐµφανίζειν| τοὺς τῶν βρεφῶν ὑπὸ| τῆς ὠιδῆς τῆς
ἀγραµ|µάτου κατακοιµισµούς, Phld. De poem. 1.131.16-23)
41 “(Andromenides) said that the most beautiful diction (is) that which enchants the rabble, not that which is admired
most correctly by just some” ([ταύτην τὴν λέξι]ν καλ|λίστην //ἔ//[λεγε, τὴν] τ̣οὺς| ὄχλους̣ [ψυχαγωγο]ῦσαν,| οὐ
τὴν [κατ]ὰ̣ τ̣ό̣ [γ’ ὀ]ρθό|[τατ]όν [τισι δ]ὴ θαυµασθεῖ|[σαν], Phld. De poem. 1.161.7-12).
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1.3.2. Heracleodorus on enchantment and word order (σύνθεσις)
For Heracleodorus (3rd cent. BCE), the quiddity (ἴδιον) of poetry is not word choice (ἐκλογή)
so much as verbal composition (σύνθεσις) by which he means word order.42 In his opinion, when
poets write a line of poetry, they aim at arranging words in the proper sequence. If the poet arranges
words effectively, a certain euphony (εὐφωνία) supervenes upon the verse and produces the
experience of enchantment.43 Crucially, for Heracleodorus, euphony and the enchantment it
produces are almost entirely divorced from reason. He goes about proving this through a variety of
demonstrations. One of these is to cite lines of poetry that are either unintelligible44 or full of
unpleasant content45 in order to establish that, despite their meaning or lack thereof, they still
enchant the listener by way of their sound.46 Another tactic is to switch around the word order of
famous lines of poetry while maintaining the same semantic meaning. Known as metathesis, this

42 On Heracleodorus, see especially Janko 2020:131-142, which updates Janko 2000: 155-165. Still useful is also Gomoll
1936.
43 “‘[P]oets, in borrowing a plot from others and making it clear with pre-existent words, achieve enchantment by
composition alone’[…] ’the supervening euphony is the quiddity of poetry, but the thoughts and words are external
to poetry and must be considered common’” (Phld. De poem. 2.69.26-70.8 quoted at p. 156; cf. 1.55.18-27, 1.193.8-11,
1.195.4-8, 2.4.7-9, 2.7.5-9, 2.47.7-19, 2.62.8-13, 2.76.8-10, 2.83.22-5, 2.91.18-24, 2.132.2-5, 5 col. 29.24-30.2). Heracleodorus
is careful to distinguish euphony from its effect of enchantment (Phld. De poem. 2.71.13-16).
44 For example, he cites Homer’s famous and yet hopelessly opaque description of animal sacrifice at Il. 1.459-61 =
2.422-4 (Phld. De poem. 2.41.4-23; cf. 2.60.1-14 and Janko 2020: 209-11). These incomprehensible verses “seem to
resemble those which enchant, in accordance with word order (παρόµοια| δοκεῖν εἶναι κατὰ τὰς| συνθέσεις τοῖς
ψυχαγω|[γοῦσιν, Phld. De poem. 2.41.25-42.1). Elsewhere, “the verses are unclear, but they enchant all the same”
(ἀσαφῆ{ι} µὲ[ν τὰ]| π̣οήµατ᾽ εἶναι, ψυχαγω̣|γεῖν δ᾽ ὅµως, Phld. De poem. 2.54.20- 2). See also Phld. De poem. 2.5.912, 2.32.1-13, 2.48.4-12, 2.49.17-50.26, 2.54.26-55.1, 2.65.1-3, 2.93.20-94.1. Heracleodorus’s claims about the enchanting
quality of obscure verses are, in part, meant to counter certain unnamed opponents who apparently had argued that
obscurity hinders the experience of ψυχαγωγία (Phld. De poem. 2.52.20-3).
45 “… (contents) that are hard to bear in regard to sight or smell, when spoken, do not make verses worse, except in
regard to things heard” (τὰ δ̣υσχερῆ π̣ρὸς| [ὄ]ψιν καὶ πρὸς [ὄ]σφ[ρ]η̣σιν| [ο]ὐ ποεῖν ἀπαγγελλόµε|[ν]α χείρω τὰ
[ποή]µα`τα´ ἀλλ᾽ ἤ| [πρ]ὸ̣ς ἀκου[στικά τ]ινα, (Phld. De poem. 2.62.23-7; cf. 1.207R.4-208R.3 (olim 209-10), 1.210R.8211R.4 (olim 212-13), 2.9.21-25, 2.65.1-3).
46 For Heracleodorus, even excellent content will not save poorly constructed verses, as in the case of the dramatist
Chaeremon (Phld. De poem. 2.7.10-14, 2.33.12-20).
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process is meant to show how the excellence of a verse can be stripped away by altering the sound
alone.47 For example,
Homer (Il. 16.112-114)

Heracleodorus (De poem. 1.39.3-8)

ἔσπετε νῦν µοι, Μοῦσαι Ὀλύµπια δώµατ᾿ ἔχουσαι,
ὅππως δὴ πρῶτον πῦρ ἔµπεσε νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν.
Ἕκτωρ Αἴαντος δόρυ µείλινον […]

ἔσπετε Μοῦσαι Ὀλύµπια δώµατα νῦν µοι ἔχουσαι,
ὅππω̣ς πρῶτον δὴ νηυσὶν πῦρ ἔµπεσ’ Ἀχαιῶν·
Αἴαντος δόρυ µείλινον Ἕκτωρ […]

Tell (me now), Muses, you who inhabit dwellings upon Olympus, how fire was initially cast on the ships of the
Achaeans. Hector, the ashen spear of Ajax [

Here, Heracleodorus maintains the same vocabulary, dactylic hexameter,48 and general semantic
content.49 Yet the soundscape he produces is radically different from Homer’s and apparently quite
offensive to the Hellenized ear.50 What this demonstration is meant to prove is that a poem’s
capacity to enchant us has nothing to do with the lexical meaning of words and everything to do
with word order and sound. For Heracleodorus, nowhere does intellection enter the equation.
Instead, he stresses that the euphony, which a good poem produces, is an irrational sound (τὴν
ἄ̣λο[γον φ]ω̣νήν εὐφωνίαν̣ ε̣ἶν
̣ α̣ι)̣ 51 which is able to tickle (γαργαλίζειν) our irrational
apperception (τὴν ἀλόγιστον ἐπαίσθησιν).52 In fact, Heracleodorus is so committed to the irrational
nature of poetic enchantment that he refuses to offer any rational explanation for how this tickling

47 “If the same content and diction are present, and these (words) are shifted by metathesis, the verse is rendered
either fine or base” (τῆς αὐτῆς| [δι]ανοίας {ι} καὶ {της} λέξεως| [ἐ]ν̣υπαρχο̣[υςῶν, τῶ]νδε| δ̣ὴ κ[εινουµένω]ν
παρὰ| τ[ὸ µεταθ]εῖ̣να
̣ ̣ι̣, ἤ καλὸν| ἤ µ[οχ]//θ//ηρὸν ἀποτελεῖ̣ς|θα[ι τὸ] // π̣//[όη]µ̣α, Phld. De poem. 2.70.28-71.5; cf.
1.29.27-30.28, 1.37.1-27, 1.38.27-39.8, 1.39.28-40.28, 2.71.8-11, 2.76.1-13, 2.82.27-83.11). On the process of metathesis, see
Greenberg 1958, Armstrong 1995, Armstrong and Oberhelman 1995.
48 He does, however, destroy the caesurae.
49 Although, the congruity of meaning is a bit strained by the displacement of νῦν µοι, as noted by Janko 2000: 227
n.1.
50 For the sake of easily comparing Homer’s version with that of Heracleodorus, I have removed the editorial marks
that betray considerable difficulty on the part of the scribe. “By muddling the text, the scribe proves how upsetting a
native speaker of Greek found the disruption of the verse-form” (Janko 2000: 227 n.1).
51 Phld. De poem. 2.92.10-17.
52 “… (the poet) tickles our irrational apperception with his word order or produces pleasure without content or in
some other way makes (the composition) enchanting” (τὴν ἀ[λόγιστον ἐπαί]|σθησιν τῆι συ[νθέσει γαργα]|λίζειν,
ἢ τὴν [ἡδονὴν παρέ|χειν ἄνευ δια[νοήµατος,]| ἤ καθ᾽ ἕτερόν τ[ινα τρόπον]| ψυχαγωγοῦσ[αν ποεῖν,], Phld. De
poem. 2.43.5-10; cf. 1.37.13, 1.208.12-16, 2.53.5).
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process works. In a striking passage, Heracleodorus outright denies any possibility of ever
comprehending just how word order is able to enchant (θέλγειν). All we can be sure of, he asserts, is
that it does. Since enchantment is not subject to reason (τὸ οὐ λογικόν), it can only be judged as an
epiphenomenon (τὸ ἐπιγεινόµενον̣) and those who experience enchantment suffer what is
irrational and observe what is inexplicable (παθεῖν ἄλογον κἀναπόδοτον βλέπειν).53 Thus, with
Heracleodorus’s theory based on word order (σύνθεσις), the notion of poetic enchantment drifts
even further from content and intellection. For him, a poem enchants through sound alone, and, like
magic itself, this process may never be fully understood.
1.3.3. Pausimachus on enchantment and sound (ἦχος)
Pausimachus (c. 200 BCE) takes up essentially where Heracleodorus left off.54 He, too,
believes in the primacy of sound over linguistic content.55 Also, like Heracleodorus, Pausimachus
thinks that a good poem is one that enchants through the production of euphony. A crucial
difference between Heracleodorus and Pausimachus is that the latter provides a way of rationally
accounting for this euphony.56 As Pausimachus understands things, euphony does not come down
to word order (σύνθεσις) so much as pure sound (ἦχος).57 By this, he means the atomic sounds of
language – namely, letters (γράµµατα).58 Pausimachus insists that, even before discussing word
order (or word choice), one must know about sounds in themselves (περὶ τῶν ἤχων αὐτῶν), how

Phld. De poem. 1.37.8-13 ~ 2.76.24-77.11 and 15-16.
On Pausimachus, see Janko 2020: 142-154.
55 As proof of this, he cites the experience of overhearing birdsong or a foreign language which, although
unintelligible, often strikes the ear as either pleasant or unpleasant (Phld. De poem. 1.99.24-100.15, 2.184.26-185.26; cf.
1.114.19-115.17, 2.198.19-199.16, 2.199.24-6, 2.200.5-23.
56 He complains about how his opponents “offer not even a rough hypothesis of what they mean by euphony and
cacophony” (τὸ γε λεγό̣µεν̣[ο]ν| ὑπὸ τούτων εὔφωνον̣| καὶ κα[κό]φωνον οὐδὲ̣| πονηρῶς ὑπογράφειν, Phld. De
poem. 2.153.4-7). Thus, his project is to provide a set of rules guided by method (µεθοδικὴ παραγγελία, Phld. De
poem. 1.79.27-81.9).
57 Phld. De poem., 1.91.21-25, 2.152.25-153.7, 2.154.27-155.6, 2.174.24-175.1 and 2.175.24-5, 2.176.6-7.
58 Phld. De poem. 1.85.1-17 and 2.157.26-158.7.
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they strike the ear both individually and in combination, for better or for worse.59 At various points,
Philodemus shows Pausimachus assigning different values to letters and letter combinations and
ranking them according to their sound. What he ends up with is essentially a sonority hierarchy:60
long and open vowels are to be preferred, semi-vowels are to be tolerated, and mute consonants
along with most consonant clusters are to be avoided. 61 A good poet, like Homer, will stick to this
hierarchy while also mixing in the appropriate degree of variatio.62 For instance, Homer does well,
according to Pausimachus, to repeat the euphoniously lettered words lotus (λωτός) and Lotus-eaters
(Λωτοφάγοι) as well as the name Nireus (Νιρεύς). It is not the content but the very sound structure
of these individual words that, in Pausimachus’s opinion, produces poetic enchantment
(ψυχαγωγίαν).63 Another example he provides is Homer’s line: “greatly did the oaken axle crash”

Phld. De poem. 1.83.11-24.
This general sonority hierarchy, which Pausimachus promotes, is echoed in many later sources. For references, see
Janko 2000: 175-8.
61 His terminology reflects these differences: under the umbrella of sounds (ἠχοῖ), he distinguishes between “noise”
(ψόφος) which refers to consonantal speech and “vocalization” (φωνή), which refers to vocalic and semi-vocalic
speech (Janko 2020: 385 n. 7). He also distinguishes between the more consonantal styles, which are harsh (τραχεῖα),
the more vocalic styles, which are smooth (λεία), and the mixed style which is supple (εὐπαγης, Phld. De poem.
2.214.13-218.11). The literary theorist, Demetrius, writing around 100 BCE, may be directly influenced by
Pausimachus’s categorical distinctions between τραχεῖα, λεία, and εὐπαγης (Eloc. 176-8 with Janko 2020: 144).
Demetrius does not, however, adopt the language of enchantment into his technical vocabulary as Pausimachus
does.
62 Variation is not only practical but also necessary to prevent too much repetition, which can sate the sense-organs
(Phld. De poem. 1.87.1-8 and 2.162.25-163.1): “‘Since the iota is judged to be worse than the eta,’ Pausimachus says,
‘one must not, for this reason, write (eta) everywhere’” (ἐ̣[πεὶ γὰρ τὸ]| ἰῶτα τοῦ ἦτα [κρίνεται χεῖ]|ρον, διὰ τοῦτ΄,
ἔ[φη, οὐ κατὰ]| πάντα δεῖ γρά[φειν, Phld. De poem. 1.102R.1-8 (olim 99); cf. 2.213.7-13). This need for variation
extends to accentuation – whether it is varying between acutes and graves on the ultima (De poem. 1.89.5-18, 2.165.69) or mixing up the syllables on which consecutive accents fall (Phld. De poem. 1.96R.10-19 (olim 93), 1.97R.1-13 (olim
94), 2.178.9-24, 2.179.5-9).
63 “’The sounds’, he says, ’produce enchantment in the (vocalizations) of the word lotus and Lotus-eaters, and so too
in the vocalization of Nireus, since that which is arranged smoothly pleases when spoken always and often, while in
regards to concepts it does not enchant’” (‘ψυχαγωγίαν [το]ὺς| ἤχους’ ἔφασκε ’ποεῖν] ἐ[πὶ]| τῶν̣ [] τ̣ο̣ῦ̣ λ̣[ωτοῦ καὶ
Λω|τοφάγων, ὡς καὶ ἐ̣[ν τῆι φω|ν̣ῆι τοῦ Νειρέως, ἐπειδὴ| τὸ π[ρ]οσηνῶ[ς] διατ⟦εθ⟧ὲν| ἀεὶ καὶ πολλάκι
λεγό|[µεν]ον ε̣ὐφρ[α]ίνει, κα|[τὰ τὰ]ς ἐπιν[οί]α̣ς οὐ ψ[υ|χαφ]ωγ[οῦν], Phld. De poem. 2.161.1-10; cf. 1.158.18-159.3).
At De poem. 1.85.27-86.7, we find the counter example of Hom. Il. 164-5: “With the one spear, he struck the shield and
it did not break through the shield” (καί ῥ᾿ ἑτέρῳ µὲν δουρὶ σάκος βάλεν, οὐδὲ διαπρὸ | ῥῆξε σάκος). Unlike
λωτός and Νιρεύς, the repetition of sibilant-heavy σάκος irritates the Hellenized ear (Phld. De poem. 1.86.7-87.1,
2.160.1-10, 2.161.16-162.1).
59
60

163

(µέγα βραχε φήγινος ἄξων).64 Here, Pausimachus notes that ‘holm-oaken’ (πρίνινος) would have
had a greater semantic weight to it than the metrically equivalent ‘oaken’ (φήγινος). 65 However,
πρίν-ινος by dint of its narrow (στενή) and cumbersome (δύστοµος) first syllable is weaker than
φήγ-ινος, and Homer did well to avoid the former in exchange for the latter.66 What this reveals is
that, for Pausimachus, the primary job of the poet is the proper management of letter sounds – even
if this duty comes at the expense of conveying the most precise or powerful content.67
For Pausimachus, the atomic sounds of speech are not only responsible for producing
euphony and enchantment, but they are also capable of conveying a basic level of content.68 For
instance, by including φήγινος instead of πρίνινος, Homer’s verse is said to produce an experience
(παθος) that bears witness to the thought (τῶι νοουµένωι µαρτυρεῖ), even if its lexical meaning falls
short.69 Pausimachus frequently speaks of how pure sounds can produce a suggestion (ὑποβολή),70
a representation (φαντασία),71 or a testimony (µαρτύρησις) to a thought or feeling.72 These sonic

Hom. Il. 5.838.
Phld. De poem. 1.103.21-104.9 and 2.192.22-5; cf. 2.192.1-4.
66 For Pausimachus, ease of pronunciation (εὐστοµία) is largely equivalent to euphony (εὐφωνία), and difficulty in
pronunciation (δυστοµία) is largely equivalent to cacophony (κακοφωνία, cf. De poem. 1.126.14-17, 2.206.11-25).
67 The overriding emphasis on creating euphonious sound structures can even justify false, unclear, or ungrammatical
content. Pausimachus, for instance, lauds Homer, for calling the narrow Hellespont broad (ἐπὶ πλατεῖ
Ἑλλησπόντωι, Phld. De poem. 1.103.17-21; cf. 2.191.3-11, 2.192.1-4), for misspelling of town names (Phld. De poem.
1.103.4-12 with Janko 2000: 310-1; cf. Janko 2020: 605 ad loc.) and epithets (τανύσφυρος à τανίσφυρος, Phld. De
poem. 2.190.3-6), and for misgendering of words (κίονα µακρόν à κίονα µακρήν) all so that the resulting sound
structure may be utterly enchanting (κατακηλῶν, Phld. De poem. 1.103.12-17 and 2.191.1-11).
68 This aspect of Pausimachus’s theory may reflect a particular influence from Stoic theories of music and education,
to which we shall turn in the final section of this chapter. Like Pausimachus, Stoics seem to have developed a
materialistic framework for understanding how pure sound can communicate with and even educate the soul.
69 Phld. De poem. 2.192.10-11, 2.192.15-16.
70 Phld. De poem. 2.194.14, 2.193.24.
71 Phld. De poem. 2.208.2, 2.217.26-218.1; cf 2.176.26-177.1 and ἀποσηµασία, 1.120.19 with Janko 2000: 333 n. 5.
72 Phld. De poem. 2.192.15-16; cf. 2.192.10-11. Pausimachus also remarks how “a (poet) will grant understanding by
placing there a (sound) that is easy at least on the ears” (τ̣//ις ἁ|[πλ]ῆν ταῖ̣[ς γοῦν] ἀ[κ]οα[ῖ]ς̣ [θεὶς| κυρή]σ̣ει
νοή̣σ̣εω[ς] ἐ̣νταῦ|[θα, Phld. De poem. 2.157.19-22).
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intimations of meaning seem to occur in the soul and yet remain entirely irrational.73 They include
onomatopoeic words – such as the “gibbering” (τετριγυῖα) of Patroclus’s spirit74 or the pebbles that
“tumble” (ὀχλεῦνται) beneath a strong current75 – and extend all the way down to individual letters
and letter combination.76 For Pausimachus, then, a poem always communicates at two levels: a
rational, digital level in which words denote lexical meaning and an irrational, analog level in which
words connote or intimate meaning through sound alone. Both levels can please a listener.77 But the
process of intimating meaning through (especially vocalic) sounds is primarily responsible for
producing enchantment, as Pausimachus understands it, and is thus the primary focus of a poet.78 So
as we look over Pausimachus’s theory based on a notion of atomic sound (ἦχος), we find that poetic
enchantment continues to be understood as a product of form. Yet, in this case, form itself is
reinvested with a basic sort of semantic content in its own right.

The most euphonious sounds please the “irrational sense of hearing” (ἀλόγοις ἀκοαῖς, Phld. De poem. 2.221.2-8; cf.
1.83.24-84.9, 2.157.7-14). However, this type of hearing seems to differ from purely physical experiences. For instance,
taste is strictly physical, based merely on some somatic changes (σωµ̣[ατ]ικὰς| [τινας] ἀλ[λα]γ̣[ά]ς̣) – whereas
hearing occurs through mental/psychic capacities (ψυχικὰς, Phld. De poem. 2.182.1-5).
74 Hom. Il. 23.100-1, Phld. De poem. 1.106.5-107.10.
75 Hom. Il. 21.260-1. Homer enchants the intellect (τῆν διάνοιαν […] ψυχαγωγεῖ) by choosing ὀχλεῦνται instead of
κινοῦνται (Phld. De poem. 1.193.19-184.1; cf. 1.107.25-108.21, 2.194.3-10).
76 The sounds of the letters themselves (αὐτῶν| τῶν γραµµάτων) are the causes of representations (α[ἰ]τίας| [εἶναι
τῶν] φα[ντασιῶν], Phld. De poem. 2.207.24-208-2; cf. 2.194.11-15). Harsh pronunciations (ἐκφοραὶ τραχεῖαι) produce
the thought of labor (τὴν ἐννόησιν […] τὴν πρακτικήν, Phld. De poem. 2.191.13-16). Sometimes we perceive baseness
(αἰσθανόµεθα τῆς κακίας) out of the clashing of sounds (ἐκ τῶν συγκρουόντων, Phld. De poem. 1.125.25-126.1).
77 Evidence for the pleasing quality of rational, lexical content, is found in his discussion of slanderous language,
which can conciliate (οἰκειοῦν) the listener naturally (φύσει) and unexpectedly (παρὰ λόγον) and does so not
accordance with hearing (κατὰ τὴν ἀκοήν) or the soul (κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν) but by distracting the listener’s thoughts
(Phld. De poem. 2.183.13-20; cf. 2.182.22-183.1).
78 “… (we) cannot attain enchantment better through content” (καὶ µὴ ἀντιλ[αβεῖν δια]|νοήµατι βελ[τίον τῆς]|
ψυχαγωγία[ς], Phld. De poem. 1.109.9-11). Pausimachus even warns that denotational content can, at times, ‘distract’
the mind from the proper experience of the poem (περισπᾶσθαι at Phld. De poem. 1.91.6, 1.100.13-14, 1.112.18-19,
2.183.13-20, 2.184.2, 2.185.11-12, 2.196.22-3, and 2.199.15; ἀποσπᾶσθαι at 1.123.27; cf. 1.114.2-10). Although the Greek
language, he claims, is superior to foreign languages due to its sound (Phld. De poem. 2.185.23-6), we are often
distracted away from its charms when we naturally attend to the content of what is spoken (Phld. De poem. 1.100.7-15
and 2.185.9-12). He also gives the example of a verse from Sophocles: “two sailors hauled the anchor (lit. fig) of the
ship” (ναύτα δ᾽ἐµηπύσαντο νηὸς ἰσχάδα, Phld. De poem. 1.100.15-101.2 and 2.184.5-26). If listeners get hung up on
the strict meanings of words, they may be led astray into thinking that Sophocles is writing about a fig and not an
anchor – or at the very least become distracted away from the sound of the verse by the lexical ambiguity.
73
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With Andromenides, Heracleodorus, and Pausimachus, we find a series of attempts not only
to locate the source of poetic enchantment (whether it is in word choice, word order, or pure sound),
but also to pin down its effect (whether it is entirely irrational or in some way semi-rational). They
do this by following the Aristotelian paradigm of separating out the necessary parts of the poetic art
and ranking them in terms of primacy. For each critic, sound ranks as supreme, and lexical meaning
as secondary or not at all. This brings us quite far from the plot-driven enchantment that we
encountered in Aristotle’s Poetics. Below, I illustrate how these debates over the means of poetic
enchantment relate to similar discussions regarding the ends of poetic enchantment. In particular, I
show how the tendency to associate poetic enchantment closely with sound and formal flourish
corresponds to a popular dichotomy that emerges in the Hellenistic age, between the goals of
enchantment and education in the realms of poetry and prose.
1.4. ψυχαγωγία, διδασκαλία, ὠφέλεια and the ends of enchantment
The quarrel between poetry and philosophy, of which Plato famously spoke, still persists
well into the Hellenistic period. However, throughout the interceding centuries, the dispute has
essentially boiled down to a dichotomy between ‘enchantment’ (ψυχαγωγία), on the one side, and
‘education/truth’ (διδασκαλία/ἀλήθεια), on the other. Hellenistic authors generally agree that
certain types of literature, such as poetry, aim at producing enchantment and that the aim of
enchantment is radically distinct from or even exclusive of the goals of education and truth.79 This
dichotomy is most famously articulated by Eratosthenes of Cyrene (c. 3rd -2nd cent. BCE), who
refused to collect geographical evidence from the poets on the assumption that “every poet aims at

“In the Hellenistic Age the debate about the goal of literature, colored by the oppositional positions staked out by
Plato and Aristotle, crystallized round the term διδασκαlία, ‘instruction,’ and ψυχαγωγία, ‘enthrallment’”
(Gutzwiller 2010: 340-2; cf. Meijering 1987: 5-12).
79
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enchantment, not education” (ποιητὴν […] πάντα στοχάζεσθαι ψυχαγωγίας, οὐ διδασκαλίας),
and that poets are permitted to fashion “whatever seems appropriate for enchantment” (ὃ ἂν αὐτῇ
φαίνηται ψυχαγωγίας οἰκεῖον).80 Eratosthenes’s sentiment is echoed by another writer of
geography, Agatharchides of Cnidus (c. 2nd cent BCE), who similarly forgives the inaccuracies of
Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus, and Euripides, “since every poet is set on enchantment more than the
truth” (ὅτι πᾶς ποιητὴς ψυχαγωγίας [µᾶλλον] ἢ ἀληθείας ἐστὶ στοχαστής).81 This strong
tendency to associate poetry with enchantment and to pitch enchantment as starkly opposed to truth
and education is rehearsed by other Hellenistic authors as well.82
There is a good possibility that the opposition between ψυχαγωγία and
διδασκαλία/ἀλήθεια initially gained currency in the realm of Hellenistic literary criticism. The
growing tendency for κριτικοί to treat enchantment as a product of sound alone may have
encouraged a similar Hellenistic habit of distinguishing sharply between the aims of enchantment
and the aims of education. Andromenides, for instance, sharply distinguishes between the job of the
poet and the job of the prose author: “it is necessary for the prose writer to seek after the truth, for
the poet those things popular with the many” (δεῖν τὸν| µὲν σοφισ̣τὴν ζητεῖν| τὴ[ν] ἀλήθ[εια]ν,
τὸν δὲ πο|[ητὴν τὰ πα]ρὰ τοῖς πολ|[λοῖς εὐδοκι]µοῦντα).83 In making this claim, he seems to

Strabo 1.1.10 and 1.2.3 = I A 20 Berger. On this remark, see Pfeiffer 1968: 166-167; Fraser 1972: 759-760; Geus 2002:
265-267; Broggiato 2014: 895-7.
81 Phot. 8.444b = Agath. De mari Erythraeo 8.14-5 Müller. On this passage, see Ameling 2008: 26-33. Agatharchides
himself receives praise from Diodorus Siculus for not spreading fantasies about the geography all for the sake of
enchantment (τῆς ψυχαγωγίας ἕνεκα, Diod. Sic. 3.11.1-3 = BNJ [Agatharchides of Knidos] 86 F 1 = LGGA
[Agatharchides] 19).
82 …especially in historical prose. For instance, Ephorus makes the etiological claim that humans introduced music
(µουσική) for the sake of deception and enchantment (ἐπ’ ἀπάτηι καὶ γοητείαι παρεισῆχθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
Polyb. 4.20.5 = BNJ [Ephoros] 70 F8). For a similar etiological claim about poetry and ψυχαγωγία, see Σ on Pseud.-Pl.
Just. 374a = BNJ (Philochoros of Athens) 328 F1. The historian Zopyrus of Magnesia describes how readers of Homer
are enchanted (ψυχαγωγούµενοι) by his repeated epithets – so much so that they can misread Παλλὰς for πέλλον
(Porph. Ad Hom. Il. 10.274 = BNJ 494 [Zopyros of Magnesia] F 1 = LGGA [Zopyrus] 7 with Hainsworth 1993: 182).
83 Phld. De poem. 1.161.2-6; cf. 1.187.5-8 with Janko 2000: 411 n. 2.
80

167

realize that picking out beautiful words is not the same as picking out true ones and, thus, the goal
of poetry (as he defines it) no longer lines up with the goal of more scientific prose writers.84
Heracleodorus will question whether truth is even a criterion for prose writers since some prose
authors are as enchanting and euphonious as any poet.85 When Eratosthenes claims that one should
not judge poetry by its content (µὴ κρίνειν πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τὰ ποιήµατα), he may be working
under an assumption familiar from the κριτικοί – namely, that poetry should be judged instead by
its form.86 It is quite possible that the emphasis that the κριτικοί placed on the role of sound in the
production of poetic enchantment motivated or at least corroborated the emergence of this strict
dichotomy between ψυχαγωγία and διδασκαλία.
Although this strict, categorical distinction between ψυχαγωγία and διδασκαλία was
widespread, we find some authors who nuance this dichotomy and allow the goal of ψυχαγωγία to
exist alongside a more general goal of benefit (ὠφέλεια), if not διδασκαλία or ἀλήθεια per se.87
Polybius is one source for this type of compromise. We can see that he distinguishes, as other
authors do, between the goal of the poet and the goal of the prose writer (or, in his case, the
historian): the poet aims to astound (ἐκπλῆξαι) and to enchant (ψυχαγωγῆσαι), he says, whereas

84 He even states that “there is no beautiful (diction) that accords with truth” (µ]ηδεµίαν̣| εἶναι καλὴν κατ’
ἀλή̣[θει]|αν, Phld. De poem. 1.160.26-161.1 and 1.161.13-15).
85 Heracleodorus blurs the lines between poetry and prose when he labels Demosthenes, Xenophon, Herodotus, and
Sophron as ‘poets’ for the way their prose enchants the ear (Phld. De poem. 1.196R.24-197R.25 (olim 1.198-9), 1.199R.810; cf. 1.52.15-28, 1.54.26-55.17, 1.203R.14-24 (olim 205)) and labels the writer of verse, who fails in this, as a versifier
(ἐµµετροποιός, Phld. De poem. 1.46.1-14). He also complicates the traditional dichotomy when he suggests that prose
does not necessarily aim for truth or facticity: “’If it is not even expected that a prose writer writes things which
accord with truth,’ he says, ‘(the poet) needs to aim at writing things which are agreeable to the many’” (’εἰ καὶ|
λογογράφωι µὴ πρό|[κε]ιται τὰ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν γρά|[φε]ιν,‘ φήσας ’στοχάζεσθαι| [δεῖν] τοῦ <τὰ> τοῖς πολλοῖς
ἀρέσ|[κοντα γρά]φειν,‘ Phld. De poem. 1.49.1-5). Ultimately, however, he does maintain a distinction between the
quiddity (ἴδιον) of the poet and the that of the prose writer (De poem. 2.69.4-23 quoted at p. 156). Pausimachus, as we
saw, approves of Homer’s tendency to include falsehoods and inaccuracies as long as they serve the criterion of
euphony (see n. 67).
86 Strabo 1.2.17 = Eratosth. 1 A 17 Berger.
87 Plato already calls for this type of compromise by insisting that poetry ought not only to be pleasant (ἡδεῖα) but
also beneficial (ὠφελίµη, Pl. Resp. 10.607d).
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the goal of the historian aims to teach (διδάξαι), and to persuade lovers of learning (πεῖσαι τοὺς
φιλοµαθοῦντας).88 In the course of Polybius’s writings, however, it becomes clear that he does not
regard the aims of the poet and the historian as mutually exclusive. Instead, he imagines that
historical prose can produce enchantment alongside benefit and that these products come from
different parts of the work.89 That is, histories confer benefit (ὠφελοῦσι) when historians recount the
underlying decisions (διαλήψεις) and causes (αἰτίαι) of historical events.90 And a historian enchants
(ψυγαγωγεῖ) through the mere narrative description of these historical events.91 Polybius provides
his own spin on what enchantment is by treating it as a certain experience of narrative immersion.
When thought of in this way, enchantment does not so much distract from the goals of a historian as
aid these goals by drawing readers in and rewarding them with an ancillary experience of
enjoyment.92 Additional attempts to bridge the divide between enchantment and education are
hinted at in other Hellenistic texts, such as the literary prologues of both Second Maccabees93 and
Ps.-Scymnus’s Periodos to Nicomedes,94 where enchantment is shown to coexist alongside benefit

88 For this reason, the poet must focus on what is merely probable, even if untrue, (τὸ πιθανόν, κἂν ᾖ ψεῦδος) for the
sake of illusion (διὰ τὴν ἀπάτην) whereas the historian must focus on truth for the sake of benefit (τἀληθὲς διὰ τὴν
ὠφέλειαν, Polyb. 2.56.11-13). This opposition is traditional for ancient historians, going back to Thucydides (Thuc.
1.22.4; cf. Joseph. 2.56.11-12).
89 History, insofar as it is a study of causes and decision making, will confer both benefit as well as enchantment,
particularly for those who love learning (τὸ ψυχαγωγοῦν ἅµα καὶ τὴν ὠφέλειαν ἐπιφέρον τοῖς φιλοµαθοῦσι,
Polyb. 6.2.8-9).
90 By studying causes and decisions, one forms presentiments (προλήψεις) that guide one’s own choices and
attitudes toward the future (Polyb. 12.25.3).
91 “[T]he outcomes of the actions enchant” (τὰ γὰρ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ψυγαγωγεῖ, Polyb. 11.18a.2). “the historical
event alone, when simply described, enchants” (ψιλῶς λεγόµενον αὐτὸ τὸ γεγονὸς ψυχαγωγεῖ, Polyb. 12.25.2-3).
92 Although he lays the groundwork for the possibility of an enchanting form of history, he admits that his is less of a
narrative and more of a political history. Thus, it will be lacking in enchantment for most readers (τῷ δὲ πλείονι
µέρει τῶν ἀκροατῶν ἀψυχαγώγητον, Polyb. 9.1.2–5).
93 Where the author states that his work aims to be memorable (εἰς τὸ διὰ µνήµης ἀναλαβεῖν εὐκοπίαν) as well as
both a benefit (ὠφέλεια) and an enchantment (ψυχαγωγία, 2 Maccabees 2.19-31 = BNJ 182 [Jason of Cyrene] T1). On
this passage, see Doran 2012: ad loc. and, recently, Borchardt 2016.
94 On this passage, see Hunter 2008.
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within the stated goals of a work. For these writers, the poles of enhancement and education are not
mutually exclusive, even if they are categorically distinct.
This attempt to find a compromise between enchantment (ψυχαγωγία) and benefit
(ὠφέλεια) may have, again, originated in the realm of literary theory. In Philodemus’s On Poems, for
instance, we hear about another Peripatetic theorist by the name of Neoptolemus of Parium (c. 3rd
cent. BCE) who offers a somewhat more multifaceted poetic theory than we found in the κριτικοί.
For Neoptolemus, the art of poetry consists of three parts (εἴδη): the stylistic details of the poem
(ποίηµα), its plan or hypothesis (ποίησις), and the talent of the poet (ποιητής).95 Although
Neoptolemus, like the κριτικοί, ranks sound and style (i.e., πόηµα) somewhat more highly than
ποίησις or ποιητής, he does not treat form and content as exclusive domains.96 According to him,
the perfect poet (ὁ τέλειος ποιητής) will be able to balance these three aspects of the art of poetry to
provide benefit for the listeners (τὴν τῶν ἀκουόντων ὠφέλησιν) and edification (χρησιµολογίαν)
along with enchantment (µετὰ τῆς ψυχαγωγίας).97 Neoptolemus’s theory and those like his seem to
have had a lasting influence on later poetic and rhetorical theories. The most famous of which (and
perhaps the most directly indebted to Neoptolemus himself) is Horace’s claim, in his Ars Poetica, that
a poet may benefit (prodesse) as well as enchant (delectare).98

Phld. De poem. 5 col. 14.5-11 = fr. 6 Mette.
“[T]he details are primary among the divisions” (τὸ [τοί]|νυ[ν π]ρωτεύ[ει]ν τ[ῶν] | εἰδῶ[ν] τὰ ποιήµατα
λ[έ]|γων, Phld. De poem. 5 col. 15.27-28 with Porter 1995a: 123; cf. De poem. 5 col. 13.32-14.4 with Wigodsky 2009: 9).
97 Phld. On poem. 5 col. 16.4-6 = fr. 6 Mette. On Neoptolemus, see Asmis 1992, Porter 1995a, LGGA (Neoptolemus). We
also hear of Heraclides Ponticus (c. 390- c. 310 BCE) who believed that poetry confers both delight and benefit
(ὠφέλεια, Phld. On poem. 5 col. 3.11–6.5 = fr. 116b Schütrumpf; cf. Phld. On poem. 2.98.19-99.28 = Fr. 116a
Schütrumpf). According to Heraclides, this benefit seems to derive from sound (Phld. De mus. 4.49.1–20, 137.27–138.9
= Frs. 115a-b Schütrumpf). On Heraclides and his relation to the κριτικοί, see Janko 2000: 134-138, LGGA (Heraclides
[1]).
98 Hor. Ars P. 333-4. Words related to delectare are often used by Latin writers as a way of translating Greek words
associated with enchantment – κήλησις, θέλξις, ψυχαγωγία, and the like (see n. 117 and pp. 183-4 below). Horace
95
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What these Hellenistic literary critical trends reveal is that a broad dichotomy develops
between the semantic domains of enchantment (ψυχαγωγία) and education (διδασκαλία). For some
authors, it is a strict ‘either/or’ in which the goal of enchantment excludes the goal of education. For
others, it is more of a ‘both/and’ situation in which the goal of enchantment may coexist with the
goal of providing benefit. This popular dichotomy between the ends of enchantment/poetry versus
the ends of education/prose arises alongside (and perhaps in consequence of) Hellenistic debates
over the means of poetic enchantment. The final figure to include in this tradition is the man who
preserves much of it: Philodemus.
1.5. Philodemus
In addition to preserving a large swath of our evidence for Hellenistic literary criticism,
Philodemus also participates within the same debate about the means and ends of literary
enchantment which we have traced thus far. Like others, Philodemus regards a good poem as one
that enchants the soul:
τὰς ψυχὰς θέλγο̣ι⟦ν⟧ τῶν ἐ- <
παιδοµένων. καὶ καθό- <

will also calque the Greek literary critical term ψυχαγωγία more literally elsewhere in the Ars: “It is not sufficient for
poems to have beauty; they must have charm and must lead the soul of the auditor wherever they will” (Non satis est
pulchra esse poemata; dulcia sunto | et quocumque volent animum auditoris agunto, Hor. Ars P. 99-100). The connection
between the poetic theories of Horace and Neoptolemus goes back to Porphyrion: in quem librum congessit praecepta
Neoptolemi τοῦ Παριανοῦ De arte poetica, non quidem omnia, sed eminentissima “in this book (Horace) gathered together
the teachings of Neoptolemus of Parium on the art of poetry – not indeed all of them, but the most important”
(1:162.6 Holder = fr. 5 Mette). See Brink 1971: xviii-xx; Rudd 1989: 23-6. However, with better editions of
Philodemus’s works, it is becoming clear that Horace was reading and borrowing from Hellenistic criticism more
widely and likely from Philodemus himself, whom Horace may have known personally (see Wigodsky 2009 and,
most recently, Janko 2020: 162-166). Cicero’s later tripartite officia oratoris of docere, delectare, movere (audientium animos)
may likewise betray some influence from the poetic theories of Neoptolemus and the like. Cicero, for instance, also
presents the goal of rhetoric in similar terms: to teach (docere) but also to enchant (delectare) and to move the souls of
listeners (movere audientium animos, Cic. De Orat. 2.27.115; cf. Quint. Inst. 9.4.9). See Grant and Fiske 1924 on the
similarities between Ciceronian rhetorical theory and Horatian poetic theory. Also, see Asmis 1992: 218-20 on the
similarities between Cicero’s rhetorical theory and Neoptolemus’s poetic theory.
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[λου] δ̣ὲ τὴ̣ν̣ ψυχα̣γωγίαν ἀ[κοήν τι]ν̣α ψυχ̣ῆς̣ ̣ ἀγω[γὸ]ν
[καλοῦσιν]
[poetry would succeed if] it enchants the souls of those who are being spellbound. In
general, people call psuchagôgia ‘a kind of hearing that moves the soul.’99
Here, Philodemus acknowledges the traditional notion of verbal enchantment. In the course of his
aesthetic works (On Poems, On Music, and On Rhetoric), he participates within that tradition, and he
is not the first Epicurean to do so.100 In fact, we can see Epicurus himself remarking on how sophistic
speeches produce the experience of ψυχαγωγία.101 Philodemus, however, is the only Epicurean to
speak at any length about this notion of poetic enchantment and to do so in reference to the
Hellenistic debates about form and content, education and enchantment.
Philodemus’s view on poetic enchantment differs quite sharply from the trends in
Hellenistic literary theory which we have traced thus far, especially in what he says about the means
of poetic enchantment. More like Aristotle, Philodemus will argue that content rather than sound is
the essential source of poetic enchantment. Despite plumping for the primacy of poetic content,
Philodemus denies poetry any real capacity for education. Thus, regarding the ends of enchantment,
Philodemus’s theory of poetry aligns with other Hellenistic critics who draw a strict line between the

Phld. De poem. 1.166.1–3.
According to Polystratus, some use syllogisms and axiomatic arguments and others use flattery (ἀ̣ρ̣εσκείας) or
deceit (ἀπάτης) to create momentary assent (παραυτίκα ἐπίνευσι[ν]) or enchantment (ψυχαγωγίαν) in the masses
(De Contemp. PHerc. 336 col. 18.2-7 Indelli). Carneiscus seems to label flatterers as γόη̣[τες] (Philistas 2 PHerc. 1027
col. 16.1-9 Capasso). Colotes may also speak of γόη̣[τες]; however, the context is lost (PHerc. 208 fr. 1 Crönert).
101 (“‘Whenever they listen to them (i.e., sophists) at their display speeches and festival performances’ says Epicurus,
‘and are enchanted…whenever they listen in this way, they focus not on what is said, whether it is advantageous or
not advantageous or, in general, whether it is true or not true, rather being enchanted by the sound alone and
periodic structures, the examples of parison, the antitheses, and homoioteleuta’” (⸤ὅ⸥ταν γὰρ̣̣| ἀ̣κ̣ούσω̣σ̣⸤ι̣ν α⸥ὐ̣τῶν
ἐν̣| τα̣ῖ̣ς δε̣ί̣ξ⸤εσι̣⸥ [ν] ⸤κ̣⸥α̣ὶ τ̣αῖς πα|νη̣γύρεσ̣ι[ν, φ]η̣σ̣ὶν [ὁ] Ἐ̣π̣ί|κο̣υρος, κα̣⸤ὶ̣ ψ̣⸥[υ]χαγωγη|θῶσι̣ […] ⸤ὅ̣ταν⸥ δ’
οὕ̣|τ̣ω⸢ς⸣ ἀκούω̣⸤σι, τ̣οῖ̣ς⸥̣ µ̣ὲν̣| ⸤λ⸥εγοµένοι[ς] ⸤ο̣ὐ̣ π̣⸥[ρ]οσέχο̣υ̣|[σ]ιν̣, [π]ό̣τ̣ε̣ρ̣α ⸤σ⸥υ̣µ[φ]έ̣ρ̣ον|τα ἤ ο̣ὐ̣
σ̣υµφ̣έ⸤ρον⸥τα| καὶ τὸ ⟦.⟧ σύν̣ολον̣ ἀληθ̣ῆ|̣ ἢ οὐκ ἀ̣λ̣ηθῆ, ὑ̣π̣’ α⸢ὐ⸣τοῦ̣| δὲ τοῦ̣ ἤχου̣ καὶ τ̣ῶν̣ ⸤π̣⸥ε|ριόδων καὶ τῶν
παρί|σ⸢ω⸣⸤ν̣⸥ κα̣̣ὶ̣ ἀ̣⸤ν⸥τ̣ι̣⸤θέ⸥των̣| καὶ ὁµοιο⸢τελεύ̣⸣τ̣ω⸢ν⸣| ψυχαγωγ̣⸢ο⸣⸤ύ⸥⸢µεν⸣ο̣ι̣ , Fr. 53 Usener = Phld. De Rhet. 3
P.Herc. 1426 col. 3a.7–5a.2 = P.Herc. 1506 col. 50.22-52.4).
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goals of poetry and prose, ψυχαγωγία and διδασκαλία. In what follows, I treat Philodemus’s stance
on the means and ends of enchantment in turn.
1.5.1. Means of enchantment: Philodemus and the primacy of content
One basic observation that Philodemus stresses in his arguments against the κριτικοί is that,
since poets work in the medium of language, linguistic content must serve an important role in their
art. As he points out, Pindar and Simonides, “insofar as they were musicians, produced meaningless
noises and, insofar as they were poets, produced meaningful words”(κα|θὸ [µ]ὲ̣ν̣ µουσικοὶ τὰ
ἀσήµαν̣|τα, κ[α]θὸ δὲ ποιηταὶ πεποιη|κέν̣[α]ι τοὺς λόγους).102 For Philodemus, content is not just
an important element of what makes a poem enchanting but the most important. As he puts it, poems
enchant in being understood with regard to thought (τὰ ποήµατα, συνιέµενα πρὸς διάνοιαν,
ψυχαγωγεῖ) whereas melodies and pleasing rhythms (µελῶν καὶ…ῥυθµῶν οἰκείων) are generally
processed by hearing (ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκοήν).103 By way of illustrating the primacy of the content of poetry,
Philodemus draws on many of the concepts that the κριτικοί had put forth and refashions them to
fit his own claims about the primacy of content. He speaks, for instance, of the importance of word
choice (ἐκλογή). However, for him, word choice no longer entails picking out the prettiest words, as
Andromenides had thought, so much as picking out the most precisely accurate words.104
Elsewhere, he acknowledges the importance of word order (σύνθεσις). However, in his mind,
σύνθεσις is not the nebulous (ἀέριος), autonomous thing (ἐπαινο̣υµένη καθ’ αὑτήν) that
Heracleodorus had thought it to be, but rather a handy paralinguistic tool that poets use to help
communicate more effectively the content with which they enchant (π[ρο]σπαρίστησι διανο̣ίας αἷς

Phld. De mus. 4.143.30-33.
Phld. De poem. 1.151.1-8.
104 Phld. De poem. 2.67.26-68.10.
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ψ[υ]χαγωγοῦσιν).105 For Philodemus, then, poetic enchantment is first and foremost a matter of
content.106
This strong emphasis on the primacy of content has led some to suppose that Philodemus
had an overwhelmingly lexical and intellective understanding of ψυχαγωγία.107 However, what
becomes clear from a closer reading of the fragments is that Philodemus, much like Aristotle,
acknowledges the existence of multiple sources of enchantment – some aesthetically-driven and
others intellectively-driven.108 Although Philodemus believes that poetic enchantment is primarily
dependent upon content, he does not deny that a poem produces some ancillary experiences of
sound-driven enchantment.
Philodemus’s notion of sound-driven enchantment appears in a passage from On Music,
where, after acknowledging that content (rather than music) is what ultimately makes poetry
admirable (περίσ[κ]επτον), he notes how poets nevertheless add music to their content to help
produce delight (τὴν τέρψιν) as well as enchantment (τὴν ψυχαγωγία[ν]).109 Here, Philodemus
describes an aesthetic rather than intellective response triggered by sound rather than meaning. As
we look at other examples, we can see that Philodemus’s notion of sound-driven enchantment
differs from the one espoused by the κριτικοί in two critical ways. For one, when Philodemus speaks
of sound-driven enchantment, he does not treat it as the goal of a poet so much as the goal of a

Phld. De poem. 2.70.12-28; cf. 2.4a.1-9.
See also Phld. De mus. 4.125 and 4.131. At 4.133.26-134.6, Philodemus reinterprets the tale of the musical feats
which Thaletas of Crete carried out in Sparta by asserting that, while Thaletas was able to distract (περισπᾶν) the
Spartans with musical enchantments (µουσικαῖς ψ̣υχαγωγίαις), his enchantments came about not through melody
alone but through sung words (δ̣ιὰ λόγων ἀιδοµένων).
107 Schächter 1927 and Mangoni 1993: 319. A similar picture is painted by Chandler 2006: 147-167. However, he notes
that there appear to be inconsistencies in the way words related to ψυχαγωγία are used in On Rhetoric and suggests
that Philodemus uses the concept differently in different works. I argue that Philodemus’s usage remains consistent.
108 The distinction is again similar to the one Aristotle makes regarding ὄψις and µῦθος (pp. 148-52).
109 Phld. De mus. 125.14-24.
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performer. In On Poems, Philodemus stresses how a single word like λωτός does not enchant us
autonomously (as Heracleodorus suggests); rather, it enchants only when a performer vocalizes it
with all of the rhythms and verse-forms well woven in (εὖ| δὲ ῥυθµοῦ κα[ὶ] µε[τ]ρ̣[ω]ν̣|
παραπλεκοµένων).110 It is thus the performer’s enunciation of λωτός that achieves the aural
enchantment, not the word itself as the poet scripts it. Elsewhere in On Poems, Philodemus
acknowledges that poets may at best provide general cues (ἀφορµαί) within their writing which a
reciter can follow with a view towards enchantment (εἰς τὸ ψυχαγωγεῖν). These cues may, for
instance, take the form of a series of long vowels clustered together in a prologue which a reciter
may notice and make the most of. What is crucial is that these features embedded within the script
are only hints and that the actual production of aural enchantment is ultimately in the purview of
the performer.111 The goal of a poet and goal of poetry more generally is, for Philodemus, the
effective communication of enchanting content.
The second reason that Philodemus’s notion of aural enchantment differs from the κριτικοί
is that it is at bottom an intellective phenomenon. When explaining the efficacy of the embedded
performance cues (ἀφορµαί), Philodemus stresses that people only respond to these patterns of
sound because they have become naturalized to appreciate them as conventional (πρὸς τὰ θέµατα
… πεφυ[σι]ωµένο[ι]).112 Stylistic rules about consonant clustering or long compounds in tragedy,
epic, dithyramb, or iambos are, for the Epicurean, a matter of convention. The enchantment they
produce is a matter of belief instilled through repeated experience. What this means is that when an
audience is enchanted by the sounds of a poetic performance, what they are responding to is a set of

Phld. De poem. 2.159.17-25.
Phld. De poem. 2.73.1-17.
112 Phld. De poem. 2.74.18-75.7.
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preconditioned beliefs – what Epicureans call pre-conceptions (προλήψεις) – about poetic
conventions that they have developed empirically over time.113 For Epicureans, these beliefs are a
matter of cognition and are certainly more rational than the irrational or sub-rational ticklings of
sound of which Heracleodorus speaks.
In sum, Philodemus’s writings on poetry and music describe two types of enchantment that
are fundamentally products of the mind rather than bare sense experience. The first is a type of
enchantment experienced when lexical content is conveyed clearly. This content-driven form of
enchantment is the one that poets aim for. The second is enchantment experienced when the sounds
of a poetic performance match an audience’s pre-conditioned beliefs about poetic conventions. This
second form of enchantment is not the one that poets primarily aim for and is more in keeping with
the goals of a musician or performer.
1.5.2. Ends of enchantment: ψυχαγωγία versus διδασκαλία
Despite advocating for the role of content in poetic enchantment, Philodemus discounts
poetry’s capacity to teach anything useful. His stance on this issue is certainly at odds with his
contemporary, Lucretius, who clearly found poetry a viable medium through which to educate. It
seems that Epicureans were slightly divided on this question of poetry’s educative value. Yet, the
opinion which Philodemus expresses is in keeping with most other statements about the standard
Epicurean attitude toward the arts.114 We hear that Epicureans used to tell their students to ‘hoist
sail’ and flee past the siren song of poetry.115 By this, they meant that poetry must not be a
distraction from the sober practice of Epicurean philosophy. Although they permitted students to

On Epicurean pre-conceptions, see Tsouna 2016 and Asmis 2020.
On the Epicurean attitude toward poetry, see Asmis 2006 [1995]; Blank 2009b; and more recently McOsker 2020.
115 See Epicurus’s remark in his letter to Pythocles (163 Usener = Diog. Laert. 10.6 cf. Plut. Mor. Quomodo adul. 15d,
Mor. non posse suav. 1974d; Quint. Inst. 12.2.24.
113
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practice poetry avocationally – Philodemus was himself an acclaimed epigrammatist – they warned
against allowing this practice to eclipse or guide students’ philosophical studies.116 This stance on
poetry, which Philodemus adopts, is more in line with other Hellenistic authors (such as
Eratosthenes) who drew a strict line between the goals of poetry and goals of more scientific prose.
A report from Sextus Empiricus on the Epicurean view of poetry drives this point home:
καὶ ὅτι οἱ συγγραφεῖς µᾶλλον ἢ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ χρήσιµα τῷ βίῳ δηλοῦσιν, εὐεπιλόγιστον.
οἱ µὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς στοχάζονται, οἱ δὲ ἐκ παντὸς ψυχαγωγεῖν ἐθέλουσιν,
ψυχαγωγεῖ δὲ µᾶλλον τὸ ψεῦδος ἢ τἀληθές.
And it is simple to understand that prose-writers, as opposed to poets, disclose things useful
for life. The former aim at truth, the latter are willing to enchant by all means, and what is
false enchants more than what is true.117
This sentiment (if not the statement itself) probably goes back to Philodemus’s teacher Zeno of Sidon
who, like his student, focused a great deal of his attention on questions of rhetoric, poetics, and
aesthetics.118 For the Epicureans, the problem with poetic enchantment is not that it aims only to
tickle the ear rather than communicate content, but that it produces largely false and harmful
content. Philodemus echoes this sentiment not only by treating ψυχαγωγία as the primary goal of
poetry, but also by sharply distinguishing poetic ψυχαγωγία from educative utility. For
Philodemus, the content through which poetry enchants is almost entirely harmful and counterproductive toward Epicurean philosophy. Philodemus even claims that if poems provide some
utility, they do so not as poems per se (κἂν ὠφελῆι,| κα[θὸ πο]ήµατ᾿οὐκ ὠφε|λεῖ).119 It is because

See Sider 1997 for a collection and commentary on Philodemus’s poetry.
Similarly, the Epicurean Torquatus, in Cicero’s De finibus, draws a strict dichotomy between properly educative
content which contributes to the good life (beatae vitae disciplinam iuvaret) and poetic content which has no secure
usefulness (nulla solida utilitas) and is only childish enchantment (omnisque puerilis est delectatio, Cic. Fin. 1.71-2). On
delectatio as a common calque for Greek words for enchantment, see n. 98 above and pp. 183-4.
118 On the probable attribution of this statement/sentiment to Zeno of Sidon, see Asmis 1991: 12-13; Asmis 2006 [1995]:
257; cf. Blank 1998: xlvii; Janko 2000: 9 n.3.
119 Phld. De poem. 5 col. 29 17-19.
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poetry so often delights through the depiction of fictions and follies that ought to be avoided that
neophytes ought to “hoist sail” away from its siren-like enchantment. Should Epicureans choose to
enjoy poetry, they must treat it for what it is, a delightful diversion that enchants without necessarily
providing any educative value.
Although the evidence is somewhat scanter, Philodemus makes similar claims about the
value of enchantment in his treatise On Rhetoric.120 There, Philodemus uses the language of
enchantment primarily to label the effect of ‘sophistic’ rhetoric – by which he means epideictic
rhetoric.121 One of Philodemus’s central arguments in the treatise is that ‘sophistic’ rhetoric, unlike
forensic or political rhetoric, should be understood as a τέχνη. In arguing for this view, Philodemus
is countering another group of Epicureans, who denied all branches of rhetoric the status of τέχνη
because no branch could ever adequately teach what they collectively purported to teach – namely,
persuasion. Philodemus agrees that sophistic rhetoric not something that a good Epicurean should
practice seriously. However, he argues that it still meets the criteria of being a τέχνη insofar as it is
the one branch of rhetoric that does not aim to teach persuasion but rather something else.122 The
text, in its current state, is unclear about what this aim is. However, Robert Gaines has plausibly
suggested that the aim of sophistic rhetoric is in fact ψυχαγωγία.123 If this this true, the comparisons
to poetry are clear enough. Both poetry and sophistic rhetoric are geared toward the production of a

On Philodemus’s On Rhetoric, see Kleve and Longo Auricchio 1992; Blank 2003, 2009a, 2009b; Gaines 2004, 2017;
Chandler 2020.
121 Phld. De Rhet. 2 P.Herc. 1674 col. 11; 3 P.Herc. 1426 col. 3a.7–5a.2 = P.Herc. 1506 col. 50.22-52.4 Hammerstaedt; 4
P.Herc. 1423 col. 3 with Blank 2009a: 88.
122 See, in general, Blank 2009a, 2009b, Gaines 2004. On what activities an Epicurean sage should and should not focus
on, see Diog. Laert. 10.117–21. Rhetoric may be practiced avocationally like poetry. However, skill in rhetoric is even
handier than skill in poetry and is equated to having a basic knowledge of economics (Phld. Oec. 17, 22-23 with Blank
2009a, 2009b). In both cases, the knowledge one obtains must be non-technical, and one must neither become a
professional rhetor nor a money-maker.
123 Gaines 2017: 64. On Philodemus’s definition of τέχνη, see Rhet. 2a P.Herc. 1674 38.2-18 (edited in Blank 2003) and,
more generally, Tsouna 2021.
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type of enchantment; however, the ends of these modes of enchantment do not exactly align with
the ends of Epicurean philosophy.124
From this evidence, it appears at first blush that Epicureans regarded the category of
enchantment as broadly antithetical to the educative agenda of philosophy. However, there are
some indications (even apart from Lucretius’ poem) that this dichotomy between poetic/sophistic
enchantment and philosophical education has some bend to it. In On Rhetoric, for instance, we find
one suggestive fragment in which Philodemus speaks of producing enchantment throughout a
whole life with an accompanying benefit (παρ᾿ ὅλην τὴν ζωι|[ὴν] µετὰ τῆς ὠφελίας| [.]α
ψυχαγωγοῦντες).125 This remark appears in conjunction with an apparent comparison between the
act of doing rhetoric and the act of doing philosophy (τὸ ῥητορεύ[ειν –| φι]λοσοφεῖν). Should we
imagine that Philodemus is speaking here of a philosophical form of rhetoric that puts rhetorical
enchantment into the service of philosophical benefit? In another suggestive fragment from On Vices,
Philodemus remarks how the Epicurean sage does not behave like a flatterer and yet may resemble
one in the way he enchants the mind as not even Sirens do (κη[λεῖ φρέ]|νας οὕτως ὃν τρόπον οὐδ'
α[ἱ µυ]|θικαὶ Σειρῆνες).126 Passages like these raise the question of whether or not Philodemus
envisioned a philosophical form of enchantment akin to the one Plato represents in the Laws.127
Should we understand, say, the famous tetrapharmakos as a tool for philosophical enchantment?

Philodemus draws a certain equivalence between poetry and forms of prose (Phld. De Poem. 5 P.Herc. 1425 col.
30.6-33 Mangoni). He says that the prose art of sophistic rhetoric has method to it but not much of it, just like poetry
(φαµὲν τοίνυν τὸ µεθοδικὸν ἔχειν αὐτήν, οὐ πολὺ δὲ καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ποιητικήν, Phld. De Rhet. 2 P.Herc. 1672
col. 22.20-39 Longo Aurrichio).
125 Phld. De rhet. P.Herc. 1669, fr. 8. I take the text from Ferrario 1980, who calls Sudhaus’s interpretation into
question.
126 Phld. De vit. P.Herc. 222 col. 2.2-7.
127 On the general question of whether an Epicurean notion of philosophical rhetoric can be found, see Blank 2009b:
218-221, 232-3; Blank 2009a: 77, 88-93; cf. Gaines 2004: 217. Philodemus speaks of how an Epicurean will stick to
“philosophical discourses” (λόγοι φιλοσόφοι) which are characterized by “truth, a lack of strife, and, in short,
ataraxia” (ἀληθ̣ινῶν καὶ | ἀφιλο[ν]ε̣[ί]κ̣ων καὶ [σ]υ̣[λ]λήβδη[ν| εἰπεῖν ̣ [ἀτ̣]αράχων, Phld. De oec. 23.30-2 Tsouna).
124
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Based on our evidence, these questions are not easy to answer. What remains clear from the
foregoing account is that Philodemus and the Epicureans, like other Hellenistic thinkers, continued
to find the semantic category of enchantment a helpful frame for articulating and negotiating the
boundaries of reason and sensation, harm and benefit, within the realm of the verbal arts, such as
poetry, music, and rhetoric. For all involved, enchantment is used as a label for articulating a family
of experiences that Greek culture associated with the most effective and affective oratory, music, and
poetry. Enchantment is the experience produced by Homer’s poetry or the infectious oratory of the
sophists. The means of this experience is debated, as is the upshot of enchantment – is it a beneficial
or useless psychological phenomenon? In what remains, we shall turn to the Stoics who develop
their own theory of enchantment and provide their own picture of what this experience looks like
from a psychological point of view.
2. The Stoics on pleasure as enchantment
In the material covered thus far, we have come across only a handful of remarks which
indicate that Hellenistic authors were thinking deeply about the psychological experience of
enchantment. For instance, Heracleodorus seems to have a psychological-cum-anatomical model in
mind when he discusses how enchanting speech is able to tickle (γαργαλίζειν) what he calls our
irrational apperception (τὴν ἀλόγιστον ἐπαίσθησιν).128 Pausimachus also seems to understand the
experience of aural enchantment as irrational; however, he interestingly distinguishes it from other
anatomical sensations such as taste – the latter is based merely on some physical changes
(σωµ̣[ατ]ικὰς| [τινας] ἀλ[λα]γ̣[ά]ς̣) while the former on psychical (ψυχικὰς).129 We find some
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Phld. De poem. 2.43.5-10 (quoted in n. 52 above).
Phld. De poem. 2.182.1-5 (discussed in n. 73 above).
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attempts to define enchantment, such as Philodemus’s tautological remark that “[poetry would
succeed if] it enchants the souls of those who are being spellbound,” which he accompanies with the
remark that “In general, people call ψυχαγωγία ‘a kind of hearing that moves the soul’”.130
Elsewhere Philodemus quotes a certain Megaclides (perhaps a contemporary of Theophrastus) who
provides a different definition: “poetry produces enchantment, and that enchantment is the
subjection of the soul” (τὴν πό|ησιν κήλησι[ν φέρειν, τὴν ]|δὲ κήλησιν ψ[υχῆς εἶναι
κα]|τάσπασιν).131 What Heracleodorus means by ticklings, Pausimachus by psychic changes, or
Megaclides by the subjection of the soul is never clarified by anything that comes close to an
anatomical or psychological model. What these remarks do indicate is that Hellenistic authors are
interested in the experience of enchantment and what it consists of. There is only one school that
provides evidence robust enough for analysis, namely, the Stoics. In this section, we shall see how
the Stoics incorporate the language of enchantment into their theories about physical pleasure. From
what survives of Stoic writings on emotions and pleasure as well as from what Philodemus
preserves about Stoic theories of enchanting music, we can roughly reconstruct what the Stoic
experience of enchantment might look like psychologically.
Below, I begin by collecting and analyzing the sources in which enchantment appears as a
subcategory of Stoic pleasure. I then explain this evidence by setting it within the larger context of
the Stoic theory of emotion. We see that Stoic emotions are rational and involve assenting to certain
experiences. All forms of pleasure are then products of the mind. The language of enchantment
marks out a family of physical pleasures (pleasures at sights and sounds), which occupies the far
outskirts of what is a largely rationalizing Stoic framework of human emotion. In the final section, I
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Phld. De poem. 1.166.1–3 (quoted at p. 171).
Phld. De poem. 1.130.20–3.
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turn again to Philodemus and, specifically, to his treatise On Music which preserves the musical
theories of the influential Stoic scholarch, Diogenes of Babylon. Diogenes is our only Hellenistic
source that provides systematic information on how the Stoics might have explained the experience
of aural enchantment. From a careful analysis of his fragments, we can reconstruct what a Stoic
psychological model of enchantment might look like.
2.1. Types of Stoic emotions
The language of enchantment plays a rather important role within Stoic discussions of
pleasure. For the Stoics, pleasure (ἡδονή) is one of the four cardinal emotions, which also include
pain (λύπη), fear (φόβος), and desire (ἐπιθυµία). Under each, Stoics list a variety of sub-categories.
It is under pleasure that Stoics include the specific experiences of what they call κήλησις and
γοητεία. Since it will be helpful to look at the evidence together, I quote below the relevant passages
from Cicero, Arius Didymus, Ps.-Andronicus, Diogenes Laertius and discuss them as a whole.

Ps.-Andronicus:132
Ἡδονῆς εἴδη ε'. Ἀσµενισµός· τέρψις· κήλησις· ἐπιχαιρεκακία· γοητεία.
α' Ἀσµενισµὸς µὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡδονὴ ἐπὶ ἀπροσδοκήτοις ἀγαθοῖς.
β' Τέρψις δὲ ἡδονὴ δι’ ὄψεως ἢ δι’ ἀκοῆς.
γ' Κήλησις δὲ ἡδονὴ δι’ ἀκοῆς κατακηλοῦσα· ἢ ἡδονὴ ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ µουσικῆς ἢ
δι’ ἀπάτης γινοµένη.
δ' Ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πέλας ἀτυχήµασιν.
<ε'> Γοητεία δὲ ἡδονὴ κατὰ ἀπάτην ἢ διὰ µαγείας.
There are five types of pleasure: glee, delight, κήλησις, spite, γοητεία:
1. Glee is a pleasure at unexpectedly good things.
2. Delight is a pleasure through sight or hearing.
3. κήλησις is a pleasure that bewitches through hearing – the pleasure which comes
about from speech and song or by means of deceit.

132

Ps.-Andron., Path. § 5 =SVF 3.401.
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4. Spite is a pleasure at the misfortune of one’s neighbors.
5. γοητεία is a pleasure from deceit or by means of magic.
Diogenes Laertius:133
ἡδονὴ δέ ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν, ὑφ’ ἣν τάττεται κήλησις,
ἐπιχαιρεκακία, τέρψις, διάχυσις. κήλησις µὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡδονὴ δι’ ὤτων
κατακηλοῦσα, ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς, τέρψις δέ, οἷον τρέψις,
προτροπή τις ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνειµένον, διάχυσις δὲ ἀνάλυσις ἀρετῆς.
Pleasure is an irrational expansion at obtaining what seems to be good. Under it are
arranged κήλησις, spite, delight, and complacency. κήλησις is a pleasure which enchants
through the ears, spite is a pleasure at others’ ills, delight (τέρψις) – like the word ‘turning’
(τρέψις) – is a certain protreptic toward weakness, and complacency is a dissolution of
virtue.
Arius Didymus:134
ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαι καὶ ἀσµενισµοὶ καὶ γοητεῖαι καὶ τὰ ὅµοια· […]
ἐπιχαιρεκακία δέ, ἡδονὴ ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς· ἀσµενισµὸς δέ, ἡδονὴ ἐπὶ
ἀπροσδοκήτοις· γοητεία δέ, ἡδονὴ δι’ ὄψεως κατ’ ἀπάτην·
Under the category of pleasure, there are spites, glees, γοητεῖαι, and the like. […] Spite is a
pleasure at others’ ills. Glee is a pleasure at unexpected things. γοητεία is a pleasure from
deception through sight.
Cicero:135
Sed singulis perturbationibus partes eiusdem generis plures subiiciuntur […] voluptali
malevolentia laetans malo alieno, delectatio, iactatio et similia […] Voluptatis autem partes
hoc modo describunt, ut malevolentia sit voluptas ex malo alterius sine emolumento suo,
delectatio voluptas suavitate auditus animum deleniens, et qualis est haec aurium, tales
sunt et oculorum et tactionum et odorationum et saporum, quae sunt omnes unius
generis, ad perfundendum animum tamquam illiquefactae voluptates. Iactatio est
voluptas gestiens et se efferens insolentius.
Moreover, there are many subcategories of the same genus classified under each emotion
[…] Under pleasure is spite (which rejoices at another’s ill), enchantment, vainglory, and the
like […] They describe the subcategories of pleasure in the following way: spite is a pleasure
derived from another’s ill without any benefit to oneself, enchantment is a pleasure which
enchants the mind in hearing sweet sounds, and similar to these pleasures of the ears are

Diog. Laert. 7.114 =SVF 400.
Arius Didymus in Stob., Ecl. 2.91-2 W. = SVF 3.394, 3.402.
135 Cic., Tusc. Disp. 4.16, 20 = SVF 403.
133
134

183

those of sight, touch, smell and taste, which are all of one class, in that they are pleasures
which pour through the mind like liquids. Vainglory is a pleasure in which one exults and
puffs oneself up arrogantly.
The sources differ in their particulars, and their differences may be distributed in the following
chart:

Ps.-Andronicus
Diogenes Laertius
Arius Didymus
Cicero

Aural pleasure
κήλησις
κήλησις
delectatio

Optical pleasure
γοητεία

Involving ἀπάτη
κήλησις/ γοητεία

γοητεία
(delectatio)

γοητεία

For Ps.-Andronicus, γοητεία is a pleasure from deception (ἀπάτη), and it is associated with magic
(µαγεία), whereas κήλησις is a pleasure in hearing also associated with deception (ἀπάτη).
Diogenes omits the label of γοητεία and yet similarly includes the label of κήλησις as a type of
pleasure associated with hearing. Arius Didymus omits the label of κήλησις and yet includes the
label of γοητεία. However, unlike Ps.-Andronicus, he provides a different definition for γοητεία –
namely, pleasure derived through sight. This division between optical versus aural enchantment may
be familiar to Cicero, who lists auditory pleasure (i.e., κήλησις, which he calques with term
delectatio) and quickly notes that aural pleasure is, in fact, closely related to other sensual pleasures
such as those derived through sight.
The slight variation from author to author as well as Cicero’s choice to lump together
periphrastically “all […] pleasures which pour through the mind like liquids” (omnes […] ad
perfundendum animum tamquam illiquefactae voluptates), is consistent with other Stoic lists of minor
emotions which tend to contain gaps, apparent redundancies, and variations in their details. As
Margaret Graver has suggested, the jumbled quality of these lists may reflect a conscious choice on
the part of the Stoics; rather than coin new terms for all of the varieties of human emotions, the
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Stoics took a more mobile, bottom-up approach by drawing their labels from popular usage.136 This
choice to use popular language may have been further motivated by the Stoic tendency to invest a
certain truth value into traditional tales and conventional speech. For them, customary stories and
customary ways of describing experiences (such as γοητεία and κήλησις) must bear some
fundamental correlation to what they traditionally label, otherwise people would not have begun or
continued to use them as they do. Thus, when it came to the Stoic task of labeling all the sundry
subcategories of pleasure, pain, fear, and desire, the lexicon of popular usage provided a ready and
fitting cache of terms. When it specifically came to the task of describing certain sensual pleasures
that tend to create the grounds for deception, they drew from the readymade category of
enchantment.
Despite the loose way in which Stoics incorporated the words κήλησίς and γοητεία into
their discourse about pleasure, their usage had a clear impact on the semantic range of these words.
Centuries later, Plutarch will show signs of Stoic influence when he writes how “pleasure which is
derived through the ears has the name of κήλησίς, whereas that which derives through the eyes has
the name of γοητεία” (Ἡδονῆς δὲ τῇ µὲν δι᾿ ὤτων ὄνοµα κήλησίς ἐστι τῇ δὲ δι᾿ ὀµµάτων
γοητεία).137 He will also project this division etymologically onto the names Melpomenê for aural

“Where ordinary Greek is well supplied with terms, as in the vocabulary of anger and of grief, the philosophical
classiﬁcation should be correspondingly rich; where previously existing deﬁnitions can be assimilated to the Stoic
system, these will be favored” (Graver 2007: 57).
137 Plut. De soll. an. 961d8-9. See also, for instance, Porphyry who writes how “κήλησίς is the name for the pleasure
derived through the ears, and γοητεία is the pleasure derived through the eyes” (ἡδονῆς δὲ τῆς µὲν δι’ ὤτων ὄνοµα
κήλησίς ἐστιν, τῆς δὲ δι’ ὀµµάτων γοητεία. Porph. Abst. 3.22.25-7; cf. Suda Η.97; Etym. Magn. 510).
136
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pleasure (µέλπειν “to sing”), and Terpsichorê for optical pleasure (τέρψις “enjoyment,” ὁρᾶν “to
see”).138
2.2. Stoics on enchantment as pleasure
How, then, might the Stoics describe the experience of enchanting pleasures? To answer this,
we must first understand what pleasure is in the framework of Stoic emotions. As we noted before,
Stoics divide human emotions into the quartet of cardinal emotions: pain, pleasure, desire, and
fear.139 This quartet is not original to the Stoics but goes back to Plato.140 Like Plato, the Stoics treat
pleasure and pain as distinct from fear and desire. But their distinction is not cast in terms of bodily
experiences (pleasure/pain) versus psychic expectations (fear/desire), as it had been for Plato. It is
cast more in terms of present and future beliefs – that is to say, fear and desire are beliefs about a
future condition whereas pain and pleasure are beliefs about a present condition. The reason for this
difference is that unlike Plato, Stoics strictly limit the possibility for a human to have purely nonrational experiences. Instead, they treat each emotion as an evaluative response to some
propositional content. For instance, pleasure or pain is never simply an unmediated experience (of

138 “Regarding the type of pleasure derived through the ears and eyes, whether it belongs to reason or emotion or
common to both, the remaining two Muses, Melpomenê and Terpsichorê, pick this up and give it orderliness so that
there is, on the one hand, delight as opposed to κήλησις and, on the other, delight rather than γοητεία” (τὸ δὲ δι᾿
ὤτων καὶ ὀφθαλµῶν ἡδονῆς εἶδος, εἴτε τῷ λόγῳ µᾶλλον εἴτε τῷ πάθει προσῆκον εἴτε κοινὸν ἀµφοῖν ἐστιν, αἱ
λοιπαὶ δύο, Μελποµένη καὶ Τερψιχόρη, παραλαβοῦσαι κοσµοῦσιν· ὥστε τὸ µὲν εὐφροσύνην µὴ κήλησιν εἶναι,
τὸ δὲ µὴ γοητείαν ἀλλὰ τέρψιν, Plut. Quaest. conv. 746f4-747a2). The sense, here, is that κήλησις and γοητεία are
the less-rational/orderly counterparts to εὐφροσύνη and τέρψις. Also, Diodorus Siculus’s slightly different version:
“Melpomenê, from the singing by which she enchants audiences, and Terpsichorê from the delighting students with
the advantages of education” (Μελποµένην δ᾿ ἀπὸ τῆς µελῳδίας, δι᾿ ἧς τοὺς ἀκούοντας ψυχαγωγεῖσθαι,
Τερψιχόρην δ᾿ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέρπειν τοὺς ἀκροατὰς τοῖς ἐκ παιδείας περιγινοµένοις, Diod. Sic. 4.7.4.11-13; cf. Luc., Im.
14). For the Stoic pedigree of these etymologies, see also Corn. De nat. deor. 14.4.
139 For the leading expert on Stoic emotions, see Graver 2007; 2017. For accounts of Stoic pleasure more specifically,
see Gosling and Taylor 1982: 415-427 and, more recently, Wolfsdorf 2013: 182-213.
140 The only difference from Plato’s list found in the Laws is the replacement of confidence (θάρρος) with desire
(ἐπιθυµία). In other dialogues, Plato similarly swaps out confidence for desire (e.g., Phaed. 83b6–7, Resp. 430a7–b1,
Theaet. 156b4–5). On the interesting place of confidence (θάρρος) within the Stoic theory of emotions, see Graver
2007: 213-220.
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body or mind), but always an evaluation or, rather, a “fresh belief” (τὸ δοξάζειν πρόσφατον) that
one has in the moment about whether their experience is positive or negative.141 Pain stems from the
evaluation of one’s present experience as negative, whereas pleasure stems from the evaluation of
one’s present experience as positive. In conceiving of emotion in this way, Stoics treat fear and desire
as primary, and pain and pleasure as secondary because it is our future-oriented desires and fears that
tend to dictate how we evaluate our present circumstances.142 For instance, experiencing something
that one has feared will be assessed in the moment as bad and will register as pain, whereas
experiencing something that one has desired will be evaluated in the moment as good and will
register as pleasure.
This Stoic conception of pleasure appears, at first blush, far more mental than physical. Yet,
since the Stoics have a materialistic conception of the soul, a mental state (such as the rational
evaluation of a present experience as good) is also a physical state. That is, each emotion corresponds
to a specific psycho-physical motion. As the Stoics put it, each emotion is an impulse (ὁρµή) which
they define as “an inclination of the soul toward something” (τὴν δὲ ὁρµὴν εἶναι φορὰν ψυχῆς ἐπί
τι).143 This ‘something’ (τι) is a particular psychic motion (κίνησις): fear is a leaning away of the soul
(ἔκκλισις), desire is a reaching out of the soul (ὄρεξις), pain is a contraction of the soul (συστολή,
µείωσις, ταπείνωσις), and, finally, pleasure is a swelling or outpouring of the soul (ἔπαρσις, διάχυσις,
Lat. profusa; cf. Cicero’s ad perfundendum animum above).144 Our sources explain very little about

On fresh belief, see Ps.-Andron. Path. § 1 = SVF 3.391 = LS 65b; Stob. 2.90.7 = SVF 3.394; Stob. 2.88.6 = SVF 3.378 = LS
33I; Cic. Tusc. Disp. 3.74–75.
142 In general, see Wolfsdorf 2013: 202-3.
143 Stob. 2.86.19 = SVF 3.169 = LS 53Q. For a recent study of the role of impulse in the Stoic theory of emotions and its
relation to psycho-physical responses, see Sauvé-Meyer 2018: 124ff., esp. 127.
144 Gal. PHP 4. 4. 24 = SVF 3.46 = LS 65D; cf. Diog. Laert. 7.116 = SVF 3.431 = LS 65F; Stob. 2.90.14-18 = SVF 3.394 = LS
65E.
141
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what these various psycho-psychical motions are; however, we can safely surmise that they
correspond, in some way, to the psychosomatic experiences associated with each emotion – the rush
of pleasure, the tug of desire, a sinking sensation of fear, and so forth.145 Taken together, Stoic
pleasure is thus not just a “fresh belief” about a present experience as being positive; it is also (on a
psycho-physical level) an impulse toward the swelling or outpouring of the soul. If we put this all
into the most basic terms, pleasure is a happy belief about the present moment accompanied by a
certain rush.
At this point, we can turn back to the question of Stoic enchantment. If we place the
experience of κήλησις and γοητεία back into the larger Stoic theory of pleasure, we can say that
they are experiences of sounds or sights that are positively evaluated in the present moment and
that produce a psycho-physical rush. As Cicero puts it, they are pleasurable sensations that “pour
through the mind like liquids” (ad perfundendum animum tamquam illiquefactae).
Here, we reach an old problem about how rational such sensual emotions can actually be.
While it is easy to imagine how pleasures of, say, spite (ἐπιχαιρεκακία, malevolentia) and vainglory
(iactatio) might be evaluative responses to particular circumstances, it is less immediately obvious
how becoming pleasurably enchanted by an attractive melody is anything more than a physical and
non-rational response to a sensual experience. Ancient sources that bring up this dilemma point
specifically to instrumental music and its power to trigger emotional responses.146 To answer this
question, we shall turn to the Stoic, Diogenes of Babylon, whose writings about the formative
powers of melody and rhythm go some way toward explaining how the Stoics might specifically

On this possibility that the soul might sense its own movement, see Nemesius, 78.7-79.2 = SVF 1.518 = LS 45C and
Hierocles, Elements of Ethics, col. 4.38–53 = LS 53B with Graver 2007: 23-4; 2017: 207.
146 Posidonius, for instance, points out that Chrysippus never sufficiently deals with this issue (Posidon. fr. 168 Kidd =
Gal. PHP 5.6.20–22).
145

188

account for pleasure derived through hearing – an experience that Stoics, as we have seen, tended to
label as κήλησις or delectatio.
2.3. The pleasure of music in Diogenes of Babylon
Diogenes of Babylon (c.230–c.152 BCE) is the fifth scholarch of the Stoa after Zeno of Tarsus,
a pupil of Chrysippus, and the representative of the Stoic school in the philosophical embassy to
Rome in 155 BCE. Traditionally, he has not attracted much attention from modern scholars. Yet,
there is no doubt that he was a highly influential figure in the history of Stoic philosophy.147 Among
other notable contributions, he may have been one of the first Stoics for whom Plato and Aristotle
were again treated as philosophical authorities.148 After his death, his writings were influential
enough to generate a healthy amount of polemic from later philosophers. Among those who locked
horns with him is the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus, who devotes the fourth and final book of
his treatise De Musica to the refutation of Diogenes’s claims about the transformative power of
melody and rhythm.149 Fortunately for us, when Philodemus writes his polemics, he often
extensively recounts his opponent’s arguments before systematically dismantling them. Thus, in the
first third of what remains of De Musica, we have Diogenes’s own remarks about music. These
remarks may, for our purposes, serve as a helpful account of what a prominent Stoic in the
Hellenistic period could say about the psychology of κήλησις.

See Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991, Janko 1992.
Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991: 357–8 argue that Diogenes’s primary aim is to incorporate the doctrines of the
Socratics into the fold of Stoic philosophy (cf. Delattre 1991: 3, 15–6; Blank 2011: 246).
149 For an excellent edition of the text and French translation, see Delattre 2007. My quotations and citations all refer
to this edition. Philodemus also deals with Diogenes in his On Rhetoric and On Piety.
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2.3.1. Music as enchantment
It is important to note up front that Diogenes does not refer to the pleasure derived from
hearing solely in terms of κήλησις. Instead, he draws together snippets of lyric poetry that discuss
enchantment as well as a mélange of historical and mythical examples of enchantment – a concept
he marks out with words related to θέλξις, κήλησις, and ψυχαγωγία. This material serves as
evidence for his theory of how music soothes and stirs the mind with a sense of pleasure and, over
time, instills certain ethical dispositions. For instance, he notes how early poets already knew that
instrumental music is capable of producing an experience of enchantment (ψυχαγωγία).150 He
justifies this with a host of anecdotes about different early poets and musicians and even quotes
some approvingly, as when he cites Archilochus’s remark that “all mortals are enchanted by songs”
(κηλ⸢έε⸣ται δ’ ὅτις [βροτ]ῶν ἀοιδαῖς) and uses it as evidence for how a song can soothe its
audience.151 Some anecdotes he uses as evidence are drawn directly from myth, such as when he
freely invokes Orpheus’s ability to enchant (θέλγειν) rocks and trees as evidence for the fact that
melody and rhythm have the power to incite motion.152
In his rebuttal, Philodemus criticizes this Stoic tendency to support scientific claims with
non-scientific evidence such as myths:
Κἄν
τὸν Ὀρφέ[α] µ̣[ὴ δ]ιὰ τ̣ὴ[ν ἐξ]ο̣χὴν τῆς ἐµµ̣ελε̣ία
̣ ̣ς̣ [ὑ]π̣ακούωµεν µεµυθε̣ῦσθα̣[ι] κα[ὶ

Phld. Mus. 4.47.
Phld. Mus. 4.49. On this fragment, see Delattre 2007: ad loc.; Gigante 2003. In addition to Archilochus, Diogenes
draws on the examples of many other poets and musicians, such as Ismenias the aulete (Phld. Mus. 4.41.21),
Menander (Phld. Mus. 4.43.35), Timotheus (Phld. Mus. 4.43.23), et al. Philodemus complains how Diogenes does not
argue by giving proofs (οὐκ ἀποδεικτικῶς) but rather narrates like a historian (ἱστορικῶς) or exegete (ἐξηγητικῶς,
Phld. Mus. 38).
152 Phld. Mus. 4.41; cf. 4.63, 4.122. He elsewhere points to the likes of Olympus (Phld. Mus. 4.19), Amphion (Phld. Mus.
4.41) as other mythical exempla.
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τοὺς λίθους καὶ [τὰ δ]έ̣νδ
̣ ̣ρα θέλ⟦θ̣⟧‘γ’ειν, ὡς καὶ ν[ῦν ἡµεῖς γ’] εἰώθαµεν ὑπερβολ̣ικ
̣ ῶ
̣ ς̣ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τριηραύ̣λαις,
ὥσπερ ὁ στωικός, ἀναλ̣[ό]γως
ἐ̣φ[ε]στῶτα ποιῶµεν ο̣ἰκοδόµοις, διὰ ταῦτα φήσοµεν,
ο[ὐ δ]ι̣ὰ τὰ τούτου ληρήµατα.
Even if we do not give credence to the myth of Orpheus enchanting rocks and trees through
the preeminence of this song – since these days we are accustomed to speak hyperbolically –
and instead we present the story as an analogy to the flute players on triremes, as the Stoic
does, standing at the head of a team of builders, we will say that this effect occurs due to the
reasons [I put forth], not through this man’s [i.e., Diogenes’s] nonsense.153
Even though Philodemus does not entirely endorse Diogenes’s appeal to the myth of Orpheus, he
nevertheless recognizes the analogical appeal of bringing stories of enchanting songs into
conversation with scientific discussions of music. We can see how this Stoic tendency to invest a
certain truth value into traditional poetry and myth may be what led some Stoics to draw the poetic
language of enchantment into their scientific catalog of human emotions and, specifically, pleasure.
For the Stoics, truths are not only to be found in traditional myths (such as that of Orpheus) but also
within language itself. Etymology, for instance, is a valid form of explanation for Stoics.154 Diogenes
etymologizes the words for audience (θεατή and θέατρον) to show how music was invented
primarily for the divine (πρὸς τὸ θεῖον) as well as for learning (τὸ θεωρεῖν). He even etymologizes
name of the Muse, Erato, to point out how music naturally encourages love-making.155 In col. 20,
Diogenes strikingly extends this truth value to metaphors when he claims that people would not
label music as magnificent (µεγαλοπρεπῆ), temperate (σωφρονικά), courageous (ἀνδρεῖα), fragile
(δειλά), undisciplined (ἀκόλαστα), and shameful (αἰσχρά) if music did not, in fact, give rise

Phld. Mus. 122.25-36. For a study of the references to Orpheus within the Herculaneum Papyri, see Vassallo 2015.
On Stoic use of etymology, see Allen 2005.
155 Phld. Mus. 4.38, 4.43.
153
154
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(συνεπιφέρειν) to these dispositions (διαθέσεις).156 This logic may be extended to the language of
magic and enchantment: if music does not, in fact, produce an experience somehow akin to
enchantment, people would not use language in that way; Archilochus would not write that “all
mortals are enchanted by songs” if music did not have some enchanting effect and people would not
continue to tell the tales of Orpheus singing trees and rocks into motion if music did not have some
capacity to incite movement. Although Diogenes does not make technical use of the language of
enchantment, his way of illustrating the powers of music through the evidence of myth and
conventional language indicates a clear path through which this labeling process might have come
about.
2.3.2. Diogenes’s psychology of music
For Diogenes and later Stoics, there is a close correspondence between the experience of
enchantment (κήλησις) and the pleasant experience of hearing a fine tune that holds an
extraordinary sway over the mind and body of an auditor, for better or for worse. Diogenes’s overall
project in his writings on music is to show how song can be harnessed to engender a positive form
of enchantment, how it can direct rather than distract the mind through a certain delight and, in
doing so, engender a more enlightened disposition in the soul of the listener.

156

Phld. Mus. 4.20.

192

Diogenes starts from the observation that music pleases all people.157 On this point, even
Philodemus agrees.158 Where Diogenes draws Philodemus’s ire is in making the additional claim
that music also gives rise to certain dispositions and can, over time, shape an individual’s character
for better or for worse. In a way highly reminiscent of Plato’s Laws, Diogenes proposes that it is
philosophically responsible for one to use music from an early age in order to shape one’s character
for the better.159
Although Diogenes’s account owes a great debt to Plato (particularly his Laws), it remains
fundamentally Stoic in its principal assumptions. In particular, music’s effect on the soul is described
as a thoroughly physical process relying upon the Stoic theory of emotion and some creative ideas
about musical harmony.160 In effect, music triggers impulses that lead to virtuous intentions and
actions. In col. 14, Diogenes describes how music can produce certain impulses (ὁρµάς τινας) and
how, when these impulses constitute as emotions with an energy to them (πάθη τ⸤ι⸥ [νὰ µε]|τὰ
δ⸤υνάµεως⸥), they become intentions which, in turn, lead to actions.161 For example, a feeling of
confidence can lead to courage (πρὸς ἀνδ̣ρεί[α]⸤ν µὲν θάρ⸥|σος) just as a feeling of shame and

157 He speaks of how rhythms (ῥυθµοί) and melodies (µέλη) are naturally pleasant (ἡδέα) to all and how all are
inclined toward them (ἐπιζήτειν) without being forced by any actual teaching (ἐξ οὐδεµᾶς διδαχῆς) or previous
habit (ἔθους) but, instead, it seems, autonomously (ὥσπερ ἀυτοµάτους, Phld. Mus. 4.17.7-13). He notes how music is
common to Greeks ([Ἔλ]ληνας) and Barbarians (Βαρβάρου[ς]) of all age groups (κατὰ πᾶσα̣[ν] … ἡλικίαν̣) and
how even before we have reason (λογισµόν) and intelligence (σύνεσιν), music touches us (ἅπτεσθα[ι ἡµῶν], Phld.
Mus. 4.25.8-14).
158 “Music puts those listening to it in a more delightful disposition” (Τὸ γε |ἐπιτερπῶς ᾑµᾶς ἀκρ̣̣οωµέ|νους τῆς
µουσικῆς διατίθε|σθαι, Phld. Mus. 4.132.9-11).
159 Diogenes speaks of music as the educational tool for the soul ([π]αιδευτικήν […] [ψ]υχῆι µουσικ[ήν]) just as
gymnastics (σώ|[µ]α̣τι γυµνασ[τικ]ήν) is the educational tool for the body insofar as it establishes a certain harmony
(ἁρµ̣[ότ]τεται, Phld. Mus. 4.8.3-10). Elsewhere music as protector and safeguard (⸤την σω⸥||τερίαν [καὶ] τ̣ὴν
⸤φυλακὴν⸥| τῆς ἀρετῆς, Phld. Mus. 4.12.44-13.2) and that music appropriately disposes us toward many virtues
(οἰκείως ἡµ̣[ᾶς]| δ⸤ι⸥α̣τιθέναι πρὸς πλείους ⸤ἀ⸥|ρ⸤ε⸥τὰς) and even all (καὶ πρ̣[ὸς]| π⸤ά⸥σας, Phld. Mus. 4.49.15-20).
He quotes Plato’s Laws directly (Phld. Mus. 4.51.13-47; cf. Delattre 1991; Woodward 2010). Also, like Plato, Diogenes
notes that music, misapplied, poses the greatest harm to characters (τὰ ἤθα, Phld. Mus. 4.51.14-20).
160 For recent accounts of Diogenes’s theory of music, see Barker 2001; Scade 2017.
161 Phld. Mus. 4.14.5-10. Delattre takes δύναµις in the Aristotelean sense of aptitude or capacity (2007: 28 n.3).
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decorum (αἰσχ̣ύν⸢η⸣[ν κ]⸤αὶ κόσµον⸥) can lead to moderation (πρὸς σωφρ⸤οσύνην⸥).162 To explain
just how music triggers ethically inclined impulses and intentions, Diogenes incorporates an idea of
harmonic ratio. What guides impulses toward specific intentions are the dispositions (διαθέσεις)
which, according to Diogenes, are already physically encoded within the sound structure of the
music itself.163 Different types of music bear different dispositions encoded within their different
sound structures.164 When these different types of music pour through the soul, they can physically
harmonize with and alter analogous dispositions already present within the soul.165
We may ask, at this point, how rational is this process? As we saw before, Stoics make little
room for non-rational emotions, and this poses a problem with how best to explain sensual
pleasures like the pleasure of hearing music. Diogenes’s solution comes at col. 34 where he makes a
distinction between two types of sense perception – intellective (ἐπιστηµική) versus innate
(αὐτοφυὴς αἰσθήσις) sense perception.166 Innate sense-perception picks up on basic sensations such

162 Phld. Mus. 4.14.15-17. Courage (ἀνδρεία) and prudence (σωφροσύνη) are two of the four cardinal virtues for the
Stoics. These four virtues receive subspecies, much like the four cardinal emotions of pleasure, pain, fear, and desire.
What Diogenes is doing here is linking up a species of emotion up with a species of virtue. Confidence (θάρρος) is
the emotion, which correlates with the sub-virtue of θαρραλεότης. The latter is itself a category of the overall virtue
of ἀνδρεία (see Stob., 2.58.5-15 = SVF 3.95 = LS 60K; Cicero Tusc. Disp. 4.66 (confidere); also, Graver 2007: appendix).
Shame (αἰσχύνη) and decorum (κόσµος) are emotions seem to correlate with the sub-virtues of αἰδηµοσύνη and
κοσµιότης respectively, which are themselves categories of the overall virtue of σωφροσύνη (on αἰσχύνη, see
Glibert-Thirry 1977: 287 ad 61 and on κόσµος/κοσµιότης, see Glibert-Thirry 1977: 310 ad 7).
163 Diogenes described how music has certain natural virtues (ἔχουσά τινας ἀ̣[ρετ]ὰ̣ς συγ|γενεῖς, Phld. Mus. 4.18.45). Its qualities accord with impulses (τὰ κατὰ τὰς ὁρ̣[µὰς]) and accompany pleasure and pain (τὰ µεθ᾿ ἡδονῆς καὶ
[λύ]|πης, Phld. Mus. 4.25.1-3).
164 Phld. Mus. 4.36.1-14.
165 According to Diogenes, we hold the causes (τὰς αἰτίας) of the appropriate dispositions (τῶν οἰκείων
δ̣[ιαθέ]|σ[ε]ων) within us (ἐ[ν ἡ]|µῖν) and do not take them from without (οὐκ ἔξωθεν, Phld. Mus. 4.25.3-6). In col.
20, he speaks of how music only calls forth dispositions already present in the individual. As he puts it, one cannot
become more doctorly or knightly, if they have yet no knowledge of medicine or horsemanship, any more than can
one become more courageous (ἀνδρ̣[ει]ότ̣ερον) or better ([β]ελτ{ε}ίο̣[να]) without having already exhibited some of
the corresponding virtue (Phld. Mus. 4.20.8-14). When a melody enters the ears, it can change (µετακο̣[σµεῖν]) a
person and redirect (ἀποστρέφειν) them from one impulse to the next (πρὸ̣[ς ἄλ]|λην ὁρµὴν απ’ ἄλλη[ς]) leading
the preexisting disposition (ὑπάρχουσαν) toward growth (αὔξησιν) or diminution (ἐλάττ[ωσιν], Phld. Mus. 4.36.1014).
166 Phld. Mus. 4.34.2-21. For a recent reading of this passage, see especially Klavan 2019. However, I do not think it is
necessary to claim that Diogenes coined this distinction.
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as hot and cold, whereas intellective perception picks up on whether a sensation is somehow in tune
or out of tune (ἡρµοσµέν[ον] καὶ ἀνἁρµο̣|στον). As he explains, even if these two modes of
perception may agree (συµ[φ]ωνεῖ⸢ν⸣) that a sound striking the ear is harsh or clear ([π]ι̣κρ
̣ ὸ
̣ νἢ
λ̣[ιγ]υ̣ρόν), they could disagree (διαφωνεῖν) about the pleasure or pain that accompanies it – i.e.,
about whether or not the harshness or clearness of the note harmonizes or not with what is good.
Since these two processes occur simultaneously, hearing music is always partially intellective;167 a
good, philosophical listener will have trained his or her intellective sense of hearing over the years to
be able to pick up on when sounds and rhythms harmonize with what is good or ‘natural’ (κατὰ
φύσιν).168 If Diogenes’s division between innate and intellective sense-perception corresponds to the
Stoic division between two types of belief – i.e., ‘judgment’ (κρίσις, ὑπόληψις) versus mere ‘belief’
(δόξα) or ‘weak judgment’ (ἀσθενὴς ὑπόληψις) – we may say that intellective sense-perception
involves judgment while innate sense-perception involves mere opinion or weak judgment.169 In
final analysis, Diogenes’s project in his writing about music seems to promote the practice of honing
one’s intellective sense of hearing to discern the rhythms and melodies that most harmonize with
what is good and natural in the soul.
If we ask now how a Stoic may explain κήλησις (pleasure at sounds), we may say that it is
understood as an aural experience evaluated in the moment as good. Diogenes gives an account of

As he puts it, one type of perception is closely linked (συ⸢ν⸣[ε]|ζευγµένή̣[ν]) with the other and, in many cases (ὡς
[ἐπὶ τ]ὸ̣ πολύ), follows alongside (παρακολου|θοῦσαν) the other in the way in which we distinguish the pleasure
accompanying each sensation ([π]αρεποµέ|νην ἡδον[ήν ἐκ]άστῳ τῶν| αἰσθητῶν, Phld. Mus. 4.34.9-14).
168 Diogenes describes how music has certain natural virtues (ἔχουσά τινας ἀ̣[ρετ]ὰ̣ς συγ|γενεῖς) that can allow a
child to become a good listener (εὐηκό[ον]) insofar as the enjoyments they take at perceptions become very strict
(Phld. Mus. 4.18.1-14). In col. 33, he describes how, after a great deal of noble effort has been amassed
([ἀθ]ροιζοµένης πολ|[λῆς τε κ]α̣ὶ γενναίας σ̣⟦ι⟧που|δῆς), an attraction toward musical study no longer leaves
space for other habits (οὐκέτι καταλεί|πεσ̣[θαι] χώραν τοῖς ἐωαω|τίο̣ι̣[ς ἔ]θ̣εσ̣ιν, Phld. Mus. 4.33.4-11).
169 Stob. 2.88.6 = SVF 3.378 = LS 65A.
167
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how this aural enchantment can be harnessed in a philosophically responsible way by habituating
one’s intellective sense of hearing into attunement with sounds that harmonize with what is
considered good and natural by Stoics.
In some ways, this Stoic inquiry into enchanting pleasure takes us rather far from the
discussions of poetic enchantment found in Aristotle and the κριτικοί. However, there is reason to
believe that some possible cross-pollination occurred between these two discourses. Pausimachus’s
theory of sound (ἦχος) is particularly reminiscent of Diogenes’s. Furthermore, we can be fairly sure
from col. 48 that Diogenes was aware of the κριτικοί. There, he speaks of how music is useful for
intelligence (πρὸς σύ̣[ν]εσ̣ιν) since we find in it many divisions, distinctions, demonstrations
(ὅ|⸤ρους⸥ καὶ διαιρέσεις καὶ ἀπ̣⸤οδεί|ξεις⸥ ἐ̣ν ἁρµονικῆι). In this vein, the study of the structures of
music and harmony is a theory (τινὰ θεωρίαν̣) quite close to criticism (⸤τῆι κριτικῆι⸥).170 Although
Diogenes uses this art of criticism for different ends than the κριτικοί (Diogenes toward the Platonic
end of musical-cum-philosophical education and the κριτικοί toward the Aristotelian end of
developing a teleological poetics), both keep alive the semantic tradition of enchantment by placing
it at the heart of their inquiries into the exceptional powers which poetry and music seem to hold.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have traced how Hellenistic authors continued to debate the means and
ends of enchantment within the realm of literary theory and how Stoics incorporated the language
of enchantment into their psychological theories of pleasure. Contrary to earlier scholarly studies of
the concept of enchantment, this chapter reveals that Aristotle did not so much suppress the notion
of enchantment as supply to it a teleological framework through which it survived in the writings of

170

Phld. Mus. 4.48.22-30. On the label κριτικοί, see Blank 1994; Porter 1995b.
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Hellenistic literary criticism. Following Aristotle, Hellenistic critics continue to divide and rank the
most necessary elements of the art of poetry and take part in a debate regarding the means of
enchantment. Unlike Aristotle, these authors focus mostly on the role sound plays in the production
of poetic enchantment. This new focus leads naturally into another Hellenistic habit in which
authors distinguish the ends of poetry/enchantment sharply from the ends of prose/education.
When Philodemus writes at the end of the Hellenistic period, he opposes the tendency to hold sound
as primarily responsible for poetic enchantment and plumps instead for content while at the same
time denying that poetic enchantment has any educative value.
Although there was clearly broad interest in the concept of enchantment throughout the
Hellenistic period, very few accounts discuss the actual psychology of enchantment. The exception
to this is the Stoic theory of pleasure that uses the concept of enchantment to understand and discuss
certain physical pleasures. The writings of Diogenes of Babylon, in particular, provide us with a
glimpse into what one school’s psychological model of aural enchantment might look like. In this
case, it is a model of harmonic ratio in which sounds physically pass over the soul and harmonize
with it in ways that result in psycho-physical changes.
What this chapter shows is that enchantment continues to be used as an important semantic
frame through which authors debate and discuss the limits of speech and song. As we have seen in
earlier chapters, the language of enchantment gravitates toward sites of human experience that
appear exceptional. In the Hellenistic period, it is primarily drawn upon to mark out the ineluctable
essence of good poetry and rhetoric as well as the strange sway physical pleasures hold over the
mind and body, for better or for worse. Authors from Aristotle to Philodemus express keen interest
in harnessing this category of enchantment in different ways so that they may stake out the rational
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or irrational limits of speech and song and thereby negotiate the value of the pleasures derived
therefrom.
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Conclusion

The idea of enchanting speech does not disappear at the close of the Hellenistic period but
persists through the rise of the Roman empire, the second sophistic, and beyond.1 My thesis traces
only the early stage of its history. In doing so, it brings together the chief characteristics of the
concept of enchantment and the motivations behind its recurrent use which extend well beyond
early Greek thought.
As we have seen, different writers account for the experience of enchantment in different
ways. In the first chapter, we saw how Gorgias of Leontini uses the language of enchantment to call
attention to the extra-linguistic and para-linguistic powers of communication as well as the
instability of these modes of speech. Like a magic spell, the Gorgianic λόγος – with its power to stir
emotion, deceive, and delight – can be a bane or a boon. In response to Pre-Socratic preoccupations
with the questions of language and linguistic reference, Gorgias recasts speech as a quasi-physical
substance that manipulates the human soul.

The influence of the κριτικοί continues to be felt in the writings of later rhetorical and literary critics (such as
Dionysus of Halicarnassus and Longinus) who keep the notion of poetic enchantment alive. The revival of interest in
the writings of Plato and the sophists coupled with a broad interest in the recovery of the classical vocabulary of
enchantment had the knock-on effect of spurring the popularity of the concept of enchantment. Not only do early
grammarians (e.g., Julius Pollux, Apion, and others) include the language of enchantment in their lexica, but writers
under the Roman Empire (e.g., Philo, Dio Chrysostom, Plutarch, Aelius Aristides, Numenius, Lucian, Maximus of
Tyre, Philostratus, Aelian, and others) draw freely on the language of enchantment in their own works for their own
purposes. De Romilly briefly touches upon this later tradition (1975: 75-88). For some post-antique manifestations of
the semantic tradition of enchanting speech, see Ward 1988; Covino 1994.
1
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In the second chapter, we saw how Plato takes up the Gorgianic notion of enchanting speech
and harnesses it toward his own philosophical ends. For him, enchantment denotes a particular
realm of experience located at the tidal zone between sensation and opinion. Plato sees this category
of experience as a weakness that ought to be dealt with in a philosophically responsible manner. In
his dialogues, he is careful to distinguish good applications of enchantment from bad and, in his
final work, the Laws, he illustrates how the experience of enchantment can be exploited on a statewide level in order to maintain equanimity between citizens and willing obedience to the city’s laws.
In the final chapter, we turned to the Hellenistic period in which the language of
enchantment is pressed into several sites of technical discourse regarding the quintessence of poetry
and the nature of pleasure. Following Aristotle’s lead, much of Hellenistic literary theory centered
on a quest to determine how a poem produces its characteristic effect, namely, enchantment.
Whereas Aristotle had privileged the enchanting quality of poetic content, later theorists viewed
enchantment largely as a product of the sound structure of a good poem. In associating the cultural
categories poetry and poetic enchantment strictly with sound, Hellenistic literary theory helped
undercut the didactic role which poetry had traditionally served and led the way toward the
widespread dichotomy between (poetic) enchantment (ψυχαγωγία) and (prosaic) education
(διδασκαλία). The psychological experience of enchantment came to be of interest to Stoics, as well,
who used the language of magic as a frame for understanding certain physical pleasures – including
aural pleasure. In the musical theory of Diogenes of Babylon, we saw an example of how a leading
Stoic philosopher of the Hellenistic age might describe the psychology of aural enchantment.
Despite broad differences between individual explanations of what enchantment consists of,
what binds these authors together is their central motivation in striking an analogy between speech
and magic in the first place. The language of magic is especially useful for talking about
200

extraordinary experiences as extraordinary. When writers like Gorgias, Plato, and Hellenistic writers
describe speech as enchanting, they bring in to arm’s reach some unfamiliar and exceptional
channels of communication. But in doing so, in framing these channels in terms of magic, they
simultaneously hold them at arm’s length and invite an air of otherness and ambiguity. For
Hellenistic writers, enchantment is a label for the uncanny powers which poetry and song have over
the mind and body. In Plato’s dialogues, enchanting speech stirs the irrational part of the soul with
remarkable efficacy for better or for worse. For Gorgias, the language of enchantment provides a
means for articulating his theory of non-discursive communication. At the same time, it also
represents this mode of communication as strange, exceptional, and potentially dangerous. In each
case, the language of enchantment provides a way of theorizing about extraordinary modes of
speech without domesticating them as familiar or ordinary.
This common motivation, I believe, persists even in contemporary attempts to use the
language of enchantment as a frame for thinking about human experiences. In the past several
decades, for instance, modern scholars of philosophy, religion, literature, and the political sciences
have frequently turned to the language of enchantment and disenchantment as way of defining the
modern person’s experience of life and literature.2 This phenomenon is, at root, a belated response to
Max Weber’s claim about the modern West: “there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come
into play but rather […] one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the
world is disenchanted.”3 Weber’s model of disenchantment, in which modernity is characterized by

Courtney Bender remarks how the term has become “exhaustingly” ubiquitous in the scholarly inquiry into
modernity: “enchantment is a term, and terms have limits. […] I invite us to consider whether maybe enchantment’s
current term is nearing an end. Our most brilliant writers and thinkers show us what we can do with it and what all
its moves make possible to say […] Of course, I admit that no matter what I say about it, enchantment will remain a
potent game, one that seems to play itself and catch people in it”(2020).
3 Weber 1991 [1917]: 139. For a good overview of this trend from Weber onward, see Saler 2006.
2
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the sober progress of reason, was dominant in the academy until the past several decades when
philosophers such as Jane Bennett and Akeel Bilgrami, as well as literary critics such as Rita Felski,
Michael Saler, and others, began to promote a counter narrative that flies under the banner of
modern enchantment or the re-enchantment of modernity.4 For these writers, Weber’s claim about
the disenchantment of the modern world struck a chord. It seemed to entail a denial that modern
(secular) individuals have any capacity to appreciate or tolerate the strange superabundance of the
human experience. In response, they marshaled together various theories for how certain
experiences – what they call ‘enchantments’ – are or can be made available within a modern context.
For Bilgrami and Bennett, enchantment comes from re-attuning ourselves to the mysterious agency
of nature either through a type of surrender or through an appreciation of objects as agents. For
Saler, the modern experience of enchantment is achieved by our boundless imaginations and our
capacity to become immersed in story worlds. For Felski, enchantment is the experience of
absorption we feel when experiencing good art or literature. It is also the feeling that can be
destroyed by certain methods of critical analysis commonly taught in the classroom. Although each
theorist has a slightly different take on what enchantment is and how it is triggered, they collectively
use the language in a similar manner. Like our ancient writers, they use the language of
enchantment in order to draw attention to certain channels of experience and to represent them as
extraordinary. It is for this purpose primarily that enchantment was and still is a remarkably rich
and attractive category through which to negotiate our experiences of life, language, and literature.

Bennett 2001 and Bilgrami 2010a (as well as the back-and-forth between the two in Bennett 2010 and Bilgrami
2010b), Felski 2008, Saler 2012 (cf. Saler and Landy 2009, Landy 2012: passim). The trend extends well beyond this
small sampling.
4
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